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A b s t r a c t
-IN THE INDIAN REGION OF NORTH BIHAR DURING THE 20TH CENTURY A GREAT POTENTIAL 
FOR MASS AGRARIAN AND NATIONAL PROTEST EXISTED. THE BIHAR CONGRESS, AN 
ORGANIZATION CONTROLLED BY CONSERVATIVE, LOCALLY DOMINANT PEASANTS, HARNESSED 
AND DIRECTED THIS POTENTIAL TO ITS OWN CONSERVATIVE ENDS. THE SUCCESS OF THE 
BIHAR CONGRESS IN DOING SO RESULTED FROM THE GUARDED TOLERANCE ITS ACTIVITIES 
RECEIVED FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF THE REGION AND FROM BRITISH POLICIES 
WHICH SOUGHT TO MINIMIZE DISRUPTION TO THE EXISTING SOCIAL ORDER. UNDER THE 
DIRECTION OF THE BIHAR CONGRESS MASS PROTEST ERODED THE EXTERNALLY IMPOSED 
STATE STRUCTURE WITHOUT AFFECTING THE GROSSLY UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 
AND POWER WITHIN NORTH BIHAR SOCIETY.
EARLY 20TH CENTURY NORTH BIHAR HARBOURED AN IMPOVERISHED, RIGIDLY STRATIFIED 
POPULATION DEPENDENT FOR ITS LIVELIHOOD ON AN INEFFICIENT SYSTEM OF AGRARIAN 
PRODUCTION OPERATING WITHIN A COLONIAL ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK. CONFLICTS WITHIN 
NORTH BIHAR SOCIETY WERE CONTAINED BY BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL MECHANISMS OF 
CONTROL. THE BRITISH SPENT LESS ON THE GOVERNANCE OF NORTH BIHAR THAN ON 
ANY OTHER REGION IN BRITISH INDIA AND HENCE THE ’FORMAL 1 (I.E. POLICE AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE) CONTROL APPARATUS WAS WEAK. MUCH WAS LEFT TO THE 'INFORMAL' 
CONTROL OF THE GREAT LANDLORDS, EUROPEAN PLANTERS AND LOCALLY DOMINANT 
PEASANTS WHO COMPRISED THE LANDED INTEREST IN THE REGION.
IN NORTH BIHAR BETWEEN 1917 AND 1922 MOUNTING POPULATION PRESSURE AND THE 
ECONOMIC DISRUPTION CAUSED BY THE FIRST WORLD WAR INCREASED THE POTENTIAL 
FOR POPULAR TURBULENCE. THIS POTENTIAL WAS VARIOUSLY CHANNELLED INTO A 
LANDLORD/TENANT CONFLICT OVER TENANTS' RIGHTS; INTO A STRUGGLE BY PEASANTS 
AGAINST EXPLOITATION BY EUROPEAN INDIGO PLANTERS ; AND INTO AN EXTENSIVE 
CAMPAIGN, LED BY THE BIHAR CONGRESS OF NON-COOPERATION WITH ALIEN RULE.
MASS PROTEST IN THE 1917-1922 PERIOD STRONGLY TESTED THE FORMAL APPARATUS 
OF CONTROL AND REVEALED ITS FRAGILITY.
IN THE EARLY 1930s THE CONGRESS DREW ON NATIONALIST SENTIMENT AND ON POPULAR 
ANTAGONISM TO THE POLICE AND ADMINISTRATION IN ORDER TO MOUNT AN INTENSE, 
EXTENSIVE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BRITISH. DESPITE ITS PUBLIC 
ESPOUSAL OF THE DOCTRINE OF NON-VIOLENCE, CONGRESS MADE A CAREFULLY CIRCUM­
SCRIBED USE OF VIOLENCE TO RALLY WAVERERS AND TO INTIMIDATE ITS OPPONENTS.
VBY LIMITING THE USE OF VIOLENCE CONGRESS ENSURED THAT IT CONTROLLED THE 
DIRECTION AND CHARACTER OF PROTEST. ULTIMATELY, THE BRITISH REPRESSED THE 
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE CAMPAIGN BUT DURING ITS COURSE CONGRESS VIOLENCE SHOOK THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH RULE OVER NORTH BIHAR. THE LIMITED USE OF VIOLENCE 
ACHIEVED THIS RESULT BY CONTRIBUTING GREATLY TO THE IMPETUS OF A PROHIBITION 
CAMPAIGN WHICH DIMINISHED THE REVENUE THE GOVERNMENT EARNED FROM EXCISE 
DUTIES AND BY INTIMIDATING MANY VILLAGE WATCHMEN (WHO COMPRISED THE FOUNDATION 
OF THE REGION’S SYSTEM OF FORMAL CONTROL) INTO TEMPORARILY ABANDONING THEIR 
POSTS.
LATER IN THE 1930s AGRARIAN PROTEST CHALLENGED THE SYSTEM OF POLICE AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL. AT THIS TIME A RECENTLY ELECTED PROVINCIAL CONGRESS 
GOVERNMENT WAS CHALLENGED BY A SMALL GROUP OF LEFT-WINGERS WHO DEMANDED 
AGRARIAN REFORM AND WHO HAD PUT THEMSELVES AT THE HEAD OF A PEASANT MOVEMENT 
MOTIVATED BY THE IMPACT OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION ON PRIMARY PRODUCE PRICES.
THE CONSERVATIVES WHO DOMINATED THE CONGRESS GOVERNMENT AND THE CONGRESS 
PARTY SUCCESSFULLY CONTAINED THE LEFT-WING CHALLENGE. THE SUCCESS OF THE 
CONSERVATIVE CONGRESSMEN IN MAINTAINING STABLE GOVERNMENT AFFECTED THE MORALE 
OF INDIAN OFFICIALS AND POLICEMEN. OFFICIALS AND POLICEMEN CAME TO REGARD 
THE CONGRESS AS THE LEGITIMATE AND SOON TO BE ESTABLISHED SUCCESSOR TO THE 
BRITISH REGIME. AFTER THE CONGRESS MINISTRY LEFT OFFICE IN LATE 1939 THEY 
WERE RELUCTANT TO CARRY OUT BRITISH ORDERS DIRECTED AGAINST THE CONGRESS.
IN ADDITION, THE POLICE LOST POPULARITY BECAUSE OF THEIR PART IN CURBING 
PEASANT PROTEST.
IN AUGUST 1942, IN REACTION TO HARSH BRITISH REPRESSION OF A CONGRESS MASS 
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE CAMPAIGN, THE PEOPLE OF NORTH BIHAR ERUPTED INTO 
INSURRECTION. THE INSURRECTION COMBINED A 'NATIONALIST PROTEST’ BY HIGH CASTE, 
CONGRESS SUPPORTING, LOCALLY DOMINANT PEASANTS AND A 'REBELLION OF DESPERATION' 
BY POOR AND LANDLESS LOW CASTE AND HARIJAN VILLAGERS. THE INSURRECTION 
TEMPORARILY DEMOLISHED THE STATE STRUCTURE. IN THE INTERIM BEFORE THE 
BRITISH RE-ESTABLISHED FORMAL CONTROL AN OPPORTUNITY EXISTED FOR THE 
INITIATION OF AN ANTI-LANDLORD MOVEMENT. HOWEVER THE HIGH PRICES PREVAILING 
IN THE EARLY 1940s BENEFITED MIDDLE PEASANTS AND MADE THEM DISINCLINED TO 
ENGAGE IN AGRARIAN PROTEST. THE REVOLT OF AUGUST 1942 MARKED THE CULMINATION 
OF THE INTERRELATED PROCESSES WHEREBY IN THE POST-1917 PERIOD THE BIHAR 
CONGRESS EFFECTIVELY HARNESSED THE POTENTIAL FOR POPULAR TURBULENCE TO ITS 
OWN CONSERVATIVE ENDS AND EMPLOYED MASS PROTEST TO ERODE THE FORMAL CONTROL
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APPARATUS. THE BRITISH RULERS OF NORTH BIHAR HAD TREATED THE ACTIVITIES 
OF THE BIHAR CONGRESS WITH GUARDED TOLERANCE AND HAD MINIMIZED SOCIAL 
CHANGE, THUS PROTECTING THE POSITION AND INTERESTS OF THE CONSERVATIVE, 
LOCALLY DOMINANT PEASANTS WHO CONTROLLED THE CONGRESS. HENCE THE 1942 REVOLT 
DISSOLVED THE STRUCTURE OF THE IMPERIAL STATE BUT ISSUED NO CHALLENGE TO THE 
SOCIAL ORDER.
Ac k n o w l e d g e m e n t s
I accept full responsibility for the contents of this thesis, but readily 
admit that it could never have been written had it not been for the generous 
financial assistance of the Australian National University and the advice and 
help of a large number of individuals. I am very grateful to my supervisor, 
D.A. Low, who always found time in a busy programme to discuss the thesis 
with me and to improve my drafts through kindly, constructive criticism. I 
also owe much to Ravinder Kumar, the scholar who originally sparked my 
interest in Indian history and peasant society. It was Ravinder who 
suggested that I partially base the thesis on research into the Darbhanga Raj 
archives, and he has been a continuing source of stimulus and criticism. 
During my time in India, moreover, he and his wife Asha gave me warm 
hospitality and much practical help. I am also much indebted to Chetkar Jha, 
who acted as my research guide during my studies in India and who arranged my 
initial access to the Darbhanga Raj archives. Furthermore, he and his 
brother Buddhikar Jha supplied me with much information about and many 
insights into the history and society of Bihar, and they and their families 
provided warm hospitality and extensive practical help.
I am also glad to record my debt to M.V. Harcourt for his continuing 
intellectual stimulation; to Walter Hauser, who helped me greatly and from 
whom I learnt much during my first field trip to India; and to G. McDonald, 
who has given me much advice and information and who originally suggested 
the possibility and value of examining the history of popular turbulence in 
20th century Bihar. There are a number of other people whom I can only 
briefly mention: my appreciation is not the less for being only briefly 
expressed. My thanks go to: Paul R. Brass 5 R.L. Chandapuri; Clive Dewey;
C.M. Fisher; F. Tomasson Jannuzi; V.C. Joshi and the staff of the Nehru 
Memorial Library; Jageshwar Mishra and M.A. Raziq and the staff of the 
Darbhanga Raj archives; M. Mishra and his colleagues at the Darbhanga 
University; Ramnandan Misra; I.N. Jha and the staff of the Darbhanga Raj 
library; The director and the staff of the National Archives of India; 
Taran Sharan Sinha and the staff of the Bihar State Archives; R.S.P. Singh 
and the staff of the S.L. Sinha library; Sachchidananda and the fellows and 
staff of the A.N. Sinha institute; and last but certainly not least,
Anand A. Yang.
viii
I am also very grateful to friends and colleagues at the Australian 
National University. My thanks to Meredith Borthwick, who unscrambled my 
prose and constructively criticized my ideas; to Margaret Carron, who 
advised on style and presentation; to Dipesh Chakrabarty, who supplied 
much stimulation and many insights; to Robin Jeffrey, who gave enthusiastic 
support and kindly, penetrating criticism; to Brij V. Lai, who analysed my 
drafts with painstaking care; and to Beverly Ricketts, who prepared the final 
draft with her characteristic cheerful efficiency. I owe a particular debt 
to Roger Stuart, who supplied continuing encouragement and who helped greatly 
to shape my analysis and clarify my argument during the preparation of the 
final version of the thesis.
I also owe more than words can usefully express to my friends and 
family. My thanks to my parents, all four of them, and to Merle Greer for 
her affection and her vision. My thanks also to Rama Amritmaha1-Laws and 
Terrence Patrick O ’Mahony, who helped check the final manuscript; to Alfred 
W. Croucher, who advised on peasant society and mass culture, and to 
Kathryn Cole, who helped greatly with final preparations. I shall always be 
indebted to R.K. Chopra who, in Patna, provided a stranger from a distant 
land with cold beer and warm friendship. And of course my greatest debt, for 
advice, encouragement and assistance at every stage of the preparation of the 
thesis, is to Jeanette Hoorn.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
Early one morning in October 1976, accompanied by two friends, I set out 
from the small north Indian town of Darbhanga on a journey into the country­
side. It was Sunday, interview day, and I was glad to have a change from 
the Monday to Saturday routine of work in the archives of the formerly 
extensive landed estate known as the Darbhanga Raj. We reached our destina­
tion, a small village, at about 11 a.m. The prosperous landholder whom I had 
come to interview, and whom I will call R.L. Sinha, stood waiting in the shade 
of a mango grove to greet us. Sinha, a tall, distinguished man in his late 
sixties, welcomed us warmly before escorting us to the verandah of his house. 
There we were glad to sit down, being weary after a journey that had begun at 
first light. We had travelled most of the way by horse-cart, first along a 
main highway, and then along a narrow, winding and bumpy village track. 
Eventually the progress of the horse-cart had been blocked by an irrigation 
ditch cut across the track, so we had completed our journey on foot.
I was keen to begin questioning Sinha about his experiences as a member 
of a powerful landholding family and as a supporter of the Bihar Congress 
Party, but before our interview began certain formalities had to be observed.
We sat exchanging pleasantries while in the courtyard in front of the house a 
group of curious villagers made my companions and me the subject of careful 
inspection. Sinha's house, the biggest in the village, was a large rambling 
brick structure with a tiled roof. It stood on a slight eminence, commanding 
a view of the surrounding plain. At my request Sinha pointed out the main 
features of the village. Directly in front of the verandah, on the other side 
of several yards of open ground, lay a large rectangular 'tank' or pond. To 
one side of the tank stood the village temple, an imposing building which, Sinha 
informed us, his grandfather had had built on the site of the temple which had 
been destroyed in the great earthquake of 1934. The village, a loosely knit 
collection of hamlets rather than a concentrated settlement, straggled away on
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three sides of the tank. To the left of the tank, beyond the temple, stood a 
small hamlet of large, sturdily built houses, some of mud brick and some of 
bamboo and thatch, but all roofed with tiles. In this hamlet, Sinha told us, 
the higher caste and more prosperous villagers lived. To the right and at 
some distance away began a large hamlet which curved in an irregular crescent 
around to and along the opposite side of the tank. Here the middle caste villagers 
lived; their medium sized houses were constructed of thatch and bamboo. Some 
of these houses had tiled roofs but most were roofed with thatch. Beyond and 
partially obscured by the middle caste hamlet were two smaller hamlets, both 
consisting of small, ramshackle straw and bamboo dwellings. Here, Sinha told 
us, the low caste and Harijan villagers lived. Beyond the hamlets of the 
village lay rice fields, green and sparkling in the sun, stretching as far as 
the eye could see. In the midst of the fields thin, wiry labourers worked at 
a steady, rhythmic pace, sweat glistening on their bent backs.
At this point we were served with a huge meal, containing many delicacies, 
which had obviously required considerable advance preparation. While we ate 
our host sat nearby, making frequent enquiries to ensure that the repast was to 
our satisfaction. Everything served to us, he told us proudly, had been grown 
on his own lands, either in the extensive garden that surrounded his house or 
in the fields that surrounded the village. We worked our way through the meal, 
at first with relish and later, as fresh dishes kept appearing, with dogged 
determination. Meanwhile an electric fan on a long extension cord cooled us 
from the midday heat. Frequently, however, the power failed, and whenever 
the whirring of the fan died away two servants, bearing large palm leaves, 
sprang forward and began fanning us. After we had eaten our fill and more
Sinha excused himself from our company on the verandah and retired into 
the house to take his own meal, avoiding our company so as to preserve his 
ritual purity.
I had many questions to ask, and we talked into the late afternoon. Sinha, 
a plump, genial man of considerable education and much experience, answered 
some of my questions in great detail, others in a brief sentence or two, and 
some with polite but definite evasion. As might have been expected, he 
declined the opportunity to enlarge upon his own financial and social position, 
other than commenting that he held a substantial portion of the village lands 
and that he also held lands in neighbouring villages. He also had little to 
say about inter-group relations within the village, and did not wish to discuss 
the landless labourers' and sharecroppers/ protest movement which had developed 
in the area from the late 1960s onwards. He gave only brief answers to questions 
about the effect of zamindari abolition on his family's fortunes, and did not 
enlarge upon the history of landlord/tenant conflict in the region during the 
pre-independence period. He was more willing, however, to talk about the 
nationalist movement, and how it had gone from strength to strength from around 
1920 onwards. He himself had briefly left school in 1921 in support of the 
non-cooperation movement, and he had participated in the civil disobedience 
campaign of the early 1930s. Subsequently, having taken employment in the 
bureaucracy of the Darbhanga Raj, he had been unable to take an active role in 
nationalist activity. But he had continued to be sympathetic with the 
nationalist movement and its guiding organization, the Indian National Congress, 
and had been moved deeply by the events of the Quit India Revolt in August 
1942.
After several hours I reluctantly brought the interview to an end.
Sinha had tea served to us and the conversation became general. He questioned 
me about the Australian cricket team and the current test series, but found^ 
to his evident surprise, that his knowledge and interest concerning this 
subject outstripped mine. Having finished our tea, we rose to leave, and
Soon he returned, and he and I settled to the business of the day.
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Sinha escorted us to the outskirts of the village. As we strolled he commented 
on how little the village had changed during his lifetime. There was the 
electricity of course, made available since the coming of independence. But 
his was the only household in the village which could afford to pay the 
electricity rates, so the coming of electricity had not made much difference 
to the general pattern of living. We reached the village track, thanked 
Sinha for his hospitality and made our farewells. In his parting remarks to 
us he commented that he had been glad of our company as a relief from the 
tedium of life in the countryside. Day by day, year by year, he told us, life 
went on in the village much as it always had. In his lifetime, he said 
reflectively, the only really dramatic event had been the revolt of August 1942.
-k k  k  k
The village in which I interviewed R.L. Sinha in October 1976 was typical of 
the 20,000 or so villages which are scattered across the Indian region of north 
Bihar. North Bihar lies in north-eastern India. (Please refer to map 1). I 
chose this region for study because it comprises a relatively distinct and a 
hitherto neglected area, because it has been a centre for extensive political 
turbulence for a significant portion of this century, and because the hitherto 
little used archives of the Darbhanga Raj offer valuable insights into its 
history and society. The region extends 80 miles from north to south and 250 
miles from east to west and covers an area of 20,400 square miles. In approxi­
mate terms, it is twice the size of Belgium, four-fifths the size of Tasmania, 
two-thirds the size of Scotland, and half the size of Tennessee. North Bihar 
is incorporated with the regions of south Bihar and Chota Nagpur into the 
present day state of Bihar. In the roid-18th century Bihar was a province of the 
Mughal Empire, but from the time of the battle of Buxar (1760) it became part 
of the British administered Bengal Presidency. In 1911 the British separated
Bihar from the Bengal Presidency and united it with Orissa (the area that 
adjoins south Bihar and Chota Nagpur), to form the separate province of 
Bihar and Orissa. In 1936 Bihar and Orissa were separated, and the province 
of Bihar came into existence. With the coming of Indian independence in 1947, 
Bihar became a state within the Indian Union.
*  *  *  *
In August 1942, led by the Bihar branch of the Indian National Congress, the 
people of north Bihar rose in revolt. Militant street demonstrations, attacks 
on policemen and police stations, extensive sabotage of road, rail and tele­
graphic communications, and attacks on officials and government buildings com­
prised an insurrection which temporarily demolished the structure of imperial 
rule. jror two or three weeks the formal apparatus of police and admini­
strative control over the region disintegrated. Only by importing large bodies 
of troops did the British manage to re-establish their rule.
The 1942 revolt marked the culmination of two processes which began in 
the first decades of the 20th century, namely the increasingly successful 
harnessing, by the Bihar Congress Party, of north Bihar's potential for mass 
protest, and the progressive erosion by this protest of police and admini­
strative control. This thesis examines these interrelated processes during the 
1917 to 1942 period, focusing especially on particular protest movements and 
the response they elicited. It should be borne in mind that, though the period 
was one of unusual turmoil, one year out of every two passed without major 
protest movements developing. And even in the years when major protest did 
erupt, it was most often sporadic, short-lived, and concentrated within a 
limited area. Thus the thesis deals only with certain aspects of the modern 
history of north Bihar. Nonetheless, on the assumption that societies, like 
individuals, reveal much of themselves when undergoing periods of stress, the
thesis hopes to contribute Co the analysis of Che dynamics of continuity and 
change in the region.
The thesis begins with a descriptive analysis of north Bihar society 
and politics in the early 20th century. At this time north Bihar harboured 
a numerous, rigidly stratified population which depended for its livelihood on 
a backward, inefficient system of agrarian production. Bihar, the province 
of which north Bihar formed a part, was the poorest province in British India, 
which meant that the provincial administration had only limited funds at its 
command. The administration's financial problems were much increased through 
its continuing support of the politically expedient but economically disastrous 
system of zamindari landholding, under which intermediaries known as zamindars 
collected the agrarian surplus of the province but paid only a small proportion 
of it to the administration as land revenue. The impoverished provincial 
government could only afford to maintain a skeletal police and administrative 
apparatus with which to excercise formal control over north Bihar society. In 
protecting its authority the government benefited from the limitations that 
prevailing social, economic and cultural conditions imposed on the organization 
and expression of protest. And to maintain its rule the government relied on 
the effective informal control exercised by those groups which comprised the 
'landed interest' in north Bihar, namely the great landlords, the European 
indigo planters and the locally dominant peasants. To ensure the continuation 
of effective informal control by members of the landed interest, the admini­
stration sought to avert and minimize any social change which might endanger 
the established order.
From the second decade of the 20th century the structure of formal and 
informal control established by the British in north Bihar began to disintegrate. 
Mounting population pressure on a static agrarian base combined with pervasive 
inequality to create a potential for popular protest. The disastrous economic
aftermath of the First World War increased this potential, and in the 1917-23 
period extensive popular protest crystallized around a variety of grievances. 
Members of the landed interest led these movements, and succeeded in command­
ing extensive support from people lower down in the social scale. The Bihar 
Congress, an organization which from 1920 onwards came under the control of 
locally dominant peasants, played a leading part in the coordination and 
direction of protest. During the 1917 to 1923 period, the extent and 
intensity of popular protest revealed the fragility of formal, police/ 
administrative control over north Bihar.
In the early 1930s the Congress-led civil disobedience campaign 
heightened popular antagonism to the police and to the British administration 
and seriously strained the formal system of control. During this campaign 
Congress combined espousal of its official policy of non-violence with an 
implicit, covert policy of ’limited violence’. By the limited use of 
violence, the Congress put effective pressure on the imperial administration 
while yet retaining control over the character and direction of protest.
Later in the 1930s formal, police/administrative control was again 
tested when a recently elected provincial Congress government encountered a 
challenge from a group of left-wing Congressmen who demanded agrarian reform 
and who assumed leadership of a peasant movement motivated by the impact of the 
great depression on the prices of agrarian produce. The conservatives who 
dominated the Congress government and the Congress organization contained 
the left-wing challenge and maintained police and administrative control. 
Because of their success in doing so Indian officials and policemen came to 
think of the Congress as the legitimate, and soon to be established^successor 
to the British regime. After the Congress Ministry relinquished office in 
October 1939 Indian policemen and officials lacked enthusiasm in their 
carrying out of the orders of their British superiors.
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In the early 1940s the erosion of formal control reached its zenith, 
and the Bihar Congress launched a revolt which temporarily demolished the 
state structure. In the interim before the British re-established formal 
control an opportunity existed for the initiation of an anti-landlord move­
ment. However the high prices prevailing at this time benefited middle 
peasants and made them disinterested in agrarian protest. The intellectual 
and social dominance of the conservative, big peasant— dominated Bihar Congress 
also helped ensure that the struggle proceeded along strictly nationalist lines. 
At a more fundamental level, moreover, the success of British efforts to 
minimize social change and maintain the established order had made it unlikely 
that radical initiatives would emerge from within north Bihar society. Given 
the existing configuration of social and political forces, therefore, the 
revolt of August 1942 dissolved the structure of the imperial state but issued 
no challenge to the social order.
The extensive protest which erupted in north Bihar between 1917 and 1942 
resulted from conflicts between nationalists and their opponents, from conflicts 
between distinct interests and between different strata within the agrarian 
hierarchy, and from conflicts between distinct communal groups. The thesis 
concentrates on protest associated with the nationalist movement and with 
agrarian tension rather than on that associated with communal conflict.
Communal conflict and protest receive only passing mention because, though a 
recurrent feature of north Bihar life, they were relatively unimportant in 
their effects on the operation of police and administrative control. Hindu/ 
Muslim tension frequently manifested itself, and when on certain days of the 
year one or the other group engaged in the public espousal of its religion 
violence erupted with monotonous regularity. In part because the occasions
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for eruption could be predicted in advance, and in part because Hindus and 
Muslims directed violence against one another, rather than against the 
authorities, the administration and police found that communal turbulence 
could be contained. Agrarian and nationalist turbulence, in contrast, could 
not always be dealt with so easily. In north Bihar eruptions of communal 
turbulence functioned as a "safety valve", allowing the dissipation of 
tensions, whereas agrarian and nationalist turbulence threatened existing 
governmental/administrative arrangements and challenged the prevailing social 
order.
*
k k k k
The thesis draws on files held in the Bihar State Archives and the National 
Archives of India, on the contents of the two leading Bihar newspapers, the 
Searchlight and the Indian Nation_, and on materials held in the archives of the 
Darbhanga Raj, formerly the largest landed estate in Bihar. Research employing 
these resources was supplemented by several interviews and discussions and by 
work at the Nehru Memorial Library on the papers of Rajendra Prasad, Jay 
Prakash Narayan, Swami Sahajanand, and the All-India Congress Committee.
The records of the British administration supply extensive information 
about the occurrence and character of agrarian and nationalist protest and the 
official response it elicited. But unfortunately for the historian, British 
administrators tended to treat any protest movement primarily as a threat to 
the maintenance of law and order, without enquiring overly much into its wider 
context and implications. This narrowness of vision was combined with the 
distortion inseparable from their means of collecting information. Two groups 
of people renowned for their lack of education, partiality, unreliability, 
and corruption, namely the chaukidars or village watchmen and the lower ranks
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of the police force, held the major responsibility for collecting and 
supplying information on popular disturbances. Members of these groups, it 
seems certain, often suppressed, slanted, or exaggerated certain aspects of 
the information they collected either to please the locally influential or 
to pander to the preconceptions of their superiors.
Nor do the Searchlight or the Indian Nation provide ideal hunting 
grounds for the student of popular protest. Both newspapers concerned
themselves much with international, national, and provincial news, often to the 
neglect of their coverage of events at the local level. The Searchlight,as the 
mouthpiece of the Congress party, fully supported the ideal of non-violent 
protest: when the Searchlight dealt with violence it generally concentrated 
on the excesses of the police, or the activities of non-Congress activists, 
rather than with the actions at times taken by Congress supporters. The bias 
of the Indian Nation derived from its ownership by the Maharaja of Darbhanga 
and its commitment to the landed interest and to constitutional politics. 
Landlords often became the targets for militant and violent political activity, 
and the Indian Nation_, as for instance concerning the agrarian disturbances 
in Darbhanga district in 1938-40, often preferred to present a polemical 
account rather than give a full coverage.
The third major body of material consulted resides in the archives of 
the Darbhanga Raj, which in mid-1976 were taken over by the Government of Bihar. 
These archives have not previously been used for research into the political 
history of north Bihar during the post-1920 period.^" Much of the material held
1 My only predecessor in using the Darbhanga Raj archives for a major research 
project is Jata Shankar Jha, whose major publications are a collection of 
readings on education in north Bihar from 1860 to 1930 and a biography of 
Lakmeshwar Singh, who reigned as Maharaja of Darbhanga from 1879 until his 
death in 1898. For details of Jha's publications and for further information 
about the Darbhanga Raj and its archives see the materials listed, (and par­
ticularly the review article by Clive Dewey), in notes 12 and 15, pages 62 
and 63 below.
in the Raj Darbhanga Archives deals with the strictly technical, administrative 
and economic problems of administering a vast estate covering 2,400 square miles 
whose holdings were scattered over most of north Bihar. But there is also 
much to interest the historian of conflict, protest, and control. The material 
available is written from the point of view and in the light of the interests 
of the estate and its owner, but there was frequent discussion between members 
of the Darbhanga Raj management both over matters of policy and over details 
of policy implementation. This continuing debate is preserved in conference 
proceedings, in annual reports on the administration of the dozen or so 
'circles' which comprised the basic units in the Raj's administration^, and in 
the correspondence between the head office of the estate and its managers 
and sub-managers. These materials illuminate the local-level relationships 
between social conflict, popular protest, and formal and informal means of 
con trol.
N O T E  ON S P E L L I N G  A N D  C O N V E N T I O N S
Proper names appear in the form usually employed by the person to whom 
they refer, and place names are spelt in the accepted modern form. Indian 
words are not italicized but are briefly explained on their first usage and 
are more fully defined in the glossary. Confusion may arise because in 
Bihar the same name is often applied to more than one geographical unit. 
Bhagalpur, for example, is the name of a town, a district, and a division, 
while Muzaffarpur is the name of both a town and a district. In the text 
a name on its own is only employed to refer to a district. Thus Darbhanga 
means Darbhanga district, and the town of the same name is referred to as 
Darbhanga town. Similarly the text refers to Bhagalpur town and Bhagalpur 
division, but refers to the district of that name as Bhagalpur. The only 
exception to this usage concerns the city of Patna, the provincial capital. 
The name Patna is used on its own to refer to the city of Patna, and the 
text refers to Patna district, as well as to the Patna subdivision and the 
Patna division.
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AAR - Annual Administrative Report
AICCP - All-India Congress Committee Papers
BSA - Bihar State Archives
C - Collection
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Chapter 1
Confl ict and Control in early 20th  century north Bihar
Introduction; The region of north Bihar; Control over 
lands social structure and the pressure of population 
growth; The operation of social control : the admini- 
strationthe police and. the landed interest; Conclusion.
2In the early 20th century north Bihar harboured a numerous, impoverished, 
and rigidly stratified population which depended for its livelihood on a 
traditional, inefficient system of agricultural production. In north Bihar, 
those with control over land held the premier position. At the regional 
level, the great landlords dominated, while at the local level European 
indigo planters, small landlords and well-established tenants held sway.
By the beginning of the 20th century mounting population pressure had begun 
to exacerbate social conflicts and tensions, but until the second decade of 
the century these conflicts and tensions only expressed themselves in small 
scale, localized clashes. Almost all of these clashes arose out of dis­
putes within or among the groups which made up the ’landed interest’ of 
north Bihar, namely the great landlords, the European indigo planters, and 
the locally dominant peasants. Tensions and conflicts were contained by 
the limitations that prevailing social, economic and cultural conditions 
imposed on the organization and expression of protest, by the formal control 
exercised by the administration and the police, and by the informal control 
exercised by the great landlords, the European indigo planters, and the 
locally dominant peasants. The following chapter introduces the region of 
north Bihar, describes its social structure and the impact upon this 
structure of mounting population pressure, and examines the expression and 
control of conflict in north Bihar society in the pre-1917 period.
Introduction
3The visitor arriving in north Bihar in October or November discovers, at 
least upon first acquaintance, a green and pleasant land.^ The nights are 
cool and crisp; the days, warm and sunny. If the June to September monsoon 
rains have been good the ripening rice crop spreads like a rich green quilt 
over the surface of the earth. The land stretches flat to the horizon, but 
streams, tanks and ponds, clean and full after the rains, and groves of 
mango and other fruit-bearing trees rescue the scene from monotony. As 
November turns into December and December into January the weather becomes 
colder. In colonial times British officials and planters delighted in this 
winter season. The mornings are superb, bright and crisp and sunny, ideal, 
or so the British found, for riding out on hunting expeditions. There would 
be crocodiles and waterfowl to shoot at and pigs to be stuck; occasionally 
an unwary leopard might find himself in the hunter's sights. Until about 
1920 hunters set out after the tigers that roamed in the swamps and jungles 
of the district of Purnea or in the jungles fringing the north of Champaran 
district. But during the course of this century the jungles have all but 
disappeared, encroached upon by the spread of cultivation and devastated by 
the demand for building timber and firewood, and the tigers have either 
been slaughtered or have fled north to the safety of the forests of the 
Kingdom of Nepal. The nights of the north Bihar winter are cold, and for 
a few weeks around Christmas homesick Britishers could sit nostalgically 
around cheerful fireplaces, warming themselves and dreaming of cosy 
cottages ’at h ome’.
Not all the population regarded the winter so favourably. The 
poor, inadequately supplied with fuel, warm clothing and blankets, and 
crowded into unlined mud or bamboo huts, have always found winter a harsh 
season. At this time in north Bihar pneumonia, tuberculosis, and other
The region of north Bihar
4bronchial ailments take a heavy toll. Fortunately, the cold, dry con­
ditions lessen the incidence of typhoid, cholera and malaria, the chief ail­
ments of the hot and wet seasons. Inevitably, the health and welfare of 
many people depends much on the quality of the aghani or winter rice crop, 
harvested in late November and early December. Harvest time is exciting, 
and often turbulent, as villagers swarm into the fields to cut and gather 
the region's main and staple crop. Agricultural labourers, chronically 
underemployed for most of the year, for this brief period find themselves 
much in demand, and villagers compete keenly for the services of cartmen 
and of carts and bullocks. Sharecroppers and landholders dispute over the 
division of the crop, and peasants quarrel over the ownership of plots of 
land and the crops thereon.
After the excitement of the winter rice harvest comes a slack
2period in the agrarian cycle. The next major agricultural event is the 
harvesting of the rabi or spring crop, sown the previous October, of wheat, 
gram and pulses. The rabi crop is harvested in late spring/early summer. 
For eight or nine months, from October to May, scarcely any rain falls; 
from February the temperature begins to rise. The transition to summer 
occurs by early March, about the time of the rabi harvest and of the Holi 
festival, at which rigid social distinctions are, temporarily, in part for­
gotten while inferiors and children delight in throwing coloured mud and 
water over their elders and superiors. By late March the daytime temper­
ature rises to over 100 degrees on the Fahrenheit scale; by May it reaches 
110 degrees. The heat is unremitting; at night temperatures are-not sig­
nificantly lower than during the day. From early March the heat and the 
absence of rain begins to dry up the tanks and the creeks and the rivulets 
and the rivers; all foliage wilts and the landscape, formerly so green, 
assumes a dull brown hue. As the summer reaches its height, hot dust-laden
winds blow, obscuring visibility and making movement outside difficult and 
extremely uncomfortable. Fire becomes a constant hazard to thatch-roofed 
and grass-walled huts, and disease runs riot. (In colonial times, during 
this period of the year, British planters and officials used to send their 
wives and children off to the safety and the comfort of Ranchi, Darjeeling 
and other hill stations. Nowadays, some Indians do the same.) At this time 
of the year the rich retreat during the heat of the day into the relative 
coolness of their stone or brick houses. Their houses have high ceilings 
and wide verandahs, and their punkah wallahs (or often, nowadays, their 
electric fans), work unceasingly to bring some movement into the air.
The poor seek what shade they can in the shelter of their miserable huts, 
and avoid physical activity as much as possible. But coolies, rickshaw 
pullers, palanquin bearers and other labourers who survive from day to day 
by the sweat of their backs must work no matter what the conditions, no 
matter how grave the risk of heat exhaustion.
And then, usually in June, comes the monsoon. In the south­
west corner of the region, with its rich, loamy soil, the coming of the 
rains permits the sowing of lucrative cash crops. In the less fertile
north-east, in contrast, the arrival of the monsoon marks the occasion for
3the sowing of winter rice. For weeks before its arrival the monsoon has 
been a recurrent theme of conversation among a population whose members, 
almost without exception, depend on agriculture. Would the monsoon come 
early, or would it come late? And when it came, how would it manifest 
itself? Everyone hopes that the rain will fall slowly and steadily, drum­
ming persistently into the parched earth. But often the rain comes in 
torrential outbursts, waterlogging the soil or carrying it away in flash 
floods. North Bihar consists of a vast plain, bounded on the south by the 
east/west course of the Ganges and on the north by the Nepal frontier,
6of the Himalayas. From the Himalayas the Gandak, the Bagmati and the Kosi
and their tributaries flow southwards to the Ganges. These rivers, slow
and lethargic during much of the year, become raging torrents once the
monsoon arrives, carrying all before them. Almost every year, most parts
of the region experience minor flooding; in most years, in some parts of
4the region, major flooding occurs. The floods disrupt communications, and 
isolate large tracts for months at a time. In many areas during the mon­
soon period crudely fashioned boats provide the only means of transport­
ation, and every year people drown when these boats capsize. Villagers 
sow the rice crop early in the monsoon because it needs much water, but 
often flooding brings an over-supply of water and destroys the crop.
Rivers change course, sweeping away huts and villages, ruining some 
people by destroying their crops but enriching others by leaving behind 
rich deposits of silt. Fish teem in the waters that spread across the 
land, ready to be caught and to provide a valuable dietary supplement. At 
this time of year, according to one observer
...the whole country is...a perfect network of streams.
Every rice field is a shallow lake, with countless 
thousands of tiny fish darting here and there among the 
rice stalks. Every ditch teems with fish, and every 
hollow in every field is a well stocked aquarium.
5
During the monsoon flood waters spread rotting animal and vegetable 
matter, bacteria multiply rapidly in the heat and humidity, and malarial 
and filarial mosquitoes breed in flooded tanks and fields. Every year, 
many people fall prey to disease.
By late August/early September, about the time of the bhadoi or 
autumn harvest of the cash crops sown in the previous June, the monsoon is 
over and the villagers set to to repair the damage done. In early October, if 
all goes well, comes a brief downpour which keeps the water level high in
which runs parallel to and about 10 miles to the south of the foothills
7the aghani rice fields and prepares the ground for the sowing of the rabi 
crop. From now on, as the weather becomes colder, people's thoughts turn 
towards the forthcoming harvest in December. Thus is the yearly cycle 
completed.^
In north Bihar the livelihood of all depends upon the vagaries 
of the climate, and all hope for a good harvest. The risks of a bad 
harvest and the benefits of a good harvest are not, however, distributed 
evenly among the members of the population. The harsh natural environment 
and unpredictable natural calamities bring misery and insecurity to the 
lives of many. But the social environment, the environment of interactions 
between men and between their institutions is at least equally harsh. 
Throughout the region the rich and the powerful move in the midst of the 
poor and the powerless.
Control over landsocial structureand the pressure 
of population growth
In 1901, four out of every five members of the north Bihar population 
depended directly on agriculture for their livelihood. The region had no 
significant industries, and less than 3 per cent of its population lived 
in towns.  ^ Nor were the towns of north Bihar much more than overgrown 
villages. Patna, the nearest large urban centre, itself scarcely a thriv­
ing metropolis, lay south of the broad stream of the Ganges. Throughout 
the 19th century the size of this overwhelmingly agrarian society had been 
steadily increasing. In the 18th century famine, and the recurrent war­
fare during the final decades of Mughal rule, had kept the population down, 
but during the 19th century the Pax Britannica combined with effective 
famine relief measures to permit steady population growth. In 1800, vast 
tracts of north Bihar had been jungle or savannah, but by 1900 most of the 
previously uncultivated land had been brought under the plough. In 1881, 
the first year for which reliable census figures are available, north 
Bihar, in an area of 20,400 square miles, had a population of just over 
13,000,000 and a population density of 638 per square mile. In the ensuing 
decades, as Table 1 illustrates, population growth continued. Between 
1881 and 1921, to judge from the figures established by eacli of the 
decennial censes, the total size of the region’s population remained rela­
tively constant. Rather than a decline in the birth rate, however, these
figures reflected the substantial inroads, during inter-censal years, of
8poverty and disease into the numbers of the population. In the period 
from 1920, during which the administration brought infectious diseases more 
effectively under control, the population expanded rapidly. Population 
growth resulted in an especially high density of population in Saran, 
Muzaffarpur and Darbhanga, all districts in which political turbulence 
became particularly frequent during the 20th century. "Although exceeded
9by the figures for a few individual districts such as Howrah and Dacca," 
one British official commented,
...the portion of north Bihar which comprises the three 
districts of Saran, Muzaffarpur and Darbhanga has a more 
teeming population than any other tract of equal size in 
Bengal or Eastern Bengal.
TABLE 1
Population and population density of north Bihar, 1881 to 1971
YEAR POPULATION POPULATION PER
1881 13,038,132 638
1891 13,841,489 678
1901 13,553,733 663
1911 13,841,072 678
1921 13,820,537 677
1931 14,920,351 731
1941 16,445,112 805
1951 17,896,799 877
1961 21,594,650 1,058
1971 26,198,681 1,283
Sources: Census of India, 1961, Volume IV, Bihar, Part l-A(i), 
p. 49; 1951 District Census Handbooks for Champaran 
(p. xi) Saran (pp.xiv-xvi) Muzaffarpur (pp.xiv, xv) 
Darbhanga (pp. xii, xiii) Monghyr (pp. xii, xiii) 
Saharsa (pp. ix, x) and Purnea (pp. xv, xvi); Census 
of India, 1971, Series 1, Paper 1, 1972, p. 9.
Within the populous, agrarian society of north Bihar the 
relationship between an individual and the land and its produce determined 
his social, economic and political position. The zamindars or landlords 
occupied the top end of the social scale, while landless labourers 
occupied the bottom. Even those engaged in non-agricultural occupations
10
also often had control over land. Temple priests were given small land 
grants by zamindars seeking to gain religious merit; lawyers and merchants 
invested their profits in land; and traders and artisans combined small 
holder cultivation with the pursuit of their occupations. The most sig­
nificant indigenous non-agriculturalist group were the lawyers, who made a 
living out of fighting complex agrarian cases through the labyrinthine legal 
system imposed by the British administration. Lawyers, like the other 
groups engaged in non-agricultural occupations, held a position in the 
social scale commensurate with the usefulness and prestige of their 
vocation as judged by the zamindars. (For a summary depiction of the social 
structure, see Diagram 1.) •
The zamindars^ owned all the land in north Bihar except for
small portions held by the government, by temples and by charitable
organizations. The zamindars, who comprised about 5 per cent of the
11region's population, rented nine-tenths of their land to ryots or 
occupancy tenants, who, under the law, held hereditary rights in their 
tenancy holdings. The zamindars held the remainder of their land under 
direct control, and either supervised its cultivation by labourers or 
rented it out year by year to sharecroppers or short term tenants. A small 
part of this directly controlled land was zirat, a classification of land 
in which no rights other than those of the owner could exist, and the re­
mainder was bakast, a term which denotes land under the direct control of 
a landlord but in which, under certain legally defined conditions, occupancy 
tenancy rights could become established. (For a depiction of the tenurial 
system on ryoti lands and on zirat and bakast lands please refer to 
Diagrams 2 and 3).
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DIAGRAM 1
The social hierarchy in north Bihar3 circa 1900
AGRICULTURAL OCCUPATIONS NON-AGRICULTURAL OCCUPATIONS
1 . The great landlords (high 
caste)
1 (a) European Indigo planters
2 . The locally dominant: 1 . Brahman priests
small landlords and big 2 . Lawyers, teachers, doctors
tenants (high caste) and other professionals; 
money-lenders and big 
traders (high and middle 
caste)
3. Middle and small tenants 
(middle and low caste)
3. Artisans and small traders 
(middle and low caste)
4. 'Dwarf' holders and landless 
(low caste, Adivasi and 
Harij an)
4. Servants 
(low caste)
5. Scavengers 
(Harijan)
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DIAGRAM 2
Tenurial structure on Ryoti lands in north Bihar circa 1900
Zamindars
(thikadars —  i.e. lessees of zamindar rights)
ryots with occupancy rights
Short-term tenants paying cash rents/sharecroppers/landless labourers
(Note: Most ryots held small holdings which they tilled with family labour 
but there were some big ryots who had all or part of their lands 
tilled by the poor and the landless.)
DIAGRAM 3
Tenurial Structure on Zirat and Bakast lands in north Bihar circa 1900
Zamindars
short-term tenants
paying rent in cash sharecroppers
landless labourers
In 1901 the premier zamindar in north Bihar, and indeed in Bihar
as a whole, was Rameshwar Singh, Maharaja of the Darbhanga Raj, 18th in a
line of landed magnates that had come to power in 1556 and head of the
12Maithil Brahman community, the elite religious community of Bihar.
Rameshwar Singh' s property covered some 2,400 square miles, which was
slightly more than 12 per cent of the total area (20,400 square miles) of
north Bihar. Rameshwar Singh received, from land rents, an income of
approximately 2,000,000 rupees. He paid about 12 per cent of this income
as land revenue and cess to the provincial government, and spent another
10 to 15 per cent in the administrative costs of running holdings spread
13over a wide area and staffed by about 3,000 people. The remainder, 
supplemented by the proceeds from investments in industrial undertakings 
and real estate, formed a substantial sum, much of it spent in a manner 
befitting a Maharaja of ancient line. It paid for the upkeep of the three 
palaces in Darbhanga town, and for the residences in Muzaffarpur, Patna, 
Calcutta, Darjeeling, Delhi and Simla. It supported a string of 30 race­
horses, and fed and maintained the 40 elephants kept for ceremonial 
purposes. It was eventually to pay for a fleet of motor cars, at a time 
when the motor car was a rare sight in north Bihar, and it paid for two
lavishly appointed railway carriages, which were hitched onto a special
14train when the Maharaja wished to travel long distances. Considerable 
sums were also spent for religious purposes: Rameshwar Singh, the rigidly 
orthodox head of a rigidly orthodox community, fulfilled his obligations 
scrupulously, paying for the upkeep of temples and their attendants, award­
ing stipends to scholars of Sanskrit, endowing religious schools and spend­
ing generously on the rituals of traditional Hinduism as practised in north 
Bihar.^ From this position of social and religious eminence the Maharaja 
supported and was in turn supported by the British administration. He 
served in the Bihar and Orissa Legislative Council, and exerted strong
13
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influence over the Darbhanga Municipality and over the Darbhanga District 
Board. He also participated in a variety of voluntary associations in­
cluding the Bihar Landholders' Association, the Benares Hindu University 
Committee, and the Maithil Mahasabha.^
The position of Rameshwar Singh and his fellow zamindars had been
guaranteed when the British administration implemented the Permanent
Settlement of 1793 within the vast area incorporated within the then
"Bengal Presidency", which consisted of the modern-day regions of Bangla
Desh, West Bengal, Bihar, a substantial portion of Orissa and of parts of
modern day Uttar Pradesh. The British imposed the Permanent Settlement in
an unstable, fluid context of land holding in an attempt to ensure economic
and administrative stability by (a) vesting proprietary rights in the
possession of established land controlling families and (b) declaring that
the land revenue levied from those certified as zamindars would not be
increased.^ The British administration exacted the land revenue demand
according to a rigid timetable, irrespective of whether the harvest was
good or bad, and in some areas social disruption occurred when established
land controllers, unable to meet their revenue payments, had to sell their
18land to urban-based speculators. In north Bihar, however, British
revenue officials underestimated the productivity of the land and hence
demanded only a moderate land revenue, which made it possible for most of
19the land controlling families to adapt effectively to the new order.
The British calculated that, by holding the land revenue demand
constant, they would ensure that any increase in the output of the land,
and thus its rental value, would benefit the zamindars. The British hoped
that the zamindars would improve agricultural techniques and increase pro-
20duction in order to be able to demand higher rents. This hope met with 
disappointment. Zamindars, Walter C. Neale points out, operated within a
15
social and cultural context entirely different from that in which the
British "improving landlord" had emerged. To maintain and advance their
local political position zamindars sought to increase the number of people
under their control. Hence they had no interest in new techniques and
technologies which would enable them to employ less labour, and instead of
re-investing their profits in capital improvement they used them to
service extensive patronage networks and to bolster their prestige by
21means of conspicuous consumption. The zamindars had no desire to become
improving landlords, and British policy inhibited indigenous industrial
22development which might have galvanized the agrarian economy. The
zamindars found, moreover, that because of steady population growth they
could increase their profits without changing their style of land management.
As population grew, zamindars profited as formerly uncultivated lands came 
23under the plough. The growing demand for land meant that rents could be 
raised, even though no improvement in agricultural techniques occurred.
Most of the rising profits from land rent stayed with the zamindars. In the 
district of Darbhanga, for example, the designers of the Permanent Settle­
ment intended that nine-tenths of the rent collected from the tenants by 
each zamindar should be passed onto the government as land revenue. By the 
end of the 19th century this officially approved ratio had become reversed, 
and one-tenth of the rental income went to the government while the remain­
ing nine-tenths stayed with the zamindars.^
Zamindars swelled their profits with illegal and quasi-legal exactions.
From their tenants they levied salami, a tenancy transfer and settlement
fee. In Champaran, according to one British official, this fee was "...
25levied with the stereotyped regularity of rent." Salami often amounted 
to several years rent. In 1918-19, in the Alapur administrative circle of 
the Darbhanga Raj in north-east Darbhanga, the average rental was less than
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4 rupees per bigha, but the rate of salami ranged, depending on the
quality of the land, from a minimum of 25 rupees per bigha to a maximum
2 6of 160 rupees. In 1910-11, in the Maredigar' circle in north-west
Bhagalpur, the Darbhanga Raj demanded an average rental for newly settled
land of 5h rupees per bigha, and an average salami of 20 rupees. In the
same circle 30 years later the Darbhanga Raj demanded a slightly lower
rental of just over 4 rupees per bigha for newly settled land, but levied
27higher salamis at the average rate, per bigha, of just under 31 rupees. 
Zamindars also imposed abwabs, which were illegal but customarily sanctioned 
additional dues levied on the tenant. In some parts of Champaran, Settle­
ment Officer J.A. Sweeney informed the Agrarian Enquiry Committee in 1917,
2 8abwabs amounted to 120 per cent of the rent charges. Zamindars also 
profited from money lending and grain dealing. Many tenants, needing credit 
to meet social and religious obligations and to tide themselves over the
lean periods of the agrarian cycle became hopelessly indebted to zamindar
29money lenders. When dealing in grain, zamindars bought cheap at harvest
30time and sold dear later in the year when prices had risen. Through
their rental, commercial, customary and illegal earnings the zamindars
cornered much of the agrarian surplus. Unfortunately for the welfare of
the region, however, they showed little interest in agricultural improvement
or industrial investment, and generally spent their profits in non-economic
ways. As Barrington Moore, Jr., comments, the "...peasant was suffering
many of the pains of primitive capitalist accumulation, while... society
31reaped none of the benefits." The British administration had hoped for 
"improving landlords" on the English home counties model, but had got rack- 
renting landlords on the Irish colonial model instead.
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The tendency of zamindars to rack-rent increased as popu­
lation growth fragmented their holdings. When the Permanent Settlement 
formalized the zamindars' position there was already considerable vari­
ation among them in the size of their estates and the extent of their 
wealth and influence. This differentiation increased rapidly during the 
19th century. It was only among those few families that had enjoyed 
quasi-regal status under the Mughals —  the families of the Hathwa Raj, the 
Bettiah Raj and the Darbhanga Raj —  that the tradition of primogeniture 
had become established. Among the rest of the zamindar population property 
was divided equally among the male heirs, while among Muslims both males 
and females inherited equally.
The 19th century increase in the number of zamindars broke up
zamindari holdings and made it harder for those dependent on them to
maintain their position. By the early 1880s, Gordon Johnson points out,
"...less than one zemindar in two hundred in Bengal and Bihar held really
32large estates, and 88.4 per cent held estates of less than 500 acres."
By 1900, with the exception of the Maharaja of Darbhanga and a few other
large and middle range zamindars, most zamindars held only small 
33properties. In Darbhanga circa 1900 each zamindar, on average, held
15 acres and had an annual rental income of 85 rupees. These averages,
however, overstate the size of the property and the income of most of the
zamindars of the district, because the Maharaja of Darbhanga owned nearly
a third of the district while some middle range zamindars held properties
34covering 100s of acres. In the final decades of the 19th century, as 
Table 2 illustrates, the number of zamindari estates in Darbhanga had 
increased rapidly.
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TABLE 2
Officially registered, zamindari estates 
in Darbhanga3 1878 to 1905-06
YEAR NUMBER OF ESTATES
1878 7,962
1889-90 10,813
1899-1900 13,400
1905-06 14,183
Source: O ’Malley, Darbhangaj pp. 119-20
The figures given in this table, dramatic as they are, do not reflect 
accurately the true extent of the subdivision of proprietary rights, 
because zamindars, to avoid the registration fee, often divided their 
property privately without having the division recorded legally. By 
1905-06, the number of proprietors in the district totalled approximately
135,000 out of a population of just under 2,900,000. Except in the 
Madhubani subdivision in the north of the district, where the Darbhanga
35Raj had a predominant interest, there was "a host of petty proprietors".
In Samastipur subdivison in the south of Darbhanga each individual
zamindar held an average of about eight acres, which meant that the
3 6average zamindar "was little more than an ordinary cultivator". Private
partitions had also been common in the district of Saran, and except in
the areas held by a few big zamindars rights of ownership had been sub-
37divided to "a most extraordinary extent". The fate of many zamindari 
families was typified by the history of a Rajput family which migrated into 
Saran in 1788, and acquired control of the villages of Gangapur and Bhagar. 
During the 19th century the property of the family became dissipated "as
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successive generations of descendants inherited smaller and smaller
„ O O
shares. In Saran by 1906-07 the average area held by each zamindar
was 14 acres, and the district had "a vast army of landlords, ranging from
the Hathwa Raj in the north, sole owner of over 1,000 villages, down to the
39peasant proprietor of four acres". In Muzaffarpur, the number of estates 
had increased from 13,001 in 1879 to 21,050 in 1904-05, and private par­
titions had been frequent. By 1905, "there were on the average 5^ estates and 
and 37 proprietors to each village, each holding 12 acres . " 40 In north Monghyr, 
the number of estates on the official revenue roll increased by 100 per cent
between 1874-75 and 1907-08, and during these years private partition had "gone 
to extieme lengths . By 1907-08 an average village of around 600 acres was
usually divided among some 51 zamindars, giving them an average share of about
i o 421 z acres.
As the subdivision process continued, generation by generation, 
small zamindars competed keenly amongst themselves and with tenants to get 
control over more land. A zamindar who inherited only a small portion of 
what formerly had been an extensive property usually set out to acquire 
more land and to bring as much as possible of his property under direct 
cultivating control. Zamindars favoured direct control because share­
croppers and labourers, working on land under zamindari control, occupied
a more precarious position than tenants with occupany rights and hence
43could be squeezed more. In Darbhanga, the Settlement Officer commented 
in 1903,
...the increasing subdivision of proprietary rights, 
which is going on over a large part of the district, 
has made it necessary for the petty proprietors to 
resort to direct cultivation to a much greater extent 
than was formerly the case. The manner in which this 
tendency works is illustrated...in the fifty villages 
in which...it has been found possible to compare the 
statistics of the resumption proceedings of 1840 with 
those of the present operations. The selected villages 
are scattered all over the district and may be taken as 
fairly representative. In them the occupied area has, 
within the last sixty years, increased from 20,218 
acres to 27,959, or by 38 per cent. The area in the
20
occupation of raiyats has increased from 18,436 
acres to 22,966 acres, or by 24 per cent, but the 
area in occupation of landlords has gone up from 
1782 acres to 4,993 acres, or by 180 per c e n t . ^
The strength of kinship loyalties, and in particular the
institutions of the joint family and the proprietary brotherhood, worked
against the effects of property fragmentation through inheritance.4^
Frequently, two or three generations of zamindars held land in common,
profiting jointly from its proceeds. But such units displayed a proneness
to internal strife, particularly when they grew large, and tended to split 
46up. Kinship bonds slowed but could not stop or reverse the trend to 
fragmentation of holdings.
By the late 19th century population growth had also begun to 
pressure the ryots, or "occupancy tenants" of north Bihar. During the 
first three-quarters of the century ryots had been able to take up the
47cultivation of lands previously held by zamindars as jungle or wasteland.
At the start of the century Darbhanga, for example, included large tracts
of uncultivated land. One official, writing in 1802, estimated that the
ratio of cultivated to uncultivated land was three to two, and pointed out
that "For miles and miles are plains with only here and there a few bighas
in cultivation, and the uncultivated land surrounding it apparently as well
48worth the trouble of agriculture as any part I have seen". The area in the 
vicinity of Alapur, later to become one of the most productive parts of the 
district, was at this time "the haunt of wild elephants", who did great
49damage when they ventured out of the grass jungle and preyed on the crops. 
Over the ensuing decades the area under cultivation greatly expanded. By 
1850, three-quarters of the total area of the district and by 1875 just under 
four-fifths of the total area was being cultivated. Of the land that had 
not been brought into cultivation, one quarter was devoted to mango 
groves and grazing, one quarter was unculturable waste, and half
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consisted of roads, rivers, house sites and t a n k s . I n  Darbhanga, the
Settlement Officer concluded in 1903, "...there is very little room for
the extension of cultivation."^ By the beginning of the 20th century,
among the seven north Bihar districts, only Purnea, north Bhagalpur and
Champaran had arable land not yet under cultivation. But Purnea was an
endemic malaria and cholera area and thus was not attractive to potential
cultivators. "Don't take poison," the proverb ran, "You have to die so go 
52to Purnea." The western portion of Purnea, and much of north Bhagalpur,
moreover, were subject to the depredations of the torrential river Kosi,
the Hwang-Ho of India, which changed its course frequently, ruining land
by burying it in deposits of sand and endangering the lives and property
of any foolhardy enough to attempt to establish permanent settlements in its
basin. And in Champaran, much of the land not yet brought under the plough
provided indispensable grazing land both for local cattle and for cattle
brought in from the overcrowded neighbouring districts of Muzaffarpur and
53Saran and the adjacent United Provinces' district of Q rcm zJkRfu*',
The drying up of the supply of surplus land boded ill for the
future. Admittedly, as Table 3 illustrates, most ryots held, according to
official estimates, slightly more land than the minimum necessary for the
subsistence of an 'average family'. This extra land gave ryots some
reserves with which to cope with bad seasons, but did not allow for the .
subdivision of holdings among descendants into economically viable units.
In the most overcrowded districts, Muzaffarpur and Saran, emigration to
54Calcutta and further afield had become common. In Saran, according to 
the Settlement Officer, "the land can no longer support the population, and 
in most families the young men must, and do go forth to seek their living 
elsewhere". Not infrequently a ryot mortgaged part of his holding to
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raise money to give the young emigrant "a start in life"; subsequently,
the mortgage could be redeemed from the remittances sent home by the absent
s o n . ^  Temporary, seasonal migration occurred even more frequently. From
Saran, Anand A. Yang points out, emigration overseas only amounted to a
trickle compared with the massive exodus to Bengal and elsewhere, involving
more than 10 per cent of the population, which occurred during the slack
period of the agrarian c y c l e . T h e  landless formed the bulk of the
migrants but with increasing population pressure on a static agrarian base
many cultivators also found themselves obliged to emigrate permanently or
58to leave their homes temporarily in search of work.
TABLE 3
Average and Subsistence holdings in Saran3 
Darbhanga and Champaran_, circa 1900 
(Areas given are in acres)
DISTRICT SUBSISTENCE HOLDING AVERAGE HOLDING
Saran 2.5 3.8
Darbhanga 2.5 3.5
Champaran 4.0 5.0
Sources: O'Malley, Saran, pp. 89-90; O ’Malley, Champaran
p. 97; Kerr, Darbhanga Settlement Report3 pp. 128-9.
Population pressure and the disappearance of the land frontier 
threatened the position of the tenantry as a whole but some tenants, by 
determination and good fortune, managed to protect and advance their
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interests and to retain or achieve a position of local power. Often such
men were the descendants of families that had long held sway; sometimes,
however, they had only recently risen to eminence. Characteristically, they
engaged in money lending and grain dealing in addition to cultivating their
59lands. Often, for the sake of status and for financial advancement, they 
acquired zamindari holdings. At the village level, they shared or competed 
for dominance with small zamindars. One typical 'big' tenant was Mithan 
Prasad Kuar, who held land near Sonbarsa, on the north bank of the Ganges 
in Bhagalpur district. In 1922 he held about 28 bighas. In the ensuing 
years he expanded his possessions and by 1936 held 116 bighas. In addition 
he had obtained some zamindari property in which, his opponents alleged, he 
dealt harshly with his tenants.*^ Another prosperous tenant was Khendar 
Prasad Rai, an inhabitant of Champaran. Rai, a Rajput by caste, told the 
Champaran Agrarian Enquiry Committee of 1917 that he held 100 acres of 
land and had a "money-lending business to the extent of a lakh".^
Below the big ten£ints in the social scale came a group of
middle range tenants. Below them came tenants who had just sufficient land
to meet their needs; and finally below them came tenants whose holdings
were too small to sustain them and who had to supplement work on their own
holdings wiLh labour for others. In 1890 a survey carried out among the 190
ryot households of Dalsingserai village in Darbhanga categorized 12 of them
as "well-to-do", 50 as "comfortably off", 54 as "dependent on the outcome
6 2of the year" and 74 as "poor". In Muzaffarpur in 1899 there was an
average of 667 ryots per square mile, of whom 496 had sufficient land to
support themselves, while 171 supplemented cultivation on their own land
6 3with work as labourers. The position of these ryot-labourers did not 
differ greatly from that of landless labourers, and they faced a crisis
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whenever there were "short crops or high prices". Only marginally.
better off than the ryot-labourers were ryots cultivating at subsistence
level. One such ryot was Ghuna Sinha, of village Bhataura, Saran district.
Ghuna Sinha's 18 bighas of land produced just enough, in favourable seasons,
to support the 18 members of his joint family. But when times were bad he
was forced into debt: in 1918, for example, after flooding which resulted
65in a crop failure, he had to borrow 181 rupees. In 1900 the ryots who 
lived at or above subsistence level made up just under half of the popu­
lation of the region. Below them in the social scale came those who could 
unequivocally be described as poor .
The poor made up about one-third of north Bihari society.^
They included both landless labourers and 'dwarf holders', i.e. holders of
tiny, non-economic plots of land. Some dwarf holders held their plots as
ryots, while others had the status of sharecroppers, or of short-term
tenants paying an annual cash rent. Some of the landless labourers were
attached, as bonded servants or 'debt slaves', to big tenants and
zamindars.^ Of the labourers x>/ho were not thus bonded, some engaged in
non-agricultural occupations on a seasonal basis, and returned to their
6 8village during the peak work periods of the agrarian cycle. The most 
secure among the poor were those with steady employment as servants, 
government coolies and palanquin bearers.
North Bihar a predominantly Hindu population, and the
hierarchy of caste mirrored, reinforced and was reinforced by the hierarchy
of economic, social and political power. Muslims, who totalled, according
to the 1901 census, 15.4 per cent of the population, were the only sub-
69stantial non-Hindu group. Within the Muslim community great economic 
and social differentiation existed. A small number of Muslims — the
6 4
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descendants of the members of the landed aristocracy in Mughal times —  
were notable as middle-range zamindars ,^ 0 while the rest of the community 
was dispersed through the middle and lower ranks of society.
Among the Hindus, and within society as a whole, Brahmans, 
Rajputs, and 3humihars (also known as military Brahmans and Babhans) pre­
dominated. These groups all but monopolized land-owning and held first 
place among the tenantry. Brahmans, Rajputs and Bhumihars, as Table A 
illustrates, only comprised a small proportion of the population of the 
region. Particular high caste groups were concentrated within particular 
areas. In a village studied by Ramashray Roy, more than one-fifth of 
the population were Brahmans, while in the Beguserai area in north Monghyr 
around one-fifth of the population were Bhumihars. In Saran, Rajputs com­
prised 10 per cent of the population.^ In a context in which, with the 
exception of the Yadavs, the other groups in the social hierarchy were 
also small, the local concentration of Brahmans, Rajputs and Bhumihars 
contributed to their social and political pre-eminence. Members of the 
Kayasth caste also had great influence. Traditionally, Kayasths had 
functioned as a literati. They monopolized the post of patwari, or 
village accountant, occupied many positions in the lower ranks of 
the bureaucracy, and outnumbered others in the legal profession. The 
Yadavs (also known as Goalas and Ahirs), and the Koeris and the Kurmis 
predominated in the middle range of the social hierarchy. The Kurmis and 
the Koeris had a reputation as skilful, hardworking cultivators, while the 
Yadavs, the most numerous caste group in north Bihar, combined their 
traditional occupation of cow-herding with tenancy cultivation. At the 
bottom of the social hierarchy low caste and Harijan groups predominated. 
Members of these groups generally worked as dwarf holders or landless
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labourers. Among the lower castes the Dusadhs and the Dhanuks formed 
the largest groups.
Community and Caste
TABLE 4
groups in north Bihar circa 1900
CLASSIFICATION GROUP PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION
High caste Brahman 4.6
Bhumihar 4.4
Rajput 4.1
Kayasth 1.4
Total high caste groups: 14.5
Middle caste Yadav 1 2 .2
Koeri 4.9
Kurin i 2.8
Total middle caste groups: 19.9
Low caste Dusadhs 4.9
Dhanuks 3.2
Telis 2.8
Others (all less
than 2 per cent
of population) 20.2
Total low caste groups: 31.1
./con t'd
CLASSIFICATION GROUP PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION
Harijan Chamars 4.0
Musahars 2.7
Others (all less
than 2 per cent
of population) 9.4
Total Harijan groups: 16 .1
Adivasi 2.5
Non-Hindu groups: Muslim 15.4
Miscellaneous 0.5
TOTAL OF ALL GROUPS: 100.0
Table 4 cont'd 2 7
Sources: Calculated from figures given in Byrne, Bhagalpurpp. 43, 
46-8; and in O'Malley gazetteers for Champaranpp. 36, 40,
46; Saran> pp. 32, 39, 43; Muzaffarpur3 pp. 26, 32, 3 7-40; 
Darbhanga3 pp. 23-36; Monghyr3 pp. 50, 55, 62 and Pumea3
pp. 1, 58, 61; and in the Statistical Appendices to the above. 
(Calcutta, 1908-12). pp. 1, 58, 61; (Please note: figures 
have been adjusted to allow for south Gangetic portions of 
of Monghyr and Bhagalpur).
Harijans comprised one-sixth of the north Bihar population. Characteristic­
ally, they were segregated into one of the three or four hamlets that made 
up the north Bihar village, and suffered discrimination in every aspect of 
their lives. The Chamars and the Musahars were the two largest Harijan 
groups. In 1909 one official described the Musahars as
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...field labourers, whose wages are paid in kind...
They live in a kind of social thraldom, sometimes 
selling themselves, their wives, and children to 
lifelong servitude for paltry sums.^
And in 1911, another official commented that the Musahars lived "... a
life very near the margin of subsistence and eat rats, snails, snakes, or
73anything else they can find." Harijan and low caste dwarf holders and
landless labourers held an unenviable position in the north Bihar agrarian 
hierarchy. By the turn of the century, because of population pressure on 
an inefficient agricultural system, their prospects, and the prospects of 
the larger society within which they lived, seemed to be becoming increas­
ingly bleak.
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The expression of conflict and the limitations on protest
The people of north Bihar competed over resources and their use and over 
produce and its distribution. Competition became bitter because of a 
medley of demographic, economic, social and cultural reasons. By the end 
of the 19th century the region was entering a period of demographic crisis. 
In the ensuing decades steady population growth continued, bringing in­
creasing pressure on the land. North Bihar's inefficient, subsistence 
agriculture could not effectively meet the challenge of providing for these 
numbers. Most of the actual work of cultivation was done on a small scale 
by tenants, sharecroppers and labourers. Those in a financially strong 
position, among the zamindars and the better established tenantry, showed 
little inclination to invest in technical innovation and organizational 
modernization. The agrarian economy of north Bihar stagnated within the 
restrictive, conservative framework maintained by India's colonial rulers,
yet by virtue of its inclusion in an imperial system was vulnerable to
74 .fluctuations within the world economy. Apart from encouraging, without
notable success, the siphoning off of excess population by migration , 7 
British administrators had no solution to north Bihar's agrarian 
problems. The British realized that the zamindars had failed to become 
improving landlords and to galvanize rural society, but because of their 
respect for private property, and because they relied on the zamindars 
for social and political support, they did nothing, (apart from some 
largely ineffectual legal measures intended to protect the ryots from the 
zamindars' worst excesses)^ to alter the social structure and the distri­
bution of wealth within it so as to promote greater agricultural efficiency 
and to encourage agricultural reinvestment. So crucial, indeed did the
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British regard the support of the zamindars that they propped up the 
existing order whenever it came under challenge. One example of this 
policy is their handling of the affairs of the Darbhanga Raj after the 
death of Momeshwar Singh, who was Maharaja of Darbhanga from 1829 until his 
death in 1860. During his reign Momeshwar Singh supported a host of kins­
folk, lived in great state, and spent lavishly on ceremonies. Many of his 
relatives held posts in the administration of the Darbhanga estates, and 
displayed an inefficiency only surpassed by their venality. When Momeshwar 
Singh died, leaving behind a minor heir, the Darbhanga Raj was verging on 
bankruptcy. But the provincial government stepped in, took over the admin­
istration of the estates and, by careful management, restored prosperity 
before handing them back to the heir, Lakmeshwar Singh, when he came of
age in 1879.77 Similarly, as Anand A. Yang details, the British protected
7 8many other zamindari estates from bankruptcy and disintegration. The 
contradiction between economic rationality and political expediency could 
not have been more complete.
Within this stagnant agrarian system most north Biharis found
life insecure and unpredictable. Economic fluctuations particularly
affected the poor. In 1915 and 1919, for example, and to a lesser extent
79in 1920, widespread distress resulted from scarcity and high prices.
80Many people were driven to crime in order to survive. In 1915, the
number of burglaries increased by more than 20 per cent and the number of
thefts rose more than 17 per cent over the annual average figures for the
1911-1914 period. In 1919, the increases over the 1911-1914 figures for
burglary and theft were, respectively, 60 and 52 per cent. During 1919,
37 per cent of all convictions were for one month or less, and 64 per cent
81of all prisoners were serving sentences of three months or less. One
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British official concluded that "A very large proportion of these short
term convicts are men and women, driven, more or less directly by want of
82food to the commission of petty theft." Within this harsh economic con­
text, tensions and conflicts emerged, and became heightened and intensified 
by the fragmented and rigidly hierarchical character of north Bihari 
society.
People in north Bihar felt loyalty first to their immediate
kinship group and second to their caste group. The embryonic quality of
83wider loyalties reflected itself in the neglect of civic duties, in the
84widespread incidence (and general acceptance) of ’corruption', and in 
the failure of attempts to create cooperative credit institutions. Groups 
competed bitterly against one another, and even those which had become 
well established could not relax in the enjoyment of their position. The
strength of kinship bonds meant that people, to the limit and beyond of
85their capacity to do so, provided for their poorer relatives. And to
enhance and uphold their social prestige, established and aspiring groups
86spent lavishly on social ceremony, and particularly on weddings. Nor,
because of considerations of social prestige, did more established groups
make effective use of their labour power. Among lower caste, families
large numbers could be
...not a hindrance but a source of profit: the children 
tend the cattle and do the weeding, while their mothers 
work with the men."
But in contrast,
...if a Rajput, Babhan or Brahmin have a large family, 
there are simply more mouths to feed and fewer hands 
to work: their womankind do not work out of doors and 
they [i.e. the men of the family] will not, from caste 
pride, dig or till themselves. 8 7
Established individuals and groups, moreover, operating within the fluid
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context of village and factional politics, had to extend their patronage
. . .  88as widely as possible m  order to guarantee their political position.
In north Bihar, even established groups found themselves under pressure, 
and had to live in constant competition with their peers and in constant
r u • • r • 89exploitation of their inferiors.
The conflicts between individuals and groups manifested them­
selves in both litigation and direct action. The courts handled a large 
number of disputes, but did not effectively redress grievances and smooth 
tensions. Judicial processes moved at a snail's pace, the law was complex 
and, too often, vague and internally inconsistent, and the lower ranks of 
the legal profession were riddled with corruption. The rich and the influ­
ential exerted undue influence, and the tactic of harassing an enemy by 
"getting up" a false case,against him was much used. The enemy might, if 
all went well, be convicted, and at the very least, he would be put to the 
inconvenience of attending at court to defend himself. The plaintiff's 
kinsmen and servLints could be called upon to perjure themselves, and if 
their testimony proved inadequate, there were always professional witnesses
hanging about the law courts, ready, for a small fee, to present whatever
90evidence was required. In 1908 F.E. Lyall, the Bhagalpur District
Officer, commented in his official annual report that
No one who has not heard at first hand such tales as 
I have, can imagine the utter and cruel injustice now 
habitually worked in the name of justice through our 
Civil Courts, simply because all this tangled web of 
procedure has put the poorer man, the less educated, 
at the mercy of any unscrupulous man who chooses to 
ruin him by litigation. The fact that our courts are 
here to administer justice seems to be lost sight of by 
almost every officer presiding in them, and their eyes 
are rivetted only on questions of whether some rule of 
procedure has been transgressed or not.^
In north Bihar the laws were "...cobwebs for the rich and chains of steel
for the poor."
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tended to take the law into their own hands. If there was a dispute
over the right to some trees, or the possession of a plot of land, or the
division of a crop, or the payment of rent, why not turn out against one's
opponent with a body of men bearing spears and lathis? North Bihar had a
93consistently high incidence of rioting over agrarian disputes. In the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries most of these riots developed between 
rivals for influence at the local level. "...any unlawful assembly involv­
ing force," Anand A. Yang points out, "required at least two antagonists
with sufficient economic and social standing to mobilize a few clubmen and
94other supporters." In north Bihar intense and often violent conflict
developed over positions of local control, and "factionalism," in the sense
of the crystallization of two distinct groups competing for local power
95frequently manifested itself within village society. Both factions 
would usually be led by high caste men, sometimes from the same caste 
group and occasionally from the same family group. Faction leaders relied 
primarily on their kinsfolk for support and secondly on their retainers and 
clients within village society. Inter-factional struggle performed a
1 safety-valve' function, allowing the expression of tensions without 
threatening the stability of the social order: when an 'out' group tri­
umphed over its rival it merely took over and duplicated its functions, 
while the defeated 'in' group assumed the former role of the 'out' group. 
And often, anyway, the results of conflict were not clearcut: disputes and
conflicts between factions could and did simmer on for decades and
96generations.
In north Bihar circa 1900 conflict characteristically developed 
along vertical rather than horizontal lines. Clashes frequently erupted
In part because of the failings of the legal system, people
34
between rivals for local influence, buL only infrequently between distinct
social strata, between the people whom Anand A. Yang describes as
97"subordinates and superordinates." The subordinate/superordinate clashes
that did occur took place between distinct components of the landed interest
of north Bihar, and occurred when locally dominant peasants differed with
indigo planters and with great landlords. Except for the communally based
anti-cow-killing riots of 1893, which drew on Hindu religious beliefs to
break down caste barriers and to coordinate the activities of large numbers
of people over a wide are, most incidents involved only a few people and
98occurred in a geographically limited, area. Overall, the mass of the 
population took little part in these affrays. In impoverished, inegali­
tarian north Bihar prevailing social, cultural and economic conditions, 
namely poor health, inadequate communications, illiteracy, linguistic 
diversity and the caste system, did much to limit the expression of 
conflict.
The poor health of the mass of the population greatly limited
the extent of popular protest. Inadequate diet, low in proteins and
vitamins, caused malnutrition, endangered the intellectual development of
99children and made people easy targets for the impact of disease, an impact
greatly facilitated by the insanitary, overcrowded conditions in which most
people lived.'*'00 Every year, cholera and typhoid took their toll.
Recurrent intestinal infections and hookworm, which could be caught
merely by walking in bare feet over open ground, were widespread, and
adversely affected peoples' vitality. Malaria was widely prevalent: a
survey done in the 1920s on children under 10 years of age revealed that
7 per cent of them had an enlarged spleen as a result of malarial in-
102fection. Good health rarely existed among the poor and downtrodden,
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among those who were worst fed and worst housed and most exploited on the 
labour market. Those with the most reason to protest and rebel often had 
the least physical capacity to do so. One European indigo planter, des­
cribing the workers employed in indigo concerns, concluded that the "type 
of feature" was "as a rule a very forbidding and degraded one."
They are mostly of the very poorest class. Many of 
them are plainly half silly, or wholly idiotic; not 
■ a few are deaf and dumb; others are crippled or 
deformed, and numbers are leprous and scrofulous.
Numbers of them are afflicted in some districts with 
goitre, caused probably by bad drinking water; all 
have a pinched, withered, wan look, that tells of 
hard work and insufficient fare.^
Inadequate education, by circumscribing the horizons of the
people, also limited the expression of conflict and tension. Only the
landed could afford to educate their children. Illiteracy was all but
universal; in 1921, less than 5 per cent of the population could read and
104write. Though well versed in the long established (if not markedly
efficient) methods of winning a living from the soil, villagers knew little 
of book learning and of life and circumstances outside their immediate 
locality, and thus tended to accept existing circumstances as the only ones 
possible. Poor communications increased the villager’s parochialism.
During the monsoon, movement became extremely difficult,"*'0  ^ and even 
during the dry seasons the railways were overburdened and the road system 
inadequate. As late as 1944 a British administrator commented, "It seems 
incredible. ...there is not one pukka P[ublic] W[orks] D[epartment] road 
in the whole of the Tirhut division. Linguistic diversity also helped
limit the widespread expression of conflict. Most people spoke, as their 
first language, a distinctive village dialect current only in a limited 
geographical area.^07 In central and eastern north Bihar these dialects 
were part of the Maithili language, while in the west they formed the
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Bhojpuri language. Both languages were variants of Hindi, the lingua
franca of the region. People from different areas could interact by means 
of Hindi, but often communication was less than perfect.
The caste system compounded the limits resulting from 
linguistic diversity. The basic unit of the caste system, the jati or 
sub-caste, comprised an endogamous group whose members usually lived within 
a circumscribed geographical area. Fine distinctions existed even between 
groups of a broadly comparable status. Thus the various distinct Brahman 
jatis could be ranked, by subtle criteria, into an order of prestige. With 
loyalty to the family and to the jati the ultimate loyalty, with people 
consciously limiting and directing the range of their social interaction, 
many obstacles stood in the way of the organization of broadly based 
protest movements. Of course, caste loyalties themselves operated to 
mobilize support. During day to day life in the village, and when tension 
threatened to erupt into a clash, jati-fellows rallied in mutual support.
But relative to the total population jati groups were small, and not in­
frequently they were riven with internal conflict. Jatis, moreover, com­
prised "social pyramids" which were internally differentiated economically,
and which thus fitted neatly into the prevailing factional, patron/client
109pattern of politics. The ideology of the caste system, furthermore, only
sanctioned political initiatives among high caste groups. The ideology of 
caste presented society as innately and unchangeably hierarchical, and in­
sisted that the only legitimate course open to the individual was to accept 
without complaint his position in the social order and to fulfil the duties 
and obligations implied by that position. This ideology had been made con­
crete in an elaborate etiquette of day to day behaviour which, Barrington 
Moore Jr. points out, had decisive political results. "Make a man feel
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humble by a thousand daily acts and he will act in a humble way." The
long established patterns of social deference which formed the backbone of 
the caste system had to weaken before the mass of the population could 
express the tensions arising from life within the social hierarchy of north 
Bihar.
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The operation of social control: the administrationthe police3 
and the landed interest
Over the impoverished, illiterate and diverse population of north Bihar the 
administration, the police force, the big zamindars, the European indigo 
planters, and the locally dominant small landlords and big tenants exer­
cised social control. Formally, the police and the administration held 
the responsibility for the maintenance of order, but because of the im­
poverishment of the provincial government the apparatus of police/admini­
strative control was skeletal. This meant that much of the work of 
maintaining order was performed by an informal system of control operated 
by the groups which comprised the landed interest of north Bihar, namely 
the big zamindars, the indigo planters, and the locally dominant peasants. 
(For a depiction of the formal and informal systems of control in north 
Bihar, please refer to Diagram 4).
DIAGRAM 4
Formal and informal systems of control in north Bihar circa 1900 
FORMAL INFORMAL
Provincial Government
Great Zamindars
District Officers
Police
(European Indigo Planters)
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The administrative structure established by British rule over­
arched north Bihar society (please refer to Diagram 5). The Collector/ 
Magistrates or District Officers held the routine responsibility, on behalf 
of the government of the British province of Bihar and Orissa, for the 
administration of north Bihar. The Collector/Magistrate, according to one 
official who had served in the post, functioned as
The pivot on which the whole administration turns; 
all those below him are under his orders and engaged 
in assisting him; all those above him depend upon 
him for information and are engaged in giving him 
orders and ins tructions .
Within each district junior officials known as Subdivisional Officers
assisted the Collector/Magistrate and held responsibility for one of the
two or three subdivisions .
As map 2 illustrates, north Bihar incorporated seven 
112districts. Darbhanga lay in the centre of the region, and extended
from the Nepal frontier on the north to the Ganges on the south. On the 
east, Darbhanga bordered on that half of the Bhagalpur district which lay 
north of the Ganges. To the south-east, Darbhanga adjoined the north 
gangetic section of Monghyr district, while on the west it bordered on 
the district of Muzaffarpur. On the further side of Muzaffarpur lat 
Champaran to the north-west and Saran to the south-west. Both Saran and 
Champaran adjoined, on the west, with the neighbouring United Provinces.
On the opposite frontier the district of Purnea lay between north 
Bhagalpur and the border with Bengal.
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DIAGRAM 5
Administrative structure in Bihar and Orissa
Governor of Bihar and Orissa 
Provincial Administration 
Divisional Commissioners 
Collector/Magistrates 
Subdivisional Officers
Above the level of the district the division, supervised by a 
Divisional Commissioner, comprised the next unit of organization. The 
Tirhut division comprised the central and western districts of north Bihar — 
Darbhanga, Muzaffarpur, Saran and Champaran, and had its headquarters at 
Muzaffarpur town. The remainder of the region — consisting of north 
Monghyr, north Bhagalpur, and Purnea — lay within the Bhagalpur division, 
which also included territory in south Bihar, and which had headquarters at 
Bhagalpur town on the southern bank of the Ganges. The Divisional 
Commissioners reported to the provincial government, which was stationed at 
Patna during most of the year and at Ranchi, in the hill country in southern 
Bihar, during the hot weather. The officials in charge of Divisions, 
Districts and Subdivisions usually came of British stock and supervised a 
staff of Indian assistants and clerks.
District officials carried out the day to day work of admini­
stration. They held responsibility for the maintenance of law and order,
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for the collection of the land revenue from the zamindars, for the well­
being of the population and for the successful completion of a variety 
of miscellaneous administrative duties. They sought to minimize social 
conflict by mediating between conflicting groups, using their authority to 
bring about a mutually acceptable settlement. District and Subdivisional 
Officers carried a heavy burden, working in large, thickly populated areas 
in which communications were very poor. In the neighbouring provincial 
jurisdiction of the United Provinces, Elizabeth Whitcombe points out,
It was an easier matter for European officers in the 
later nineteenth century to leave a district for 
another or for a sanctioned spell abroad than it was 
for them to move about within one during the performance 
of their duties.
Local officials in Bihar found it even harder to keep up with developments
114in their districts. The Bihar districts were twice as large as those
in the United Provinces, and because of its financial weakness the Bihar
and Orissa government spent less than other provincial governments on the
£ J . . . 115maintenance of administration.
Bihar and Orissa, as Table 5 illustrates, was the poor relation 
among the provinces of British India. Each year the province, from land 
revenue and other sources, raised 1,669 rupees per thousand head of popu­
lation, which was less than half the average amount (4,084 rupees) raised
116by the other provinces. Unlike most of the other provinces, Bihar and
Orissa could not profit by increasing the amount levied in land revenue.'*'^ 
In common with the other areas subject to the Permanent Settlement, the 
receipts of Bihar and Orissa from land revenue had been settled in 1793 
and had only been subject to marginal increases. But even in comparison 
with the rest of the Permanent Settlement region the province, as Table 6 
illustrates, was disadvantaged.
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TABLE 5
Income and Expenditure (1927-28 Budgets) per 1,000 inhabitants 
of each province of British India
JURISDICTION REVENUE EXPENDITURE
Rs Rs
Bihar and Orissa 1,669 1, 766
Bengal 2,295 2,372
United Provinces 2,848 2,513
Assam 3,503 3,679
Madras 3,911 3,690
Central Provinces 4,036 4,229
Punj ab 5,380 5,258
Burma 7,824 9,156
Bombay 8,003 8,277
Source: Adapted from table in GGB, Statutory Commission, 
XII, p. 388.
TABLE 6
Land Revenue Demand in relation to area of estates in 
Bihar and Orissa and in Bengal, 1927-28
LAND REVENUE DEMAND AREA IN SQUARE MILES
Bengal 21,600,000 Rs 60,000
Bihar & Orissa 10,600,000 Rs 67,000
Source: GGB, Statutory Commission, XII, p. 387.
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Bihar and Orissa had an overwhelmingly agricultural economy but because
of the Permanent Settlement the government of the province could not
command, by means of land revenue exaction, more than a small portion of
the agrarian surplus. Because of the agrarian character of the provincial
118economy only limited funds could be raised from other sources, and
119the Government of India, itself subject to fiscal difficulties, was 
not willing to give Bihar and Orissa special financial aid. The provincial 
government had extremely limited funds, yet had to provide administrative 
services to a dense and rapidly increasing population. Before 1911, when 
Bihar and Orissa were still incorporated into the Bengal Presidency,
...the standard of expenditure in Bengal was lower 
than in any other province in India; and in Bengal 
the standard in ... Bihar and Orissa was little more 
than half of what it was in the rest of the province,
This unfortunate situation continued, as Table 7 illustrates, into the post 
1911 period.
TABLE 7
Expenditure (1927-28 Budgets) on administrative services 
per 13000 inhabitants of each province of British India.
JURISDICTION EDUCATION MEDICAL PUBLICHEALTH AGRICULTURE INDUSTRIES
Rs Rs Rs Rs Rs
Bihar & Orissa 256 88 44 45 26
Bengal 305 128 72 52 29
United Provinces 392 77 58 68 29
Assam 382 15 7 160 76 25
Madras 514 179 82 82 49
Central Provinces 407 114 28 127 21
Punjab 753 229 101 264 42
Burma 1,040 370 268 158 34
Bombay 1,073 260 128 150 5
Source: Adapted from table in GGB, Statutory Commission_, 
XII, p. 377.
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commented in 1929, "...there has never been enough money in time past to
121provide anything like an adequate standard."
Because of financial stringency, the provincial administration 
could hold only a light rein over the people under its jurisdiction. In 
1921, the management of affairs at the local level was in the hands of less 
than 100 district officials, spread thinly throughout the 21 districts of 
the province. In north Bihar less than 40 district officials held respon­
sibility for the government of 20,400 square miles inhabited by nearly
12214,000,000 people. Perforce, the provincial adminstration found itself
limited to the fulfilment of its minimal tasks of collecting the land
revenue and other taxes, and of quelling riots and containing crime.
Because of the great disparity between the amount the zamindars collected
in rent and abwabs and the amount they paid to the aministration in land
revenue, the collection of land revenue tended to look after itself. The
collection of revenue by excise, stamp and other duties also proceeded smoothly.
But the frequency of riots arising out of agrarian disputes and the high
incidence of crime, much of it poverty induced, sometimes posed more
serious problems. For the handling of these problems the administration
depended on the police force. In north Bihar the core of the police force
consisted of about 3,000 trained career policemen. An auxiliary body of
26,000 chaukidars, or village watchmen, acted in support of the trained 
123force. The administration recruited an average of one chaukidar for
each 500 members of the population, and stationed, in proportion to the
124number of its inhabitants, one or more chaukidars in each village. The
chaukidars operated in the village from which they came. They usually 
belonged to the Dusadh caste, and often inherited their post from their 
father or uncle. Their duties included guarding villagers’ crops, houses,
In the administration of Bihar and Orissa, the government of the province
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and possessions against theft, reporting deaths, births, crimes, and 
unusual events to the local police station, and assisting the police in the 
investigation of crime and the apprehension of criminals. In payment they 
received a miserly wage of three to five rupees a month, raised by a levy 
on the inhabitants of the village. An officially appointed committee drawn 
from among locally influential zamindars, European indigo planters, and big
tenants, known as a chaukidari panchayat or union, held the responsibility
for levying the chaukidari fee from the villagers and for recruiting,
directing, and paying the chaukidars. Because of their low pay chaukidars
125tended to be inefficient and corrupt. Not infrequently, they operated in
collusion with local criminals. Their local residence, and their employment 
by a committee made up of local notables, meant that often they had to per­
form their duties in a manner consistent with the wishes of these notables.
The chaukidars, Anand A. Yang comments, "... were never successfully in­
corporated into the official system". Instead, they operated as the "functionarie
126of the landholders' systems of control." The best that the author of
the official 1921 Bihar and Orissa yearbook could find to say of them was that
"... a large minority of chaukidars do their work with remarkable efficiency,"
127and that "... no other class could perform these duties as cheaply."
The basic unit of police operations was the police station or 
thana. These two terms were used interchangeably, and denoted both the 
actual police stat ion/thana building and the territory over which it had 
jurisdiction. Each district had some 10 to 20 police stations, which 
meant that each station held jurisdiction over areas of tens of square 
miles populated by thousands of people. In Darbhanga in 1901, for example, 
there were 12 police stations and 10 police outposts, manned by a total of 
492 policemen. This police force held responsibility for law and order in 
an area of 3,348 square miles inhabited by 2,912,611 people In Darbhanga,
4 6
there was one policeman for every 6.7 square miles of area and for every
1285,919 members of the population. The staff of each thana consisted
of a dozen or two constables under the direction of a ’Writer Head 
Constable', so called because of his literacy, and under the overall control 
of a Sub-Inspector. The constables were unarmed except for lathis, while 
the Sub-Inspector carried a revolver. Often, a couple of old shotguns lay 
about the thana, for use against bandits and rioters. The thana staff, 
with the assistance of the local chaukidars, handled the routine police 
business of the locality. When a situation threatened to get out of con­
trol the local police could call for reinforcements from the Armed Reserve, 
a unit armed with muskets and made up of men seconded from the main force
for a two-year period of special training. In 1921 this unit consisted of
1291,286 officers and men, of whom 400 were stationed in north Bihar. Help
could also be requested from the Bihar and Orissa Military Police, an elite
police unit of well-armed, highly-trained men divided into four companies,
two of which were mounted. One company, the Military Police Company,
consisted of 111 officers and men stationed at Muzaffarpur town; the other
three companies were stationed south of the Ganges, delegated to protect
the provincial capital, Patna, and the valuable south Bihar coal fields in
130the event of serious trouble. These units recruited from among ex-army men,
and were under the command of the provincial Inspector General of Police.
The military provided the last resort. From 1922 a company of British
infantry was based at Muzaffapur town; before then the nearest military help
was south of the Ganges at Dinapur town, four miles west of Patna, the home base-
131of a British infantry battalion.
In north Bihar, a policeman's lot was not a happy one. It 
involved night duty, travel over difficult country, and physical danger.
47
Because of its financial difficulties the provincial government kept 
the wages of the police to a minimum. Constables, who usually came from 
low status groups, earned a wage, in 1921, of 15 rupees per month. Un­
skilled labourers earned about the same; and rank and file railway and
132postal employees earned more. Most constables compensated themselves
for their poor pay and hard working conditions by extorting money and by
accepting bribes. Indeed the opportunity to profit by corrupt practices
133helped greatly to attract recruits to the police force. The constable
stationed in the towns, the Bihar and Orissa Chief Secretary commented in
1929, had more possibilities of corruption open to him than a rural
constable. A rural constable
"may be a 'free feeder', but the town constable, with 
the whole range of opportunities which section 34 of 
the Police Act gives him, will have no enthusiasm 
for an increase of pay of one or two rupees a month.
A town constable takes his toll from the toddy shop 
keeper, the bullock cart driver, the Marwari, the 
shopkeeper and the prostitute. Unlike a mufassal 
constable a town constable's fees are probably as 
regular as his Pay*"j_ 34
Nor was corruption limited to the lower ranks of the police force. Writer
Head Constables earned twice the amount of constables but had a better
education,came from a higher social stratum, and were accustomed to a higher
standard of living. A Writer Head Constable could not live on his pay and
even if he wished "to run straight" he found himself "driven to dishonesty.'
The Writer Head Constable, according to Inspector General R.J. Hirst, was
"the cancer of the force, spreading his evil influence above and below him.'
The rank above the Writer Head Constable was that of the Sub-Inspector.
Hirst, in his special secret report of 1929, commented that "some of our
Sub-Inspectors enter the service with the desire to earn an honest living
137and some of that number contrive to keep their honest purpose." During
the 1920s, Sub-Inspectors began on a salary of 80 rupees a month which rose,
,135
,136
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over a period of 25 years, to a maximum of 135 rupees. This salary
compared unfavourably with those given in Bengal and the Punjab, but
should have allowed its recipient to live in reasonable comfort without
resorting to corruption. But the social pressures on a Sub-Inspector to
support distant relatives and to spend large sums on religious and social
13 8ceremonies usually obliged him to live beyond his income. Only among
the highly paid higher ranks, the Inspectors and the District Super-'
139intendents of Police, who included a large proportion of Britons, was 
corruption infrequent, though here it also existed. When Police Super­
intendent Frank Lockwood Bussell was accused, in 1919 and 1920, on 
multiple charges of taking bribes, the administration definitely estab­
lished after investigation that four Inspectors, as well as four Sub- 
Inspectors and three Head Constables had participated in the network of 
corruption that Bussell had set up in Darbhanga and adjoining districts.
The official investigation also revealed the collusion of a large number
140of other policeman. The Bussell case created a dilemma for the
administration. Some of the suspected policemen refused to give any evi­
dence to the investigation committee, while others came forward with full 
details of what had occurred, thus providing strong evidence against 
themselves. Would it be fair to punish those who had given information, 
and who "had the grace to admit their misconduct", while those suspects who 
had refused to cooperate escaped punishment because there was insufficient 
concrete evidence against them? Eventually, in a decision which reveals 
official acceptance that a certain level of corruption was unavoidable,
the administration only dismissed Bussell and his closest accomplice, and
141merely subjected the other culprits to departmental disciplinary action.
The police supplemented dishonesty with brutality. Adept at 
extracting confessions from people they had arrested, they reacted swiftly
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and violently to any threat to their authority. 14 2 This aspect of the
popular image of the police is illustrated by an item printed in the 
Indian Nation on 30 September 1938, relating that in Siwan, the chief 
town of Saran, a cow owned by a policeman had run amok, injuring seven 
people, one seriously and six slightly. This proved, commented the 
reporter, that "a policeman's cow may by long association develop a police­
man's traits ... like the class which owned the animal it was no respecter 
of persons."
Policemen found that their reputation for dishonesty and
brutality handicapped them in’their task of maintaining law and order.
People feared and distrusted them, and did not assist them in the execution 
143of their duties. Their work also suffered because of their sparse
numbers. As table 8 illustrates, the province of Bihar and Orissa spent
the least on police per head of population and had the lowest proportion of
police to population of any of the provinces of British India. And only
the jurisdiction of the Central Provinces, with its low population and hilly
144terrain, had a lower proportion of police to total area.
TABLE 8
Ratio of people to police and cost of police in provinces 
of British India, 1929
JURISDICTION PEOPLE TO EACH POLICEMAN COST PER 1,000 OF 
POPULATION
Bihar and Orissa
Punj ab 
Bombay 
Burma
United Provinces 
Madras
Central Provinces
Bengal
Assam
2,372
1,853
1,772
1,343
1,526
1,259
1,053
776
954
Rs
236
314
303
328
370
424
481
700
893
Source: Adapted from table in GGB, Statutory Commission, 
XII, p. 389.
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Policemen were part of a garrison dotted across the countryside, rather 
than active participants in the day to day life of the people. Policemen 
depended on the information supplied by the chaukidars, and frequently 
only arrived on the scene well after serious trouble had erupted. Sometimes, 
the police did not even get wind of serious disturbances. On 16 June 1923 
a group of ryots clashed with servants of the Darbhanga Raj near the 
Bahora indigo concern in Purnea. The ryots, incensed by their grievances 
over the cultivation of indigo, assaulted several men, injuring one of 
them very seriously. But the local Darbhanga Raj manager did not report 
the incident to the police because, he explained to his superiors,
145" ... the Sub-Inspector of Pirpainti is exorbitant in his demands."
In north Bihar the British maintained only a skeletal
apparatus of police/administrative control. District officials and regular
policemen, the main representatives of the State in north Bihar, were so
thin on the ground that peasants, at least until their perspectives
changed in response to the rise of the nationalist movement from circa
1920 on, tended to perceive "... the State as a distant entity to which
146they attached both their hopes and fears." The British administration
of north Bihar operated, to use Anand A. Yang's perceptive phrase, as a
14 7"Limited Raj" which left much of the routine work of social control in 
the hands of the locally influential private citizens who comprised the 
landed interest.
Within the landed interest the great landowners exerted much 
influence. The Maharaja of Darbhanga owned properties scattered across 
Muzaffarpur, Darbhanga, north Bhagalpur and Purnea; the Maharaja of 
Hatwa owned most of the northern half of Saran; and between them the 
Maharani of Bettiah, the Maharaja of Ramnagar and the zamindar of Madhuban
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owned most of Champaran district. These great landholders, in return
for loyalty to the British administration and donations to public 
charities, received knighthoods and other honours, seats on district boards 
and in the Legislative Council, the right to surround themselves with pomp 
and ceremony, and privileged access to to the highest circles of official­
dom. To run their estates they generally employed hundreds of people
ranging from chief managers and head office clerks and accountants through
149assistant managers and their establishments to peons and lathials.
Lathials were strong-arm men adept in the use of the lathi, the north 
Indian equivalent of the English quarter-staff, while peons operated, in 
the words of an indigo planter, as the landlord's "... unofficial police."^0 
At the village level, the estate bureaucracy meshed in with the locally 
dominant peasants who occupied the posts of jeth ryot and patwari. The 
jeth ryot held responsibility for collecting the rents due from the ryots, 
while the patwari acted as the ' village accountant ' in charge of the 
records of rent payment and land holding.
Rather than having all their property concentrated into one 
or two large blocks, the great zamindars generally held a number of 
distinct holdings dispersed over a wide area. The mauza or revenue village 
formed the basic unit of ownership. (The mauza, which was often loosely 
referred to as a "village", consisted of an area of land which might or 
might not be co-incident with a residential village and its surrounding 
fields). Often, great zamindars shared proprietary rights in a mauza with 
one or more small zamindars. The great zamindars, P.J. Musgrave has 
argued, had their power limited, particularly vis-a-vis locally dominant 
peasants, because their lands were not concentrated within a limited geo­
graphical area and because they often shared ownership of a mauza with
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great landlords possessed pervasive influence throughout the broad areas
152within which their properties lay. Because they lived in grand style,
in a luxury and splendour that created wonder among poor villages, and 
because of their high ritual status within the hierarchy of Hinduism, the 
great landlords of north Bihar helped maintain the raja/praja (king/subject) 
mentality of the mass of the population. Villagers looked to a remote, 
distant Maharaja, a figure hedged with divinity, with loyalty and defer­
ence, and hoped for his help in times of need. This attitude persisted 
because usually, after flood or famine, the great zamindar dispensed
relief; and because occasionally, he punished the misdeeds of his
153servants and retainers.
More concretely, locally dominant small landlords and sub­
stantial tenants looked to the great zamindar*s estate as a valuable 
economic and political resource. The great zamindar dispensed patronage 
and had the ear of high level officials. In his properties he employed 
large numbers of people, most of whom came from the ranks of the locally 
dominant or their clients. In the property of both great and small 
zamindars the collection of rent was supplemented with the levying of 
abwabs from the tenantry. But whereas small zamindars benefited from 
both sources of income, great zamindars found that while their rental 
income passed on up to them through their managing bureaucracy, most of 
the money earned from abwabs lined the pockets of estate managers, jeth 
ryots, patwaris, retainers and servants. The great zamindar, moreover, 
provided funds for the institution of law suits, supported village schools,
and had retainers and lathials at hand who could be used by a small land-
154lord or big tenant to gain leverage in local factional struggles.
151other landlords. But despite these limitations on their power the
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Admittedly, conflicts occasionally erupted between the locally dominant 
and the estate bureaucracies. But such conflicts characteristically 
resulted from attempts by the locally dominant to advance particular 
interests and gain particular concessions, and usually consisted merely of 
a show of force and dissidence in order to gain bargaining leverage. 
Opposition of this kind could generally either be intimidated or bought off, 
and these conflicts were short lived and localized, and did not challenge 
decisively the continuing influence of the great zamindars.
In the middle range between the great zamindars and the 
locally dominant peasants came the European planters and entrepreneurs.
These men had originally been attracted to north Bihar by the profits to be 
made from indigo p l a n t i n g . L a t e r  when in the early decades of the 20th 
century indigo manufacturing ceased to be profitable, they and their 
descendants turned their attention to sugar manufacture and to the culti­
vation of cash crops. They acquired control over land by various means.
In some instances they purchased proprietary rights from zamindars, while 
in others they rented out lands and established ryoti rights. Generally, 
however, they became thikadars or lessees by leasing out property rights 
from zamindars who wished to be freed the tedious, exacting business of 
rent collection. The European planting and business community in north 
Bihar numbered only a few hundreds, but because of its unquestioning 
loyalty and its dispersal across the region it served to bolster Imperial 
rule and acted as a useful intelligence network for the provincial admini­
stration .
In north Bihar big landlords and European planters exercised 
influence in interaction with locally dominant small landlords and big 
tenants. In areas were big landlords owned most of the land, big tenants
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tended to dominate local society. One locally dominant tenant in the
early years of this century was Pandit Palat Mishra, a Maithil Brahman
and Darbhanga Raj jeth ryot who farmed, jointly with his younger brother,
about 30 bighas of first class land in Satlakha village in the Madhubani
157thana in the north of Darbhanga. Babu Lai Chand of Dharampur in
Purnea was another substantial tenant. Babu Lai Chand rented a large area
of land from the Darbhanga Raj. In March 1920 the Dharampur circle manager
described him as
... a reasonable man but never a friend of the 
[Darbhanga] R.aj . He avoids open fight but covertly 
instigates tenants to challenge the Raj. His father 
Raja Chand (deceased) moved the whole Pergunnah 
[i.e. locality] against the Raj in the time of [the 
previous manager] Mr Mayer. He has great influence 
and cultivates Raj parta land [i.e. land lying 
fallow] without settlement [i.e. without paying rent].
In areas where small landlords held the land, they held sway
over local society. Circa 1900, in the village of Radhanagar, a Brahman
family owned nine-tenths of the land and also owned land outside the
jurisdiction of the village. This Brahman family exercised dominance as
158the only employer of the labour and services of the local non-Brahmans.
Not infrequently locally dominant peasants had dual status. Circa 1910
Ram Sakhi Tewari, a Brahman of Dumari village in Darbhanga, was "both a
ryot and a zamindar." He held about 50 acres in the Dumari village and a
larger area scattered through two neighbouring villages. He held some of
159this land ¿is a zamindar, and rented the rest from the Darbhanga Raj.
A man who acted as a 'boss 1 over a village or group of villages 
might be a zamindar, or a well-established tenant, or perhaps both of these 
things. To put it more simply: he would be someone who held control over 
a large portion of the village's lands. Almost always he would come from 
one of the higher castes. Often, like the Rajput ryot Khendar Prasad Rai,
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who held 100 acres of land in Champaran and had a lucrative money-lending
business, he would combine money lending with landholding.“^ 0 Through
money-lending, locally dominant peasants could profit politically as well
as economically. Circa 1900, when the Brahman extended family that
dominated Radhanager village split up into two rival family groups, both
the new groups
... began to consolidate their position in the village.
As they were the richest families in the village, they
had certain advantages in their favour ... they could
lend money to the needy villagers and thus claim their
support in return ... there began a period ... in which
both the families were actively competing at money-lending
business. Both the families could also give out lands to
their friends, supporters and retainers on sharecropping
basis and, consequently, make them politically subservient
to their aspirations._,..161
Locally dominant peasants kept retinues of lathials to help protect their
property and prestige; in times of trouble they could also call upon their
kinsmen, their clients and their low caste bonded servants. Locally
dominant peasants exacted feudal dues from those subordinate to them:
162begari or forced labour, and concessional rates for food and handicraft 
163products. They arbitrated in local and petty disputes, and spoke for
the local society in its interactions with the outside world. They exerted
influence over the village chaukidars, and in some instances acted as the
patrons of dacoit gangs which operated outside their immediate locality.
They had an ambivalent relationship with the regular police: they resented
their intermittent interventions into the world of the village but also
colluded with them. Locally dominant peasants contributed generously to
the upkeep of the village temples, and also donated to other charities.
Not infrequently they might ameliorate the rigours of their control by
164taking a paternal interest in the welfare of their subordinates. The
165locally dominant occupied a pivotal role because of their control over
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land, the major source of subsistence; because through money lending 
they tided poor peasants over during the lean periods of the agrarian 
cycle, because they provided payment in kind, and thus the right to live 
for their servants and bonded labourers; and because, from their position 
of local power, they provided the only channel of communication between 
local society and those who held power and dispensed resources beyond the 
narrow confines of the world of the village. Locally dominant peasants 
both conflicted and collaborated with the other groups, namely the big 
zamindars and the European indigo planters, who made up the landed interest 
of north Bihar. Those who made up the landed interest had a common interest 
in retaining dominance and extracting wealth from the mass of the population, 
but they found much to quarrel about over the distribution of wealth and 
the exercise of power. Locally dominant peasants maintained control at 
the local level in collaboration with big zamindars and European planters, 
but they also competed with these two groups and amongst themselves.
"Indeed," as Anand A. Yang points out, "at the fundamental level of agrarian 
society, also the immediate area of action for any raiyat, the village- 
level controller was the key to both control and conflict.
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In the late 19th and early 20th century north Bihar was part of the poorest 
province in British India. The poverty of the province meant that the 
local administration had only limited funds at its command with which 
to maintain control and to provide administrative services. Financial 
difficulties were further exacerbated by the administration's continuing 
support of the politically expedient but economically disastrous system of 
zamindari landholding. Because of this financial weakness the formal 
apparatus of police and administrative control was weak. To maintain con­
trol over north Bihar society the provincial administration benefited from 
the limitations that prevailing social, economic and cultural conditions 
imposed on the organization and expression of protest and relied on the 
informal control exercised by the great landlords, the European indigo 
planters, and the locally dominant peasants. Until the second decade of 
the 20th century, despite the existence of great poverty and oppression, 
tension and conflict did not erupt other than in faction fights for local 
dominance and in clashes between the different components of the landed 
interest. Between 1917 and 1923, however, intense turbulence erupted, 
extending- over broad areas and involving large sections of north Bihari 
society. In this turbulence locally dominant peasants assumed a leading 
role. They coordinated their activities with members of a newly emergent 
regional intelligentsia, and looked for support to their clients and 
retainers within the middle levels of village society. Once protest got 
under way, however, opportunities arose for people lower down in the social 
scale to participate. The following chapter examines this intense and 
extensive popular turbulence, analyses its causes and significance, and 
assesses its impact on the north Bihar apparatus of police and administrative 
control.
Conclusion
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Chapter 2
1917 -  1922 : Popular Turbulence and Police/Administrative Control
Introduction; The first phase of the anti-indigo 
movement, 1917-19; The tenants' rights movement,
1919-20; The second phase of the anti-indigo 
movement, 1919-22; Nationalist Protest, 1920-22 :
The non-cooperation movement as a vehicle for 
popular discontents; Conclusion : Police/admini­
strative control, 1917-22.
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On 10 January 1921, in the Sonbarsa police circle of Bhagalpur, 200 villagers 
attacked 37 Gurkhas who had been employed by a European landlord to protect 
his interests in a land dispute. The Gurkhas, heavily outnumbered, were 
massacred; after the battle was over seven were dead and 14 were missing, 
presumed dead. In the first weeks of the same month, numerous outbreaks of 
market looting occurred in various parts of north Bihar. Some 10 months . 
later, on 1 November, 5,000 villagers attacked the Chauterwa indigo factory 
in the north of Champaran. They assaulted the factory amlas, looted the 
manager's bungalow, and set the bungalow alight and watched it burn to the 
ground. Two months later on 30 December a group of 200 demonstrators in­
vaded a police station in the north of Muzaffarpur near the border with 
Nepal. They occupied the building for several hours, disrupting police 
work and making speeches in favour of independence for India. Four months 
later, on 22 April 1922, Police Constable Gudar Chaubey quarrelled with 
picketers at a liquor shop in Barabigha village, Purnea district. The 
quarrel intensified and led to blows, and Chaubey was beaten up. In 
retaliation, he opened fire with his shotgun, wounding three people.
These incidents were the more dramtic events in a wave of popular 
turbulence which developed in north Bihar between 1917 and 1922. During 
this period the anti-indigo movement, the tenants' rights movement and the 
non-cooperation movement emerged. These three overlapping but distinct move­
ments created considerable anxiety among officials and placed great strain 
on the apparatus of police/administrative control. British officials, thinking 
a large scale rising imminent, arranged the posting of troops at Muzaffarpur 
town and critically scrutinized contingency plans for civil defence. Locally 
dominant groups led the three movements, and much of the initiative within
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them was exercised at the local level. The movements had only limited 
organization above the local level, but despite this they had developed 
great impetus, not least because people from the middle and lower sections 
of north Bihar society became involved in protest.
The wave of popular turbulence between 1917 and 1922 can be related 
to prevailing economic conditions. In the second and third decades of this 
century many people suffered because post-war economic dislocation increased 
the price of consumer goods and because a succession of bad seasons resulted 
in food grains being in scarce supply and highly priced. Scarcity and high 
prices prevailed in 1915, 1919 and 1920, and relatively high prices con­
tinued throughout the 1920s.^ Most people had few reserves with which to 
tide themselves over for even one bad year, and suffered greatly from a 
recurrence of bad seasons. The wages for labour remained relatively steady, 
but from them labourers had to pay higher prices for food. Fortunately, it 
was customary for them to get part of their wages in kind. Tenants with 
marginal holdings found themselves in a precarious position: to pay their 
rent they had to sell much of their produce at harvest time, when prices 
were at a seasonal low, and later in the year, had to buy their food at a 
time when prices had risen. Sharecroppers, lacking storage facilities, had 
to sell much of their crop cheap at harvest time, and then had only limited 
cash with which to contend with high commodity prices. The more strongly 
established members of society, however, found higher food prices of great 
benefit. People with sufficiently large holdings generally hoped to produce 
both enough for their own subsistence and a surplus to be sold on the market. 
Higher food grain prices meant that rent could be paid more easily, and that 
more money remained for the purchase of consumer items. Zamindars also 
benefited: they earned more from the produce of the land over which they 
exercised direct control, and found that they could collect their rents
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relatively easily. Not infrequently, zamindars and rich tenants profited 
as grain dealers, buying cheap at harvest time and selling dear later in 
the year. The overall result, in short, was that while the poor were under 
serious pressure, those who were better established found themselves in a 
favourable positon. Even better established people, however, suffered from 
the ecological effects of population pressure.
North Bihar reached the verge of demographic crisis in the late
19th century. Because of large numbers of deaths from scarcity and famine
2this crisis did not crystallize until 1920. From 1920 onwards, however, 
population pressure and land shortage pressed on north Bihar society like, 
to use a regional saying, "an oil press on an oil seed". Population 
pressure and land shortage greatly intensified landlord/tenant conflict.
In the late 19th century there had been a shortage of land, of timber, 
and of grazing areas for cattle. By the first decades of the 20th century 
shortage had become acute scarcity. Land, timber and grazing rights became 
increasingly contentious issues. The worsening land — man ratio affected 
all sections of society, but those who took a leading part in reacting 
against pressure came from locally dominant groups. Such people had both a 
substantial position to protect and substantial means with which to protect 
it. Some people from among the locally dominant reacted to pressure by 
oppressing, in their capacity as zamindars* amlas or servants, those beneath 
them in the agrarian hierarchy even more strongly than hitherto. Such 
activity helped intensify discontent throughout society. Other people from 
among the locally dominant took a leading part in organizing the tenants 
against their landlords, in an effort to force the redress of their grievances. 
Within the area controlled by the Darbhanga Raj, an extensive tenants' rights 
movements developed in 1919 and 192 0 under the leadership of Swami 
Vidyanand, an activist who combined traditional religious appeal with an
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Turbulence also erupted in areas where European indigo planters 
held sway, and particularly in the district of Champaran. From the late 
1890s indigo prices slumped, gravely threatening the position of the 
European entrepreneurs who had invested in the cultivation and production 
of the crop. The European planters tried to pass the burden of the slump 
in indigo prices onto the shoulders of the peasantry. Because planter 
oppression weighed down upon a broad spectrum of north Bihar society, anti­
indigo agitation attracted wide support. Because the indigo planters came 
of European stock and were closely indentified with local British officials 
the excitement generated by the anti-indigo planter agitation spilled over 
into anti-British and anti-administration feeling. In the Tirhut division — 
the area that was the centre of the anti-indigo planter agitation — the 
non-cooperation movement of 1920-22 achieved its greatest success.
A newly emergent regional intelligentsia, which had developed after 
Bihar and Orissa was separated from the Bengal Presidency in 1911 to form a 
separate province with its capital at Patna, helped organize and lead 
peasant agitation. Braj Kishore Prasad and Rajendra Prasad, both lawyers, 
and J.B. Kriplani, a schoolteacher, numbered among a group of professional 
men who interested themselves in peasant grievances, publicized-them before 
the government and the general public, and attempted to coordinate and direct 
peasant protest. A section of the Bihari intelligentsia, organized into the 
Congress party, initiated the non-cooperation movement of 1920-22. In doing 
so they drew on the dissatisfaction of Muslims over Great Britain's attitude 
to international Islam, on the social tension and racial feeling that had 
crystallized as a result of the anti-indigo movement, and on popular dislike 
and opposition to the administration, particularly as represented by its
ability to operate in the modern political arena.
most visible instruments in north Bihar, the police and the chaukidars.
More generally, the non-cooperation movement commanded wide support because 
at a time when economic difficulty exacerbated demographic pressure it 
offered an opportunity for the voicing of popular discontents.
The development of intense, extensive popular turbulence in the 
1917-22 period had a considerable impact on the operation of police/admini­
strative control in north Bihar. Before analysing this impact the following 
chapter discusses, in a broadly chronological framework, the anti-indigo 
movement, the tenants’ rights movement and the non-cooperation movement.
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In Champaran in 1917 and throughout north Bihar in subsequent years the
peasantry protested on an extensive scale against their oppression by
European indigo planters. The roots of this oppression lay back in the
first half of the 19th century, when European entrepreneurs, attracted by
north Bihar’s fertile earth, cheap labour and plentiful supply of water
3began the commercial production of indigo. In the second half of the 
19th century the industry expanded greatly, partly because, after the trauma 
of the rebellion of 1857-59 the administration encouraged its growth as a
4means of establishing pockets of European influence to bolster British rule 
and partly because of developments in the indigo industry of Bengal. In 
Bengal planter oppression sparked off the "Blue Mutiny" of 1859-61.“* In 
these years, assisted by reformist members of the Calcutta intelligentsia 
and by liberal Englishmen the Bengali peasantry mounted a large-scale protest 
movement against the European indigo planters. Peasant intransigence and 
administrative reforms made it commercially impossible for the indigo 
industry to continue in Bengal. Many planters transferred their activities 
to north Bihar, in the outer reaches of the Bengal Presidency, an area far 
away from Indian reformers, their British non-official allies, and from the 
base in Calcutta of the provincial government and the Government of India.^
The planters became best established in Champaran, the most remote
of the districts of north Bihar. Here, by the late 19th century. Europeans
7held long term leases over nearly half of the land. In Muzaffarpur they 
held short term leases on 17.5 per cent of the land, while in the other
g
districts they held only a few per cent of the total land area. By 1901, 
the planters of Champaran, with their families and European assistants, 
formed a tightly knit group of about 200. Another 200 to 300 members of the
The first phase of the anti-indigo movement1917-19.
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planter community was scattered across north Bihar.
Planters, even when they controlled only a small portion of a district's 
land, exercised considerable influence because the administration favoured 
them. In Muzaffarpur, though relatively few in number, planters held one out 
of every four of the presidencies of the chaulcidari unions, and thus had 
extra political and economic leverage at the local level."*'0 Planters held 
seats out of all proportion to their numbers on the District Boards, the 
organs of limited self-government, had charge of cattle pounds, and held 
the contract for the upkeep of roads within an area. The administration
often located post offices near a planter's bungalow, both to suit his con­
venience and to help protect the post office against dacoits. The admini­
stration built railways, partly under pressure from the planting community, 
and sited lines and stations to suit the planters' interests. Officials 
and planters, moreover, often participated in social activities together.
They gathered for drinks at the club, and accompanied one another on hunting 
12expeditions. Occasionally individual officials criticized the planters but 
generally planters and officials cooperated harmoniously. From the per­
spective of the north Bihar peasant, differences between planters and
13officials assumed far less importance than the cooperation between them.
For most north Biharis, planters had the power and prestige of British 
officials.
In north Bihar European planters began their operations by acquiring
control over land. Sometimes they took over land as ryots, and sometimes
they purchased zamindari rights, but generally they assumed zamindari rights
14as thikadars or lessees. Having gained control over land, the planters 
established living quarters and a factory in a suitable position at the side 
of a lake, which would supply the large quantities of water necessary to
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the successful extraction of the dye from the indigo plant. Planters 
generally used the land in the immediate vicinity of the indigo factory 
as a homestead farm producing foods and products for home consumption — 
rice for the servants, for example, and oats for the horses. Almost all the 
indigo processed by the factory grew on the land held by the tenants. Some­
times the ryots would plant indigo on their own initiative, hoping to sell 
the harvested crop to a nearby indigo factory. Much more frequently, however, 
the planter, helped greatly by his influence as the possessor of proprietary 
rights over the ryot's lands, arranged with each ryot for him to cultivate 
indigo on a certain portion of his land — usually on three kathas out of 
every twenty. This practice, known as Tinkathia, allowed a planter to 
ensure the use of the best land throughout the area under his control for 
the cultivation of indigo. And when, after two or three crops, the land 
lost productivity, a new portion of the ryot's holding would be chosen for 
indigo cultivation. In return for reserving their best land ryots were 
assured of a market for their indigo crop, and might also receive some 
concessions on the amount of rent they paid.
A planter, to make a good profit by legitimate means, had to be 
active both as a landlord and as a supervisor of the manufacture of indigo.
As a landlord he had to ensure that all cultivable land was fully and 
properly under cultivation, that the tenants paid their rents promptly and 
in full, and that his rights in trees, hides, fishing and other micellaneous 
commodities were protected. The successful cultivation and manufacture of 
indigo also demanded close attention. The planter had to ensure that the 
ryots used their best lands for indigo, and that every few years, to guard 
against soil exhaustion, they employed a new area for the plant. Throughout 
the lengthy period of its preparation, the indigo crop required close
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attention. The soil had to be carefully prepared before the crop was sown 
and once sown had to be frequently and carefully weeded. Members of the 
colony of labourers attached to each indigo factory did much of this work, 
but because only the most fertile plots, which were usually widely dis­
persed, were used for indigo, because the proprietary rights that the 
planters leased often applied to zaminari holdings scattered in bits and 
pieces over a wide area, and because the need for labour varied greatly 
throughout the year,the planters could not afford to keep employed a full­
time staff sufficiently large to handle all the work associated with the 
cultivation of the plant. Planters relied instead on the help of their 
tenants, with whom they arranged for the supply of labour, and also for the 
provision of carts and bullocks for transportation. ^
For assistance in the management of their concerns planters relied on
Indian amlas. The chief amla, the jemadar, functioned as "... a sort of
16farm-bailiff or confidential land-steward." The jemadar, assisted by a 
staff of amlas, supervised the work of labourers and the cultivation of 
the crop. The behaviour of the amlas often caused tension between a 
planter and his tenants. One planter commented that if a jemadar was
an honest, intelligent and loyal man, he takes 
half the care and work off your shoulders. Such 
men are however rare, and if not very closely 
looked after, they are apt to abuse their position, 
and often harass the ryots needlessly, looking 
more to the feathering of their own nests than the 
advancement of your interests.^-,
The rest of the factory staff similarly tended to abuse their positions of
18authority, unless kept under careful scrutiny by their employer.
The close attention needed for the successful production of indigo 
also created tension between planters and tenants. The necessity of careful 
preparation of the soil, repeated weeding, and quick efficient harvesting
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provided opportunities for disputes between the ryots growing the crop
19and the planter for whom it was being cultivated. The indigo harvest, m
addition, coincided with the harvest of the ryot’s food grains. The
planters insisted on priority in the use of the villagers' carts and in the
supply of casual labour, both of which were in short supply at the height 
20of the harvest. The planters also insisted that the best land be reserved
for indigo, and since the process of growing indigo continued throughout
the entire year the peasants could not use the land set aside for indigo to
21grow other crops.
The fundamental conflict, C.M. Fisher points out, was between 
European entrepreneurs seeking to maximize returns from a single speculative 
crop grown on a large scale, and subsistence farmers operating on a small 
scale who sought to minimize risk rather than to maximize profit. Indigo, 
in contrast to other cash crops, and especially high quality rice 
grown for the market rather than for home consumption, could not be eaten 
if the market slumped. And indigo
... was very labour intensive, removed land from 
normal use and so involved a very high opportunity 
cost, and was very risky. ^
Because indigo was grown in a manner unsuitable to small-scale peasant 
production, peasants were disinclined to cultivate the crop. Because of 
this reluctance, and because of the high costs involved in the production 
of the crop, free market relations could not ensure the commercial manu­
facture of indigo. Hence the north Bihar planters employed extra-economic
pressures., and particularly those they could exercise as local land con-
23trollers, to oblige the peasants to grow indigo. Rather than acting as 
a modern, galvanizing force within the north Bihar agrarian economy, the 
planters accepted traditional forms and operated within established
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institutions. "The indigo industry", Fisher concludes, "created
tensions for the peasant, subsistence economy but instituted no radical
24change." These tensions created a strong undercurrent of peasant 
• 25 antipathy to indigo cultivation.
The character of the indigo planters intensified this antipathy.
The planters were adventurers who had come to north Bihar to make their
fortunes in what was, because of the frequency of fluctuations in yields
26and prices, a highly speculative industry. One Collector/Magistrate
described them as "... rough uneducated men, hard drinkers, loose livers
27and destitute of sympathy for the natives ..." The planters, he continued,
attempted "... to get rid of as much as possible of the authority of the
Magistrate, because it interfered with the despotic control which they
28considered it essential to exercise over the ryots." Sometimes the
control of the planters amounted to a benevolent despotism, with the
planter acting to protect, as far as his own interests allowed, the
welfare of the people within his realm of influence. A planter who acted
fairly and justly could gain the respect of the local people, who would
then call upon him to arbitrate disputes which they did not wish to entrust
29to the lengthy, complicated processes of the official legal system. Not
all planters, however, were cast in this image. Many were drunken never-do-
30 , ^ wells, who survived financially by extortion rather than by
31management. "The factory influence", one planter testified in 1876,
"... is generally represented by a peon with a stick ... I do not think the
32factory influence extends beyond that. It is all due to coercion."
Despite their faults, the planters did bring some benefits to the 
people of north Bihar. They increased the demand for labour, and sometimes 
paid their labourers better than Indian zamindars. They provided managerial
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employment for Indians, gave loans to impoverished zamindars, and, by
providing a guaranteed market for the indigo grown by the ryots, assured
33 . . . .them of a steady income. Because of these benefits the administration
viewed the planters favourably, though it sometimes expressed disquiet over
34the misbehaviour of individual planters. For the administration the
planters provided a valuable buttress of imperial rule, not least because
they were organized into the Bihar Light Horse, an auxiliary unit which had,
35in 1904, a membership of 141. But administrative support for the planters
was guarded. The planters helped secure British rule, but this contribution
would be nullified if, by mismanagement and oppression, they sparked off
peasant protest and thus jeopardized the stability of British administrative 
3 6control. Several times during the latter half of the 19th century the
administration, in response to tenant agitation, obliged the planters to
make concessions, usually in the form of an increase in the amount paid to
37the tenant for his indigo crop. The administration also encouraged the
formation, in 1877-78,of the Behar Planters' Association, an organization
intended, according to its founders, both to protect the interests of the
indigo industry and to ensure that the planters observed reasonable
3 8standards of behaviour. Overall, throughout the 19th century, the admini­
stration did little other than indulge in occasional pious exhortations to 
the planters, urging them not to oppress the people. By the 1890s the 
north Bihar indigo industry had become well entrenched. Now and again, and
especially frequently at harvest time, small scale disputes arose between
39planters and tenants, but in these the planters kept the upper hand.
The planters enjoyed the sympathy of the administration and had strong links
40with important, Calcutta-based commercial enterprises. Indigo provided
good profits and the planters lived in a grand style in palatial mansions. 
Indeed, the industry provided such good returns that the Maharajas of
41
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Darbhanga and Hathwa both devoted part of their lands to indigo production,
42employing European managers to run their concerns. But all at once the
industry came under serious challenge. In the mid-1890s a German scientist
invented a commercially competitive synthetic substitute for the indigo
43dye. In the ensuing years, as table 9 illustrates, the prices for indigo 
plumme ted.
TABLE 9
Average indigo prices, 1894-96; 1897-99; and 1904
PERIOD PRICE PER MAUND IN RUPEES
1894-96 234
1897-99 152
1904 100
Source: Reid, "Indigo in Bihar", p. 257.
The slump in indigo prices created a crisis for the indigo planters.
Taking the continuing prosperity of the industry for granted they had
borrowed heavily to invest in their enterprises and to support their lavish
life-style. They had found it necessary to borrow particularly heavily
because each season the cultivation of indigo required a substantial initial
investment which could not be recouped until many months later when the
44processed product finally reached the Calcutta market. When the competit­
ion of the synthetic substitute for indigo began, their Calcutta financiers
, 45cut off the planters supply of credit. When the slump in the indigo
industry began some planters left the region but others remained, partly
because they were too financially committed to extricate themselves and
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The planters who remained attempted to deal with the crisis in the 
industry in several ways. They experimented with new techniques and with 
a different variety of indigo seed in an effort to improve production and 
increase the quality of their product. They diversified their enterprises,
lowering the acreage under indigo and growing sugar cane, mustard seed and
, , 46other cash crops.
partly because they hoped for an improvement in the industry's fortunes.
TABLE 10
Acreage under indigo in Champaran 1898, 1907 and 1914
YEAR ACREAGE
1900 96,000
1907 52,600
1914 8,100
Sources: O'Malley, Champaran, p. 72; Brown, Gandhi's 
Rise, p. 63.
They kept a stricter control over their amlas, attempting to ensure that
none of the concern's profits were embezzled. (Sometimes, however, this
policy backfired, and dissident amlas led agitations against their former
47masters). And they attempted, wherever possible, to ensure that the 
peasantry bore much of the burden caused by the slump in prices. They 
found several ways of doing this. Frequently, they took advantage of the 
agreements that the ryots had entered into to grow indigo on a certain 
portion of land. The planters would persuade the ryots, often by dubious 
methods, that in return for being allowed to stop growing indigo in future,
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they should either agree to their rent being increased or else pay a lump
48sum as compensation to the factory. They also protected their position
by increasing the incidence of abwabs upon the villagers and by dealing more
49stringently with their labour force. By these initiatives the planters 
created discontent throughout a broad spectrum of the community. In particu­
lar, planter oppression affected both big and small occupancy tenants, and 
the tenants in the indigo growing areas reacted by engaging in extensive 
protest. But planter pressure also had an impact on people lower down in 
the social scale, and because of this, and because they were mobilized by 
locally dominant tenants, the labouring poor also participated in anti­
indigo protest.
The first striking manifestation of increased planter-peasant tension 
came in 1907 when tenants surrounded Bloomfield, the manager of an indigo 
concern in northern Champaran and beat him to death with lathis. The 
administration later explained that Bloomfield was attacked after an argu­
ment arising out of his refusal to sanction the transfer of some holdings, 
but according to the local inhabitants, he had been killed because he had 
been sexually exploiting the local women.^ In Champaran during the follow­
ing years recurrent anti-indigo protests occurred. In 1907-08 members of 
the Muslim Sheik community spearheaded protest against the Sathi indigo 
factory in the Shikapur thana in the southwest of the district. Their campaign 
concerned the exaction from the tenents of compensation money in return for
them being released from the obligation to grow indigo on part of their hold- 
52ings. The tenants contended, completely accurately, that they had not
entered any formal agreement to cultivate indigo on behalf of the factory,
and therefore had no obligation to compensate the planter when he decided
53that he no longer required them to produce the crop. The disturbances 
continued for a year, only subsiding when the administration arranged a
100
compromise under which tenants who stopped supplying indigo to the factory
would pay a higher fee for the use of the irrigation works the factory had
54constructed. In 1908-09 a wave of protest spread throughout the Bettiah
Subdivision, which comprised the western half of the district. To restore
order the authorities brought in Military Police, instituted 57 criminal
cases, and convicted 226 people of acts of violence.' They also arranged a
compromise whereby the area under indigo cultivation was reduced from
3/20th to l/10th of the tenants holding and the price paid for indigo rose
55from 12 to 13 rupees per acre.
The next wave.of protest in the district began in December 1911
with a large but abortive demonstration before the King-Emperor, George the
Fifth, when he stopped at Narkatiaganj railway station while on his way back
5 6from a hunting trip in Nepal. Shortly after this demonstration a press
and petition campaign began which continued until October 1912. ^  The level
of tension heightened with the commencement, in October 1913, of survey and
settlement revision operations, which involved the re-assessment and re-
58cording of all existing obligations and rights. During 1914, activists
sent a series of petitions protesting against the imposition of abwabs, and
59obliged the administration to make an investigation. Then, in 1915-16,
there was again a period of large scale unrest, similar to that of 1908-09,
except that this time protest centred in the Motihari Subdivision, which
made up the eastern half of the district. The ryots contested the legality
of the rent enhancements made in lieu of continued indigo cultivation, claim-
6 0ing that force had been used to procure their agreement. The ryots, "through­
out this period, manifested remarkable cohesion and persistence ..."^* They, 
and especially the Bhumihars of the Pipra and Turkalia areas, "were inclined
to be turbulent ... and the settlement officers had a continuously un-
6 2pleasant experience ..." Agitation also continued outside the district,
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grievances in the Bihar and Orissa Legislative Council, at the annual meeting
of the provincial Congress organization at Chapra in 1915, and at the Indian
6 3National Congress session in Lucknow in 1916.
Raj Kumar Shukul, a Brahman and a "well-to-do middle class peasant 
and money-lender who also managed the farm of a landholder belonging to 
Allahabad", took the leading part in the continuing agitation. In April
1917, after repeated requests, Shukul managed to bring M.K. Gandhi to 
Champaran to enquire into the ryots' grievances.^“* This newcomer to the 
district was an unknown quantity in Indian politics. A Gujerati bania by 
birth, a lawyer by training, and a political activist cum religious philos­
opher by vocation, Gandhi was, at the time he came to Champaran, 48 years of 
age. He had returned to India two years before, after spending most of his
adult life in southern Africa, where he had achieved considerable fame and
66some success as a stalwart champion of the rights of immigrant Indians.
He was adept both in conventional constitutional agitation and in his own
distinctive brand of non-violent civil resistance, which he termed
6 7satyagraha. In the India of 1917 Gandhi was a respected but little-known 
figure whose only notable public act since his return to the subcontinent 
had been the making of a controversial speech at a meeting of the Hindu 
University at Benares in July 1916.
Gandhi's intervention in the anti-planter agitation helped bring
it to a head. He assumed the role of leadership and soon stood forth as
6 8the ryots' advocate. In rising, to this position of local eminence 
Gandhi benefited from the maladroitness of the British administration.
When Gandhi arrived in the district, the Collector/Magistrate passed an 
order, on the grounds that his presence might cause a breach of the peace,
and members of the regional intelligentsia publicized the tenants'
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forbidding him to engage in public affairs and requiring him to leave the
69district within a few days time. The provincial government, when informed 
of this action, immediately responded by instructing the local officials to 
drop the proceedings.70 As the Chief Secretary pointed out, the evidence 
concerning Gandhi's activities in Africa indicated that he would make the 
most of any opportunity offered to make a martyr of himself and attract 
attention to his cause.7'*' This, indeed, is exactly what happened: by the 
time the countermanding instructions of the provincial government arrived 
Gandhi had already issued a statement declaring that, despite his general 
respect for the law and for legally constituted authority, he felt obliged, 
in this particular instance, to obey his conscience and to show his dedi­
cation to truth and justice by defying the order, even at the risk of being 
72jailed. The matter did not come to the test: the administration took no
action against him and without further hindrance he began making a detailed
enquiry into the allegations and complaints of the ryots. His willingness
to stand up to the administration had, nevertheless, redounded greatly to
his credit, and encouraged many to support him, including several professional
men who were adherents of the Bihar Congress and who had been taking an
73interest in the dispute between the planters and the ryots. These pro­
fessional men, who included two noted lawyers, namely Braj Kishore Prasad, 
from Darbhanga town, and Rajendra Prasad, from Chapra, the headquarters 
town of Saran district, assisted Gandhi during his investigation by acting 
as scribes and interpreters.
Gandhi's activities in the district soon created a state of 
"unparalleled excitement."7  ^ His stand against the local officials, the 
aura of saintliness associated with his austerity and simplicity, his 
novelty as an outsider who had come from afar, his transparant sincerity 
and the enthusiastic help he received from his lawyer-scribes and from the
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leading local peasants encouraged thousands of tenants to come forward
76 '¡m u ^ cÁ /
and lay their stories before him. Indeed, so^ln demand did he become
that one of his assistants, J.B. Kriplani, had to spend his days putting 
off unwanted visitors who would unnecessarily interrupt the work of inter­
viewing tenants and recording their statements.77 The interest and excite­
ment generated by Gandhi's unofficial enquiry inspired official fears that
78major turbulence was about to erupt. With tension at a high level
and with Gandhi producing strong evidence in support of the ryots'
complaints the administration felt obliged to appoint a commission to
79enquire into the agrarian conditions in Champaran and, to the dismay
and anger of the planters, appointed Gandhi to it as the spokesmen for the 
80ryots. The committee conducted hearings from July to October 1917, and 
made recommendations which formed the basis of the Champaran Agrarian Act 
of 1918, a piece of legislation designed to establish a lasting settlement
of the conflicts between the planters and tenants of the district of
r, 81 Champaran.
The Champaran Agrarian Act did not, however, provide a lasting
82solution to the problems it set out to rectify. The tenants complained 
about the concessions that had been made in the bill to placate the 
planters, and particularly because the legislature had
... rejected the clause in the bill which was most of all 
to protect the raiyats' interest, that is, the clause 
conferring on the Collector summary power to fine landlords 
for the exaction of abwab. 83
The compromise that Gandhi engineered in Champaran and which was enshrined
in the Champaran Agrarian Act has been widely acclaimed as a verification,
in India, of the value of the techniques of political agitation which he had
84developed during his years in southern Africa. Many of those for whom he
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Settlement Officer, "the more turbulent elements ... frankly repudiated
him and his agreement on their behalf, and raised all possible frivolous
85objections." The Bhumihar ryots were particularly truculent: their
actions confirmed, for Sweeney, "the unpleasant impression" that had been
86"gathered from a somewhat long experience of them".
The Champaran Agrarian Act outlawed certain of the planters’
customary activities relating to the cultivation of indigo, but this merely
meant that the planters had to find new means by which to extract extra
income from their tenants. In doing so they took advantage of their status
as long-term lessees of proprietary rights, which endowed them with a wide
8 7range of rights and privileges, many of which they had not previously
*
88bothered to implement fully. One of these hitherto relatively neglected
rights derived from their proprietary control over much of the waste land
which the tenants used for grazing purposes. Formerly most planters had
89taken some advantage from this use of their land, and had also always
been ready to impound any cattle that strayed from the waste lands into
90fields where indigo was growing. From 1918 onwards the planters began
to take full advantage of their ownership of waste lands by charging the
ryots high grazing fees. In doing so, the planters were perfectly within 
91their rights, and since there were no effective legal or administrative
provisions to control the situation, a heavy burden was placed upon the
ryots. The planters also enquired into and began taking greater advantage
than hitherto of the rights they possessed as landlords to timber, hides,
92extra rent payments for land on which houses had been built and so on. 
Planters had of course always taken some profits from these things, but
henceforth they exploited them with an unprecedented rigour and vigour.
had acted did not share this view. According to J.A. Sweeney, the
93
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Indeed, they at times pushed their claims beyond that to which they were
legally entitled, but to prove this the ryots had to engage in lengthy and
costly legal processes. And, if other means failed, the planter could
always attempt to make extra income by imposing abwabs, against which the
94Act failed to make effective provision. The Act, moreover, only applied to
Champaran, and did not affect abuses by planters in other parts of north 
95Bihar. Perhaps not surprisingly, therefore, tenants continued to protest
against planter oppression, both in Champaran and elsewhere in the region.
Planter/tenant conflict, moreover, intensified when during and immediately
after World War One the industry temporarily revived because of the demand
for dye for uniforms and because of the interruption of the supply from
96Germany of the synthetic dye. This revival, though it did not bring any 
benefits to the tenants, encouraged inefficient and oppressive planters to 
remain involved in the industry.
Throughout 1918 and 1919 many Champaran tenants displayed dis­
satisfaction with the agreement that Gandhi had reached on their behalf with 
the planters and the administration. They delayed the payment of rents and
refused to cooperate with the officials who were finalizing the survey and
97settlement operations in the district. Gandhi’s name continued to be used
in'efforts to rally support: in March, 1919, three activists from the
Gobindganj thana in the northwest of the district, newly returned from the
Congress session in Delhi, told the tenants that Gandhi had given instructions
that rents were not to be paid and had promised to come to the area in the
near future to take personal command of the campaign in defence of their
98rights and interests. In the ensuing months anti-indigo feeling continued
to simmer in Champaran, and also expressed itself in a number of areas 
throughout north Bihar. During the 1919-22 period, as will be shown in more
106
detail below, antagonism to the planters intensified and a number of violent 
incidents occurred. At about the same time as the first, Champaran centred, 
phase of the anti-indigo movement was coming to an end, extensive protest, 
arising out of disputes over rights in land and timber, got under way in the 
areas owned by the Darbhanga Raj.
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During the second and third decades of this century recurrent landlord/tenant
conflict developed. Such conflict had occurred before, but never before on
such a scale and in so many different areas. Nor, ever before, had the ryots
been as well organized and as successful in gaining concessions for themselves.
Previously, it had only been in somewhat exceptional circumstances that they
had been able to gain the upper hand. Throughout the 19th century the
zamindars had been in a very strong position. The Permanent Settlement of
1793 had clarified and guaranteed their rights, but it had done little to
99protect the rights and interests of their tenants. The first legislative 
initiative to protect the tenantry did not come until the passing of Act X of 
1859, the provisions of which were subsequently improved upon and enlarged 
upon by the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885. These Acts abolished the landlords' 
power to compel ryots to attend when summoned to their offices, protected 
the ryot from summary eviction, guaranteed the continued rights of occupany 
ryots who could establish that they had rented land from a zamindar for a 
period of twelve successive years, and required zamindars who wished to raise 
their ryots1 rent to prove, through legal processes, that their claim was 
reasonable.'*"00 But neither this legislation nor the whole complex structure 
of British/Indian civil, commercial and criminal law could of themselves 
effectively secure the position of the tenantry. The key problem concerned 
the successful implementation of the laws: the tenants often knew little 
about their rights and even when they knew of them they often found that in 
legal contests the zamindars benefited from being at the centre of a wide 
circle of influence. Zamindars, moreover, usually commanded more financial 
resources, a crucial advantage when, because of the slowness, corruption and 
complexity of the legal process, legal struggles frequently became long drawn
The tenants ' rights movement, 1919-1920
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r r- • i 101out tests of financial endurance.
The tenant who did not wish to take legal recourse could engage in
direct action against his landlord. He might, perhaps, be able to put up a 
102good fight, but in the long run the struggle was likely to go against him,
not least because the police, if they intervened, tended to take the side of
the zamindar. Until the early 20th century flight provided another option
for the ryot. North of the border Nepal, with its lower population, had
103vacant land for cultivation. And, because north Bihari marriage networks
extended into Nepal there were often relatives to greet the newcomer and help
104him to settle down. In the 1880s, large areas of the district of Darbhanga
became all but depopulated when ryots and their families responded to
oppression by the rent collectors of the Darbhanga Raj by fleeing northward
into N e p a l . B r u t a l ,  extortionate rent farmers, backed up by a corrupt,
arbitrary administration collected the rent in Nepal, so taking refuge there
106could be likened to leaping from the frying pan into the fire. But if
conditions became too unbearable ryots could always, once they heard, that 
conditions in north Bihar had improved, return either to the area from which 
they had come or to some other nearby place. Most ryots, even when 
relatively well off, had a minimum of material possessions, most of them 
readily portable, so changes of residence could be made fairly easily."*-07
By the turn of the century the relationship between ryots and 
zamindars had begun to change. From the last decades of the 19th century 
the administration had begun to show less inclination to always automatically 
react in support of the zamindars. The survey and settlement operations 
conducted throughout north Bihar during the 1890s and the 1900s revealed 
numerous instances in which abwabs had been imposed and in which the rights
and privileges of the tenantry had been flagrantly ignored. The admini­
stration strongly criticized the zamindars for this misconduct, and also 
scolded them for their abuse of the legal system. The survey and settlement 
operations, moreover, involved the detailed recording of patterns of land- 
holding, of rental rates, and of occupancy rights, and thus established an 
authoritative documentary basis to which tenants could refer in legal dis­
putes with their landlords. Nor was the alternative of fleeing from an
109extortionate zamindar as attractive as it had been. There was still land
to be tilled, though less than previously, across the border in Nepal, but 
because of demographic pressures in north Bihar, and a resultant shortage of 
land, anyone who migrated out of the region would have to do so permanently, 
since if he returned there would almost certainly be no land available for 
him to occupy, except under very disadvantageous terms as a sharecropper or 
as a temporary tenant.
With greater protection from the law, and with emigration a much
less attractive proposition than hitherto, tenants were increasingly
encouraged to engage in protest to secure and advance their interests.
Indeed, this response was increasingly forced upon the ryots since, because
of demographic pressure, the zamindari system impinged upon them with ever
greater force. The small zamindars, threatened with impoverishment, competed
keenly with their tenants for control over land, collected their rents
rigorously, and intensified their exaction of abwabs.  ^° The large zamindars,
though not always under the same financial pressure as small zamindars,
nevertheless held responsibility for much oppression. The large zamindars
112employed as their amlas men from small zamindar or big tenant families.
Some of these amlas lost no opportunity to profit at the expense of the
113villagers over whom they had been given authority. It was to be in the
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largest zamindari estate in the region —  the Darbhanga Raj that 
substantial tenant protest developed.
The tenants' rights movement which developed in 1919 and 1920
involved large numbers of people and covered a wide geographical area. The
development of the movement depended much on the leadership and organizational
skills of Bishu Bharan Prasad, a member of the Pachhima Kayasth jati who came
from the village of Sughar in Saran. Bishu Bharan Prasad had been born into
a well-established family: his father held 30 bighas of land as an occupancy
114tenant and sat on the local chaukidari panchayat. There is only limited
information available about Prasad's early years, other than that he had
been educated to a reasonable standard and had adopted the life style of a
religious mendicant under the name of Swami Vidyanand (also spelt
Bidyanand) . Swami Vidyanand wished to emulate M.K. Gandhi’s saintly
dedication to social work and political activism. His critics alleged that,
when speaking to villagers, he claimed to be Gandhi's chela or disciple;
116but when explaining his activities to officials he denied this charge. 
Vidyanand may not have presented himself as Gandhi's chela, but he had been 
impressed by Gandhi's impact on the people and politics of Champaran in 
1917-18. ^  And like Gandhi, Vidyanand combined traditional religious 
appeal with an ability to publicize his cause and a capacity to organize 
political protest.
Vidyanand's career of political activism among the villagers of 
north Bihar began in June 1919, when he participated in a meeting held at the 
village of Narar in Madhubani, the northernmost of the three subdivisions 
of the district of Darbhanga, and delivered lectures on the rights of culti­
vators and on the need for the establishment of schools to spread education 
118among the people. The meeting, which extended over four days from
26 June, provided an opportunity for the airing of a number of grievances.
A few weeks later, on 31 July, a petition was addressed to the Lieutenant-
Governor of Bihar and Orissa from the "inhabitants of Narar" complaining
that their landlord was denying them their customary right to the fruits
and timber of the trees grown on their holdings; that they were being
required to pay a mutation fee when their holdings changed hands; that the
landlord had unjustly resumed some of their lands and was holding them as
bakast; that they were being forced to supply labourers, ploughs and carts
for the cultivation of this land; that the "... well-to-do people of the
village" who had refused to supply free assistance and utensils for the
cultivation of this land were being harassed by the institution of false
criminal and civil cases; that customary grazing rights were being denied
them because former grazing lands were being settled for cultivation; and
that "even in these days of fearful scarcity" the amlas obliged the vendors
120of oil and ghee to give them a free supply of these commodities.
121This petition began a long series. The petitions varied from
one another in matters of detail, but usually featured complaints relating
to the tenants' rights in trees, the disappearance of grazing lands, the
levying of mutation fees, the interference by the landlord with occupancy
rights, and the exactions and oppressions of amlas. As the year progressed
Vidyanand extended his field of agitation. By 16 August he was able to take
part in the framing of a petition on behalf of the inhabitants of Narar and
12217 other villages in the Madhubani subdivision. Some six weeks later, on
2 October 1919, his associate, Anirudh Singh, presided over a meeting
attended by about 5,000 "lower and suppressed class tenants", on whose behalf
he sent a telegram, urging that a commission of enquiry into their grievances
123be established, to the Lieutenant Governor. The grievances of the tenants,
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one official of the Darbhanga Raj later commented, "... took shape when
124Bidyanand came on the scenes ... (sic)" and it was merely chance that
led him to start his movement in the areas of Rohika and R.ajnager in the
Darbhanga district. If Vidyanand had "... gone elsewhere to commence with",
the official contended, "... the results would have been the same."
Vidyanand, he suggested, wished to use the support of the tenantry to
advance his own political career and therefore could be expected to "... find
or manufacture grievances“ in any place that he visited in the course of his 
125agitation.
Throughout the final months of 1919 the Swami continued his
activities in the north of Darbhanga but also found time to make brief forays
out of the district. In November he went to Supaul subdivision in north
126Bhagalpur intending to address a meeting. The officials of the
Darbhanga Raj, however, in collusion with the local representatives of the
127British administration, deterred him from doing so. Next, in early
December, he travelled to Patna in an attempt to gain the support of the
128nationalist intelligentsia. Later in December he visted the Sonbarsa
area, on the banks of the Ganges in north Bhagalpur, to enquire into the
129grievances of the local peasants. Encouraged by the support and the
donations he received during his tours and at the meetings he held the Swami
outlined a scheme designed to institutionalize peasant activism by the
• it i 130.creation of an extensive organization with branches m  every village.
This scheme did not come to fruition, but he at least managed to establish a
rudimentary agitational machine which employed, at the rate of eight annas a
' 131day, workers to tour from village to village to activate the ryots.
113
Vidyanand journeyed, with a batch of 200 kisan delegates, to the annual
132conference of the Congress at Amritsar in December 1919. His effort
failed: those present at the conference showed little interest in his
133tenants’ rights campaign. In January 1920 Vidyanand returned to north
Bihar to continue his work. The focal point of his activities continued to
be the Madhubani subdivision of Darbhanga district, but he continued to
attempt to broaden the geographical range of his movement. Late in January
1920 he went to the Bihar Provincial Peasants’ Conference, held in 
134Muzaffarpur town. The following month he toured in the Supaul sub­
division of the Bhagalpur district. On 5 February a meeting of between 15,000 
and 20,000 people from the Supaul area demanded that in Permanent Settlement 
areas rents should be immune from increase; that common grazing lands be 
provided in all villages; that ryots should have an unrestricted right to 
all the trees standing in their holdings; and that ryots, without having to
gain the permission of the zamindar, should be allowed to build houses and
135dig wells in their occupancy holdings. During the following month
Vidyanand initiated agitation in Purnea and in the Madhepura subdivison,
136the more southerly of the two subdivisions of north Bhagalpur. In early
April he visited Patna to attend a meeting of the Provincial Congress, at
which, to no avail, he called for the establishment of a committee of enquiry
137to look into the grievances of the tenants of the Darbhanga Raj. Through­
out the following months he continued his campaign in the districts of
13 8Darbhanga and Bhagalpur, and also visited the Gogri thana of the district
of Monghyr where he spoke to tenants about their grievances over the
embankments that the government had built to protect the Bengal and North
Western railway and which obstructed the drainage of flood waters during the
139flood season.
In an effort to gain the support of the Indian National Congress
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In his speeches Vidyanand struck a militant note. When
addressing a meeting in ^  ( ‘ ~ in the south of Darbhanga, he
argued that villagers had a right to use violence in self defence against
140the oppression of zamindars and their retainers. Speaking to the people
of the Gogri thana in Monghyr district, he urged his audience to cut the
embankments themselves if the railway company took no steps to deal with
141the problem of drainage. Some peasants needed little encouragement to
engage in direct action in defence of their interests. On many occasions
during the course of the campaign peasants cut down trees and used their wood
in defiance of the claim of the landlord to exclusive or substantial
142rights in trees standing on land which he owned. The authorities became
143concerned over the excitement that Vidyanand generated. Some members of
the administration, as will be shown below, cooperated covertly with the 
Darbhanga Raj in suppressing the agitations he inspired. Publicly, 
however, the authorities avoided taking sides in landlord/tenant disputes. 
They stayed aloof from Vidyanand's movement, and merely attempted to ensure 
that both parties stayed within the bounds of the law.
During the second half of 1920 Vidyanand became increasingly involved
in running for election to the Bihar and Orissa Legislative Assembly, the
electorate of which had been expanded, as a result of the Montagu/Chelmsford
reforms of 1918, to include a substantial representation of the more estab-
144lished occupany tenants. His campaign succeeded; in electorates in
northern Darbhanga and northern Bhagalpur he and four other tenants’
145representatives won victories.
In the course of his movement Vidyanand attracted extensive support. 
The petitions framed under his auspices and the meetings over which he 
presided concentrated on two categories of grievances both of which were of
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central importance to most members of the rural population. One category of
grievances concerned the behaviour of the amlas whose characteristic
dishonesty and oppressiveness is amply documented, not merely by the com-
146plaints of their opponents, but also in the administrative records
recording the policy discussions and decisions of the senior management of 
147the Darbhanga Raj. The other category of grievances concerned the inter­
ference, on the part of the management of the Darbhanga Raj, with what the 
tenants regarded as their rights both in the light of long established 
custom and under the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885. Disputes 
over the use of timber, over the rightful possession of land, over the 
exaction of fees for the transfer of tenancy rights, and over the use of 
grazing lands were not new to north Bihar, but by the second decade of this 
century they assumed an unprecedented importance in relations between land­
lord and tenant. Only recently, in the period 1896 to 1907, survey and 
settlement operations had helped create a new awareness among the tenants of 
their rights. Much more central however, were demographic and associated 
ecological factors. Population pressure and the demand for land multiplied
and magnified disputes over the possession of holdings and tempted zamindars
148to rent out "waste lands" that had formerly been used for grazing. The demand
for land created a market in land tenancies. Rich villagers acquired
occupancy rights as an investment and then profited by sub-letting the
149holdings to sharecroppers and short-term tenants. Landlords benefited
from the transfer of tenancies by levying mutation fees.^° These fees, 
which were imposed both on transfers by sale and transfers by inheritance 
obstructed the taking over of land by the poor and interfered with the 
investment strategies of the better-off, and were thus widely resented.'*"'^
With the disappearance of large tracts of standing timber, destroyed for 
building and fuel, wood assumed an unprecedented scarcity value, and disputes
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over rights in trees multiplied. Cow dung ’’cakes" provided an altern­
ative fuel for domestic use, but wood was essential for building and for the
correct fulfilment of Hindu funeral rites, which involved the incineration
153of the dead on a wood fire.
The issues Vidyanand raised involved the interests of a large pro­
portion of the population of north Bihar. Peasants demonstrated their 
support for his campaign by coming in large numbers to his meetings. 
According to a Police Special Branch report Vidyanand attracted 10,000 
villagers to a meeting held in Darbhanga on 11 October 1919. Five months
later, according to the same source, some 15,000 to 20,000 people attended a
154meeting he presided over in the Supaul subdivision of Bhagalpur. In a
region in which communications of all kinds were very poor, the ability to 
attract such numbers was impressive. Of course, an individual's ability to 
attract large numbers is in itself not decisive evidence that he has exten­
sive support. Such is the tedium of life in rural India that large numbers 
of people will flock to any kind of public event. More convincing proof 
that Vidyanand commanded considerable support is supplied by the Darbhanga 
Police Superintendent's report that at the 11 October meeting peasants 
donated 8,000 rupees to help finance the campaign in defence of their rights. 
"There is no doubt", commented the Superintendent,
that this man is following the footsteps of Gandhi
and inflaming the minds of the Ryots against the
Darbhanga Raj as Gandhi did in Champaran against the 
planters.
A few days later he reported that the movement was developing rapidly
and that Vidyanand's influence over both Hindus and Muslims was "increasing
.... 11 156 steadily .
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commanded may be found in the reports from the managers of the circles
which formed the basic administrative units of the Darbhanga Raj."*’“*7 One
such account came, in March 1920, from the manager of Rohika, a circle
situated in the Madhubani Subdivision near 'the border with Nepal. In this
area well-established Brahman tenants predominated, "At the end of the
year", the manager reported,
... a peasant agitation was started in the circle 
by a charlatan calling himself Swami Bidyanand, he 
had meetings instigating ryots to rebel against 
landlords and defy their authority, he very soon got 
a large following as he promised them all their 
desires, though of course he could not fulfill any 
of his promises, (sic)
158
In the Madhubani Subdivision Vidyanand attracted support from locally 
prominent Brahmin occupany tenants, but elsewhere, in the Padri circle in 
south-east Darbhanga for example, he drew support from people lower down in 
the social scale who held less secure rights over land. According to the 
circle manager, the population of the Padri area consisted of "low caste men
159such as Gowalas, Koeris, Mussalmans etc and they are most obstinates, (sic)"
Some of these people had been cultivating holdings belonging to the
Darbhanga Raj on a sharecropping basis. But "... this year," the Padri
manager reported in August 1920, under ''the instigation of a Swami ... who
came out in this elaka twice, they have changed their minds not to share the
160produce but to pay rents." The sharecroppers' demand that they be allowed
to pay a cash rental rather than give the landlord a half share of the crop 
was partly, no doubt, designed to take advantage of the unusually■high prices 
prevailing for food grains. Yet it also indicated an awareness on their part 
that, if they continued tilling the land as cash rent payers, they, by 
collecting receipts, could establish occupancy rights to the land. Indeed 
they already claimed such rights, and contended that they had some documentary
Further evidence of the extent of the support which Vidyanand
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stressed the "need for orders as to how to handle this urgent business."
Vidyanand’s campaign drew support from a broad spectrum of the social
hierarchy. In the petition from Narar village in Madhubani which initiated
the movement the petitioners complained that they had "... to supply labourers"
to their landlord, a complaint which suggests that the petitioners were
162locally dominant tenants with tied labour at their command. The petitioners
also complained that the "... well-to-do people of the village" who had
refused to comply with the wishes of the Darbhanga Raj were being harassed by
163the institution of legal proceedings. The Narar petitioners also, however,
complained that the Darbhanga Raj amlas insisted on a free supply of oil and
164ghee "... from those dealing in these commodities. In the village context
the producers and suppliers of these commodities were from lower caste groups, 
namely Yadavs in the case of ghee and Telis in the case of oil. And as has 
just been shown, Vidyanand also drew support from the lower caste share­
croppers of the Padri area.
By late 1920 Swami Vidyanand had excited widespread interest and had 
established sufficient support among locally dominant peasants to win a seat 
in the legislature. By this time, however, his movement was on the wane. 
VidyanandTs shift of emphasis away from direct action and towards election­
eering partly explains the decline of the movement. In 1920, in addition,
prices were lower and scarcity was less than in 1919, with the result that
165economic pressure decreased. After a time moreover, the novelty value of
Vidyanand's tours and meetings wore off, and people, finding that change did
not come as completely and as quickly as at first they had hoped, lost their
166enthusiasm for the movement. The attitude of the Congress party also
contributed to the decline of the campaign. -At first, aware that the
evidence to support their claims. In concluding his remarks the manager
161
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grievances the Swami publicized were genuine and impressed by his ability
167to mobilize mass support, Congressmen sympathized with his movement.
But as support for Vidyanand increased Congressmen became less willing
to be associated with him. The Bihar Congress sought to create a united
front drawn from a broad spectrum of society against the British administration
and Vidyanand*s movement, by setting tenant against landlord, conflicted with
this aim. Eventually, Rajendra Prasad, a leading figure in the Bihar
Congress, publicly denounced Vidyanand, accusing him of being a charlatan
out to make a career for himself by exploiting the discontents of the
peasants. After Prasad's speech, most Congressmen disassociated themselves 
168from Vidyanand. But perhaps the most important reason for the ebbing away
of Vidyanand's movement can be found in the policies adopted by the management 
of the Darbhanga Raj. These policies effectively combined concession with 
coercion.
The response of the administration of the Darbhanga Raj to the 
challenge posed by Vidyanand's movement combined a diversity of elements.
169This diversity resulted in part from the structure of the Raj administration.
The basic administrative unit was the circle, the manager of which reported 
to the chief manager,'*'70 who, with his staff, ran the head office located in 
Darbhanga town and reported directly to the Maharaja. The circle managers, 
assisted by an office staff, directed a group of .four or five tehsildars, or 
assistant managers, each of whom held responsibility for the control of Raj 
activities within a subdivision of the circle. Beneath the tehsildars were 
the "village servants" — a category which consisted of jeth ryots, patwaris, 
peons and barahils.
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DIAGRAM 6
Administrative structure o f the Darbhanga Raj 
MAHARAJA OF DARBHANGA
CHIEF MANAGER, ASSISTED BY HEADQUARTERS STAFF
CIRCLE MANAGERS, ASSISTED BY CIRCLE OFFICE STAFF
ASSISTANT MANAGERS OR TEHSILDARS
JETH RYOTS, PATWARIS, PEONS AND BARAHILS
The jeth ryots had charge of the collection of rents form the tenants within
one or two mauzas, and received a commission of a few per cent, varying
upwards in proportion to the percentage of the total rental demand which they
171managed to collect. The patwaris kept the rent and land records of the
mauzas owned by the Darbhanga Raj. They and the jeth ryots got assistance
from the peons and barahils, who acted as messengers, retainers, guards and 
173stand-over men. In theory a jeth ryot and patwari counter-balanced one
another, checking each other's actions and ensuring that each did his job 
174properly. In fact, they frequently acted in collusion to oppress and
defraud the tenantry and to hoodwink and defraud the Darbhanga Raj.^7“* The 
Darbhanga Raj administration had only a limited capacity to deal with this 
situation because in order to ensure the effective collection of rent, the
Raj had to employ locally dominant peasants in the positions of jeth ryot and
. 176 patwari.
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Vidyanand's campaign threatened the lower level staff of the 
Darbhanga Raj. The allegations made against them often rang true, and as an 
object of attack they initially had no sympathy for the campaign. Despite this, 
many of them eventually became covert supporters of Vidyanand. "The people 
we should be able to rely on to keep up Raj prestige and influence in the
17villages" one manager reported, "have many inducements to sell Raj interests.1;
The village level staff were paid at rates that had been fixed around 1880,
when the price of food was somewhere about a third of the price prevailing 
178in 1920. Previously they had been able to increase their income by ex­
tracting abwabs from the villagers but this could much less easily be done
179now that the tenant movement had encouraged the villagers to defy them.
Because of the shaky morale of the lower level staff, this manager reported, 
the Darbhanga Raj was faced, by the beginning of 1920,
... with a crisis and danger never known before.
The Ryots and their ring leaders are being offered
the things they value most ... in return for simply
combining to disobey the Raj. On the other hand,
at present they have no prospect of getting any
advantage or concession by loyally refusing such
temptation, so that from their point of view they
have nothing to lose and everything to gain by
joining the agitators.- „ j & b 180
The upper level staff of the Darbhanga Raj knew of this problem of
staff morale and acknowledged that many of the complaints made against their
subordinates had much justification. The Saraya circle manager expressed
a characteristic opinion when he contended, on the basis of his 30 years'
experience in the service of the Raj, that "Ryots never rebel unless treated
181unfairly by amlas." Dissidence among the tenantry and discontent among
the lower level staff interfered with the collection of rent and thus handi­
capped the running of an extensive estate. The higher management of the 
Darbhanga Raj needed to keep both its staff and its tenants reasonably
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contented. In some instances, moreover, concessions had to be made to the
182tenants because they had a legal right to that which they claimed. For
this reason P.T. Onraet, the manager of the Rohika circle, urged the Raj
to meet the tenants "half way", because legally "... the Raj will not be
183able to back its demands on the grounds of ancient custom." The imminence
of an election to the Legislative Assembly, due in November 1920, also helped
shape the attitude of the Raj administration. This election would be held on
184the basis of an enlarged franchise. All those who paid 2 rupees or more
in chaukidari tax, or 1 rupee or more in road or public work cesses would be 
185entitled to vote. In order for "acceptable" candidates to win office,
the senior Raj managers decided at a conference held in January 1920, it 
would be necessary "... to have the tenants in our hands.
To protect the interests of the Darbhanga Raj and rally the support
of the tenantry the circle managers and the head office officials decided, at
187the January conference, to remedy five of the tenants' grievances. They
agreed that the village level staff should be paid more, so that they would
have less need to exact abwabs. Currently, patwaris and peons earned a lower
wage than coolies. In view of this, one official posed the question, "How
188can we not expect them to receive bribes?" They also decided that the
mutation fee, currently being realized at the rate of 25 per cent of the
purchase price, should be reduced to around about 10 per cent; that the Raj
should waive some of its claims concerning the use of timber; that tenants
should be allowed to build houses on their holdings without having their rent
increased; and that the low rates being given for the hiring of labour and
189of ploughs should be increased. The managers also considered some of the
special problems that had arisen in those of the Raj properties that lay
190within the Purnea district. The most notable of the grievances of the
Purnea tenants concerned the exaction of fees for the use of ferries. The
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Darbhanga Raj owned the right of establishing a ferry service to carry
passengers across a stream or a river that traversed an area which it owned
and usually sub-contracted this right on a long-term basis to a locally
191dominant peasant. These sub-contractors could not ferry customers during
the dry season, because the streams and rivers almost completely dried up.
Despite this, they had begun the practice of levying^ during the dry season,
a ferry fare from every traveller who crossed the dry water course at or
192near the point where their ferry plied during the wet season. Since the
ferry stations were situated along the course of the district’s roads and
tracks, travellers had to pass near them both during the dry and wet seasons.
The members of the conference ordered that henceforth no tolls would be levied
during the dry season and decided, so as to make it easier to enforce this
order, that in future the right to run a ferry would only be let out for 
193short periods.
The administrators of the Darbhanga Raj combined conciliation with 
coercion and counter propaganda. Badrinath Upadhya,the manager of the 
Rajnager circle, compiled a 52-page pamphlet in which he replied to the
194charges laid and the grievances raised both in Rajnager circle and elsewhere.
The circle managers sent retainers to keep a close watch on Vidyanand and his
195associates and to dissuade people from supporting them. At the January
conference one circle manager argued that
We should keep the few influential men in our hands.
The tenants are completely in their hands and simply 
by keeping these few men in our hands we shall practic­
ally have the whole tenantry in our hands.,196
A tehsildar of the Alapur circle in northeast Madhubani carried out this 
suggestion. Early in 1920 Vidyanand contacted some of the locally influential 
men in the circle and arranged to give a lecture on 26 February. Before the
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meeting the tehsildar engaged in counter-propaganda in his area among the 
locally dominant Yadav tenants. Thanks to these efforts
a partition was created. The better class of the 
leading Goalas carefully avoided visiting him; and 
Vidyanand had for his audience only the insignificant 
low class people.
The Swami, the tehsildar reported, left Alapur disappointed, having "failed
to achieve any success" and in the wake of his departure support for
198agitation had evaporated.
The administrators of the Darbhanga Raj also used a variety of 
coercive means to dissuade people from supporting Vidyanand*s movement. At 
one stage, it is clear from a document preserved in the Raj archives, a full-
199scale programme of repression was planned for the Rohika and Rajnager circles. 
This programme did not come into operation apparently because it conflicted 
with the conciliatory policy adopted at the January conference.^ 00 But indiv­
idual Raj officials were not inhibited by the conference from employing 
coercive methods. In the Supaul division of north Bhagalpur the Raj amlas,
"... being enraged at the stopping of perquisites", harassed the tenants by
201refusing to accept their rent payments when they were proffered. By this
means the amlas exposed the tenants to the danger of being sued for not having
paid their rent, and subjected them to the inconvenience of having to keep
their rent money on hand. In the district of Purnea a local Raj official
decided that two Raj amlas who had given evidence unfavourable to the Raj in a
202criminal case should be dismissed. In the Naredlgar circle of the Raj, in
the northwest of Bhagalpur district, the manager kept a close eye on Vidyanand*s 
supporters. Late in 1920 he described one of them, a Bengali tenant by the 
name of Suresh Chunder Laha, as "... a very dangerous person and ... the 
instigator of much evil:, and followed this comment with the cryptic phrase
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M 203"I am looking after him" . The same official had urged in January 1920
that good tenants be rewarded with concessions, but insisted that
absolutely no concessions should be made unless 
and until all other means of gaining over dis­
affected tenants, if there be such tenants, are 
exhausted. A good Manager will use his tact and 
judgement in winning over unruly, turbulent and 
disloyal men, and he should be allowed the fullest 
possible latitude in dealing with them in any 
manner which seems most expedient to himself.
He will always be acting in the Raj interests, and 
he must be permitted to exercise his fullest dis­
cretion. . . _ _ .204
Raj managers also directed coercion against the Swami himself. On
13 July 1919, according to his own account, Vidyanand was menaced by a group
205of ruffians while he was journeying from one village to another. In another
incident that occurred a short time later he discovered that men were awaiting
206him along the roads and had to take to the fields to avoid them. While
travelling to a meeting scheduled to be held at Madhubani on October 1919,
he was menaced by a large armed mob, and was only saved by the intervention of
207the local chaukidars. Next, on the 12 November, Vidyanand attempted to
hold a meeting at the village of Parsa Madho, near Nirmali town in northwest 
208Bhagalpur. By noon on the day of the meeting some 15,000 tenants had
209gathered. About 40 minutes later a Raj amla arrived accompanied by 50
210lathials. Vidyanand asked the local Sub-Inspector of Police to request
211them to leave. The Sub-Inspector made this request but the lathials
replied
that if the meeting would be held at that spot they 
would be dismissed from their services and that it was 
the order of the Sub-Manager Bhaptiahi circle. Hence 
they would try their best to prevent the holding of the
meeting.2^2
In view of the determination of the Raj servants to disrupt proceedings 
Vidyanand decided, on the advice of the Police Sub-Inspector and for the sake
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213he did after talking briefly to the crowd.
of the safety of the people who had gathered, to suspend the meeting, which
After the January conference had decided to adopt a more concili­
atory approach to the tenant problem and because direct interference with 
him had created bad publicity for the Darbhanga Raj, the supporters of the Raj 
subjected the Swami to less harassment. There continued to be times, nonethe­
less, when he courted physical danger. On 20 June 1920, Vidyanand arrived
to hold a meeting at the village of Kothia Dumri, in the north of
214Darbhanga district near the Tajpur police thana. During the previous weeks
the Swami had vigorously criticized the management of the Bhawara indigo
215factory, a concern owned by the Darbhanga Raj. The local tenants,
according to a police report, became excited aobut the meeting because they
216had heard that supporters of the Bhawara factory were planning to attend.
At about half past one in the afternoon Vidyanand arrived and announced that
the local police had decided the meeting would have to be postponed in order
to avert a breach of the peace. At this point a group of supporters of the
factory began pressing the Swami with a number of questions. Protagonists
217of both sides surrounded him. "At this juncture 50 or 60 Bhawara men" 
rushed out of an adjacent hiding place, brandishing lathis. By arriving 
armed these men broke a promise that had earlier been made to the police by
218one of the factory amlas that the supporters of the factory would be unarmed.
The Sub-Inspector of the Tajpur thana ordered the lathials to leave, but they 
219refused to go. The Swami, according to the Sub-Inspector's account,
"... was very frightened", and asked for a police escort out of the village,"..-
as the Head Clerk of the Bhawara factory had asked him to leave the village 
220at once". Once he had managed to get away Vidyanand despatched a telegram
221to the Seavchl'ight complaining about the way he had been treated.
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During the tenants1 rights movement the administration and police 
were committed in theory to take a neutral stance and to administer the law 
impartially. In reality police and local officials tended to side with the 
Darbhanga Raj against the dissident tenantry. The police did not effectively 
protect Vidyanand against harassment by Darbhanga Raj lathials and police and 
local officials, rather than protect Vidyanand’s right to speak, were quite 
prepared to close down his meetings on the grounds that a breach of the peace 
appeared likely as a result of the actions of his opponents. The administration 
had sympathy for the grievances of the tenantry, but because of its support 
for the zamindari system, and particularly for the Maharaja of Darbhanga, 
the premier zamindar of north Bihar, it was unwilling to do anything sub­
stantial to express this sympathy.
With the covert assistance of policemen and officials the Darbhanga 
Raj was able to combine coercion with conciliation and keep Vidyanand’s move­
ment under control. In the second half of 1920, with the Bihar Congress 
refusing to extend support, with the economic situation somewhat improved, 
with the Raj concessions coming into operation, and with Vidyanand directing 
his energies towards success in the forthcoming elections the movement 
declined. The movement had not succeeded in bringing about the complete 
redress of all the tenants' grievances, but it had at least brought them 
concessions. Less tangibly, but perhaps of greater long-term significance, 
the movement had raised the level of consciousness among the peasantry of the 
Darbhanga Raj. This longer term repercussion of the movement was illustrated 
by the campaign initiated in Pandoul circle in December 1921.
On 20 March 1922, a petition arrived at the head office of the
Darbhanga Raj from the Telis or oil pressers of the hamlet of Mohamedpur in
222the Maksuda mauza. The petitioners complained about the dishonesty of the
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local amlas, who, "... quite contrary to custom", had been ecacting free
supplies of oil from them, and said that though unwilling to supply free oil,
they would be willing to pay a cash rate, like the Teli ryots in neighbouring
localities, for the right to extract oil from the seeds of the linseed and
223teli plants. They said that they had approached the circle manager with
224their complaint but had received an unsympathetic response. The circle 
manager reprimanded them for having, on an earlier occasion, approached the 
head office of the Raj, demanded "in insulting terms" that they supply the 
free oil, and refused, upon the instigation of the Patwaris and the Tehsildar, 
to accept their rents, even though they came every day to the circle office
225ready to pay them, saying that he intended to realize the rent by litigation.
According to the account of the circle manager the Telis, every day "since the
time immemorial", had given small quantities of oil to the Patwari and to the
226other village amlas, but had decided to stop doing so in November 1921.
The circle manager justified the exaction of the oil by pointing out that the
227village amlas received "very low pay". He also commented that this issue
had originally been raised in the area "... by the so called Swami Vidyanand
228and since then from time to time the agitation breaks out as in this instant".
He argued that the Telis be made to supply the oil lest a
precedent ... be established and if so what is to
prevent such attacks from being made on other such
established customs. As it is we have before us the
pernicious teachings of the Gandhi cult not to pay
land revenue and also that the day of swaraj approaches
when rents are no longer to be paid.oon
L L y
Though the issue of the oil was in itself only of minor importance, he con­
cluded, the effect of the custom being successfully defied "... will be vast
and far reaching for further mischief", and therefore contended that the oil
230should be collected "at any cost". The senior management of the Raj res­
ponded to this suggested by commenting that since the exaction of the oil
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was an abwab the Raj had no legal redress against the Telis. "Our
remedy", one official decided,
lies in finding out and stopping the privileges 
we might have been hitherto allowing them to enjoy 
as a matter of favour and in putting other tactful 
pressure forcing them to come to their senses and 
realize that they should not be recalcitrant and 
ungrateful to the landlord, (sic)
The head office of the Darbhanga Raj therefore wrote to the Pandoul manager
23requesting him to find ways of putting "tactful pressure" on the Teli ryots.
By means of "tactful pressure", the exact nature of which remains 
obscure, the administration of the Darbhanga Raj defused the protest move­
ment of the Pandoul oil pressers. The history of the oil pressers’ agitation 
illustrates both that Swami Vidyanand’s movement had continuing repercussions, 
and that the Darbhanga Raj had managed to weather Vidyanand's movement 
successfully, and still had substantial resources and effective means at hand 
with which to bring dissident villagers into line. Vidyanand had succeeded 
in drawing peasants into an extensive agitation, and had managed, to a limited 
extent, to alter the attitude of many peasants to their landlord. These 
successes helped pave the way for the tenant agitations of the 1930s. But 
Vidyanand’s movement had been dominated by locally powerful tenants, and had 
had limited, reformist aims. The movement had achieved some successes, but 
had done nothing to alter the basic structure of the Darbhanga Raj and the 
distribution of power and wealth within it.
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During the period in which Vidyanand conducted his tenants’ rights movement 
the second phase of the anti-indigo campaign got under way. This second 
phase of campaigning against indigo occurred throughout north Bihar and 
involved several violent incidents. It thus contrasted with the first 
Champaran-centred and generally peaceful phase of anti-indigo protest. One 
area of great turbulence in the post-1919 period lay in the vicinity of 
Sonbarsa village, on the north bank of the Ganges in Bhagalpur.
The Sonbarsa movement challenged the position of Mr Harry Grant,
the principal owner of the Latipur and Narayanpur zamindari estates. Grant
and his fellow owners had engaged in the cultivation and processing of indigo,
but once this activity ceased to be profitable they phased indigo cultivation
out and concentrated on making a profit through efficient running of the
234property and through the collection of rents. The diara lands,which were
situated on the bank of the river or as islands in the course of the river,
provided a continuing source of profit. The word diara refers to land which
is subject to flooding and which is not infrequently swept away during the
floods of the monsoon season to be re-formed again somewhere else. Every
year the diara lands received a rich coating of silt, which made them highly
fertile. When left uncultivated they soon became covered with long grass,
providing excellent grazing for cattle and when cultivated they produced
excellent crops. These lands, consequently, were much in demand. The diara
lands did, however, have the disadvantage that they tended to disappear and
re-emerge as a result of flooding. Grant and his assistants had followed the
practice of reassessing diara lands, once they had re-emerged after the floods,
235at a higher rent than previously. In addition, Grant usually levied a fee
from each ryot before allowing them to commence cultivation on the newly
The second phase of the anti-indigo movgnent_, 1919-22
was taken from the ryots for the period in which their diara lands were under 
237water. For many years the ryots had accepted these practices, despite the
fact that they were in contravention of a clause in the Bengal Tenancy Act
which declared that no extra rent or fee was to be charged for newly emerged
diara lands, because the rights of the tenant to his diara holdings continued
238even if the lands became submerged and/or relocated in a new position.
From 1918, however, Grant's tenantry began to protest vigorously
239against the raising of rents on newly emerged diara lands. It is not clear
what sparked off protest at this time. Perhaps the tenants decided that Grant
was attempting to raise the diara rents one time too many, or perhaps they had
been inspired by news of developments in Champaran. The large village of
Sonbarsa, situated on the north bank of the Ganges about four miles from the
Latipur station on the Bengal and North Western railway became the focal point 
240of protest. Bhumihars, a group with the reputation of being, to quote a
241local official, "... a class of fighting tenants", made up most of the
population of the village. In 1918 600 bighas of diara land became fit for
cultivation. Grant told the Sonbarsa tenants that if they wanted to take up
the land they would have to pay a salami or settlement fee of one rupee per
bigha and a rent of six rupees per bigha. The tenants refused to pay,
insisting that they should only be obliged to pay rent at the prevailing
242village rate of three rupees per bigha. Grant responded to their opposition
by settling the holdings, at the rental of six rupees, with a few local tenants
whom he employed in his service and with a larger number of outsiders who
243previously had held no connection with the village diara lands. The
Sonbarsa tenants deeply resented losing their lands and initiated judicial 
proceedings in an effort to have Grant's decision reversed.
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236emerged land. Grant justified these actions by pointing out that no rent
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The Bhumihar tenant’s resentment became greatly intensified during
subsequent months as Grant, apparently in an effort both to increase his
profits and to bring the dissident villagers to heel, began a major offensive
244against them. In 1919 he called upon all his tenants to sign agreements
whereby they would undertake to' pay an increased rent, even though he had
already in 1902 and 1911, contravened the Bengal Tenancy Act by extorting
245similar agreements. The rent increase of 1911, moreover, had been forced
upon the ryots on the legally dubious grounds that they should pay a higher rent
in return for being released from the obligation to grow indigo for the land- 
i i 246 .lord. Grant also put pressure on the ryots by attempting to restrict their
access to grazing land. His men impounded some 500 cattle which they found
247grazing in some grass covered diara land which belonged to Grant. The grass
land concerned lay across the route the cattle took to the river to drink water 
The ryots retaliated by rescuing their cattle and attacking Grant’s amlas.
When the case came to court the Magistrate found that the ryots had an estab­
lished right to graze their cattle in the grass lands and found them not
248guilty of trespass, but fined them on the charge of committing assault.
In a related case Grant attempted to prohibit all the cattle of Sonbarsa from
entering into any part of the vast diara area even though the ryots had paid a
grazing fee of half a rupee each head of cattle. In the course of the hearing,
however, Grant's lawyer "curtailed his demand of restraining the raiyats from
grazing their cattle on 2,000 bighas of diara to that of 400 bighas of cultiv-
249able land only" and on this basis the plaint was accepted.
Grant also employed other means with which to harass the tenantry.
On 7 December 1918 three dacoities took place in the nearby village of 
Bisunpur. The first report of these crimes named no suspects, but subsequently 
Grant's amlas managed to throw suspicion on the leading ryots of Sonbarsa, who 
were then subjected to the inconvenience of being questioned and having their
133
dacoity case later exonerated the Sonbarsa ryots from involvement in the 
•  251Bisunpur . Before this happened, however, Grant’s men traded on
the suspicion aroused by their allegations to lay criminal charges against
several Sonbarsa tenants, including the prominent ryot Nathuni Kumar, who
recently had attracted great attention by winning a rent suit against Grant.
The case went to court but resulted in an acquittal for the accused. The
trying magistrate later remarked that he had been "surprised" by the blatant
dishonesty "... of the prosecution witnesses most of whom were Mr. Grant's 
252men". Grant also tried to implicate the Sonbarsa tenants in a murder case.
Eventually, however, the District Police Superintendent concluded after
personal investigation that the most likely culprit was the complainant who
253had initiated the case "... on behalf of Mr. Grant".
The Bhumihars of Sonbarsa reacted vigorously to their landlord's
harassment and oppression. They refused to pay their rent, initiated rent
and tenancy cases, and occasionally assaulted Grant's amlas and continually
254interfered with their work. Over the disputed diara lands they displayed
such spirited opposition that on three separate occasions in 1919 and 1920 the
authorities passed orders under the Criminal Procedure Code requiring them to
255abstain from breaching the peace. The tenants also sought the help of the
political activist Swami Vidyanand, who arrived in the village in late 1919,
and, according to a police report, "... began to preach his usual anti-
256landlord doctrines and queer ideas of the rights of tenants..." Under his
guidance the tenanats prepared a petition listing 17 grievances and presented
257.it to the Collector-Magistrate. In this petition, in addition to the
issues already mentioned, the tenants complained about the abwabs levied by 
Grant's amlas, about restriction on their right to cut bamboos and trees, 
and about the use by Grant of an undersized measuring pole in his assessment
houses searched by the police. The confession of the accused in another
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25 8of the area of land held by tenants.
Grant responded to these protests by asking the authorities to send
extra police into the Sonbarsa area in order to overawe the tenants. The
authorities refused explaining subsequently that they had not wished to
take "sides on behalf of the landlord in a contest between the landlord and 
259the tenants." The decision reflected official dissatisfaction with the
aggressive policy being pursued by Grant, which made the negotiation of a
260compromise settlement impossible. The authorities also pointed out that
Grant had supplied insufficient evidence to the local police about the belli­
cosity of the tenants. Some of his amlas, it seems, had failed him, and
261because of sympathy for the tenants had not presented evidence. Official
inaction at the local level may also have resulted from a reluctance on the 
part of the Sonbarsa police to do battle with the sturdy and militant 
Bhumihars
Grant, denied police help, hired a force of Gurkhas with which to
intimidate the ryots. The Gurkhas, who had previously been employed in a
military labour corps, arrived at Narayanpur by rail from Lucknow on 30 January 
2631921. Grant’s amlas told the Gurkhas that they would merely be required
264to stand guard over the mustard crop growing on the diara lands. They did
not, however, tell them that the crops were growing on disputed lands over
which the Sonbarsa ryots currently held possession, and that, before they
could guard the crops, they would have to take over possession of the lands.
On 1 February 37 Gurkhas set off, late at night and by a circuitous route,
265for the Sonbarsa diara. They arrived the following day at the bank of the
Ganges where, accompanied by some of Grant's amlas and some of his supporters
among the tenants, they boarded two boats in order to cross to the diara
266island. Up to this point the group, which numbered about 80 men, had been
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Lai Jha now decided that he would stay on the northern bank of the river.
He explained that he had to go and make arrangements for the supply of
food and the building of huts on the island for the Gurkhas. He also, to
quell the fears of the Gurkhas concerning a group of about 100 men that they
had noticed on the island, some three-quarters of a mile upstream, said that
he would arrange for the sending of a police party to ensure that there was
267no breach of the peace. After they had crossed to the island the Gurkhas
breakfasted on supplies they had carried with them. While eating they
noticed boat loads of men crossing from the northern bank to the island about
268a mile further downstream. The amlas urged the Gurkhas to proceed across
the island to the disputed area which they would have to guard. This area
was situated about three-quarters of a mile away but could not be seen from
the position Grant's men occupied on the bank of the river because an area
269of high ground blocked their line of vision. The Gurkhas, fearing
opposition, did not want to go any further, but the amlas bolstered their 
confidence by assuring them that the men whom they had seen crossing to the 
island were Grant's allies. Thus reassured the Gurkhas moved off across the 
island, accompanied by Singeshwar Kuar and Jugrup Mahto, two of Grant's amlas, 
and Tekan, a chaukidar from Sonbarsa village, leaving the rest of the party 
behind with the boats on the edge of the river. After the Gurkhas had gone
a couple of hundred yards however the two amlas fell back and covertly
- , 270 returned to the river bank.
When they had travelled about 600 yards the Gurkhas came to a high
ridge of sand, from the top of which they saw, a few hundred yards away, about
600 villagers armed with lathis, spears, swords, adzes and other weapons
occupying the land they had come to guard. Ten of the Gurkhas carried kukris,
271but the rest had no weapons. The villagers advanced towards the ridge and
under the direction of Chamal Lai Jha, Grant's chief assistant, but Chamal
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tried to dissuade the villagers from any violent action, but he was ignored.
When the Gurkhas reached the edge of the river they discovered that the amlas
272had taken refuge, in the two boats, in the middle of the river. The
Gurkhas, with their line of retreat cut off, found themselves at the mercy
of the villagers, and were severely beaten up. Few of the Gurkhas could swim
and many of them, after being driven into the water by their attackers, were
beaten unconscious and drowned. Some of the other Gurkhas were killed or
273beaten unconscious on the river bank. The villagers won their victory
at very little cost: there is no report of any of them being killed or
injured during the assault. After completing their rout of the Gurkhas, the
villagers began to collect some spoils of war by looting the Gurkhas of
boots, shirts, greatcoats, blankets, lanterns, wrist watches and other
miscellaneous possessions. One of the wounded Gurkhas was stripped of all
274his clothes except for a shirt. Meanwhile, the amlas watched the rout
from the safety of the boats. They next attempted to land on the northern
bank of the river, but encountering a hostile crowd which hurled rocks at them,
journeyed several miles downstream before landing. Once the Sonbarsa villagers
had dispersed, the surviving Gurkhas began to make their way to Narayanpur,
275after being taken across the river by some fishermen. Sixteen arrived
back, 12 of them wounded, mostly with head injuries. Over the next few days
the bodies of seven Gurkhas were recovered from the river. Three of the
dead men, post mortem investigation established, had died from head injuries,
and one had died by drowning, while the cause of death of the other three,
because of the decomposition of their bodies, could not be clearly ascer-
276tained. The total of seven dead and 16 survivors accounted for 23 of the .
37 Gurkhas who had crossed to the diara island. The fate of the other 14 
remained unknown. It can only be presumed that their bodies floated downstream
the Gurkhas fled back to the bank of the river. Tekan, the chaukidar,
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and provided food for fish and crocodiles.
The police did not learn of the massacre of the Gurkhas, which
occurred around noon on 2 February, until the following morning. Grant himself
did not learn of the massacre until seven in the evening, when a messenger
arrived at the European club in Bhagalpur town on the southern bank of the
277Ganges. The messenger, under Grant's instructions, journeyed back across
the Ganges and reported the events at 7.30 a.m. on February 3 at the Bihpur 
police station. The delay, it seems reasonably certain, was intentional.
The events on the disputed diara land reflected badly on Grant and his assist­
ants and they needed, in the words of a police report, time "... to concoct a 
..278plausible story.
Partly because of the delay in the commencement of their investi­
gation but mostly because of the uncooperativeness of the Sonbarsa Bhumihars 
the police could not establish a satisfactory case against those responsible 
for the death of the Gurkhas. All but one of the ¿lc-g-ociScoC won acquittal
279because they could not be satisfactorily identified as having been involved.
The authorities prosecuted Grant and his staff for taking initiatives likely
to lead to a breach of the peace, but Grant was acquitted because his intention
of using the Gurkhas as an offensive force was not proven, and in the light of
280his acquittal the authorities dropped the charges against his subordinates.
The Bihar branch of the European Association strongly criticized the way in
which the administration had handled the disputes between Grant and his
tenants, and made dire predictions about what could happen unless the admini-
281stration took a stronger stand in future. The administration argued that
it had acted quite properly because the rights of possession of the disputed
282lands could only be decided legitimately by judicial processes. The
administration, moreover, publicly criticized the tatics adopted by Grant and
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emphasized his "... moral culpability with respect to the unfortunate
283Gurkhas." The attitude of the authorities and the self-confidence of the
tenants after their dramatic and overwhelming victory in the clash on the 
diara island obliged Grant to accept a compromise settlement. Grant agreed 
that in future he would not transgress the continuing rights of tenants to 
their diara lands and worked out an agreement with the tenants over what 
constituted reasonable levels of rent. ^ 4
While the Sonbarsa campaign was underway, considerable anti-planter 
activity also developed elswhere in north Bihar. This agitation both received 
impetus from and gave impetus to the Congress party's non-cooperation movement, 
which began in September 1920. In Champaran, Muzaffarpur and Purnea, where 
the anti-indigo struggle was against European planter-landlords, the non­
cooperation campaign gave it considerable stimulus and support. Where, in 
contrast, the struggle was against an Indian-owned enterprise, as was the 
case in the indigo concerns owned by the Darbhanga Raj, anti-indigo agitation 
drew strength from Swami Vidyanand's tenants' rights movement.
In April 1920, the management of the Darbhanga Raj concerns in
Purnea reported to the Raj head office that the tenants refused to grow
indigo and had returned the cash advances that had been given to them some
285months before as a consideration for their agreement to grow the crop. One
of the ryots' complaints concerned the selection of land for the cultivation 
of indigo. The amlas, according to the report of one Raj official, character­
istically took unfair advantage of the practice of reserving the best plots 
for indigo cultivation. Year by year the ryots agreed, in return for an 
advance on their payment for the indigo crop, to reserve a certain section of
their fields for indigo. Then they would proceed elsewhere in their holdings 
to prepare the ground and sow the seed for other crops. At this point the
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prepared for another crop — tobacco, perhaps, or some other cash crop —
would have to be reploughed for the sowing of indigo, because he had decided
that the land earlier reserved for indigo was exhausted and could not be
used. But after the ryots had bribed him he would change his mind and leave
286them in peace. Discontent also arose because the price paid for indigo
was "... hardly sufficient to meet the costs of cultivation not to speak of
287the rent which the ryots have to pay for the land to the Raj." The local
Raj management, moreover, impounded the ryots' cattle if they wandered into
a field sown with indigo, even if the field was part of the tenancy holding
288of the owner of the cattle.
The local officials of the Darbhanga Raj initially responded to
protest with repression. In reprisal against the agitation in' the Kabur
indigo concern the house of one of the leading dissident ryots was burnt down,
crops belonging to the ryots were trampled and their cattle were wrongfully 
289impounded. The district authorities intervened, cautioning the amlas
. . . . 290 „ ^against continuing with coercion. Subsequently more conciliatory measures
were employed. The local Raj officials dismissed Singheshwar Prasad, an
amla against whom there were many complaints, and as a result a number of
tenants told an investigating police office that they had no further com-
291plaint. Another amla, M. Abdul Rahman Khan, who had recently been dis­
missed and who had apparently been playing a leading part among the dissident
ryots, was told he would be reinstated if he could get the tenants to grow
292indigo. In the Debipur indigo concern, the other main centre of agitation
in Purnea, the tenants complained much of Ajodhiya Singh, a senior amla who
293had "... tried to bring them under his thumb." The local manager commented
that Singh had served the Raj well during his long career and said that it 
would be inadvisable to dismiss him. Perhaps if he was "... persuaded to
jamadar would arrive and tell them that some of the land they had just
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retire it would help matters. But the removal of Ajodhiya Singh could
only be a partial solution to the problem: great interest and excitement
had been created in the area by the presence of Jika Ram Sharma, a tenants'
295rights campaigner who had arrived in Purnea form Darbhanga. The com­
plaints of the tenants, one official of the Darbhanga Raj commented, were
mostly justified, and this was particularly true of the charges against the 
296factory amlas. In order to keep the tenants under control, the local
Raj administrators sought the help of the British administration. In August 
1920 A.K. Khan, the newly appointed manager of the Gondwara circle, which 
included the Debipur concern, wrote confidentially to the Maharaja, claiming 
that the District Judge of Purnea district was an "old friend" of his, and 
that he was known and liked by the other officials of the district.
I have every reason to hope ...[he wrote] ... 
that I will receive great support from them in 
suppressing the agitation raised by Jika Ram ... 
the ryots ... are toned down because of my 
connection with the officials.
Zy/
In the final months of 1920 anti-planter agitation in the Darbhanga Raj, 
like the tenants' rights movement with which it was associated, faded away.
In the folowing year, stimulated by the impact of the non-cooperation movement, 
it again manifested itself in a number of different localities.
In April and May of 1921 tenant agitation in the indigo concern
owned by the two Shillingford brothers in the district of Purnea came to a
head. The tenants were dissatisfied because of the terms under which they
grew indigo and because the Shillingfords were, in the words of the Commissioner
of the Bhagalpur division, "... unsympathetic landlords who have been treating
298their tenants harshly and exacting numerous illegal abwabs." Investigation
by the District Magistrate revealed that the Shillingfords had exacted no less 
than 19 different kinds of abwab. They had required ryots to pay a fee for
294
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houses that the ryots built on their ryoti lands, and had charged the ryots
pasturage fees. Most of the abwabs directly affected the tenantry, but
some, such as a tax on the sale of grain and a fee exacted at the time of
marriage had a wider application and thus affected every member of the local
299population. Because of their oppressiveness, the Shillingfords inspired
peasant protest, whereas the other planters of the district, who acted less 
oppressively, experienced less popular antagonism.^00 Protest against the 
two brothers came to a head when
in the case of Mr. Charles Shillingford a woman about 
whom there was some dispute in the village was found 
concealed at night in his factory and in the case of 
Mr. Alec Shillingford when a respectable headman of a 
village whom he considered obnoxious was severely 
assaulted by his peons.
301
The tenants arranged a complete boycott of the brothers' indigo concern.
Indigo was not being grown, rents were not being paid, the factory market
302had stopped functioning, and, for a short time, even their personal
303servants had been compelled to stop working for them. The Purnea Police
Superintendent thought it unfortunate that "these gentlemen" seemed likely to
to be ruined and hounded out of their homes, where they 
have been for over forty years or so, by a pack of 
mischief makers who probably are activated purely by 
seditious and anti-European motives. 304
The brothers, however, had only themselves to blame for their troubles. For 
in addition to oppressing the ryots both men, the Superintendent commented,
have shown that they are afraid and in consequence 
their tenants etc. and even their servants have 
realized that they have the upper hand and can force 
them to do what they want.^^^
The dispute finally resulted in victory for the tenants. At a meeting between 
the Shillingfords and the ryots, with the District Magistrate present as a 
mediator, the Shillingfords had to accept all the ryots' demands concerning
permission to dig wells on their ryoti land, had levied rent on the dwelling
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the cessation of indigo cultivation, the stopping of abwabs and the protection
being successfully resolved in Purnea, planter/peasant tension continued to
simmer at the opposite end of the region in Champaran. In Champaran the issue
of grazing rights provided a fruitful source of disagreement. In June 1921
tension between the tenants and the amlas of the Piprasi indigo concern in
the Madhubani thana erupted into violence. The trouble began when a factory
peon found 100 of the tenants' cattle grazing on an uncultivated tract that
belonged to the factory. With the help of two other factory amlas he attempted
to move the cattle off to the pound. They had succeeded in getting about half
the cattle into the pound when about 100 villagers under the direction of
Baiju Gir, the leader of the village, attacked them. The villagers belaboured
the peon who had discovered the trespassing cattle with lathis and left him
lying unconscious on the ground; the other amlas fled and the cattle were
308released. What happened next is unclear but it seems that the villagers
decided to burn down the grass huts used by the amlas as living quarters. The
tenants, however, maintained that during the night after they were attacked
the amlas set fire to the huts themselves in order to be able to charge the
309tenants with arson. The Police Superintendent doubted this account; m
his view the tenants had probably been responsible for the destruction of the 
huts. He pointed out that the leader of the village, Baiju Gur, was "not 
likely to have countenanced anything more than the rescue of the cattle but 
would have been quite unable to have controlled the crowd" once they had become
rights to trees and to the unrestricted use of
their homestead lands. 306 The tenants, according to the District Magistrate,
"... expressed their universal satisfaction at the final settlement" and
307agreed to end the boycott.
While the disputes between the Shillingfords and their tenants were
excited.310
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Planter/ryot tension also manifested itself in Muzaffarpur. In 
August 1921 the Governor of the Province received a petition from the tenants 
of the Belsand factory in Muzaffarpur, complaining that they were being forced 
to grow indigo, that they were being paid very low rates for carts and
labour, that criminal cases had been instituted against tenants who had com­
plained against the factory, and that deeds in which the tenants agreed to 
set aside a portion of their land for indigo cultivation had been taken under 
duress. In the Champaran Agrarian Act, the petitioners pointed out, the 
tinkathia system and any other obligatory system of organizing the growing of 
the indigo plant, had been declared illegal, but the provisions of the Act had 
been restricted to Champaran district. The rationale for this decision had 
been the argument that it was only in Champaran that tinkathia and similar 
systems operated. The petitioners pointed out, however, that in Muzaffarpur
the Belsand indigo concern alone had more than one thousand bighas of land
•it.. 311under the tinkathia system.
Conflict and tension soon erupted into violence. In one incident
an altercation developed at Meyrick’s Karnoul indigo concern. According to
the account of the District Magistrate a group of tenants assembled and
threatened to assault the factory amlas. Mr Meyrick intervened and "...laid
out the local leader of NCO and another man", suffering as he did so "no more
312injury than a broken topi." Eleven days later, on August 25, amore serious
incident occurred at the nearby Motipur indigo concern. Two peons went to a
village the inhabitants of which were at odds with the factory. According to
313the District Magistrate a local mahant or "temple-priest"
... had been telling the villages that Swaraj will
soon be established and that then the zerait of the
factory would be divided among the raiyats and they
will only have to pay —/2/— a bigha rent. The raiyats
are mostly low caste and uneducated and they appear
to have believed the Mahant.__,314
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the peons had gone to the village in an endeavour to get them to pay up.
They were waylaid, however, and murdered. The mahant, the District Magistrate
315suggested, had been responsible for the death of the two men.
The ryots of north Bihar also employed less bloodthirsty means of
expressing their discontent. Many of the planters profited because regular
1 hats'or markets were held on land which they owned, which meant that they
could levy fees from the merchants and vendors who attended the bazaars to
sell their goods. In Champaran, anti-planter activists attacked this source
of income by setting up a rival bazaar in an area of uncultivated land near
to the planter's market place. The activists, according to the report of the
Police Superintendent, would "... induce the Banias who bring things for sale
316to leave the old site and take up their stands in the new". This tactic
was first employed in the final months of 1921, and it seems likely that the
notion of combining boycott with the establishment of an alternative
institution was borrowed from the Non-Cooperation movement, which was reaching
317its peak at about this time. Sometimes the merchants were attracted
by the fact that they had to pay a lower or even no fee at the new bazaar;
if this incentive was insufficient, they could generally be discouraged from
attending the planter's bazaar "... by a slight show of force and shouting
318to intimidate them." As of 24 October some 10 to 15 bazaars belonging to
planters had been thus interfered with; no bazaar however, which belonged to 
an Indian zamindar had experienced any trouble. According to the Police 
Superintendent the leaders of the boycott against the planter's bazaars 
generally had "... their own quarrel" with the particular factory concerned.
In the Kesariya thana, for example, Fazel Khan, a deportee from Fiji who had 
been at odds with the factory for over a year led the movement against the 
Kurnoul factory. Khan, with the help of some other "locally influential
For some time the tenants of the factory had been refusing to pay rent and
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Kurnoul concern. So far, the Police Superintendent commented in mid October,
the planters had not used force to protect their interests in the bazaars.
But, he predicted, they "will eventually do so when matters take a serious
319turn." When force was used, however, it sometimes worked to the advantage
of the ryots. In late October at Ghorashan in the Bettiah subdivision of 
Champaran district, for example, some factory peons were sent out to persuade 
people to return to the factory's market. The peons lay in wait on the main 
road by which the merchants brought their wares to the market on market days. 
The first carts that appeared had their contents covered with cloth. The 
peons assumed that the carts contained cloth and urged the carters to go to 
factory bazaar. At this juncture a crowed of villagers arrived among whom 
were the leading non-cooperators of the locality. The cloths on the carts 
were pulled back to reveal that they contained loads of bricks; and with the 
aid of these bricks the factory peons "... were quickly defeated and chased 
getting well hammered.
The most dramatic of the events involving violent encounters between
a factory and its tenants occurred in the northwest of Champaran in November
1921. On 1 November, at seven in the morning, a crowd gathered a few hundred
321yards away from the Chauterwa factory. Shouting "Gandhi ki jai" (i.e.
"Victory to Gandhi") the crowd marched past the main buildings of the factory 
and surrounded the houses of the factory amlas. The amlas shut their doors 
against the crowd, members of which "battered at the windows and doors calling 
to the inmates to come out." When the amlas refused to emerge some members of 
the crowd set fire to the thatched roofs of the houses. The amlas were 
forced to come out into the open, and came under attack. One old amla, Jamuna 
Lai, "was very badly beaten" and was carried to a nearby river and thrown in. 
He recovered sufficiently to keep his head above water and later, when the
residents" had managed to force the closure of three bazaars owned by the
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attention of the crowd had become directed elsewhere, a sympathiser pulled
him out and took him to the shelter of the house of a low caste factory
322servant whose house had escaped the attention of the crowd. The other
12 amlas who had been attacked remained lying semi-conscious on the ground. 
The police later reported that Jamuna Lai and six of the amlas had been
323seriously wounded, while the six other amlas had been less seriously hurt.
The crowd received little opposition. Broucke, the manager of the
concern, was absent at his other factory on the other side of the Gandak
river, and there was nobody staying at the bungalow. When the attack first
began the president of the local chaukidari union arrived with three chaukidars
and about 50 of his villagers and tried, unsuccessfully, to dissuade the
rioters. After being threatened, he and his men departed. The original
purpose of the crowd seems to have been to assault Kali Singh, the head amla
of the factory, but Kali Singh had been out at work when the amlas' quarters
were surrounded. While returning, some time later, he saw the crowd from a
distance and, guessing their intent, hid himself in the sugarcane field near
the bungalow. Unable to locate Singh the crowd looked for other targets.
After completing the destruction of the amlas' quarters the crowd set afire
a grain store room, a building used for processing sugar cane, and the
324factory office buildings. At first the crowd had consisted of only 150
to 200 men but during the course of the morning it grew to a size of about
5,000 and "consisted of men of all the neighbouring villages within a radius
-ng t 
„326
325of 4 miles to 5 miles of the factory." Prominent within it, accordin o
a police report, were "... low caste men of the Musahar and Nonia class.
The climax of the crowd's activities came with an attack on the factory
bungalow. One of the house scavengers, a Musahar, showed members of the crowd
the store of kerosene oil. The oil "... was immediately seized and poured all
327over the beds and doors furniture and set alight." The bungalow, a
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large two storey building, was completely gutted. The firing of the bungalow
and the other factory buildings was also accompanied by some small scale loot-
329ing of factory property.
The events of 1 November resulted from a situation which had, accord­
ing to an official report
been volcanic for the past two years being kept in 
a continual state of unrest by the truculent element 
among the ryots. This situation is really the after- 
math of the Gandhi agitation. The N.C.O. agitation 
has given the final fillip to the unrest.
The main point at issue betwen the factory and the ryots concerned 
331grazing rights. Tensions had been exacerbated a few days before the
factory was attacked when Broucke appointed Magahiya Doms, members of an
untouchable caste noted for its criminal propensities, as chaukidars to keep
332the ryots' cattle off lands belonging to the factory. In another incident
which had occurred a few days earlier, factory amlas had beaten up some of 
333the tenants.
In the period immediately after the burning of the Chauterwa factory
great tension prevailed in the surrounding area. Armed police arrived to make
patrols, rumours of impending attacks on other indigo concerns spread and at
334a couple of other factories there were minor cases of arson. Quiet only
returned after additional police were posted in the area and the administration
obliged the villagers to pay a collective fine to cover the Rs 98,000 bill for
335the upkeep of the extra police and to pay Broucke Rs 82,500 as compensation.
The police attempted, without much success because of lack of cooperation from 
the members of the local population, to subject the rioters to criminal pro­
ceedings. "it has to be recognized", the provincial government reported to 
the Government of India,
328
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that of this large mob, the numbers of which as 
now estimated exceeded 5,000, after working their 
will on the defenceless factory for three or four 
hours of broad daylight, very few will eventually 
be brought to trial, and that the evidence against 
them is not likely to be strong.^
The excitement created by the Chauterwa arson case made it difficult
for the administration to adhere to its policy of not taking sides in disputes
between planters and tenants. In December 1921 Mackinnon, a planter who
operated in the Dhanaha area asked for a police patrol to be sent out to
intimidate his tenants, who were refusing to supply him with carts and labour.
The police complied, and a force of mounted troopers, accompanied by Mackinnon
and two of his amlas, marched through three villages. While the column was
spread out in line of march some of the policemen, encouraged by the amlas,
337looted goods and money from the huts of the villagers. Soon after these
incidents a large crowd of villagers assembled and waylaid the policemen. The
villagers showered the police with clods of earth, and there were scuffles
338between the villagers and the factory amlas. The crowd o n l y a f t e r
339the police had returned the stolen goods. The Champaran Police Super­
intendent later explained that
The deputation of the Mounted Military Police on the 
trip in which they misbehaved was as usual quite a 
mistake simply due to the approach of the Christmas 
holidays and the general rush of the Prince's visit.
This "mistake" proved an embarrassment for the authorities. The Indian press 
made much of the occurrence and the publicity surrounding it, combined with 
the excitement created by the non-cooperation movement, heightened anti-
T, • • U * • 341British feeling.
In January 1922, the non-cooperation movement reached its climax 
in north Bihar. In Muzaffarpur, a district in which the movement had had 
great impact, non-cooperation activity included demonstrations against and 
the boycotting of indigo concerns. In one incident 1,000 men demonstrated
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against the Mia Chapra indigo concern in the Patepur thana. Gray, the 
owner of the factory, took refuge inside the bungalow with his family while 
the crowd moved around outside, shouting "Gandhi ki jai". The crowd demon­
strated for some time and then destroyed a considerable amount of the
342factory's sugar crop before eventually dispersing. Subsequently the
police laid charges against the leaders of the demonstration and the tenants
responded by boycotting the factory. But after the Police Superintendent
had visited the area, and instituted further charges, they abandoned the 
343boycott. Another boycotting incident occurred in the concern at Shahpur
Maricha owned by Shamnandan Sahay and managed by Captain Harvey. This boycott
related closely to the non-cooperation movement: the villagers had not been
paying their chaukidari taxes, and Sahay, as the president of the Chaukidari
union, issued warrants against them. In retaliation, the villagers decided
to boycott the factory. They intimidated the factory amlas into not working,
and attempted to stop the postman making his delivery to the factory. The
villagers stopped labourers working for the factory; according to a police
report, made at the time, "The factory labourers appear to be poor and willing
344to work, but dare not." This boycott, like the one at Gray's concern,
345broke down after police investigation and intervention.
With the waning of non-cooperation during the course of 1922 the 
anti-indigo agitations that had been associated with it ceased to occur. In 
the indigo concerns owned by the Darbhanga Raj, in contrast, renewed anti­
indigo agitation developed. Anti-indigo protest in the Darbhanga Raj centred 
in the Bahora indigo concern in Purnea. In October 1922 the ryots of the 
concern petitioned the Maharaja. They said that hitherto they had willingly 
grown indigo on their lands because "it was paying to us" and because "the
3 / ^
Raj used to show us great favours." These favours included the waiving of
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to the tenants at favourable rates. But of late these concessions were no
longer being given and the price paid for the indigo crop was too low to cover
the rental cost of the land used to grow it, let alone to cover the costs of
cultivation. Furthermore, the tenants said, "... the high handedness and the
347excessive extortions of the Raj amlas" were causing them great suffering.
The petitioners concluded by requesting the Maharaja to end the growing of
indigo and to instruct the "amlas not to compel us to grow indigo any more,
348as what is a trifling gain to the Raj means death to us." In another
petition, sent to the Collector/Magistrate of Purnea, the ryots again com­
plained of the behaviour of the indigo amlas, and particularly singled out
349that of the Bahora factory jamadar, Hialal Jha. The ryots complemented the
sending of petitions with a boycott of the factory. During the early months
of 1923 they refused to supply the factory with labour, carts, or boats.
McDonald, the manager of the factory, set out to break the boycott, and by
350his success in doing so increased the ryots' antagonism. McDonald had the
crop sown by labour from outside the locality and by some of the local ryots 
who had refused to join the boycott. When harvest time came he brought in 
coolies and carts from outside and arranged for the hiring of boats in order 
to take the harvested crop over the river to Bahora factory. On June 16, 
while the harvesting was under way under the direction of the jamadar, Hialal 
Jha, a group of 300 ryots attacked. They beat Hialal Jha, dispersed the rest 
of the harvesters, stole one of the factory carts and destroyed half of the 
crop that had been cut. On hearing of the incident McDonald sent off a messen­
ger to two other Raj managers, asking them to despatch their retainers to him 
but these reinforcements arrived too late to be of any use. Hialal Jha was 
seriously injured, and the Chief Medical Officer at Katihar was summoned to 
tend him. The riot of 16 June, McDonald wrote to his head office,
rent on land used for building purposes and the letting out of bakast land
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"... was not reported to the police as the Sub-Inspector of Pirpainti is
351exorbitant in his demands." In the same letter McDonald urged that
strong measures be taken against the ryots, lest they be encouraged to pursue 
their protest even more vigorously.
No further information, unfortunately, exists on the outcome of
the agitation in the Bahora indigo concern. It can be surmised, nonetheless,
that eventually the ryots triumphed, and no longer had to grow indigo. The
wartime and immediate post-war revival in the industry came to an end, and
the long-term trend towards low prices reasserted itself. In 1922, in the
three concerns on which there is information, the Darbhanga Raj lost on indigo
352cultivation, and the following year prices fell even lower. By the mid-
1920s the indigo industry, both in the Darbhanga Raj and elswhere, had all
but disappeared. With the decline of the indigo industry in north Bihar,
some of the Europeans who had engaged in indigo planting left the region.
Others turned their attention to the production of sugar, tobacco, and other
cash crops, and remained on in north Bihar until the 1940s when, benefiting
from high war-time prices and realizing that for political reasons their
353future in the region was bleak, they sold up and departed from India.
in north Bihar planter/peasant relations within the indigo industry 
had gone through two stages. In the first stage, which continued until the 
1890s, the industry had flourished. Intermittent peasant protest against the 
indigo planters had developed, but the planters had been able to withstand 
these challenges. In the second stage, which extended from the 1.890s until 
the early 1920s, the indigo industry had gone through a process of crisis 
and decline. The planters pressed down more heavily upon the peasantry, and 
the peasants responded by engaging in extensive protest. This protest created 
difficulties for the planters, but they were able to withstand the challenge
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of peasant discontent. Eventually, the planters gave up the production of 
indigo, partly because peasant discontent made their position uncomforable 
but mainly because by the early 1920s the production of indigo had become 
completely commercially unfeasible. Many planters remained in north Bihar 
and engaged in the production of other cash crops. Because these crops were 
viable commercially in a free market situation, planters could produce them 
without having to employ non-economic pressures to ensure the cooperation of 
- 354 the peasantry.
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Nationalist Protest 1920-2 3: The non-cooperation movement as a 
vehicle for popular discontents.
In September 1920 the Indian National Congress, meeting in conference in 
Calcutta, launched a civil disobedience campaign against the British admini­
stration of India. Under the dominating influence of M.K. Gandhi, the Congress 
denounced recent British constitutional concessions as inadequate, demanded 
that India be given Swaraj or "self rule", and undertook to force Britain to 
grant India freedom by mobilizing Indians to refuse to cooperate with alien
rule. British rule depended "... on the active collaboration of some Indians
355and the acquiescence of the rest", and if collaboration and acquiescence
ceased then the Indian Empire would collapse like a house of cards. The 
programme of non-cooperation set out to ensure this collapse through the 
.boycott of the forthcoming elections to the provincial legislature, the gradual 
boycott of government schools, colleges and courts, the resignation of honour- 
ary offices and abandonment of titles, and the boycott of foreign goods and 
particularly of foreign cloth. Subsequently, the programme also called for 
the boycott of liquor vendors, in order to reform society and to pressure 
provincial governments by reducing their income from the collection of excise. 
The programme was to be unfolded in progressive stages, culminating in active 
civil disobedience: the refusal to pay cesses, taxes and revenue and complete 
non-cooperation with the authorities in order to bring about complete admini­
strative paralysis.
As it developed throughout India during the 1920-22 period, non­
cooperation
became a chameleon campaign, taking colour from its 
surroundings as it was shaped in each locality by 
the particular forces at work and the strains and 
stresses of the local power structure. 3 5o
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Of nowhere was this assessment more true than of north Bihar. Once it 
gained momentum the campaign won the adherence of a diversity of people, and 
assumed a variety of forms. Some of these forms dismayed the members of the 
Bihar Congress, the group responsible for the initiation of non-cooperation 
in north Bihar.
In 1920, the Bihar Congress was a new and untried actor on the Bihar
political stage. Only 20 years earlier the editor of the Behar Times had
likened Bihar, in terms of the energy displayed in public life, to "... a
357pool of stagnant water." This situation was transformed in 1912 when,
as part of a general re-organization of the Bengal Presidency, Bihar and
Orissa were formed into a new province, with the sprawling riverside town of
35 8Patna as its capital.
The formation of the province of Bihar and Orissa made little or no
impact on the lives of the vast majority of its inhabitants, most of whom,
it seems certain, had no very clear notion of the designation or extent of
359the administrative unit within which they now resided. But for the members
of a tiny, high caste, middle class and educated elite the creation of the
new province brought opportunities both for private professional advancement
and for public social and political activity. Administrative separation meant
that henceforth Biharis would suffer less from the competition of skilled and
educated Bengalis, who for generations had been radiating out from Calcutta
360in search of careers. And the sleepy town of Patna, by becoming the locale
for a new hospital, a new university, a new high court, and a large and 
impressive secretariat to house the provincial administration, began to re­
verse the strong attraction that had previously drawn young, middle-class 
Biharis off to distant cities, and particularly Calcutta, in search of 
education, jobs and advancement.'^'*'
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The Patna based Bihar Provincial Congress had been inactive since 
362its founding in 1907 but began a new lease of life in 1912. At this
time the leadership of the Bihar Congress, as table 10 illustrates, was
dominated by lawyers, and most of its members and supporters were small
363zamindars and/or lawyers. Increasingly however, from around 1919, well-
established ryots began to find their way into the organization. Locally 
dominant small landlords and big tenants wishing to protect and expand their 
influence in the villages found themselves in natural alliance with politic­
ally aspiring urban professionals against the great landlords who, supported 
by the administration, dominated provincial-level social and political life
and controlled the organs of local government, namely the municipalities and
, 3 6 4  district boards.
TABLE 11.
Occupations o f  Bihar delegates to the Allahabad Congress Session3 1910
OCCUPATION(S) NUMBER OF DELEGATES
Zamindar 12
Landholder* 3
Zamindar and Lawyer 6
Lawyer 14
Banker and Zamindar 2
Member, Servants of India Society** 1
Not Known 1
Total number of delegates 39
Source: Datta, Freedom Movement in Bihar_, 1, Appendix VII.
* The term "landholder" is generally used as a synonym for zamindar
or to refer to a lessee of proprietary rights, but is sometimes used 
to refer to ryots with significant control over land. In this instanc 
it probably refers either to a zamindar or a lessee.
** The Servants of India Society was a charitable organization whose mem­
bers devoted their lives to good works.
156
Because only members of the landed interest could afford to educate their 
sons to a professional level, caste and kinship ties underlay the alliance. 
Typical of the members of the new regional intelligentsia was Rajendra 
Prasad, the son of a small landlord from Saran and the great-great nephew of
*5
Chaudhur Lai, who for many years had been the chief manager of the Hathwa Raj.“ 
Mutual interest strengthened the alliance, since urban professions supplied 
the legal, educational and other services required by locally dominant 
peasants. The extent of mutual interest between urban professions and 
dominant peasants was increased, moreover, by the Montagu/Chelmsford con­
stitutional reforms. These reforms, which were announced in April 1918, 
extended the electorate to give the rural and urban middle classes substantial
say in future elections and all but guaranteed them control over local govern- 
366ment.
Nationalist Biharis, responding to initiatives that originated in other
provinces, supported the Indian Home Rule Movement between 1915 and 1918 and
367participated in the Rowlatt Satyagraha of 1919. In Bihar before 1920 the
nationalist movement received support from only a limited section of society,
and this was reflected in the urban centred, small-scale, and peaceful
character of Congress protest. But from 1920 on agitation associated with
the nationalist movement developed throughout the countryside, occurred on an
unprecedented scale, and included many violent incidents. The transition
point in the character of nationalist agitation in Bihar came in September
1920 when at the special session in Calcutta, the Indian National Congress
decided, with the crucial vote being strongly supported by the Bihar delegates,
to make non-cooperation its official policy. Already, the previous month, a
meeting of the Bihar Congress at Bhagalpur town had passed a resolution in
368favour of Gandhi’s suggested non-cooperation programme.
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The decision of the Indian National Congress and of its Bihar branch 
to embark on non-cooperation resulted partially from the impetus supplied by 
the Muslim-based Khilafat movement. After the victories of Britain and her 
allies in Western Asia during the final years of the First World War many 
Indian Muslims joined the Khilafat campaign to protest against the unsym­
pathetic British treatment of the Khalifah, the ruler of Turkey and the 
spiritual head of all Islam. The leaders of the Khilafat campaign aligned 
themselves with the nationalist movement in order to challenge the British 
more effectively. In Bihar the Muslims formed only a small section of the 
population, but because many of them were settled in urban areas, because of 
their sense of special identity, which existed despite the internal stratifi­
cation of their community, and because of their custom of weekly congregational
worship, they could be readily mobilized over issues of religious importance
, , t t r  369and thus were a potent political force.
The decision to support non-cooperation, and in particular the decision
to boycott the elections to the reformed legislatures, also resulted from a
realization on the part of many Congressmen, many of whom were of the smaller
fry in Bihar political life, that they did not stand a particularly good chance
in the elections against the great landowners and the established, influential,
370non-nationalist members of the intelligentsia. Partly too, the decision
reflected the transformation that had begun to occur in the character of the
Bihar Congress due to the influx into its membership of locally dominant
peasants. Many peasant-Congressmen had been drawn into Congress activity via
the kisan sabhas or peasant associations. These associations were Congress
front organizations which had been established in 1919 in order to mediate in
landlord/tenant disputes and to widen the basis of support for the Rowlatt 
371Satyagraha. The Congress meeting at Bhagalpur town in August 1920,
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"... where delegates came mainly from outside the professional classes".
The peasant delegates at the Bhagalpur Congress seem to have regarded civil
disobedience as, among other things, a means whereby they could protest
373against harsh economic and demographic pressures, and they secured the 
passing of the non-cooperation resolution by voting as a block in its favour.
In north Bihar the decision to engage in non-cooperation, and par­
ticularly in a boycott of the elections to the provincial legislature, was 
also an attempt to head off Swami Vidyanand’s tenants’ rights movement, which 
conflicted with the efforts of the Bihar Congress to promote social harmony 
and a united front against British rule. When Vidyanand attended a meeting 
of the provincial Congress at Patna on 5 April 1920, and tried to have a 
resolution passed calling for the formation of a committee to look into the 
grievances of the tenant’s of the Darbhanga Raj, Rajendra Prasad successfully
opposed the motion on the grounds that the Swami was untrustworthy and un- 
374reliable. By August 1920, it was clear that Vidyanad and three of his
colleagues would make a good showing in Bhagalpur and Darbhanga in the 
impending elections. By calling for a boycott of the election in the name of 
the wider social and national interest the Bihar Congress could attempt to 
represent Vidyanand as an adventurer out for his own ends.
In Bihar non-cooperation made a slow start. Initially Congress con­
centrated on dissuading voters from participation in the elections held in 
November under the terms of the Montagu/Chelmsford reforms. As table 12 
illustrates, the election boycott had considerable success though the low
turn out may also have resulted from the novelty of the extended franchise.
Judith M. Brown points out, was the first Bihar Congress conference
ii 372
37
159
TABLE 12
Electoral turnout in 1920 Bihar Legislative Assembly elections
CLASSIFICATION OF VOTERS PERCENTAGE WHICH VOTED
All electors 41
Electors of Tirhut Division 13
Urban Hindus 27.3
Rural Hindus 41.8
Urban Muslims 12.1
Rural Muslims 28.2
Source: Brown, Gandhi's Rise3 p. 288
Other than persuading some members of what was only a tiny electorate 
376not to vote, non-cooperation workers made little impact during the final
months of 1920. In mid-December the provincial government told the Government
of India that up till then the main impact of the movement had been in urban
areas, and particularly among students, and that the countryside had generally
remained quiet. During December, however, the movement received new impetus.
In the first half of the month Gandhi made a brief tour of Bihar, attracting
considerable interest wherever he went. Then in late December the Indian
377National Congress assembled in session at Nagpur in western India. In
addition to re-affirming, in more positive terms, the non-cooperation programme, 
the ¿Vau^il^Congress meeting also reorganized the Congress party to make it a 
more effective vehicle for mass agitational politics.
In north Bihar during 1921 the non-cooperation movement won mass 
adherence and put considerable pressure on the British apparatus of police/
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administrative control. It did so despite the failure of some items
of the programme outlined at the Calcutta and Nagpur Congress sessions. The
call for resignation of titles and honorary positions received scarcely any
response, and only a limited number of lawyers, teachers and government
servants gave up their posts. Because of pervasive dissatisfaction with the
legal system, however, the boycott campaign against government courts achieved
greater success, and in less serious disputes many people accepted the juris-
380diction of Congress organized 'national' panchayats. Non-cooperation
achieved considerable success in 1921 partly because it developed in new and
unexpected directions. One important new direction, both in Bihar and
throughout the rest of India, "... was the curious appearance of a temperance
movement, not planned or anticipated by Gandhi or Congress, though both
3 81encouraged it once it had caught on." The prohibition campaign attained
social respectability because of the disdain with which Muslims and higher 
caste Hindus regarded the consumption of alcohol and drugs. In Bihar 
prohibition workers picketed liquor stores and propagandized against the con­
sumption of alcohol and other drugs. In some instances, they also engaged in
3 82the intimidation and social ostracism of liquor vendors and customers.
Because the provincial government placed substantial reliance on its income 
from excise duties the prohibition campaign put it under serious pressure.
In the financial year 1921-22 in Bihar and Orissa the campaign succeeded in 
decreasing the government's excise income, which usually amounted to around 
13,000,000 rupees, by 1,000,000 rupees.
People participated in and supported the non-cooperation movement for 
a variety of reasons. As has been noted, Muslims became mobilized over the 
Khilafat issue and they and higher caste Hindus felt sympathy for the pro­
hibition campaign. The boycott of law courts also struck a sympathetic chord,
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legal system. Non-cooperation also drew on the social tension and radical
feeling that had crystallized during the anti-indigo movement, and it is
notable that non-cooperation was strong in the centres of anti-indigo protest.
Because of the ethnic identity between European planters and British officials,
and because they supported each other politically, popular antagonism to the
planters spilled over into hostility to British district officials. In July
1921 the Tirhut Commissioner commented that "... the izzat [i.e. the prestige]
384of Europeans is nothing like it was and is diminishing ..." The movement
I
also commanded wide support because it provided a vehicle for the expression, 
often in messianic terms, of popular antagonism to the police and the chaukidars 
the most visible instruments of imperial rule in north Bihar. The movement, 
moreover, provided an opportunity for the poor to express their discontent 
with the price/supply situation.
In January and February 1921 commodities were highly priced; prices
reached high levels and goods were in short supply. In the weeks in which
this adverse price/supply situation continued many small-scale incidents of
market looting occurred throughout north Bihar. Four incidents occurred
in both Purnea and north Bhagalpur, two in north Monghyr, six in Darbhanga
385and 19 in Muzaffarpur. In one incident at Saraya in Muzaffarpur a man
arrived at the bazaar on horseback and, proclaiming himself as Gandhi's
disciple, demanded that prices be lowered. The merchants disagreed; they
386and members of the crowed quarrelled and a riot ensued. In an incident
reported from Purnea a young man appeared at a market and announced to the 
people assembled there that cloth should be sold at eight cubits for one 
rupee, rice at nine seers for one rupee and fish at one seer for two annas.
A clash developed betwen the merchants and the public and eight merchants
because many people felt dissatisfaction with the corruption and delays of the
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had goods stolen from their stalls . In one incident in Muzaffarpur a
women was killed during the riot and looting. And at Desri market in 
Muzaffarpur, according to a rather offhand report by the District Magistrate,
... there was some dispute over the price of fish 
or vegetables. Some Mohammadan — drunk they say — 
raised the cry of "loot". Some baskets were upset 
and the contents were taken. The Muhammadan pro­
ceeded with the crowd he had attached to himself to 
the main bazaar to loot the cloth shops. A stalwart 
shopkeeper ran a spear into him, and the whole dis­
turbance ended. Joo
The details of each market looting incident varied, but they followed a 
broadly similar pattern. Those involved in them mostly came from the middle 
and lower reaches of north Bihar society. The incidents began when, in a 
crowded bazaar, someone created a disturbance by demanding in the name of 
Gandhi and/or Swaraj that prices be lowered.
It is difficult to establish the extent to which non-cooperation 
activists were involved in the initiation of market looting incidents. In 
the opinion of Macrae, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Congress 
workers held direct responsibility for the incidents. But he could present 
little evidence to support this conclusion, and suggested that people were 
either unwilling or unable to come forward and identify the rioters who had 
participated in different incidents. He did think it significant, nonetheless, 
that after some of the looting incidents active supporters of the non­
cooperation movement had arrived at the markets and had attempted to act as 
mediators between the merchants and their attackers, seeking to reach some 
compromise which would make it unnecessary to call in the police and institute 
legal proceedings. Macrae regarded this initiative on their part with sus­
picion: he thought that non-cooperators were involving themselves . "with
389a view to concealing evidence". Forrest, the Tirhut Commissioner, offered
387
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a complementary explanation. He contended that the non-cooperators had
initiated the call for lower prices but now had second thoughts, after the
390lootings and disturbances, about the value of this tactic.
These interpretations were perhaps unduly Machiavellian. Conser­
vative social groups dominated the Bihar Congress and for both strategic and 
tactical reasons these groups did not want to create divisions within the 
Indian community. And in particular, these groups did not wish to encourage 
disrespect for private property. It seems unlikely that local Congress leaders 
initiated market looting incidents, though some of their rank and file supporters 
may have done so. Market looting in early 1921 resulted partly from an extremely 
adverse price/supply situation, which had a disastrous impact upon the poor.
After the price/supply situation improved from late February on, market looting 
391ceased to occur. Partly, also, market looting resulted from the messianic
expectations that the initiation of the non-cooperation movement had aroused
among the people of north Bihar. These expectations focused on the personality
and name of Gandhi, who by early 1921 had acquired a semi-divine status. In
Saran, for example, the story spread during February 1921 that the God Jaganath
had begun working with Gandhi. According to the rumour, Jaganath had made it
392known that anyone worshipping Gandhi was thus worshipping Jaganath himself.
It is perhaps no accident that the market looting incidents occurred only a 
few weeks after Gandhi had toured through Bihar.
The messianic expectations that had been aroused among the people of 
north Bihar also expressed themselves in other ways, as Police Superintendent 
McNamara discovered in March 1921 when he travelled to the Dhanaha thana in the 
west of Champaran to investigate rumours that large crowds had been gathering.
The local villagers, who willingly came forward to talk to him, told McNamara 
that crowds of villagers had arrived from the south-west, from over the border
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The villagers from the United Provinces told the local people that Gandhi,
a Brahman, a cow and an Englishman had been put into a fire together, and
that the Englishman had been burnt while the others escaped harm. The
villagers from the west told the Dhanaha people that they had to visit five
other villages, shouting "Gandhiji ki jai", and pass this story one; if they
failed to do so their crime would be as serious as if they had killed five
cows. McNamara travelled throughout the surrounding area and was given, with
393some minor variations, similar accounts of what had occurred. From Dhanaha
394the movement spread on to the north-west and east and eventually died out.
In the districts of and Basti in the western United Provinces a
similar succession of events occurred, though here the wandering crowds are
also reported to have proclaimed that "Gandhi Maharaj was king and had obtained 
395Swaraj". From the evidence available, it seems that the movement origin­
ated on an indigo concern near the border between QmuJtfyiLrand Champaran, and
396spread outwards from its point of origin. These incidents reflected an
attitude of defiance towards authority, an attitude which also expressed itself 
more directly and more dramatically in the eruption of violence against the 
police.
The non-cooperation campaign influenced north Biharis to express
their discontent with the police and the administration. The local police
station, with its staff of constables and its retinue of chaukidars, comprised
the nearest centre of state authority. By their oppressive behaviour, moreover,
the police had in many areas made themselves prime targets for defiance and
aggression. On 19 February 1921, a force of six policemen and 20 chaukidars
were attacked while engaged in investigating a case in the Kateya police circle
397of Saran district, an area in which the non-cooperation movement had "made
398great strides". In Kateya and the neighbouring police stations, as of
11 February, 35 panchayats had been formed with 219 members and 368 volunteers
with the United Provinces, beating drums and shouting "Gandhiji ki jai".
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huid been appointed. By these means 33 villages had been brought under the
"jurisdiction11 of the non-cooperation activists. The police force came under
attack while enquiring into allegations made by a Koeri woman that a panchayat
established by the local non-cooperators had treated her unjustly and
399cruelly. While the police were recording the statements of some of the
witnesses in this case a large group of men, armed with sticks, lathis and 
spears arrived, shouting the slogan "Gandhi ki jai". The men, who greatly 
outnumbered the police party, ordered the policemen and chaukidars to kneel 
down and by shouting "Gandhi ki jai" proclaim their acceptance of Swaraj.
After the members of the police party refused to comply the men showered them 
with clods of earth and attacked them with lathis, forcing them to retreat.
The sub-inspector in charge of the police party reported that the attacking 
force was "about 2,000 in number" and was drawn from 19 different villages.
He listed 32 people as having definitely been among the rioters, and this 
list, which included names which are characteristically Brahman, Koeri,
Yadav and "low caste" Muslim, indicated that the assailants came from a wide 
social spectrum. 400 The assailants came from villages, according to the sub­
inspector, in which non-cooperation panchayats had been set up by Babu Bin- 
deshwari Prasad, a lawyer from Saran, and had been put under the control of
Mouli Dass Sadh, who the police described as "a much respected though rather
401dissolute Sadhu of the locality". On the day of the attack Mouli Dass had
rallied his supporters at the village of Natwa and had then led them against the
402police.
Occasionally, as at Kateya in Saran, popular antagonism to the police 
was encouraged by the non-cooperation movement to express itself violently, but 
in other instances it manifested itself less dramatically in an unwillingness 
to cooperate with the police in their execution of their duties. In the
Bagaha thana in Champaran, an area where there had been recurrent planter/
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peasant tension, the police reported in June that the occurence of serious 
crimes was not being reported to them. In one dacoity and murder case which 
the police did learn of it became apparent that the incident would not have 
been reported if the murder victim had not actually died as a result of the 
assault on him. During the investigation into this dacoity police discovered 
that another dacoity had occurred at about the same time and rumours also
403circulated that there had been two other cases which had not been reported.
In a report submitted on 1 June on the impact of the movement in Purnea the 
Commissioner of the Bhagalpur division commented that police officers were 
finding it hard to find accommodation while touring in the countryside. In 
Purnea there had been little violence against the police, and the people were 
displaying an attitude of "cold avoidance" rather than "defiance". They were 
also delaying their rent payments, in the hope that when and if swaraj came 
they would have less or even no rent to pay. The Commissioner remarked that 
the people were too shrewd "to fully believe" either in the imminence of 
swaraj or that their rent burden might be lowered, but the belief was "firm 
that under Gandhi Raj the necessaries of life would be much cheaper" . 404
The arousal of messianic expectations among the people of north 
Bihar and the eruption of violence between non-cooperation supporters and the 
police worried the leaders of the Congress. In the early months of 1921 
non-cooperation had managed to rally considerable mass support, but this 
support had often expressed itself in a manner inconsistent with the original 
aims of the campaign. The Congress leadership was uncertain about what to do 
next. There was no political mileage left in further calls for renunciation 
of honours and resignation from professional and government posts, and 
similarly boycotts of courts and other government institutions had reached the 
upper limit of their possible success. According to the non-cooperation 
programme, the next step to be taken involved the initiation of wholescale
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But the level of excitement among the people and the occurrence of violent 
incidents indicated that the non-cooperation movement was not as yet suffici­
ently disciplined and organized to do this without risking the initiation of 
extensive violence and disorder. The Congress leadership responded to this 
challenge by temporizing. On 31 March 1921 the All-India Congress Committee, 
the new "cabinet" of the congress which had been set up as part of the general 
party reorganization at the Nagpur meeting in December 1920, decided that 
henceforth the emphasis of non-cooperation would be on the production and use
of swadeshi (i.e. ’Indian made') products and particularly on the production
405of cloth by means of the indigenous spinning wheel known as the charkha.
The concentration of the Congress leadership on spinning and on the
production and consumption of swadeshi goods failed to capture the imagination
of the people of north B i h a r . B e c a u s e  of this, and because of police
repression and the emergence of differences of opinion between the Congress and
the Khilafat leaders the non-cooperation movement experienced a temporary lull
during July and Agusut of 1921. The movement revived, however, from September,
407and moved towards its high point in December 1921 and January 1922. At the
all-India level the decisive development came in September when the British 
arrested the Ali brothers, the leading spirits of the Khilafat movement, for 
having called upon Indian troops to mutiny. In reaction to their arrest a 
wave of protest began throughout India. In response the administration made 
further arrests and clamped down much more tightly on the movement. These 
initiatives inspired yet more protest. Gandhi added to the excitement by 
publicly repeating the words that had been the justification for the arrest of 
the Ali brothers.40  ^ In north Bihar the movement achieved its greatest strength 
in the Tirhut division where it interacted with the anti-indigo campaign. 
According to a government report the Tirhut division "... was greatly disturbed"
civil resistance and the setting up of alternative government institutions.
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for the "... three or four months" from October 1921 onwards.
Defiance of authority was common ... Europeans were 
frequently assaulted and insulted and Government 
servants were subjected to pressure of every kind to 
induce them to resign their posts in pursuance of the 
policy, for propagating which in its extremest form 
the Ali brothers were arrested ... Speeches 
delivered by irresponsible agitators calling for more 
volunteers ready to bear down by weight of numbers, and 
in complete disregard of casualties>the resistance 
which Government officers would be sure to put up against 
an attempt to stop public business. The imminence of 
civil disobedience was proclaimed and the announcement 
made that Mahatma Gandhi was about to wage war against 
the Government 409
The most dramatic incident in which non-cooperation activists
brought pressure to bear on the structure of state control occurred in late
December 1921 when 200 demonstrators invaded the Sonbarsa thana on the northern
410frontier of Muzaffarpur. The demonstrators apparently had been inspired by
the announcement of the All-India Congress Committee on 4 November that the
non-cooperation movement had reached a stage at which its climactic phase of
full civil disobedience could be undertaken in selected and carefully prepared
areas.^^ After invading the police station premises the non-cooperators
called on the police to relinquish control and told them that "... they should
leave Government service, as by remaining Hindus are eating cow flesh and
412Muhammadans are eating pig flesh". The police responded by arresting
seven of the leaders of the demonstration, The remaining demonstrators "hung
about from 4 o'clock till 11 at night ..." before finally dispersing. When
reporting the incident the District Police Superintendent commented that the
demonstration had been made by "... a mob of high caste men", and said that
413this boded ill for the future. During December large crowds also demon­
strated at two other thanas in Muzaffarpur. During one of the demonstrations, 
at the Hajipur thana in the south of the district, non-cooperation activists
molested members of a group of beggars who had been assembled to be given alms
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414in celebration of the visit of the Prince of Wales to north Bihar.
The non-cooperation campaign reached its climax in December 1921 
and January 1922. On 16 January 1922 the Purnea Police Superintendent 
reported that
Almost throughout the district there are rumours
that Swaraj has been or very shortly will be obtained
and this has resulted in certain specific outbreaks of
lawlessness. In Rupauli P[olice] S[tation] the Sub-
Inspector and police were openly defied by one of the
parties in a land dispute. The party assembled in
great numbers, forced the Sub-Inspector and the few
police with him to leave the spot and in disregard of
his warnings proceeded riotously to loot away the
disputed crops with shouts of "Mahatma Gandhi ki jai".
In Forbesganj Pfolice] S[tation] some two or three
hundred people attacked and demolished a pound at
Dhanaha on 8.1.22 ... [and] ... raised the Swaraj
flag over the ruins.,,r41D
In the Araria thana in Purnea on 5 February 1922 three policemen and several 
chaukidars arrested three picketers who allegedly had assaulted and robbed a 
liquor shop customer. While taking its prisoners to the Araria police station 
the police party was "attacked by a large mob of a thousand people shouting 
the usual Non-Co-operation cries". The chaukidars fled at the beginning of 
the clash and the crowd surrounded the three regular policemen and inflicted 
slight injuries on them with "sticks and stones". The policemen relinquished
their prisoners and managed to make their way back to the Araria police
416 .-> *station. On the same day at Chauri Chaura in in the United
Provinces, members of a non-cooperation procession massacred a group of
policemen. Gandhi and the All-India Congress Committee reacted to the massacre
by calling non-cooperation off, on the grounds that if it continued then
extensive violence would result. The Chauri Chaura massacre provided an 
occasion for rather than the cause of the decision to suspend non-cooperation. 
Outbreaks of violence were merely a part of extensive popular turmoil over
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which by late 1921 Gandhi, the All-India Congress Committee and the provin­
cial branches of the Congress party had very little control. In some areas, 
notably in the United Provinces and on the Malabar coast in south India, this
turmoil threatened the social order as much as or more than it challenged the
417formal structure of imperial rule. The Congress wanted to force the
British out of India, but in doing so it did not wish to demolish the existing 
social order.
As a result of the suspension of non-cooperation and because of
continuing and effective police repression the campaign came to an end. But
because the All-India Congress Committee sanctioned the continuation of swadeshi
and prohibition propaganda and because the Bihar Congress held only tenuous
control over many of its supporters the campaign took some time to grind to a
halt. In the weeks after the suspension of non-cooperation several clashes
developed between policemen and non-cooperation activists. In Darbhanga
during March police clashed with non-cooperators who were campaigning against
liquor consumption. The non-cooperators had decided to hold drunken persons
up to ridicule by tying them up. When some policemen tried to intervene, the
418non-cooperators tied them up and marched them into Darbhanga town. On
8 April at a fair being held at Sitamarhi town in northern Muzaffarpur a 
constable quarrelled with a group of piclceters. Three of the picketeers 
attacked him and beat him with lathis. Some other policemen arrived, arrested 
the constable’s assailants and took them off to a temporary thana that had been 
set up near the area in which the fair was being held. A mob of 3,000 people 
collected and followed the police to the thana. Further police reinforcements 
arrived but could not restrain the crowd, members of which began throwing
bricks and bal fruits. The police retreated and their three prisoners escaped. 4
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Purnea. The incident began when Constable Gudar Chaubey and a companion made
a visit to Sonepur bazaar. Though not on duty at the time they were armed with
shot guns which had been issued to them because they had been engaged in anti-
420dacoit operations. Off-duty policemen customarily left their arms in safe
custody at a police station, but since there was no police station nearby the
421two men had kept their weapons with them. When the two men arrived at the
bazaar they bought some ganja from a ganja seller and then got into conversation
with Bajrangi Lai, a Marwari salt merchant, who offered to pay them if they
would stop picketers from bothering him so that he could sell some foreign
manufactured salt. Chaubey agreed to do so in return for two rupees. Two
Khilafat volunteers, Alimuddin and Karam Ali?arrived outside the shop and tried
to discourage people from buying salt by claiming that the purchase of foreign
salt was the equivalent, for Hindus and Muslims respectively, of eating beef
and pork. Chaubey began insulting and threatening the demonstrators and a
crowd, in which Muslims were present in large numbers, gathered to watch the
quarrel. Sometime around this point Chaubey's companion made a discreet exit
from the scene. The quarrel developed into a free for all and the crowd
jostled Chaubey, beat him with lathis and left him lying semi-conscious in a
stretch of open ground near the bazaar. He had kept hold of his gun during
the struggle and now, apparently to deter any renewal of the attack on him,
fired off two rounds in the general direction of the market place, wounding
four bystanders slightly. It seems that the firing was unnecessary because
the people he had taken for potential attackers were actually spectators
coming forward from other sections of the market to see the interesting and
perhaps edifying sight of a bedraggled, dust covered police constable lying
422stretched out after having been beaten up. The Commissioner of Bhagalpur,
commenting on this incident, pointed out that because the movement in the
Later in April a police constable was attacked in a market place in
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district was getting more and more quiet, because Chaubey himself had been
unnecessarily provocative, and because a group of local Khilafat activists
were helping police to trace dacoits it was not advisable to begin legal
423proceedings against Chaubey's attackers.
Constable Chaubey's misconduct and subsequent embarrassment at 
the Sonepur market in Purnea typified the ineffectiveness of the police in 
meeting both the particular challenge of the non-cooperation movement and 
the more general challenge of popular turbulence during the 1917-23 period. 
The following and concluding section of the chapter examines in detail the 
impact of popular protest on police/administrative control in north Bihar.
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In north Bihar between 1917 and 1923 unprecedented popular turbulence developed. 
Locally dominant groups took the leading part in this agitation. Along the 
banks of the Ganges in north Bhagalpur Bhumihars protested against the mis­
conduct of the planter Grant. In Vidyanand’s movement against the Darbhanga 
Raj the involvement of the leading men in a particular locality was a pre­
condition for the mounting of a successful protest campaign. In the non­
cooperation movement locally dominant small landlords and big tenants came 
forward and engaged in protest. The demonstrators who invaded the Sonbarsa 
thana in the north of Muzaffarpur district were subsequently described as "a 
mob of high caste men". In getting protest underway the locally dominant, 
following the same procedure employed in village level factional struggles, 
rallied support from among their clients and retainers within village society. 
More generally, once protest began, a bandwagon effect drew in people from the 
middle and lower levels of society who were keen to protect and advance their 
interests and to express their discontents. These people did not play an inde­
pendent role, but they contributed greatly to the extent and intensity of 
protest. In the Kateya jurisdiction in Saran in February 1921 Koeris, Yadavs 
and "low caste" Muslims joined Brahmans in an attack on police. During Swami 
Vidyanand's campaign poor tenants, sharecroppers and low status Telis became 
involved in protest. People of low caste and Harijan status took a leading 
part in the burning of the Chauterwa factory. Those involved in the market 
looting associated with the non-cooperation movement came from the middle and 
lower reaches of north Bihar society.
In the turbulence of the 1917-22 period activists from outside 
the immediate locality played an important part in stimulating and coordinating 
protest. Among these activists both M.K. Gandhi and Swami Vidyanand combined
Conclusion: police/administrative control 191 7-22
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religious appeal with organizational skill. Gandhi became the figurehead
of anti-indigo protest in Champaran, while Vidyanand sparked off protest in
Darbhanga and Bhagalpur. In late 1920 members of the Bihar Congress initiated
the non-cooperation campaign and thus provided a vehicle for the expression
of a variety of discontents. The importance of the part played by these
"outsiders" should not be exaggerated. As David Washbrook points out, they
played a mediatory role within the constraints of a wider social and political
424system. The peasants of north Bihar, moreover, displayed an ability to
engage in protest independently of outside intervention. The Bhumihars in the 
Sonbarsa area in Bhagalpur received only a single visit from Vidyanand. Their 
anti-indigo agitation had begun before his arrival, and continued strongly 
after he had departed. In Champaran, Gandhi attracted great attention. But 
in 1908-09 and 1915-16 the tenants of the district had engaged in extensive 
protest in the absence of outside intervention. And long after Gandhi had 
left Champaran, vigorous protest continued. During the non-cooperation 
campaign, the members of the regional intelligentsia responsible for the 
initiation of protest retained only limited control over many of their 
supporters.
Activists who intervened in particular localities did however con­
tribute greatly to the coordination of protest over wide areas. The geograph­
ical spread of protest, the depth of the social support it commanded and the 
tendency of protest to become violent combined to create anxiety among the 
British officials responsible for the administration of north Bihar. Officials 
had worried least about the tenants’ rights movement, which had essentially 
been a dispute within the landed interest between the Maharaja of Darbhanga 
and his locally dominant tenants. This movement had attracted extensive 
support, but had remained under the control of locally dominant peasants, had 
involved little violence and had been contained effectively by the Darbhanga
Raj. More anxiety had been created in official cirlces by the anti-indigo 
movement. The antagonists in this struggle were indigo planters holding 
landlord rights and locally dominant peasants, and thus to some extent it 
can be regarded as merely being a conflict within the landed interest. But 
the movement had wider implications. After the crisis in the indigo 
industry had begun the planters pressed down heavily not merely on their 
tenants, but on all sections of the population in the areas of their influence. 
The campaign against them commanded widespread support and involved a number 
of violent incidents. The planters found themselves in a vulnerable position 
before this wave of protest. They comprised an alien elite, and unlike Indian 
landlords they could not depend on caste and kinship ties and on the prestige 
associated with high ritual status to consolidate their influence among 
locally dominant groups. Because of the ethnic identity between planters and 
British officials, the administration found that by supporting the planters it 
attracted popular antagonism to itself. The feelings roused by the anti­
indigo campaign contributed to the strength of the non-cooperation movement 
in north Bihar. Locally dominant peasants and their allies and caste 
fellows in the regional intelligentsia played a leading part in non-cooperation. 
In part the movement resulted from conflicts within the landed interest, in 
that small landlords and big tenants who supported the nationalist movement 
saw it as a means whereby to improve their position vis-à-vis the allies of 
the British administration, namely the great landlords and the indigo 
planters. The movement also represented a successful attempt by a section 
of the landed interest to draw on popular discontents which might threaten 
its own position and direct them against the imperial state. Because the 
non-cooperation campaign attracted wide support for its challenge to the 
state structure, it created much anxiety among British officials.
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campaigns climaxed, many British officials thought an extensive uprising
imminent. In May 1921 Atkins, a planter and a Legislative Councillor,
informed the administration that a "... great spirit of lawlessness" prevailed
in north Bihar. When Atkins gave the Home Member of the Government of India
425his opinions on the turmoil in the region, he received a careful hearing.
The British worried particularly over the possibility of insurrection in
north Bihar because the region had a population which included "... many
turbulent elements". They also worried over the safety of the European
population. North Bihar was "... cut off from the rest of the Province by
426the broad stream of the Ganges". It contained
... a considerable European community numbering 
several hundreds. Twenty years ago the great 
majority of the Europeans were attached to the 
indigo factories that were established all over 
the Division but owing to the decline in the indigo 
industry many are now employed in sugar factories 
or rice mills or in zamindari management. The 
community is a scattered one and many of its members 
live in lonely and isolated positions.
If racial hostility became acute the position of the Europeans
would be very precarious. In theory the non-official European population
contributed to its own protection because its menfolk were organized into the
Bihar Light Horse, an auxiliary body of some 100 or so mounted riflemen
which held annual drills. This unit was, however, likely to be of limited
use in the case of a widespread rising because of the "... necessity of its
members to stay close to their properties and families in order to protect 
„428them ...
During 1921, the year when the anti-indigo and non-cooperation
In 1921-22 the provincial administration deployed an extra company 
of military policemen in the Tirhut division to reinforce the squadron of 
mounted military police stationed there; requisitioned the temporary services
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of a squadron of cavalry from the Eastern Command of the Indian Army; and 
arranged for the building of barracks at Muzaffarpur town to accommodate a com­
pany of British infantry detailed from the battalion stationed at Dinapur 
429town, near Patna. In addition, in December 1921, on the grounds of the
recurrent turbulence which had occurred in the preceding months, the 
administration arranged for the publication of a notification under the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act. The implementation of this legislation allowed 
the Bihar and Orissa government to greatly restrict the holding of public 
meetings in connection with the anti-indigo and non-cooperation campaigns.
In explaining to the Government of India why his government thought 
extraordinary legislation should be enacted the Bihar and Orissa Chief 
Secretary contended that
... the Bihari ryot is ordinarily a docile and 
credulous person whose actions are governed more 
by instinct than by reason. He is peculiarly sus­
ceptible to three influences, namely, (1 ) a clear 
order from someone who he believes has the power 
to enforce it, (2) an appeal to his religious 
feelings, and (3) a mutual desire to make common 
cause with his fellow-countrymen, fellow religion­
ists, fellow castemen, and fellow villagers as the 
case may be. Since the inauguration of the Non 
Co-operation movement, the Non Co-operation 
authorities consistently exploited precisely these 
three influences to their utmost, using social
boycott as their ultimate sanction. ...430
The Chief Secretary then continued his explanation by listing various incidents
which had occurred in the course of 1921. He mentioned, among other things,
the attack on police investigating an allegation of intimidation in Kateya
thana, Saran, the clash between the planter Meyrick and a leading local civil
disobedience activist, the murder of two indigo factory peons in Muzaffarpur,
the boycott of European owned markets, the vigorous picketting of cloth and
431liquor shops, and the burning of the Chauterwa factory.
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The wave of popular turbulence between 1917 and 1923 severely
tried the authorities. Official policy aimed at making the Montagu/
Chelmsford reforms work, and hence the administration had to tread carefully.
Progressive opinion in Britain had to be placated, and the moderates of
Indian politics had to be kept in sympathy with the regime. Undue repression,
as the aftermath of the Amritsar massacre had shown, could exacerbate tensions
and create a politically costly backlash. Equally, however, the administration
had to preserve law and order, and had to appear as an impartial arbiter,
432dealing out even-handed justice. In north Bihar the attempt to project
an image of impartiality was handicapped by the favouritism the administration 
displayed towards the planters and the zamindars, whom it regarded as essential 
political allies. Unfortunately for the British, neither zamindars nor 
planters justified this reliance. The zamindars were mostly passive rather 
than active supporters of the regime, and some of the smaller fry among 
them, as was shown during the non-cooperation movement, tended to participate 
in anti-administration protest. The planters were committed and organized 
supporters of British rule, but their oppressiveness created grave problems 
of law and order. And unlike Indian landlords the planters could neither 
make use of personal caste and kinship ties nor benefit from high ritual 
status to consolidate their position within local society. Hence they often 
looked to the administration for support.
Official partiality to the zamindars revealed itself during Swami 
Vidyanand's tenants' rights movement. The administration and the police were 
committed in theory to take a neutral stance and to administer the law 
impartially. Because the campaign did not involve the eruption of violence, 
the police and administration were more easily able to present an appearance 
of being strictly neutral. This appearance disguised the reality that 
police and local officials tended to side with the Darbhanga Raj against the
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dissident tenantry. The police did not effectively protect Vidyanand against 
harassment by Darbhanga Raj lathials, and police and local officials, rather 
than protect Vidyanand's right to speak, were quite prepared to close down 
his meetings on the grounds that a breach of the peace appeared likely as a 
result of the activities of Vidyanand's opponents. The administration had 
sympathy for the grievances of the tenantry, but because of its support for 
the zamindari system, and particularly for the Maharaja of Darbhanga, the 
premier zamindar of north Bihar, it was unwilling to do anything substantial 
to express this sympathy. To the extent that they remained impartial, the 
police and administration managed to avoid turning the anti-landlord antagonism 
of the Darbhanga Raj peasantry against themselves. But because they partly 
compromised this impartiality by covert assistance to the Darbhanga Raj, 
they lost prestige and support.
Partiality to the indigo planters also sapped the strength of 
police/administrative control. The administration had an ambivalent attitude 
towards the indigo industry. Officials regarded the planters as a useful 
bulwark of British rule, and because they had similar ethnic backgrounds 
and mutual sporting and social interests strong ties often developed between 
planters and district level officials. But the administration also knew that 
planters and officials were closely identified together in Indian eyes, and 
it reacted unfavourably when planters, by stirring up trouble among the 
peasantry, acted to create difficulties for the administration and to endanger 
the stability of the British Raj. But though the administration tended to be 
critical of the misbehaviour of planters, it would not propose radical reform 
of the indigo industry. The administration realized that the influence of the 
planters depended on their possession, under long term leases, of zamindari 
rights, and that any attempt to restrict the exercise of these rights would 
be tantamount to an attack on the cornerstone of British rule over north
180
Bihar, namely the zamindari system established by the Permanent Settlement 
of 1793. So when planter/peasant trouble surfaced, the administration 
characteristically attempted to arrange a compromise whereby conflicts of 
interest could be papered over and at least the appearance of social harmony 
restored. Sometimes, the administration was able to mediate successfully.
In the case of the dispute in/the Shillingford concern in Purnea, for 
example, the District Magistrate managed to arrange the redress of the 
tenants’ grievances over abwabs and to get them to agree to suspend their 
agitation. In other cases, however, official attempts at compromise did 
not achieve lasting success. The Champaran Agrarian Act of 1918, for example, 
did not effectively deal with all the tenants' grievances, and tenant protest 
continued to simmer in Champaran during the ensuing years. By failing to 
take a strong, unequivocal stand against an industry which for economic 
reasons would eventually collapse of its own accord, the British administration 
of north Bihar, in the event to no real purpose, made itself the target of ex­
tensive dissatisfaction.
The police, like the administration, lost out as a result of the 
anti-indigo movement. The police, as the instrument of the administration, 
were theoretically neutral in planter/tenant disputes. But they became 
strongly identified as acting in the interests of the planters. From time 
to time, as for example in the involvement of mounted troopers in a looting 
expedition through some villages in the Dhanaha area in Champaran, they quite 
obviously sided with planters and their amlas against villagers. And after 
such violent incidents as the Sonbarsa massacre and the Chauterwa arson case, 
the police who came into the area to investigate immediately found themselves 
cast in the role of supporters of the planters. Not only did the police lose 
public sympathy; they also lost credibility. In the two incidents mentioned 
above, the most serious breaches of order in the region betwen 1917 and 1922,
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scarcely any of the villagers involved were brought to book.
Nor did the apparatus of police/administrative control maintain its 
prestige through its handling of the non-cooperation movement. The non­
cooperation campaign was particularly difficult to contain because of the 
repercussions of the anti-indigo movement. Antagonism to the European 
planters easily translated itself into general anti-British and anti­
administration feeling. Non-cooperation gathered greatest strength in the 
Tirhut division, the area where the anti-indigo movement was strongest. In 
north Bihar in the early 1920s, the colonial attitudes of British planters 
and officials were mirrored back at them in anti-colonial feeling. This 
attitude reached a peak in the early 1920s partially because over the preceding 
years, as a result of British initiatives, there had been a transformation in 
attitudes towards the state. Throughout the 19th century, for most north
Biharis, the imperial state had been a distant, autocratic entity which played
433a limited role in their lives. From the last decades of the century,
434however, this sense of distance began to diminish. In order to improve
the political and financial stability of their far flung empire the British, 
in 1909 and 1919, made several constitutional concessions. These con­
cessions progressively increased the opportunities for a section of Indian 
society to participate in institutions of representative government, par­
ticularly in the sphere of local government. Constitutional advance and 
devolution of government power directly affected only a small minority of the 
population, but had wider repercussions because this minority commanded con­
siderable wealth and influence. Through the extension of representative in­
stitutions the state linked the politics of the locality and the region into 
wider imperial structure and itself became a more obtrusive factor in local 
politics. The constitutional concessions were less rapid and less substantial 
than many had hoped, and thus their implementation created as much animosity
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north Bihar, and particularly because of the zamindarisystem, government
had few resources at its disposal after it had covered the costs of revenue
A 3 5collection and of seeing "... that the districts remained quiet". Hence
it could spend little on social and administrative services which might have 
reaped a valuable harvest of political support. Through intervention in 
local political arenas the imperial state created expectations which, because 
of its pattern of rule, it did not have the capacity to fulfil. More than they 
had in the 19th century, people came to look at the state as a resource and to 
blame it for many of their problems.
Hostility to the imperial state increased because of the deficiencies
of its main instrument in north Bihar, the police force. The British wished
to keep a tight rein on non-cooperation, but did not wish to alienate liberal
and moderate opinion in India and Britain by unnecessary rigour in their
436measures against the campaign. The inadequacies of the police force made
it impossible for them to preserve this fine balance. The police were few in 
number and poorly equipped and were trained merely to handle routine police 
work rather than to cope with the challenge of an extensive civil disobedience 
movement involving large numbers of people who, other than their involvement 
in the movement, were law abiding citizens. Because they were few in number 
and poorly equipped the police found it difficult to handle large and hostile 
crowds. In the Kateya area in Saran in February 1920 and at Sitamarhi fair in 
Muzaffarpur in April 1922 small groups of unarmed police retreated before the 
onslaught of large, angry groups of people. The police, moreover, -were often 
inept, corrupt and harsh. Constable Chaubey's misconduct and subsequent em­
barrassment at the Sonepur market in Purnea typified the failings of the police. 
Another incident illustrative of their inadequacies occurred during the wave
as it won support. And because of the structure of imperial control in
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of market looting which developed during January 1921. During a riot in
the Makhana bazaar in the Bakhtiarpur thana of north Monghyr members of the
crowd looted four stalls. The police subsequently arrested 13 people of
whom three, it later emerged, had been falsely charged to gratify private
grudges. Apart from the laying of false charges, the general conduct of the
local police left much to be desired. Official investigation showed that in
the period before the looting there had been great discontent among the local
police constables and among the chaukidars. The chaukidars were resentful
because their pay had not. been raised for many years, despite rising prices.
And according to the District Magistrate the constables were discontented
because, as a result of agitation among the peasantry, they now had "... to
pay for their own food, a new and unpleasant experience which gives them an
437unusually large interest in prices". There was good reason to believe, the
Magistrate concluded, that the riot and robbery
was organized by the local dafadar and chaukidars 
with at least the acquiescence of the staff of the 
police station and there are some grounds for thinking 
that the writer head constable of the police station 
and some of the constables were actually concerned in 
organizing it*43g
The inadequacies of the police resulted directly from the financial
weakness of the province of Bihar and Orissa, which in turn derived from the
structure of imperial rule in the province. In Bihar and Orissa all the
instrumentalities of government were starved of funds. In 1922 the police
force of the province was severely undermanned, both in proportion to
population and to area. This deficiency continued even though, since the
foundation of the province in 1912, the share of the budget devoted to the
439police force had increased by 50 per cent. For both financial and
political reasons, the provincial administration considered that no further 
increases could be made. The provincial finances were in an extremely
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effect of the non-cooperators’ prohibition campaign on the income from excise.
And further increases in support of the unpopular and much criticized police
force would be politically unacceptable to the more representative legislature
440which had come into being under the Montagu/Chelmsford reforms. The Bihar
and Orissa government had insufficient funds even to pay its police constables
a wage above that earned by ordinary labourers. Policemen therefore had
little incentive to refrain from corruption. In January and February 1921
police work was disrupted over a wide area when an extensive agitation
441developed among the constabulary over their low pay. Nor could the
provincial government afford to meet the extra expenses associated with the 
policing of the non-cooperation movement. In May 1921 the Bihar and Orissa 
government reported to the Government of India Army Department that the 
maintenance by the provincial authorities
.... of a force sufficient to cope unaided with the 
disturbances which may result from the Non Co-operation 
movement is entirely beyond their power. It would be 
unreasonable to plan the permanent arrangements for 
maintaining law and order on the assumption that the 
Non Co-operation movement is to go on indéfinitely. ^
The Bihar and Orissa Government found this problem of finance 
impossible to resolve. Under the Montagu/Chelmsford reforms the provinces 
had been given financial autonomy, and hence the provincial government could 
solicit only limited help from the Government of India. Nor did the Bihar 
and Orissa administration see any way of increasing its income from within 
the province itself. Land was the main source of wealth and because of the 
pattern of agrarian relations within the structure of imperial rule most of 
the agrarian surplus was absorbed by the landed interest, and particularly 
by the zamindars. Only a small share went to the state. Because of its 
financial difficulties, the provincial administration ran its police force
straitened condition, and had been tightened further as a result of the
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on a shoe-string. The police force, like the administration it represented, 
displayed weaknesses in its handling of the non-cooperation movement. More 
generally, the popular turbulence of the 1917 to 1923 period revealed the 
deficiencies of the apparatus of formal, police/administrative control in 
north Bihar. In the early 1930s, these deficiencies would be revealed even 
more clearly.
N O T E S  : C H A P T E R  2 186
1 Judith M. Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power: Indian Politics 1915-1922 
(London 1972), pp. 61-22; GGB, Statutory Commission XII, p. 9;
Hauser "Bihar Kisan Sabha", p. 31; B.R. Tomlinson, "India and the 
British Empire, 1880-1935", Indian Economic and Social History 
Review XI, 2-3, 1974, pp. 337-80, pp. 349-52.
2 Hauser, "Bihar Kisan Sabha", p. 7.
3 O'Malley, Champaran, pp. 108-11; Maori, Nepaul Frontier, p. 7.
4 B.B. Misra (ed.), Select Documents on Mahatma Gandhi ' s ■ Movement in 
Champaran 1917-18 (Patna 1963) "Introduction", p. 8.
Binay Chaudhuri, "Agrarian economy and agrarian relations in 
Bengal 1859-1855" (Oxford D.Phil. thesis 1968);
B.B. Kling, The Blue Mutiny. The Indigo Disturbances in
Bengal 1859-1862 (London, 1966); Ranajit Guha, "Neel-
Darpan: The Image of a Peasant Revolt in a Liberal Mirror", The Journal
of Peasant Studies, 2 , 1 , October 1974, pp. 1-46.
6 Fisher, "Indigo Plantations", p. 35.
7 G. Mishra, "Indigo Plantation and the Agrarian Relations in Champaran 
during the Nineteenth Century", The Indian Economic and Social History 
Review,. Ill, 4, Dec. 1966, pp. 332-57.
8 Byrne, Bhagalpur p. 129; O’Malley, Champaran p. Ill, Saran p. 102-03, 
Muzaffarpur p. 101, Darbhanga p. 99, Monghyr-p. 140-1, Pumea p. 130-1.
9 Datta, Freedom Movement in Bihar, I, pp. 179-80.
10 O'Malley, Muzaffarpur, p. 126.
11 Gorakh Prasad to Editor, Searchlight, 31 Dec. 1920; "The Voice of the
187
Tenant", Searchlight> 22 Sept. 1922; Brown, Gandhi's Rise3 p. 64;
Datta, Freedom Movement3 II, p. 224; Sunil Munshi, "Railway Network 
Growth in Eastern India 1854-191011, Centre for Studies in Social Sciences 
Calcutta, Occasional Paper No. 3.
Maori, Nepaul Frontier3 pp. 5-6.
Fisher, "Indigo Plantations"* pp. 55, 232.
The following account of a planter’s mode of operation is drawn from 
Maori, Nepaul Frontier3 chap. 2.
Fisher, "Indigo Plantations", chap. 5.
Maori, Nepaul Frontier3 p. 18.
Ibid.
In 1917 a British official, J.A. Sweeney, commented that "The danger 
of the system is the extent of power exercised. Everything depends on 
the personality of the Manager. The same concern may change, in the 
eyes of the tenants, from a benevolent despotism to a capricious 
tyranny". Sweeney went on to remark that most of a planter's troubles 
were due to his amlas. GBO, Champaran Corrmittee Report3 p. 9.
Misra, Select Documents3 p. 7. For detailed discussion of the tenants' 
grievances, see also G. Mishra, "Socio-Economic Background of Gandhi's 
Champaran Movement", The Indian Economic and Social History Review3 V,
3, September 1968, pp. 245-75.
Jacques Pouchepadass, "Local leaders and the intelligentsia in the 
Champaran satyagraha (1917): a study in peasant mobilization", Contri­
butions to Indian Sociology3 New Series 8, 1974, pp. 67-87, p. 74;
188
Mishra, "Socio-Economic Background".
21 Fisher, "Indigo Plantations", pp. 87, 89.
22 Ibid ., p. 85, 87, 89, 103.
23 Ibid ., pp. 64, 104, 105, 109, 310; Datta, Freedom Movement, II, p. 223.
24 Fisher, "Indigo Plantations", p. 312.
25 Ibid ., pp. 111, 112. For a perceptive analysis of the particular 
circumstances in which this antipathy found political expression during 
the 19th century, see ibid., chap. 3 and the same author’s "Planters 
and Peasants: The Ecological Context of Agrarian Unrest on the Indigo 
Plantations of North Bihar", in Clive Dewey and A.G. Hopkins (eds.),
The Imperial Inpact. Studies in the Economic History of Africa and 
India (London 1978).
26 Ibid ., pp. 46-7.
27 Beames,•Memoirs, pp. 172-3.
28 Ibid.
29 Maori, Nepaul Frontier, pp. 153, 223; Fisher, "Indigo Plantations", 
p. 47.
30 Wilson, Behar Indigo Factories, pp. 100-01, 122-3, 138-9, 242-3,
329-31.
31 Datta, Freedom Movement, II, p. 175; Fisher, "Indigo Plantations", 
pp. 59, 60, 103, 176-8..
32 Yang, "Saran Riots", p. 15; Datta, Freedom Movement, II, pp. 178-9; 
Fisher, "Indigo Plantations", p. 104.
189
33 O'Malley, Champaran, p. 117; Sweeney, Champaran Settlement Report, 
p. 25; Maori, Nepaul Frontier, p. 22; Fisher, "Indigo Plantations", 
p. 217.
34 In the opinion of one official much depended "... on the management 
... with a considerate and just manager, who .looks into all affairs, 
and checks the work ... the ryots are philosophically resigned ..." 
Collector/Magistrate Norman, quoted in British Parliamentary Papers, 
1890-91 , 59, 157, p. 12.
35 Fisher, "Indigo Plantations", p. 310, 311.
36 Stephen Henningham, "The Social Setting of the Champaran Satyagraha:
The Challenge to an Alien Elite", Indian Economic and Social History 
Review, XIII, 1, 1976, pp. 59-73, 63-4, 66-7, 72.
37 Fisher, "Indigo Plantations", p. 64; O'Malley, Champaran, pp. 109-10.
38 British Parliamentary Papers, 1890-91, 59, 157, p. 8; T.R. Filgate,
"The Behar Planters' Association, Ltd", in Arnold Wright (ed.),
Bengal and Assam, Behar and Orissa (London 1917) pp. 268-351, 268-71.
39 Fisher, "Indigo Plantations", p. 311.
40 Ibid ., pp. 35, 37, 51.
41 D.J. Reid, "Indigo in Behar", in Wright, Bengal and Behar;
T.F. Filgate, "The Behar Planters' Association"; Henningham, "Social 
Setting of Champaran Satyagraha", pp. 62-4. For descriptions and 
photographs of the planters' properties see Wilson, Behar Indigo 
Factories and Filgate, "Behar Planters’ Association". According to 
Filgate the management of the Seeraha concern in Muzaffarpur had devoted
190
42 Wilson, Behar Indigo Factories 3 p. 101; O'Malley, P u r n e a pp. 130-31.
43 O'Malley, Chcmparan3 p. 111.
44 Reid, "Indigo in Bihar", p. 238.
45 Fisher, "Indigo Plantations", p. 280.
46 Ib id .; Filgate, "Behar Planters' Association".
47 "Rutherfordism at Bettiah", Searchlight3 18 Aug. 1920: "Rutherfordism", 
Searchlight3 1 Sep. 1920; Pouchepadass, ^Local leaders and 
intelligentsia", pp. 73-4; Henningham, "Social Setting of Champaran 
Satyagrapha", p. 68.
48 Misra, Select Documentsp. 13; Filgate, "Behar Planters' Association", 
p. 349.
49 Misra, Select Documents_, pp. 13-14; Mishra, "Socio-Economic Background".
50 Sweeney, Champaran Settlement Report_, p. 19.
51 Ib id .; M. Razi Ahmad, "Indigo Unrest in Champaran and Mahatma Gandhi, 
1867-1918",(Patna University Doctoral thesis 1966), p. 97, note 27.
52 Sweeney, Champaran Settlement R e p o r t p. 20.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ib id .; Misra, Select Documents3 p. 15.
56 About 15,000 peasants assembled at the station and shouted^in the
a section of its 21,000 acres to the construction of a golf course.
191
local Bhojpuri variant of Hindi, slogans that outlined their grievances. 
Their efforts miscarried: when George asked about the meaning of the 
slogans a quick-witted aide told him that they were expressions of joy 
and welcome. Rajendra Prasad, Satyagraha in Champaran (Ahmedabad 1949), 
p . 42.
57 Sweeney, Champaran Settlonent Report, p. 21.
58 The previous Survey and Settlement operations were conducted from 
1892 to 1899. BDG Champaran, p. 126; Sweeney, Champaran Settlement 
Report, p . 1 .
59 Sweeney, Champaran Settlement Report, p. 23.
60 Ib id ., p. 25.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Misra, Select Documents, pp. 18-20.
64 Ibid ., p. 20.
65 Datta, Freedon Movement II, pp. 193-5; Brown, Gandhi's Rise, p. 65.
66 R.A. Huttenback, Gandhi in South Africa, British Jmperialisn and the 
Indian Question, 1860-1914, (London 1971); Brown, Gandhi's Rise, 
chap. 1 .
67 Joan Bondurant, Conquest o f  Violence, The Gandhian Philosophy o f  
Conflict. (New Jersey 1958) .
68 Henningham, "Social Setting of Champaran Satyagraha".
The Champaran District Officer, W.B. Heycock, was directed to pass the 
order by L.F. Morsehead, the Commissioner of the Tirhut Division. 
Morsehead to District Magistrate, Champaran, 13 April 1917, and 
Heycock to Gandhi, 16 April 1917, Misra, Select Documents, pp. 61-2.
Telegram, GBO to Tirhut Commissioner, 19 April 1917, Misra, Select 
Documents, p. 73.
H. McPherson to L.F. Morsehead, 20 April 1917, Misra, Select 
Documents, p. 75-6.
M.K. Gandhi, Statement filed before Subdivisional Magistrate,
Motihari, 18 April 1917, Misra, Select Documents, p. 69.
Pouchepadass, "Local leaders and intelligentsia in Champaran", 
pp. 69-71.
Brown, Gccndki’s Rise, p. 77.
Sweeney, Champaran Settlement Report, p. 23. Judith M. Brown points 
out that at the time Gandhi became involved in Champaran affairs 
primary produce prices had dropped sharply, a development which 
affected cultivators "... who were accustomed to buying products 
imported into Champaran with the profit from the small surplus they 
grew over and above their own immediate needs". She suggests that 
this economic pressure on pivotal groups in the middle range of 
society increased unrest and contributed to the interest inspired by 
Gandhi. See her, Gandhi's Rise, pp. 60-1.
Pouchepadass, "Local leaders and intelligentsia", pp. 82-4.
M.K. Gandhi, An Autobiography. The Story o f  My Experiments With Truth, 
(London 1966), p. 350.
193
78 Pouchepadass, "Local leaders and intelligentsia", pp. 83-5; W.H. Lewis, 
Subdivisional Officer to W.B. Heycock, District Magistrate, 29 April 
1917, Misra, Select Documents3 p. 99.
79 For the interaction of the Government of India and the provincial 
government on .this issue, see Brown, Gandhi's Rise3 pp. 70-2.
80 H. Cox, Secretary Bihar Planters' Association, Champaran, to
H. McPherson, Chief Secretary GBO, n.d., Misra, Select Documents, p. 219.
81 Brown, Gandhi's Rise3 p. 72.
82 Pouchepadass's claim that the activities of Gandhi and his associates 
"... eventually met with full success " is exaggerated. "Local leaders 
and intelligentsia", p. 85.
83 Sweeney, Champaran Settlement Report3 p. 23.
84 Prasad, Satyagraha in Champaran; D.G. Tendulkar, Gandhi in Champaran 
(Calcutta, 1957).
85 Sweeney, Chanparan Settlement Report3 p. 25.
86 Ibid.
87 For details of the all-inclusive range of zamindari rights, see 
Sen, India3 p. 135.
88 Mishra, "Socio-Economic Background", pp. 269-74.
89 R.A. Sweeney, quoted by Hammond, Legislative Council Proceedings, p. 9, 
PSf 159,, 1922, BSA.
90 Mishra, "Socio-Economic Background", pp. 269.
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
Speech by Hammond, Legislative Council Proceedings, PSf 159, 1922, BSA.
Mishra, "Socio-Economic Background to Gandhi's Movement", p. 271;
"The Voice of the Tenant", Searchlight, 22 Sept. 1922.
"The Voice of the Tenant", Searchlight, 22 Sept. 1922.
Sweeney, Champaran Settlgnent Report, p. 24; Purnea District Magistrate, 
"Terms of Settlement", 29 May 1921, PSf 184, 1921, BSA.
Searchlight, 19 Aug. 1921.
Prasad, Satyagraha in Champaran, pp. 16-17; Brown, Gandhi's Rise, 
p. 63.
Sweeney, Champaran Settlement Report, p. 25; GBO FR (1) Jan. 1918,
PSf 8, 1918, BSA.
GBO Police Abstract 419, Champaran, 7 Mar. 1919, BSA.
Baden-Powell, Land-Systems, II, pp. 630-1.
Ibid ., pp. 641-56.
See Chapter 1 above, p. 32.
Wilson, Behar Indigo Factories, pp. 332-4.
Maori, Nepaul Frontier, pp. 216, 220-21; Wilson, Behar Indigo 
Factories, p. 191.
Buddhikar Jha, interview, Darbhanga town, 20 Sept. 1976.
O'Donnell, Ruin of an Indian Province. 
Maori, Nepaul Frontier, pp. 216-17; Wilson, Behar Indigo Factories, 
pp. 190-1.
194
195
107 O'Malley, Purnea, p. 113; C. Vowell, "Report on the Census of the 
District of Purnea, 1891", para. 145, Misc. Papers, BSA.
108 See for example, J.A. Sweeney, "Statement on Ramnagar", Champaran 
Committee Report, II.
109 It is difficult to establish when migration to Nepal ceased to be an 
attractive proposition. As late as 1921, when the tenants of the 
Parihar circle of the Darbhanga Raj petitioned the Maharaja in order 
to make complaints against the acting circle manager, calling for his 
dismissal, they contended that "... if he will live here any more, we 
shall go to settle in Nepal". Petition from Mahanand Raut, f 8G,
C Darkasht, G 1921-22, RDA.
110 It was generally agreed that small zamindars were particularly hard 
landlords. Kerr, Darbhanga Settlement Report, p. 101; Lila Rai to 
Editor, Searchlight, 24 Sept. 1922.
111 The large zamindars of Bihar had large incomes, but often lived beyond 
them, and became embroiled in financial difficulty. See "Review of 
1896", Behar Times, 1 Jan. 1897, and "Triennial Review", Behar Times,
5 Jan. 1900.
112 Umarpathi Tewari, who became a clerk in the Darbhanga Raj in 1936, was 
the son of Ram Sakhi Tewari, who held about 50 acres of land, some as 
a tenant and some as a zamindar. Palat Mishra, who was a Darbhanga 
Raj jeth ryot in the Madhubani subdivision of Darbhanga in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries, held about 12 to 15 acres of high quality 
land. Interview, Jageshwar Mishra, Darbhanga town 23 Sept. 1976; 
Interview, Umarpathi Tewari, Dumari village, Darbhanga, 17 Oct. 1976.
196
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
Confidential Police Report on Purnea, f 1411, C XXVI, G 1919-20, RDA; 
Chcanparan Committee Report, II, p. 9; "Benaili Raj — Ainlas’
Oppressions", Searchlight, 29 Sept. 1920.
Badrinath Upadhya, Reply to 'The Open Letter' Printed in the Searchlight 
Steam Press with a foreword from an alleged Sanyasi calling himself 
Swami Vidyanand (Bankipore, n.d.), p. 1. This 52-page pamphlet, which 
was written by the manager of the Rajnager circle of the Darbhanga Raj, 
is highly critical of Vidyanand but supplies much information about 
his activities. The author of the pamphlet quotes Vidyanand’s letters 
and petitions in detail before presenting arguments against them.
Ibid.
Ibid. See also the denial by Shiva Shankar Jha, one of Vidyanand’s 
associates, that he and Vidyanand had misused Gandhi’s name. Searchlight 
15 Dec. 1920.
In November 1919 Vidyanand commented "... The zamindari of the Maharaja 
Bahadur of Darbhanga is not only in the District of Darbhanga but mostly 
in all the neighbouring districts and the tyrannical oppressions have 
been prevailing everywhere which are not a bit less than those of 
Champaran." Vidyanand to the Lieutenant-Governor Bihar and Orissa,
17 Nov. 1919, para 14, quoted in Upadhya, Reply to Vidyanand, pp. 33-6.
GBO Police Abstract 1356, Darbhanga 5 July 1919, BSA; GBO FR (1) Oct. 
1919, GBO Ps f 8, 1920, BSA.
GBO Police Abstract 1356, 5 July 1919, BSA.
Memorial to the Lieutenant Governor of Bihar and Orissa, quoted in 
Upadhya Reply to Vidyanand, pp. 2-3. The land that the landlord had
1.97
resumed had originally been taken over for indigo cultivation on the 
tinkathia system.
121 Five of these petitions are quoted in ibid. on pp. 2, 7, 12, 16, 19.
122 Ibid ., pp. 12-14.
123 Ibid ., p. 47.
124 Note by Onraet, Manager Rohika circle, 11 Aug. 1920, on letter from 
Lakshmi Kant Jha, f 14H, C XXVI, G 1919-20, RDA.
125 Ibid.
126 GBO Police Abstract 1842, Bhagalpur 14 Nov. 1919, BSA; Upadhya, Reply 
to Vidyanand, pp. 34-6.
127 Upadyha, Reply to Vidyanand, pp. 35-6; GBO Police Abstract 1944, 
Bhagalpur, 22 Nov. 1919, BSA.
128 GBO Police Abstract 1981, Bihar Special Branch, 13 Dec. 1919, BSA.
129 GBO FR (2) Dec. 1919, GBO Ps f 8, 1920, BSA.
130 Swami Bidyatiand, "Timely notice to cultivators", leaflet quoted in 
GBO Police Abstract 1680, Bihar Special Branch 11 Oct. 1919, BSA; GBO 
Police Abstract 1786, Bihar Special Branch 1 Nov. 1919, BSA.
131 Manager, Naredigar Circle, Raj Darbhanga to Supaul Subdivisional 
Officer, 20 Nov. 1920, f 10E, C V, L 1920-21, RDA.
132 GBO FR (1) Jan. 1920, PS f 8, 1920, BSA.
133 Onraet, Manager Rohika Circle to General Manager, 7 Jan. 1920, f 14 H, 
C XXV, G 1919-20, RDA.
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
198
GBO FR (1) Feb. 1920, PSf 8, 1920, BSA.
Ibid .
GBO FR (1) Mar. 1920, PSf 8, 1920, BSA.,
GBO FR (2) April 1920, PSf 8, 1920, BSA.
GBO FRS for May-Sept, PSf 8, 1920, BSA.
GBO FR (1) July 1920, PS f 8, 1920, BSA.
GBO FR (1) May 1920, PSf 8, 1920, BSA.
GBO FR (1) July 1920, PSf 8, 1920, BSA.
Naredigar Manager to Head Office 20 March 1920 f 14H, C XXVI G 1919-20; 
Pandoul Manager to Babu Nath Bannurjee 12 March 1920 f 14H, C XXVI 
G 1919-20.
GBO Police Abstract 1756, Bihar Special Branch 25 Oct. 1919, BSA.
GBO, Instructions for the preparation o f  the electoral role, (Patna 
1920) BSA.
Brown, Gandhi's Rise, p. 289; GBO FR (1) Dec. 1920, PSf 8, 1920, BSA.
For tenants' allegations against amlas, see the Darkasht (i.e. petition) 
files in the General Department holdings of the Darbhanga Raj.
See for example the conference papers, f 14S C XXVI, G 1919-20, RDA.
Naredigar AAR 1318 F (1910-11), f 16D3, C Naredigar, G 1941-42, RDA; 
Dharampur Manager to Chief Manager, 13 March 1920, f 2, C XXXIV,
G 1919-20, RDA: Upadhya, Reply to Vidyanand, p. 13, para 5.
Jacques Pouchepadass, "Local leaders and intelligentsia", pp. 74-5; 
Interview, Jageshwar Mishra, Darbhanga town, 15 Sept. 1976.
199
150 Pouchepadass, "Local leaders and intelligentsia", p. 75; Alapur 
AAR 1326 F (1918-19) f 2, C XXXIV, G 1919-20, RDA; Interview, 
Jageshwar Mishra, Darbhanga town, 15 Sept. 1976.
151 Naredigar AAR 1318 F (1910-11), f 16D3, C Naredigar, G 1941-42, RDA; 
Upadhya, Reply to Vichyanand, p. 12, para 2; Interview, Jageshwar 
Mishra, Darbhanga town, 15 Sept 1976.
152 Demands concerning rights in trees recur again and again in the 
petitions quoted in Upadhya, Reply to Vidyanomd.
153 I b i d p. 12.
154 GBO Police Abstract 1756, Special Branch, 25 Oct. 1919, BSA;
GBO FR (1) Feb. 1920, PSf 8, 1920, BSA.
155 GBO Police Abstract 1756, Bihar Special Branch, 25 Oct. 1919, BSA.
156 GBO Police Abstract 1786, Bihar Special Branch, 1 Nov. 1919, BSA.
157 The number of circles varied from time to time as a result of 
administrative adjustments but usually numbered about fourteen. For 
information on the circles, see the Raj Darbhatig a Directory, 1941, RDA 
and the annual administrative reports on each circle.
158 The passage quoted continues with the allegations that "... he made 
presidents of meetings and collecting members for realizing subscrip­
tions; it is believed he enriched himself by this means to some extent 
and the collecting members also made money out of it." Rohika AAR, 
1326 F (1918-19), f2, C XXXIV, G 1919-20, RDA.
159 Manager, Padri to Chief Manager, 10 Aug. 1920, f 2A, C XXXIV,
G 1919-20, RDA.
200
161 Padri manager to Chief Manager 10 Aug. 1920 f 2A C XXXIV G 1919-20,
RDA. See also, Alapur AAR 1326 F (1918-19) f 2 C XXXIV G 1919-20 
RDA. Unfortunately I was not able to ascertain the outcome of the 
Padri sharecroppers' protest movement. It seems probable that the 
Darbhanga Raj was able to contain it effectively and to silence dis­
content by the granting of some concessions.
162 Upadhya, Reply to Vidyanand_, pp. 2-3.
163 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
165 The lessening of economic pressure seems also to have resulted in a 
fall in the crime rate. See GBO FR (2) Aug. 1920 PSf 8, 1920, BSA.
166 GBO FR (2) March 1920, PSf 8, 1920, BSA.
167 The initial sympathy of Congress politicians for Vidyanand's movement 
may have been a result of the fact that they and Vidyanand had a common 
opponent in the Maharajah of Darbhanga. GBO FR (1) Dec. 1919, PSf 8, 
1919, BSA.
168 This incident occurred at a provincial Congress meeting held at Patna 
on 5 April. Vidyanand moved a resolution calling for the formation of
a committee to enquire into the grievances of the Darbhanga Raj tenants. 
Prasad opposed the motion, and succeeded in having it shelved, on the 
grounds that Vidyanand was untrustworthy and unreliable and had falsely 
claimed to be Gandhi's disciple. GBO FR (2) April, Psf8, 1920, BSA.
1.60 Ibid.
201
169 This structure is outlined in the Baj Darbharga Directory, 1941, RDA.
170 Up until circa 1915 the chief manager of the Darbhanga Raj was referred 
to as the general manager, and the circle managers were referred to
as sub-managers. At times, the alternative terms were used inter­
changeably. Since the terms chief manager and circle manager were in 
vogue during most of the period whith which this study is concerned, I 
have chosen to use them throughout my text.
171 G.P. Danby, Chief Manager, Memorandum 9 March 1933, f 16D27,
C Management, G 1941-42.
172 "Rules Regarding Patwaries and Jethrayats", f 16D39, C Management 
G 1941-42, RDA.
173 Interview Jageshwar Mishra, Darbhanga town, 20 Sept. 1976; Maori, 
NepaiH Frontier, p. 147.
174 "Rules regarding Patwaries and Jethrayats", f 16D39, C Management,
G 1941-42, RDA.
175 In March 1920 the Parihar circle manager commented "The Patwaris and 
Jeth Ryots generally go hand in hand in injuring Raj interests."
Parihar Manager to Chief Manager 9 March 1920, letter 9, f2, C XXXIV,
G 1919-20; see also Alapur AAR, 1326 F (1918-19), f 2, C XXIV, G 
1919-20, RDA.
176 Chief Manager, Memorandums dated 6 Aug. 1937, 25 Aug. 1939, f 16D27,
C Management, G 1941-42, RDA.
177 R.S. King, "Strictly Confidential Note", 14-17 Jan. 1920, letter 1, 
f 14S, C XXVI, G 1919-20, RDA.
202
178
179
180 
181
182
Ibid. 
Ibid.
Saraya Manager to Chief Manager, 16 June 1928, f la-lc, C XVIII,
G 1927-28, RDA.
In 1915, when there had been no agitation under way among the tenants 
of the Darbhanga Raj the higher management of the Raj had shown some 
interest in improving Raj/tenant relations. On 30 June 1915 the 
manager of the Darbhanga circle canvassed the other circle managers 
suggesting the establishment in each circle of a committee of locally 
influential men, presided over by the circle manager, to "... look 
after village improvement, settle disputes, foster good Zamindar/ 
Tenant relations and preach loyalty to Government". Darbhanga circle 
manager, note dated 30 June 1915, f 26, C XXV, G 1915-16 RDA. The 
plan did not come to fruition, but initially it elicited a reasonably 
favourable response. Six of the ten managers who replied agreed with 
the proposal, two thought it was a good idea but impractical, and two 
were opposed to it. The Naredig^ir manager agreed with the proposal 
and commented that it was "... but an echo of what is before the 
Legislative Council of the Government of India regarding advisory 
boards." The Gondwara manager, however, was against the proposal 
because "Those appointed will become leaders of the tenantry and in 
cases where tenants & Raj are opposed at once a combination will be 
formed." The manager’s replies are held with the Darbhanga manager’s 
note.
Ibid.
203
183 Note by Onraet, Manager Rohika circle, 11 Aug- 1920, on letter from 
Lakshmi Kant Jha, f 14H, C XXVI, G 1919-20, RDA.
184 GBO, Instructions for the preparation o f  the electoral role.
185 Ibid..; Note by Sunder, 22 Jan. 1920, f 14Z 24, C XXV, G 1919-20, RDA.
186 "Conference Papers", letter 1, f 14S, C XXVI, G 1919-20, RDA.
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid.
189 Ibid.
190 "Special Grievances of Purnea tenants", ibid.
191 Ibid.
192 Ibid.
193 Ibid.
194 Upadhya, Reply to Vidyanand.
195 Letters 21 and 22, f 14H, C XXVI, G 1919-20, RDA.
196 Comment by Gadadhar Pandit Jha, "Notes of 15th January Conference", 
f 14S, C XXVI, G 1919-20, RDA.
197 Letter 22, f 14H, C XXVI, G 1919-20, RDA.
198 Ibid.
199 See the Head Office circular to managers Rohika and Rajnager, n.d., 
held with letter 1, f 14H, C XXVI, G 1919-20, RDA. The programme out­
lined in the circular called on the Rohika and Rajnager circle managers 
to bring rent enhancement suits against those local leaders who "had 
assisted Vidyanand, to initiate damages suits against ryots who had cut
204
trees without permission, to offer jeth ryots a commission of 10 per 
cent of the money realized if they brought people forward to have 
transfers of holdings recorded on payment of the "usual" fee of one 
quarter of the purchase price, to establish and keep up to date a 
register of "loyal" and "disloyal" ryots, and to investigate and take 
action upon any Raj legal claims against "disloyal" tenants.
200 In the margin of ibid. are written the words "Not Issued". I was unable 
to confirm that the circular had not been sent out because the volume 
of despatched Head Office circulars for the year had been misplaced and 
could not be located during the period in which I was working in the Raj 
Darbhanga Archives. I would be grateful for information on this point 
from any scholar who may in future work on the Darbhanga Raj records.
201 Letter 18, f 14H, C XXVI, G 1919-20, RDA; Moti Lai, Telsildar, 
Nawahakhar Group to Manager, Naredigar, 28 March 1920, held with letter 
29A, f 14H, C XXVI, G 1919-20, RDA.
202 "Report on Samiah case", f 14H, C XXV, G 1919-20, RDA.
203 D. Sunder, Manager Naredigar to His Highness the Maharaja, 1 Sept. 1920, 
f 14H, C XXVI, G 1919-20, RDA.
204 D. Sunder, "Confidential Note", 22 Jan. 1920, f 14 Z 24, C XXV, G 
1919-20, RDA.
205 Swami Vidyanand to the Lieutenant-Governor, Bihar and Orissa, 17 Nov. 
1919, quoted in Upadhya, Reply to Vidyanand, pp. 31-6, p. 31.
206 Ibid ., p. 32.
207 Ibid.
205
209
210  
211 
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220 
221 
222 
223
208
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid.
Ibid. p. 35.
Ibid. p. 36.
W.B. Brett to McPherson, Home Secretary, 7 Aug. 1920, GOI HPf 50,
Sept. 1920, NAI.
Ibid.
Confidential Diary, Darbhanga Police Superintendent, 23 June 1920,
GOI HPf 50, Sept. 1920, NAI.
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid.
Petition from Raghunandan Sahu and others, f 5C, C X, G 1921-22, RDA.
Ibid. The Telis' offer to pay a cash fee for the right to produce
oil perhaps indicates that they were vexed more by the arbitary 
behaviour of the amlas than by the exaction of the perquisite itself. 
However the offer to pay cash may also have been a ploy. Once money 
changed hands, then receipts could be demanded; and the Telis could 
use these receipts as evidence in court to show that the practice con­
tinued, in the hope of being awarded a court decision declaring it 
illegal.
Ibid. , p . 35.
224 Ibid.
225 Ibid.
226 Pandoul Manager to Chief Manager, 15 Dec. 1921, f 5C, C X, G 1921-22, 
RDA.
227 Ibid.
228 Pandoul Manager to Chief Manager, 7 April 1922, held with ibid.
229 Ibid.
230 Ibid.
231 Head Office notes, 3 May 1922, f 5C, C X, G 1921-22, RDA.
232 Ibid.
233 Chief Manager to Manager Pandoul, 5 May 1922, f 5C, C X, G 1921-22, 
RDA.
234 Searchlight3 31 July 1921; "Note on the situation in village Sonbarsa 
in Thana Bihpur", HPf 315, 199 NAI [hereafter "Note on Sonbarsa"] 
paras 2, 5; O’Malley, Morghyr3 pp. 74, 129.
235 "Note on Sonbarsa", para 2.
236 Ibid.
237 Judgement by Justice Das, HPf 315, 1922, p. 40, NAI.
238 Ibid. 3 pp. 54-5.
239 "Note on Sonbarsa", para 3.
240 Ib id .3 para 1 .
241 Ibid.
242 Ib id .3 para 3.
206
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
207
Ibid ., paras 5, 10; "Note on the agitation in Grant’s estate", HPf 315, 
1922, NAI [hereafter "Grant agitation"].
"Note on Sonbarsa", paras 5, 6; "Grant agitation", para 1.
Ibid.
"Note on Sonbarsa", para 9, section (3).
Ibid.
Ibid. , para 9, section (5).
Ibid. , para 1 0 .
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid.
Ibid . j para 5.
Ibid ., para 4.
Ibid ., para 7.
Ibid.
Ibid ., paras 5, 7.
Judgement by Justice Das, HPf 315, 1922, NAI, p. 43.
"Note on Sonbarsa", paras 7, 8; Chief Secretary GBO to Secretary 
European Association, 2 Nov. 1921, GOI HPf 315, 1922, NAI.
"Note on Sonbarsa", para 8.
If this were the case, then official explanations as to why no strong 
police action was taken might merely be justifications after the fact.
Ibid.
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
2 77
278
208
"Special Branch Officer's report," 4 Feb. 1921, HPf 315, 1922 NAI, 
[hereafter Special Branch report ] p. 12.
Ibid .
Ibid.', Report by Drake-Brockman, Deputy Inspector-General Police,
7 Feb. 1921, GOI HPf 315, 1922, NAI [hereafter Drake-Brockman report] 
p. 17.
Special Branch report, p. 13.
Drake-Brockman report, pp. 16-17.
Ibid ., p. 17.
Ibid ., pp. 17-18.
Ib id .; Special Branch report, p. 13.
Drake-Brockman report p. 18; Special Branch report, p. 13.
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid.
Drake-Brockman report, p. 19.
Ibid ., p. 19-20.
Drake-Brockman, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, commented "It 
will be seen therefore that no information of any sort or kind was 
given to the authorities till 7-30 A.M. of 3-2-21. This is attempted 
to be accounted for in various ways, but it is impossible to put any 
reliance on any of the excuses and was done doubtless to get time to 
concoct a plausible story." See ibid pp. 19-20.
209
279 Memorial presented to the Government of Bihar and Orissa by the north 
Bihar branch of the European Association, HPf 315, 1922, NAI.
280 GBO Chief Secretary to Secretary, European Association, 2 Nov. 1921,
HPf 315, 1922, NAI; Judgement by Justice Das, HPf 315, 1922, NAI.
281 Secretary, European Association to GBO Chief Secretary, 8 Nov. 1921,
HPf 315, 1922.
282 GBO Chief Secretary to Secretary European Association, 2 Nov. 1922,
HPf 315, 1922, NAI.
283 Ibid ., para 9.
284 K.S. Coombe, Manager, Luttipur Concern, Narayanpur, to Rajendra Prasad,
26 Sept. 1936, f XII, 1936, Mf 4, PP, NML.
285 Searchlight, 25 April 1920, cuttings held with f 14H, C XXVI, G 1919-20, 
RDA; Vaidyanath Jha, "Confidential Purnea" Report", 7 April 1920,
f 14H, C XXVI, G 1919-20, RDA [hereafter Purnea Report].
286 Purnea rerport.
287 Ibid.
288 Ibid.
289 Searchlight, 25 April 1920, cuttings held with f 14H, C XXVI, G 
1919-20, RDA.
290 W. Johnson, District Magistrate Purnea to Assistant Manager, Kabur 
factory, quoted in Searchlight, 25 April 1920, held with ibid.
291 Purnea Police Superintendent's Report, circa 30 April 1920, held with
ibid.
210
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
Purnea Report.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ib id .; Confidential CID Reports, ibid.
Vaidyanath Jha, "Confidential Purnea Report", 7 April 1920, ibid.
A.K. Khan, Gondwara Circle Manager, to His Highness the Maharaja,
18 Aug. 1920, ibid.
Commissioner Bhagalpur Division to Chief Secretary, 1 June 1921, PS f 
184, 1921, BSA.
Purnea District Magistrate, "Terms of Settlement", 29 May 1921, held 
wi th ibid.
Commissioner Bhagalpur Division to Chief Secretary, 1 June 1921, ibid. 
Ib id .3 para 4.
Ib id .; Purnea Police Superintendent to Deputy Inspector General 
Police, GBO, 10 April 1921, held with ibid; Purnea District Magistrate, 
report dated 29 May 1921, held with ibid.
Police Superintendent’s and Commissioner's letters, cited in notes 298 
and 302 above. According to the Superintendent, the disgruntled tenants 
had forced the Shillingfords' servants to stop serving them, but accord­
ing to the Commissioner the servants had struck work in protest against 
their masters’ actions.
Purnea Police Superintendent to Deputy Inspector General Police,
GBO, 10 April 1921, held with ibid.
Ibid.
211
306 Purnea District Magistrate’s report 29 May 1921; Purnea District 
Magistrate, "Terms of Settlement", 29 May 1921; both held with ibid.
307 Purnea District Magistrate’s report 29 May 1921, held with ibid.
308 Champaran Police Superintendent to 1st assistant to Deputy Inspector 
General Police, 21 June 1921, PSf 287, 1921, BSA.
309 Ibid.
310 Ibid.
311 Searchlight, 19 Aug. 1921.
312 Toplis, Muzaffarpur District Magistrate, quoted in Tirhut FR (1), 
August 1921, PS f 93, 1921, BSA.
313 A mahant(h) held the right to officiate in a village temple and also 
controlled the landholdings which wealthy peasants had donated to 
provide for the upkeep of the temple and its staff. Because he com­
bined religious leadership with control over land a mahant held con­
siderable power in village society.
314 Toplis, Muzaffarpur District Magistrate, quoted in Tirhut FR (1), 
Sept. 1921, PSf 93, 1921, BSA.
315 Ibid.
316 Champaran Police Superintendent, Confidential Diary for week ending 
24 Oct., extract quoted in PSf 93, 1921, BSA.
317 Hammond, GBO Chief Secretary to GOI Home Secretary HPf 357, 1921, 
para 5, NAI.
318 Champaran Police Superintendent, Confidential Diary for week ending
24 Oct., extract quoted in PSf 93, 1921, BSA.
212
319 Ibid.
320 Champaran Police Superintendent, report on situation in Champaran,
3 Nov. 1921, PSf 539, 1921, BSA [hereafter Champaran Police report].
321 Special Report Case 29, Report II, 2 Nov. 1921, PSf 539, 1921, BSA, 
[hereafter Special Report II].
322 Ibid.
323 Champaran Police Report.
324 Ibid.
325 Special Report II.
326 Champaran Police Report.
32 7 Ibid.
328 Hammond, GBO Chief Secretary to GOI Home Secretary para 2, HPf 357, 
1921, NAI.
329 Champaran Police Report.
330 Ibid.
331 Hammond, GBO Chief Secretary to GOI Home Secretary, paras 3 & 5, 
HPf 357, 1921, NAI.
332 Council speech by Mr Hammond, PSf 159, 1922, BSA; Champaran Police 
Superintendent’s Report, 13 Nov. 1921, GBO PSf 539, 1921 BSA.
333 Champaran Police Superintendent’s Report 13 Nov. 1921, PSf 539, 1921, 
BSA. Reporting to the Home Department, the GBO Chief Secretary noted 
that "The immediate cause of the outbreak is attributed to the insti­
tution earlier in the month of a case against some of the tenants who 
had beaten one of the factory guards when he tried to impound cattle
213
Hammond, GBO Chief Secretary to GOI Home Secretary, para 3, HPf
357, 1921, NAI.
334 Hammond, GBO Chief Secretary to GOI Home Secretary, paras 4 & 6,
HPf 357, 1921, NAI; PSf 216, 1922, BSA.
335 Ib id .; Searchlight3 23 Aug. 1922.
336 Hammond, GBO Chief Secretary to GOI Home Secretary para 2, HPf 357, 
1921, NAI.
337 J. Pearson, Risaldar Mounted Military Police to Champaran Police 
Superintendent, 27 Dec. 1921; Champaran Special Report Case 35,
Report II, 3 Jan. 1922; Extract from Fortnightly Confidential Report, 
17 Jan. 1922; Champaran District Officer to Tirhut Commissioner 28 
Feb. 1922; all in PSf 69, 1922, BSA.
338 J. Pearson, Risaldar Mounted Military Police to Champaran Police 
Superintendent, 27 December 1921, PSf 69, 1922, BSA.
339 Champaran District Officer to Tirhut Commissioner, 10 Jan. 1922, 
held with ibid.
340 Champarán Police Superintendent, Demi Official letter, 4 Jan. 1922, 
held with ibid.
341 Press clipping from PrajabandhUj 11 Jan. 1922, held with ibid and 
Searchlight, during Jan. 1922.
342 H.K. Gray, Mia Chapra Indigo Concern, to Police Sub-Inspector,
Patepur, n.d., PSf 3, 1922, BSA.
grazing on land which the factory claims to be reserved..."
214
343 Tirhut Commissioner to GBO Chief Secretary, 24 Jan. 1922, held with 
ibid.
344 Muzaffarpur Police Superintendent, Supplementary Confidential Diary,
23 Jan. 1922, held with ibid.
345 Ibid.
346 Petition by ryots of Khawaspore and other places, 16 Oct. 1922,
C XXV, f 18C, G 1922-23, RDA.
347 Ibid.
348 Ibid.
349 A.V. Khan, Gondwara manager to MacDonald, indigo manager, C XXV, 
f 18C, G 1922-23, RDA.
350 C.S. McDonald, Bahora manager to chief manager, 19 June 1923, C XXV, 
f 20, G 1922-23, RDA.
351 Ibid.
352 Conference papers 7 June, 1 Sept. 1923, f 7A, C XXV, G 1922-23, RDA; 
Instructions from Head Office, 13 June 1923, f 18ZF, C XXV, G 1922-23, 
RDA.
353 Filgate, "Behar Planters"; Sir John Wardle Houlton, Bihar, The Heart 
of India, (Calcutta 1949), p. 118; Behar Planters' Association Report 
for 1937-38, Political 2, f 52, 1939, Commissioner's Record Room, 
Muzaffarpur town.
354 Fisher, "Indigo Plantations", pp. 285-7.
355 Brown, Gandhi's Rise, pp. 307-8.
215
356
357
358
359
360 '
361
362
363
364
365
Behar Times, 5 Jan. 1900.
The analysis of the rise of nationalist activity in Bihar that follows 
is based upon G. McDonald, "Unity on Trial : Congress in Bihar,
1919-39", in D.A. Low (ed.), Congress and the Raj. Facets o f  the Indian 
Struggle, 1917-1947 (London 1977) pp. 289-314, 292-5.
On the subject of the level of supra-local political awareness among 
the mass of the population, see F. Tomasson Jannuzi, Agrarian Crisis 
in India. The Case of Bihar (New Delhi 1974), pp. 107-116.
McDonald, "Unity on Trial", pp. 292-3; Broomfield, "The Regional 
Elites: A Theory of Modern Indian History", in Metcalf, Modem India, 
pp. 60-70, 69.
McDonald, "Unity on Trial", pp. 292-3.
Ib id .; H.F. Owen, "Towards Nationwide Agitation and Organisation : 
the Home Rule Leagues, 1915-18", in D.A. Low (ed.), Soundings in 
Modem Soubh Asian History (London 1968), pp. 159-95, 160-1.
According to the hostile account of the Chief Secretary of the Government 
of Bihar and Orissa, writing in 1917, "The Congress here is a most 
hollow business. The whole thing is run by half a dozen wire-pullers 
and the audience consists chiefly of the junior bar." Gait to Vincent,
6 Aug. 1917, HPf 47, Oct. 1917, NAI.
G. McDonald, "Unity on Trial", pp. 293-4.
K.K. Datta, Rajendra Prasad (New Delhi 1970) p. 1.
Ibid ., p. 322.
216
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
Owen, Bihar 1921, p. 12; GGB, Statutory Corrmission3 XII, p. 20.
Owen, "Nationwide Agitation" and "Organizing for the Rowlatt Satyagraha 
of 1919", in Ravinder Kumar (ed.), Essays on Gandhian Politics.
The Rowlatt Satyagraha of 1919 (London 1971), pp. 64-92.
Brown, Gandhi’s Rise, pp. 259-60, 270.
Ibid., chap. 6; Francis Robinson, Separatisn among Indian Muslims. 
The Politics of the United Province’s Muslims, 1860-1923 (Cambridge 
1974); A.C. Neimeijer, The Khilafat Movement in India, 1919-24 
(The Hague 1972).
Brown, Gandhi’s Rise, pp. 253, 260, 261; Richard Gordon, "Non­
cooperation and Council Entry 1919 to 1920" in Gallagher et. al.
Locality, Province and Nation, pp. 123-53, 146. 
Brown, Gandhi’s Rise, p. 287.
Ibid., p. 260.
Brown notes that the Bhagalpur Congress meeting passed "a resolution 
urging the government to relieve distress caused by high food prices — 
which was of course completely incompatible with the principle of non­
cooperation with the government". Ibid.
GBO FR (2) April 1920 PSf 8, 1920 BSA.
GBO FR (1) Dec. 1920, PSf 8, 1920, BSA; Brown, Gandhi’s Rise, p. 288.
The Legislature which came to office as a result of the November 1920 
elections consisted predominantly of great zamindars and of non-congress 
lawyers, but also included Vidyanand and three of his colleagues, rep­
resenting electorates in the north of Bhagalpur and Darbhanga. Under
217
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
the Montagu/Chelmsford reforms the total electorate amounted to 1.9 
per cent of the total adult male population. Owen, Bihar 1921, p. 13.
GBO FR (1) Dec. 1920, PSf 8, 1920, BSA; GBO, Synopsis of History of 
NCO movements PSf 286, 1924, BSA.
Brown, Gandhi's Rise, pp. 297-200; Gopal Krishna, "The Development 
of the Indian National Congress as a Mass Organization, 1918-23", 
in Metcalf, Modem India3 pp. 257-72.
For a detailed report of the development of the campaign in the 
Madhubani subdivision of Darbhanga, see Lakshmi Mishra, "An account of 
the non-co-operation movement", PSf 434, 1923, BSA. Mishra emphasizes 
the galvanizing effect of Gandhi's Dec. 1920 tour of north Bihar.
Brown, Gandhi's Rise, pp. 309-10. In Bihar the call to boycott 
government educational institutions and to attend 'national' schools 
and colleges also achieved considerable success.
Ibid.j p. 315.
Ibid.j p. 316; GGB, Statutory Commission, XII, p. 274.
Ibid., p. 315; GGB, Statutory Comnission, XII, pp* 273, 2 74, 374.
Forrest, Tirhut Commissioner to GBO Chief Secretary 2 July 1921 PSf 37,
1921, BSA. On 9 March 1921 the Champaran Police Superintendent reported
an incident illustrative both of planter arrogance and of the change in
popular attitudes. The Superintendent reported that
A few days ago Mr Owen, Manager of Pursa factory, went 
to Murchargaon village and happened to meet Mangal 
Prasad Singh. The latter refused to salaam or failed 
to do so. This annoyed Mr Owen who lost his temper at 
the insolence of Mangal and abused him ... Subsequently
218
Mangal Prasad Singh came to Dhanaha elaka and 
delivered some exciting speeches to the raiyats 
urging them not to work for the Factorys.
Champaran Police Superintendent's Weekly Report held with ibid.
385 "Reports of Hat looting", PSf 21, 1921, BSA; Forrest, Tirhut 
Commissioner, to Rainey, GBO Chief Secretary, 20 Jan. 1921, PSf 12,
1921, BSA.
386 R.S.F. Macrae, Deputy Inspector General Police to GBO Chief Secretary,
20 Jan. 1921, PSf 21, 1921, BSA.
387 Purnea Special Report Case 11, Report II, 19 Feb. 1921, PSf 21, 1921, BSA.
388 Report by Toplis, 12 Feb. '1921, pp. 33-4, PSf 93, 1921, BSA.
389 Macrae, Deputy Inspector General Police to GBO Chief Secretary, 20 Jan. 
1921, PSf 21, 1921, BSA.
390 Forrest to Rainey, GBO Chief Secretary, 20 Jan. 1921, PSf 12, 1921, BSA.
391 The phenomenon of market looting requires further research. Disturbances 
at markets were always likely to occur, quite independently of the 
impact of political movements. Villagers tended to be suspicious of and 
hostile towards merchants, since they knew from harsh experience that 
merchants might short change them or give them short measure. Thieves 
and hoodlums and the poor and mendicant gathered in the market places, 
and could easily, for their own advantage, be drawn into and help 
magnify any disturbance that might get under way. An adverse price/supply 
situation was the essential pre-condition of market looting. In 1918
and in the first months of 1942 scarcity and high prices coincided with 
the occurrence of market looting during periods when no mass political 
agitation was under way. And in 1921,* the cessation of looting incidents
219
happened contemporaneously with the improvement, from late February 
on, of the price/supply situation. From this, and because none of the 
available evidence connects any of the incidents with any individual 
non-cooperator, it would seem that mass agitation was perhaps a con­
tributory but not a necessary or sufficient cause of market looting.
GBO FR (2) May 1918 PSf 8, 1918, BSA; GBO FR (2) Jan. 1942 Freedom 
Movement Papers [hereafter FMP] f 76, 1942, BSA.
392 Extract from diary of Gopalganj Police Inspector 13 Feb. 1921, PSf 58,
1921, BSA. See also Misra "Account of non-co-operation", PSf 434,
1922 BSA and Pouchepadass, "Local leaders and intelligentsia", pp. 83-4. 
Indeed, such was the aura surrounding Gandhi's name that his authority 
could be invoked for all kinds of purposes. In July 1921 Elliot, an 
indigo planter, dealt with a rent strike by his tenants by telling them 
that "... Mr Gandhi had said that he had no complaint against his 
factory, and if they did not pay their rents he would be obliged to 
report them to Mr Gandhi". This ploy proved to be successful, because, 
according to the official report, "The local Gandhi-ite leader, being 
much pleased with this recognition by the local magnate, ordered the 
raiyats to pay the rents and they did". Forrest, Tirhut Commissioner, 
to Rainy, Chief Secretary, 2 July 1921, PSf 37, 1921, BSA.
393 In some instances the "Lat Saheb", i.e. the Governor of the Province 
had featured in the story in the place of the Englishman. F.S. McNamara 
"Report of the gathering of mobs in the Dhanaha thana", 1/2 April 1921 
PSf 148, 1921 BSA [hereafter Dhanaha report]. The importance of the 
messianic element and of racial antagonism in popular participation in 
the non-cooperation movement led one British official to conclude that 
"... there is no economic grievance behind all this agitation.
220
It has been based on sentiment throughout . . (italics in original). 
Forrest, Tirhut Commissioner to Rainy, Chief Secretary GBO 2 July 1921 
PSf 37, 1921, BSA.
394 Basti (United Provinces) Police Superintendent's diary, extract dated 
2 April 1921, held with Dhanaha report.
395 Ibid.
396 Dhanaha report.
397 Saran Special Report Case 10, Report 1, 20 February 1921, GBO PSf 
58, 1921, BSA [hereafter Case 10, Report I],
398 Saran Special Report Case 10, Report II, 28 Feb. 1921, held with ibid. 
[hereafter Case 10, Report II]. See also Yang, "Saran Riots" pp. 20-1.
399 Case 10, Report II.
400 Case 10, Report I.
401 Case 10, Report II.
402 Case 10, Report I.
403 Champaran Police Superintendent to Deputy Inspector General Police,
21 June 1921, PSf 287, 1921, BSA.
404 Bhagalpur Commissioner to Chief Secretary, 1 June 1921, PSf 184, 1921, 
BSA.
405 Brown, Gandhi's Rise3 p. 313; GGB, Statutory Corrmission3 XII, p. 15.
406 GGB, Statutory Commission3 XII, p. 15.'
407 Ibid.j pp. 14-16.
221
408 D.A. Low, "The Government of India and the first non - cooperation 
movement, 1920-2", in Ravinder Kumar (ed.), Essays on Gandhian 
Politics, The Rowlatt Satyagraha of 1919 (London 1969) pp. 298,323,
306, 308.
409 GGB, Statutory Commission, p. 15.
410 Telegram from Muzaffarpur Police Superintendent, 30 Dec., 1921,
PSf 3, 1922, BSA.
411 Synopsis of history of NCO movement, PSf 286, 1924, BSA.
412 Diary of Muzaffarpur Police Superintendent, 29 Dec. 1921, PSf 3, 1922, 
BSA. -
413 Telegram from Muzaffarpur Police Superintendent, 30 Dec. 1921, PSf 3,
1922, BSA.
414 FR(2) Dec. 1920 PSf 7, 1920, BSA.
415 See his confidential diary 16 Jan. 1922, PS f 146, 1922, BSA.
416 Purnea Police Superintendent, confidential diary 8 Feb. 1922, report 
of 18 Feb. 1922, PSf 146, 1922, BSA.
417 For details of the Chauri Chaura incident see GOI HP files 563, 1922 
and 677, 1922, NAI. For details of developments in the United Provinces 
and on the Malabar coast, see W.F. Crawley "Kisan Sabhas and Agrarian 
Revolt in the United Provinces 1920 to 1921", Modern Asian Studies,
5, 2, 1971, pp. 95-109,^08-9; Majid Hayat Siddiqi, "The Peasant 
Movement in Pratapgarh", Indian Economic and Social History Review, 9,
—1972, pp. 305-26, 306; Brown, Gandhi's Rise, p. 327.
418 Owen, Bihar 1922, chap. 1.
222
419 Diary of Muzaffarpur Police Superintendent 11 April 1922, PSf 225, 1922, 
BSA. The bal or bel fruit is about the size of a large orange
and has a hard outer casing.
420 S.P. Mukharji, Sub-Divisional Officer, Kishanganj, Report regarding 
Sonepur Hat enquiry, 13 May 1922, GBO PSf 232, 1922, BSA [hereafter 
Sonepur report]; Dundas, Inspector General Police to GBO Chief 
Secretary, 22 April 1922, held with ibid.
421 Sonepur report.
422 Ibid.
423 Bhagalpur Commissioner to GBO Chief Secretary, 22 May 1922, held with 
ibid.
424 See his "Gandhian Politics" (review of Brown’s^  Gandhi's Rise)
Modern Asian Studies3 7, 1, 1973, pp. 107-15, p. 110. Washbrook’s 
comments draw on his own research into the role and activities of 
middle-men in the Madras Presidency. Some of the people he refers to 
had little or no connection with the land, and hence could only play 
an intermediary role. The situation in Bihar differed because the 
members of the regional intelligentsia, some of whom became involved 
in protest, had strong ties with the land.
425 W.H. Vincent’s note of an interview with Mr Atkins 12 May 1921, HPf 49, 
1921, NAI. Vincent responded to Atkin’s comments with the remark that 
"... some planters had been harsh and others unjust to their tenants in 
the past and perhaps that was the reason why the people were now so 
bitter against the planters".
426 GBO Chief Secretary to GOI Army Department Secretary 10/11 March 1922 
HPf 49, 1921, NAI.
223
427 Memorandum held with 'ibid.
428 Statements by Mr Craik, held with ibid. pp. 33ff, p.41.
429 GBO Chief Secretary to GOI Army Department Secretary 10/11 March 1922, 
held with ibid.
430 GGB, Statutoiy Commission, XII, p. 16. GBO Chief Secretary to GOI 
Home Secretary, 10 Dec. 1921, HPf 441, 1921, NAI.
431 Ibid.
432 See Low, "first non-cooperation movement", pp. 298-305. See also 
David Arnold's, "The Police and Colonial Control : An Introduction" in 
his forthcoming, Law and Order: Madras 1 858-1047.
433 Yang, "Saran Riots", p. 13.
434 Anil Seal, "Imperialism and Nationalism in India", in Gallagher et. al. 
Locality_, Province and Nation pp. 1-27.
435 Ibid. j p. 8.
436 Low, "first non-co-operation movement", pp. 298-305.
437 E.1I. Johnston Monghyr District Magistrate to Drake-Broc.kman, 17 March 
1921; E.H. Johnston to Bhagalpur Commissioner, 21 Feb. 1921; Monghyr 
Special Report Case 22, Report II, 4 March 1921; all in PSf 66, 1921, 
BSA.
438 Johnston to Drake-Brockman as cited in note 437 above.
439 GBO Chief Secretary to GOI Army Department Secretary 10/11 March 1922 
HPf 49, 1921 NAI.
224
440 Ibid. For discussion of the comparable situation in the Madras 
Presidency, see David Arnold, "The Armed Police and Colonial Rule in 
South India, 1914-1947", Modern Asian S t u d i e s II, 1, 1977, pp. 101-25, 
120.
441 PSf 1, 1921, BSA. In response to the agitation, the administration 
granted the constables a small wage increase.
442 GBO Chief Secretary to GOI Army Secretary Department Secretary, 29 May 
1921, HPf 49, 1921, NAI.
Chapter 3
1930-32: "Limited violence" during the civil disobedience movement and the 
operation of police/administrative control
Introduction; The salt and prohibition campaigns;
The anti-chaukidari movement and the clash at Bhorey;
The Bihpur disturbances; Independence day 1931; The 
waning of protest; Conclusion: "Limited violence" and 
police/administrative control.
226
*
In north Bihar between 1930 and 1932, for the first time since the 1917 to 
1922 period, widespread popular turbulence developed. The turbulence of the 
early 1930s contrasted in its focus with that of the 1917-1922 period. In 
the earlier period turbulence was associated with three relatively distinct 
movement — the anti-indigo planter movement, the tenants' rights movement 
and the non-cooperation movement. In the early 1.930s, in contrast, turbulence 
had a single focus in the civil disobedience movement launched by the Indian 
National Congress in protest against Britain's slowness in granting the people 
of India substantial advances towards self-government and independence.'*'
The Congress movement which joined battle with the British administration in 
the early 1930s was better organized and more widely supported than that 
which had taken part in non-cooperation a decade before. The years between 
the two periods of mass protest formed, in the words of K.K. Datta, a 
"constructive phase" in the history of the Bihar Congress. After the collapse 
of non-cooperation, Congress activists turned their attention to constitutional 
agitation. They achieved considerable success in the sphere of local govern­
ment by capturing control of District and Municipal Boards. Victory in local 
elections helped give Congressmen and the national movement publicity and 
prestige, while more concretely it meant that henceforth local Congress
committees had powers of patronage at their command with which to rally
2supporters and reward the faithful. By December 1929, the month when the 
annual Indian National Congress session decided to wage mass protest in the 
pursuit of the goal of complete independence, Congress activists in north 
Bihar had created extensive networks of supporters among locally dominant 
small landlords and big tenants. From the time of the non-cooperation move­
ment onwards the Bihar Congress had sought to incorporate such people into
Introduction
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self-government, they had sought involvement in the affairs of the Congress. 
Previously such people had been involved in anti-administration protests 
sporadically and in geographically limited areas. Congress provided them 
with a unifying ideology and a widespread organization which allowed the 
initiation, from 1930 on, of extensive, determined civil disobedience. In its 
aims and methods, civil disobedience in the early 1930s was broadly similar 
to the non-cooperation movement of 1920-22. But the two campaigns differed 
in that non-cooperation attracted support from a broader spectrum of society 
than did the 1930s movement. In 1920-22 non-cooperation drew strength from 
the Khilafat movement, which it incorporated, and from the anti-indigo 
movement, with which it was closely associated. Khilafat protest drew support 
from a broad cross-section of the internally differentiated Muslim community, 
while anti-indigo protest attracted support from a broad cross-section of 
north Bihar society. The broad support for Khilafat and anti-indigo protest 
was channelled into the non-cooperation campaign. In the ensuing decade, in 
contrast, Muslim participation in the civil disobedience campaign was minimal 
and the campaign had less social depth and stimulated fewer messianic expec­
tations than its predecessor. Partly, also, this contrast arose because at 
the time of the non-cooperation movement the Bihar Congress had only partially 
completed the process of establishing an organization which linked rich 
peasants with the urban middle class. By 1930 this process was complete, 
and the party organization was able to exercise more effective control over 
mass protest than it had a decade previously. And because of the conser­
vatism of the Congress in Bihar, which derived from the importance of a 
section of the landed interest in the party, this control was exercised to 
ensure that locally dominant peasants played the leading part in agitation 
and protest- Through their pivotal position in local society, and because of
its activities, and conversely, perceiving advantages in the coming of more
3
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the attractiveness of the nationalist ideology which they espoused, which
4embodied the hopes of many for a better future, such people were able to 
mobilize extensive support for anti-administration protest. In the early 
1930s they played an even more dominant role in the direction and expression 
of this protest than they had in the early 1920s.
During the civil disobedience movement the Bihar Congress evolved 
an implicit, covert policy of "limited violence" which contradicted its 
official, explicit policy of non-violence. Congress workers soon found that 
peaceful picketing and propaganda could produce only insubstantial results, 
and before long began to employ sabotage, intimidation and assault. Congress 
workers used open violence to only a limited degree, thus protecting the 
credibility of official Congress support for the ideal of non-violence and 
avoiding the unleashing, by the authorities, of massive repression. Congress 
espousal of the ideal of non-violence boosted the organization’s prestige and 
helped ensure its support among conservatives and moderates. Meanwhile, the 
use in practice of "limited violence" gave militant Congress supporters scope 
for activity, hamstrung the administration through an offensive against the 
chaukidars, the weakest link in the chain of British control, and helped 
elicit a harsh response from the authorities. This response provided the 
Bihar Congress with valuable propaganda which stood it in good stead both 
during the civil disobedience movement and in the ensuing period.
The employment of "limited violence" put great pressure on the 
provincial administration. The administration was obliged to increase its 
spending on the police, and lost money because of the success of a campaign, 
made effective through the limited use of violence, against the consumption 
of drugs and liquor, from the sales tax on which the administration earned 
a substantial revenue. In north Bihar, the police did not cope effectively
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with the challenge of limited violence. Undermanned and poorly equipped, 
and widely resented among the people, the police lost prestige by their 
handling of protest because they acted with unnecessary severity and because 
they temporarily lost out in violent confrontations with demonstrators.
The chaukidars, because they were amenable to local level pressure, dis­
played even more weaknesses than the police. Chaukidars proved ineffective 
supporters to the police in confrontations with angry villagers, and in some 
areas in north Bihar stopped functioning entirely. As in the 1917 to 1922 
period, extensive popular turbulence during the civil disobedience movement 
revealed the essential fragility of the system of police/administrative con­
trol in north Bihar. The following chapter examines the main features of 
the civil disobedience movement in north Bihar within a broadly chronological 
framework to lay the foundation for a discussion of "limited violence" and 
the operation of police/administrative control.
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The civil disobedience movement initially focused on a campaign protesting 
against the tax that the administration levied on the production and sale of 
salt.“* The salt issue was of great symbolic value to the national movement.
The salt taxes affected all sections of the community but weighed most heavily 
on the poor^ , and profits from them supported an alien administration.
Congress workers found that the campaign was well suited to coastal areas, 
where sea water could be processed by means of the heat of the sun. In 
interior, landlocked north Bihar, the manufacture of salt was more difficult, 
and depended upon the availability of saline earth from which, by means of 
boiling and clarification, salt could be extracted.^ Traditionally, through­
out north Bihar, members of the Nonia jati had engaged in the extraction of 
salt. Improved communications and the ready availability of foreign and 
coastal salt had destroyed the local industry, but in some parts of the region 
salt-making on a small scale, upon the produce of which the government levied 
an excise fee, still continued. 7 Using these long-established local methods 
of production the Congressmen of-north Bihar began, early in 1930, the illegal 
manufacture of salt. At first the breaking of the salt laws attracted con­
siderable interest. When, for example, Congress volunteers paraded through 
Samastipur town, on their way to break the salt law at the village of Pipra 
in Bahera thana in the south of Darbhanga, the local merchants presented them 
with money, fruit, and garlands of flowers. "All people", according to the
g
Searchlight's report, "gave hearty send off and showed great enthusiasm".
But the excitement generated by the salt movement soon waned as a result of 
the firm action taken by the police, who responded to the illegal manufacture 
of salt with a policy of sabotage and of selective arrest. The police confis­
cated and destroyed the pots and other utensils used by the Congress volunteers
The salt and prohibition campaigns
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one or two of the leading organizers. Arrests were kept to a minimum, because
the authorities wished to limit as far as possible the interest and excitement
9that resulted from the taking of volunteers into custody. These tactics 
succeeded: by May, as the Champaran Police Superintendent reported, salt 
manufacturing had "practically ceased", and the centres set up for the making 
of salt had either suspended operations or had closed down entirely.'*'0 A month 
earlier, the Saran Police Superintendent had reported that
... the one prominent feature of the salt campaign 
so far has been the fact that the ordinary masses 
are not taking the slightest interest in the move­
ment, and it is confined almost entirely to school 
boys and youth.^
The absence of widespread enthusiasm for salt-making and the predominantly 
non-violent response that was made by salt volunteers to police arrests and 
sabotage made it possible for the authorities to withdraw the armed police 
who had initially been stationed at salt-making centres in case of trouble.
As the Saran District Magistrate pointed out,
... the presence of Magistrates, Police Officers and 
Armed Police at small villages generally creates a 
good deal of excitement and as a consequence people 
assemble just to watch this tamasha.^
With the failure of the salt movement in north Bihar Congress volunteers 
began using other means by which to protest against and harass the admini­
stration. During the salt campaign they had adhered strictly to the ideal of 
non-violence, but henceforth they would make a limited use of violent methods. 
Congressmen launched a concerted attack on the sale of intoxicating drugs and
liquor, the excise duty on which supplied just under a third of the provincial
13revenue. They picketed drug and liquor stores and brought social pressures 
to bear on both customers and sellers. The official Congress policy required
for the production of salt and, at each centre for salt manufacture, arrested
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prohibition campaigners to adhere strictly to Gandhi's principles of non­
violence but before long these principles were transgressed. In one incident 
a sadhu who purchased a half tola of opium had it confiscated by Congress 
volunteers, while in another a man who had ignored a picket line and had
bought a bottle of liquor had it taken from him and broken and was also beaten
14up. Measures of social boycott proceeded beyond the limits prescribed by 
Rajendra Prasad. The Purnea Police Superintendent reported in May 1930 that 
Congress workers had told licensees of liquor stores at Kesba village that if 
they continued selling liquor the services of barbers, washermen and food 
sellers would be denied them. At Barhara bazaar, also in the Purnea district, 
workers told liquor vendors to abandon their business lest they be denied the 
use of the local supply of water.^ Later in the year, on 4 December, 
picketers beat up a liquor vendor of the Kesariya thana of Champaran. The 
vendor suffered a fractured skull and subsequently died.'^ When the police 
intervened in an effort to limit the activities of picketers, they often 
received a vigorous response. On 26 October 1930, for example, nine Congress 
volunteers were arrested at the Sarsi mela for picketing a liquor and ganja 
shop. While they were being escorted to the railway station by a force of 
four policemen and three chaukidars a large crowd assembled, jostled and 
abused the police, and rescued the volunteers from custody." 7^
The prohibition campaign carried out under the auspices of the civil
disobedience movement was broadly similar, though more extensive and intensive,
18to that which occurred during the non-cooperation movement. The campaign,
in addition to the well-tried technique of picketing, also employed, on a
quite unprecedented scale, the weapon of sabotage. Conveyances carrying loads
of liquor were waylaid, and on one occasion Congress workers confiscated a
large drum containing spirits sent out from a warehouse for sale, and destroyed
19its contents. More importantly for the longer term viability of the liquor
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production industry, Congress volunteers destroyed the spathes of the
20toddy palms, thus making it impossible for toddy to be produced. The
police found it. extremely difficult to cope with the prohibition campaign.
They encountered a legal difficulty in dealing with the sabotage to toddy
palms, because the toddy tappers seldom owned the palms, but instead leased
the right to extract toddy from them from the owner of the land on which they
stood. Often toddy trees were sabotaged with the support or at least the
acquiescence of the land holder, which meant that the police could take no
action. Nor were there sufficient police to protect all the toddy trees and
21the liquor and drug shops, which were scattered throughout the countryside.
The campaign, moreover, commanded widespread support both among orthodox high
caste people and among middle and low caste people hopeful of improving their
22social status by denying themselves intoxicants. The producers, vendors and
consumers of intoxicants, generally poor and of low social status, found it
23difficult to oppose the prohibition activists. In some instances they did 
fight back. In one incident, which occurred in late May in Saran, a group of 
toddy tappers assisted by some chaukidars intervened while a party of 20 
Congress volunteers was sabotaging some toddy trees. A fight broke out and
members of both parties were injured. The leader of the volunteers received
24a blow on the temple, and died a few hours later. No complaint was made
to the police, but subsequently local Congress supporters took direct action 
against Sawal Chamar, a Harijan and the leader of the toddy tappers. A 
couple of nights after the day on which the fight had occurred
... his house, straw rick, bamboo clump, mango trees, 
and everything he possessed were burnt to ashes, and 
he himself was forced to run away to Calcutta for 
fear of his life.
Over the longer term, as this incident illustrates, the advantage lay with 
the adherents of the prohibition campaign. Nor were the toddy tappers the
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only losers: the finances of the provincial government suffered severely
2 ^
from the reduction in its income from excise duties. In Champaran by late
27May the consumption of drugs and liquor had dropped by about half. Where
picketing was particularly intense, the effect was even greater. The liquor
store in Motipur town, Champaran, in the 20 day period immediately before
picketing began, sold an average of 20 gallons of liquor per day. But in the
10 day period after picketing had commenced, the store only sold a daily
28average of 4.8 gallons.
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Apart from the salt and prohibition campaigns the third main strand of
Congress civil disobedience activities in north Bihar was the campaign against
the chaukidari system. Activists in this campaign urged people to stop paying
the taxes levied for the support of their local chaukidars, urged chaukidars
to resign from their posts, and urged members of the chaukidari unions or
panchayats, which held the responsibility for the collection of chaukidari tax
and the recruitment and direction of chaukidars, to relinquish their 
29positions. The notion of campaigning against the chaukidari system found
a receptive audience among the people of north Bihar. The chaukidari tax,
according to one Congress spokesman, was "the most hated of all taxes' ' .^ 0 He
commented that no villager "likes this tax for the simple reason that the
31c.haukidar is more an oppressor than a friend to the village folk". In 
many instances, moreover, the collectors of the chaukidari tax acted oppress­
ively. It was their custom to "greatly harass the poor people and assess
32whatever tax they liked". A further important consideration, which weighed 
heavily with the conservative leaders of the Bihar Congress, was that unlike 
a rent or revenue strike, which might result in the confiscation of land­
holdings, a campaign against the chaukidari system seemed to be attended with 
few risks for its participants. The highest amount of tax levied on any
individual was 12 rupees, so the extent of individual liability for non-
33payment was limited.
The anti-chaukidari campaign began in May 1930, and rapidly gained
momentum. Villagers readily agreed to suspend payment of the chaukidari tax
and some of them went so far as to sign pledges refusing ever again to pay it
34while alien rule prevailed. Congress supporters used a variety of means, 
ranging from persuasion to intimidation, to get chaukidars to resign their
The anti-chaukidari movement and. the clash at Bhorey
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positions. Uncooperative chaukidars were refused access to village wells,
had their womenfolk harassed whenever they went out into the fields to
relieve themselves, and in some instances encountered physical violence and
35complete social boycott. The campaign seems to have been most successful in
areas where a substantial section of a locally dominant jati adhered to the
Congress movement. At Ramdiri village in north Monghyr, for example, where
Bhumihars predominated, the "entire panchayat as well as twelve out of the
3 6fourteen chaukidars ... resigned ..." In Saran, where Bhumihars and Rajputs
played leading roles in the Congress movement the chaukidars were, in the
words of the Deputy Inspector General of Police, "prevented from carrying out
their duties". In consequence, it seemed to the local authorities, the crime
rate had increased but the extent of reporting of offences had greatly de- 
37creased. From Saran, moreover, it was officially reported that
... many of the defaulters of Chaukidari tax are
rich and influential persons. They are Brahmans
and Rajputs and consequently their lead is followed
by the lower castes.„„3o
The authorities viewed the campaign with anxiety. The chaukidars carried out
the routine police work of the villages and, through their weekly reports at
the police stations, operated as the "eyes and ears" of the administration.
When they ceased to perform these functions the whole edifice of police/
administrative control was threatened. In some areas, moreover, after being
persuaded to resign from the service of the British, the chaukidars had next
been re-employed in their old positions, but this time as "national" chaukidars
39under the control of the local Congress committee. The British reacted
strongly to these threats to the foundations of their rule. Concerning Ramdiri
village in north Monghyr, where the chaukidari system had ceased to function,
the Subdivisional Officer told his superiors that "we shall not hesitate
40to use force, if this is found necessary in collecting the taxes". The
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authorities usually responded to the cessation of the payment of chaukidari 
taxes by sending a police party to the offending area. If the villagers con­
tinued to refuse to pay, the police attached their movable property in lieu
of the money owed. The police collected cattle, and had bedsteads, furniture
41and cooking utensils loaded into carts and carried away. The villagers
complained that in order to harass them, the police confiscated items whose
value totalled far more than the money owed. The villagers supported this
complaint with lists detailing the value of confiscated items. In response
the authorities explained, not entirely convincingly, that since the villagers
kept their money and valuables well hidden, the police were obliged to take
larger items. If the attachment of their property failed to force the
villagers to abandon their stand, the administration quartered additional
police at the villagers' expense and jailed the activists in the locality for 
43long periods. The police sent to the villages either to attach property or
to serve as additional police frequently took advantage of the opportunities
that arose to oppress the villagers in a variety of minor ways, thus helping
44to break the spirit of resistance.
In the long run official attempts to uphold the chaukidari system
succeeded. But in some areas official initiatives met vigorous opposition.
In the Bhorey and Kateya thanas in the extreme north-west of Saran, for
example, large sections of the population assumed a militant stand against
the administration. During the period of the non-cooperation movement, the
area had been the centre of much activity, culminating in an attack on the
Kateya police station, and the authorities had found it necessary to post an
45additional police force of 34 men there. From the time of the initiation 
of the civil disobedience movement the people of the two thanas became active 
participants in the salt campaign, the prohibition campaign and the anti-
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chaukidari campaign. In August 1930, in a request that additional police 
be posted in the area, the district police superintendent listed incidents 
in which Congress supporters had acted violently; contended that, since 
the beginning of the civil disobedience movement, the crime rate had 
greatly increased; and pointed out that police work was proceeding under 
great difficulties. The chaukidars were being subjected to social boycott, 
and the members of the career police force were being greatly hindered in the 
performance of their work. On 26 April, when a
Sub-Inspector went to village Bhagwanpur to investi­
gate a dacoity he was not allowed to stay in any 
house, and could not even get a charpoy to sleep on.
He could not obtain a scrap to eat..,46
And in the Bhorey thana the problems of the police were compounded because the 
thana, he alleged, was
... cursed with nearly 100 registered bad characters 
and suspected dacoits, almost all of whom have 
joined the civil disobedience movement and supply 
gangs of volunteers to distant places such as Chapra,
Siwan, Gopalganj and Mirganj.^
The police of Saran reacted harshly to these threats to their authority.
On 4 October, Deputy-Police Superintendent MacKensie, accompanied by the
Subdivisional Officer and some police, made a visit to Bhorey thana. He later
informed his superiors that having come upon two Congress volunteers picketing
the police station he and his party "caught them and after giving them a good
4 8thrashing sent them home. " Next he and his men visited the local "Swaraj 
Ashram", which consisted of a bamboo and thatch hut. When the hut was 
"raided", he reported,
... the garrison vanished like smoke. The property 
left behind by the volunteers in their flight was 
collected and during this operation something seems 
to have happened to the ashram., and it fell down.
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Later a suspicious column of smoke was seen to
be emanating therefrom. ... On our return from
Bhorey in the evening we descended suddenly and
heavily on the picketers at the Hatuwa ganja shop.
The proceedings may be described tersely as that
the S[ub] I[nspector] got his own back (with
interest) for the attempt to assault him on the
second...49
Actions like these antagonized Congress supporters and helped prepare 
the ground for a more serious clash. At 1 p.m. on 16 December about 2,000 
people assembled for a Congress meeting in a mango orchard near the Bhorey 
police station. The Bhorey sub-inspector, supported by his staff and by the
20 additional police who had been posted at the police station made 21 arrests 
and ordered the crowd to disperse. There are differing versions of what 
happened next. According to a pro-Congress account, the members of the crowd 
remained peaceful and did nothing apart from complaining strongly to the sub­
inspector. The sub-inspector ignored their complaints and ordered his men to 
make a lathi charge on the crowd. When the crowd did not disperse he became 
"beside himself with anger and ordered firing as a result of which some were 
wounded and all ran away".“*'*' According to the police version, the crowd
"immediately became violent" after the arrests had been made and "attacked
52with lathis and brickbats", injuring "all members of the force". The 
sub-inspector sent some of his men back to the thana to collect the muskets 
of the additional police, and meanwhile the crowd increased to about 4,000.
The police alleged that some of the members of the crowd had guns, and claimed 
that a total of four shots were fired at the police party, none of which, how­
ever, found their target. After the first of these shots had been aimed at, and 
narrowly missed, the sub-inspector, the additional police opened fire and fired
11 buckshot and 17 ball cartridges. They operated "as if engaged in a frontier
skirmish, firing in the prone position and from behind cover at a range of
53fifty yards or more". This firing did not intimidate the crowd. Because of
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police were unfamiliar with the old pattern police musket, the firing caused 
54few casualties. The only serious injury was a shattered forearm, and out 
of 10 injured who were later sent to hospital, five were only slightly injured 
and were able to make their e s c a p e . T h e  members of the crowd continued
5 6their attack and obliged the police to retreat and take refuge in the thana.
At this point the deputy-superintendent of police arrived and reorganized 
the thana's defences, and the crowd, apparently fearing that police rein­
forcements would soon arrive, melted away.^ 7
Bhorey was not the only area in which the success of anti-chaukidari 
protest, in association with other facets of the civil disobedience campaign, 
helped bring about clashes between the police and the local people. At 
Bihpur in north Bhagalpur the confrontation between the police and their 
opponents became the highlight of Congress protest in north Bihar.
the poor quality of the guns and ammunition, and because the additional
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The Bihpur disturbances
From the beginning of the civil disobedience movement the authorities 
were aware of the need to act carefully when dealing with Congress demon­
strations. Violent or undeniably subversive activity had to be stopped, but 
overly vigorous repression of Congress volunteers could result in adverse 
publicity and in the creation of widespread sympathy for the national movement. 
At times, despite the risk of creating adverse publicity, officials took 
rigorous measures against Congress protest. Such a situation of confrontation 
developed at Bihpur town in north Bhagalpur.
In late 1929 local Congress leaders chose Bihpur, an important rail
junction situated five miles north of the Ganges, as the locale for a Congress
ashram. The Bihpur ashram became the centre for Congress activities in the
vicinity. The local Congress organizers enrolled 300 volunteers at the ashram.
According to a police report the Congress organizers gave the volunteers
"intensive training" along "semi-military lines with formal parades held twice
58daily and ostentatious practice of fighting with lathis and daggers". The
ashram, which was regular visited both by local Congress leaders and by
several people whom the administration suspected of being revolutionary
terrorists, created great excitement among the local inhabitants many of whom
were members of the Bhumihar jati. According to one official, members of this
59group could "be easily stirred up to violence". After a period of preparation
Congressmen initiated the salt campaign at Bihpur on 17 April and, a month
later, began the picketing of foreign cloth shops and of liquor and drug
stores. Congress workers also made intensive efforts to win over the local
chaukidars to the nationalist cause. By mid-May, according to the Deputy
Inspector General of Police for north Bihar, "Congress had practically got
60the upper hand in this elaka and the police were hardly functioning."
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Many chaukidars resigned, while others stopped performing their duties.
The regular police, fearing for their safety, were unwilling to go into the
61countryside to carry out their duties. Ninnis, the District Police 
Superintendent, decided that it was necessary to take action. Later, when 
justifying Ninnis's initiatives, the Deputy Inspector General pointed out 
that, in addition to the undermining of the loyalty of the local chaukidari 
force, there had also been two incidents near to Bihpur in which Congress 
volunteers had engaged in violent protest. At the village of Sabour, Congress 
supporters had attacked a senior policeman while he was attempting to enforce 
a prohibition order against volunteers who had started a market in competition 
with the market owned by a local zamindar. And at the village of Gopalpur, he 
alleged, volunteers had broken up a district board election in an attempt to 
ensure that the loyalist candidate was defeated. The Deputy Inspector 
General also justified Ninnis's actions by referring to the murder, "a few 
years ago", of the Gurkha watchmen on Grant's estate at nearby Sonbarsa. In 
the Sonbarsa murder case, he contended,
... the district authorities were largely to blame
in that they failed to appreciate the situation
and take strong preventive action in time. Sonbarsa
has in these parts become a war cry of rioters and it,
with others, was used at Gopalpur.,„63
It was against this background that Ninnis, after receiving orders from the 
provincial government and after consulting the District Magistrate, ordered 
his men to occupy the Bihpur ashram in an effort to cripple Congress activities 
in the locality.
6 4The police took over the ashram on 31 May. The Congress volunteers 
departed from the ashram as soon as the police arrived, and, according to 
Ninnis's account, displayed no opposition except for the throwing of some 
stones at some members of the police party. On each of the next few days
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crowds of Congress supporters gathered outside the gateway, and attempted 
to force their way into the grounds of the ashram. On each occasion 
policemen stationed at the gateway drove them back. By 4 and 5 June the 
situation, in the opinion of Ninnis, had become more serious. The crowds 
that gathered were larger than they had hitherto been, and the speakers who 
addressed them assumed a more militant stance. On 4 June a speaker told the 
crowd that Congress workers would find out the names and addresses of the 
constables and the Sub-Inspector who had occupied the ashram and would send 
these details to the Congress committees of the localities from which the 
policemen came so that pressure could be brought to bear on their families.
On the following day speakers, the police alleged, urged the crowd "to use 
all means in their power to compel the resignation" of those few chaukidars 
who still remained in their posts. One Congress activist, according to 
Ninnis,
... got up on a table, turned to the constables 
who were on duty at the gate-way, lifted up his 
hands and denounced them as ’bloody butchers' 
for opposing their own countrymen; informed 
them that by doing so they were committing a 
deadly sin and said dramatically that their place 
was not where they stood but on the side of the 
Congress volunteers ... Other leaders followed 
suit and addressed both the crowd and the constables 
in a similar manner. From time to time these 
lecturers used to appeal to the crowd and asked 
whether they supported what was said with regard to 
the police and the crowd used to shout back unani­
mously that they did. On this day one of the 
prominent speakers was Chulhai Mahto who took a 
prominent part in the Gopalpur riot. OD
These attempts to undermine the morale of the police worried Ninnis. He was 
also anxious because it was rumoured that a major attempt to "rush" the ashram 
grounds would soon be made. He could not enquire effectively into the truth 
of this rumour because there were no chaukidars available to act as his 
informants, and he therefore "had to rely for all information upon one or two
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plain clothes constables". To protect the morale of his subordinates 
and the security of the ashram, Ninnis decided that henceforth he would not 
allow crowds to assemble outside the gateway. On 6 June he sent detachments 
of policemen to disperse crowds as they approached the open space outside 
the entrance to the ashram. On three separate occasions police broke up 
crowds of volunteers with lathi charges. On one of these occasions the police 
became the target for "some fairly heavy stone-throwing", but soon managed to 
force the crowd to retire.^ 7 The next day, after the forces at his disposal 
had been increased by the arrival of a party of military police, Ninnis 
stationed pickets along the approaches to the ashram. This arrangement, which 
had the concurrence of the District Magistrate, allowed the police to turn 
back demonstrators before they had an opportunity to get themselves organized. 
On the following day the Moharram festival was held, and no political demon­
strations took place. And then, on 9 June, according to Ninnis,
... a large number of prominent leaders including 
Rajendra Prasad visited the place. The crowd on 
this occasion was, as might be expected, enormous.
Two of these gentlemen whose names I now forget 
took the extraordinary course of suggesting a visit 
to the volunteer’s camp a step which could only 
have resulted in drawing larger crowds than ever to 
the spot. As it was the police pickets that had been 
posted on the road had difficulty even during the 
early part of the day in keeping back the crowd. I 
replied that I was afraid that under the existing 
circumstances a visit to the Ashram could produce no 
good results. I further sent the circle inspector 
to the leaders to inform them that while I regretted 
that I could not see anyone at the moment I should be 
glad to receive a letter from any one of them if there 
was any matter which required discussion. I was in­
formed that they had no thought of coming to see me.^g
By late afternoon "immense crowds" had assembled at three different locations 
near to the ashram. One of these crowds gathered in an orchard near the gate­
way. Ninnis later alleged that he was slow to take action against the crowds
because, so he had been told, there were "a large number of responsible leaders
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present", and he did not think that "they would commit the folly of marching
69these immense uncontrollable crowds towards the camp". Eventually, however, 
he reported, he felt that it was necessary for the police to intervene, and 
ordered the people who had assembled to disperse. When they did not do so, 
he mounted lathi charges against each of the crowds in turn until they had 
been broken up and forced to retire. Some of the demonstrators, while retiring 
before the onslaught of the police, gathered stones from the adjacent railway 
track and hurled them at their attackers. Ninnis denied that the leaders of 
the crowds had been singled out as special objects of attack, and claimed that 
he was not personally acquainted with any of the leaders that were said to be 
present. Nor were any of his officers, he claimed, able to verify the presence 
of most of the prominent leaders who were said to have been in the crowds that 
were attacked. And, he contended, it was "difficult in the confusion caused 
in dispersing such a huge crowd ... to avoid hurting even known persons" . 70
The events of 9 June created a sensation.7'*' Many people did not 
believe the official assertion that the police in occupation of the Bihpur 
ashram had been obliged, by the force of circumstances, to act as they did.
One strong protest came from Anant Prasad, a local 'notable' and a member of 
the Bihar and Orissa Legislative Council. For some time Prasad had been 
sympathetic to the civil disobedience movement and had previously complained 
to the higher administration of the province about the treatment of picketers 
at Bihpur by the local police. On 11 June Prasad wrote to the private 
secretary of the Governor of the province, complaining that the police had 
taken over the ashram on legally dubious gounds and presenting his own account 
of the events that had occurred two days previously.7  ^ On 9 June, Anant 
Prasad reported, the prominent leaders Rajendra Prasad, Professor Abdul Bari, 
Baldeo Sahai and Murli Manohar Prasad set out to investigate, in cooperation 
with local leaders, the circumstances surrounding the occupation of the Bihpur
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ashram. When they found their way to the ashram blocked by a body of police, 
Anant Prasad sent a message to Ninnis asking him for permission to make an 
inspection. Ninnis replied that in his opinion "no useful purpose would be 
served by a visit to the place in question." Thwarted in their attempt to 
visit the ashram, the leading politicians present had begun to move back to 
the bazaar. Before doing so, Rajendra Prasad, Abdul Bari and A. Ariff 
addressed a large assembly of about 10,000. After this meeting had been 
dissolved the police began, according to Anant Prasad,
... the assaults on the sightseers which beggar 
description. I solemnly affirm that there was no 
justification for this ... The crowd was perfectly 
peaceful and if it be said that the crowd displayed 
any hostile attitude or threw brick bats X am pre­
pared to deny this on solemn affirmation before any 
tribunal in the country ... the indiscriminate 
assaults began, the Superintendent of Police running 
in front of a batch of constables ... beating right 
and left and chasing the crowd ... shouting Maro 
Sala Ko.
The police passed by the point where Anant Prasad was standing and entered 
the bazaar area, where a number of Congressmen and a few shopkeepers were 
gathered. The police, Anant Prasad, reported,
... proceeded to apply 'moderate* force to this crowd 
and it appears to me that Professor Abdul Bari and 
Babu Rajendra Prasad were mainly selected for the 
purpose.  ^^
Abdul Bari received lathi blows on the head and shoulders, and "bleeding 
profusely" and feeling faint, he collapsed onto the ground. While he was 
lying there "he was given another lathi blow which he warded off by his 
left hand thus sustaining a severe wound on the wrist". Rajendra Prasad got
three lathi blows on his shoulders but was saved from further injury by the 
self-sacrifice of some Congress volunteers who surrounded him and "almost 
covered him", one or two of them "sustaining severe injuries" as they did so.
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Next the police moved on and attacked the crowd assembled nearby at the 
railway station. Afterwards, Anant Prasad comments, having engaged
... in this favourite pastime of beating innocent 
sightseers and others this valiant Superintendent 
retired fully satisfied, I believe, that he had 
thus rendered a great service to his country.
So shocked was Anant Prasad by the violence of the police that he resigned 
his membership of the Legislative Council because he found "co-operation 
with Government impossible under the present circumstancesHe warned the 
authorities that whatever the outcome of the civil disobedience movement,
... the seed of hatred that is being planted in the 
minds of people of all classes in this country not 
by the propagandists but by the officers of Government 
themselves, will fructify one day in a manner fright­
ful to contemplate.^
The events at Bihpur supplied valuable publicity for the Congress
movement in Bihar, and there was much discussion of the brutality of the
7 8police. Similar charges to those made by Anant Prasad featured in the
nationalist press, with emphasis placed on the injuries to Rajendra Prasad
and other well-known leaders and on the contention that many of the members
of the crowd were bystanders and sightseers, innocent of close connection
79with the Congress movement. In the Bihpur thana itself, the harsh action
taken by Ninnis failed to restore the position of the local administration.
After the taking over of the ashram on 31 May those few chaukidars who were
still performing their duties stopped doing so, either willingly or under 
80pressure. And after the violence of 9 June feeling against the authorities 
rose to a new level of intensity. On 11 June — the same day that Anant Prasad 
sent his letter of protest and resignation — Ninnis reported that,
All work outside Bihpur itself is at a standstill.
The Sub-Inspector is unable to go out into the 
moffasal as threats have been made against his life
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and even when no active violence is shown to him 
he cannot obtain any assistance in making his 
enquiries. For the same reason it is not possible 
for the constables to go out ... to watch bad 
characters. Summonses and warrants cannot be 
served. Cases are not being reported ... In fact 
it is no exaggeration to say that this area is 
temporarily lost to the Government. ol
This situation continued throughout the next few months. At Bihpur ashram 
Congress workers kept public interest alive by sending, everyday, a batch 
of volunteers to the gateway. The volunteers attempted to enter the ashram 
but on each occasion the police drove them back. The police, according to
82Congress accounts, were unnecessarily harsh in dealing with the volunteers,
83but according to Ninnis a minimum of force was used. Elsewhere in the
vicinity Congress agitation continued and in areas that had previously been
inactive propagandists effectively rallied support by reference to the events
at Bihpur. Immediately to the north, in the Kishanganj thana, the movement
had little effect on the chaukidars until early June, but from then on "almost
daily up to the end of the month and well into July" complaints were made to
the thana that chaukidars were being intimidated "in spite of the action that
84was being taken where possible under the ordinances". In July and August
Bihpur and the surrounding areas suffered from severe flooding but protest
continued indicating that "the movement had taken root and did not need
85encouragement from outside leaders". With the breakdown of the apparatus
of law and order the crime rate increased. In June, July and August 1930
there was a total of 77 burglaries in the Bihpur and Kishanganj thanas, com-
86pared with an average of 51 for the same months in 1927, 1938 and 1929. Nor
do figures such as these illustrate fully the increase in the crime rate,
8 7because in the absence of chaukidars many crimes went unreported.
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Gradually, with the sending out of strong police patrols to trouble­
some villages and the continual taking into custody of leading Congress 
workers the administration began to regain control. In the second half of 
June chaukidars began to return to their posts, and by mid-July almost all 
had done so. By this time, too, "the Sub Inspectors had begun freely to move
about their jurisdictions, but never without an armed escort". Nor was it
88yet "considered safe to send out night patrols for surveillance work".
Agitation continued throughout August and September, but there was a tendency
for volunteers to avoid confrontation with the police. On 17 September a
liquor vendor of Naugachhia village complained that his shop was being
aggressively picketed and that "not infrequently" volunteers snatched bottles
away from liquor customers and destroyed them. The volunteers kept a round-
89the-clock watch on the trains and usually fled whenever the police arrived.
By September collections of chaukidari tax had been brought more or less up-to-
date but "not without considerable trouble". It was definitely known that in
one village the president of the chaukidari union had "collected nothing and
has met the demand from his own pocket". It was thought that the same had
happened in other cases. The members of the chaukidari force were functioning
but they were still affected by "the fear of social ostracism should they give
90out more information than the villagers wish". In view of the continuing
unrest, and because in his view the local people were "by nature refractory,
turbulent, and disposed to resort to force on the slightest provocation", the
Deputy Inspector General of Police for north Bihar decided in September to
post 110 additional police in the area, and to pay for their upkeep by a levy
91on the local inhabitants.
The reaction of many Indians to the disturbances at Bihpur illustrated 
the problems faced by the administration when coping with the civil disobedience
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movement. Police Superintendent Ninnis was antagonistic to the national 
movement, and was worried because the excitement of the local population, the 
intimidation of the chaukidars and the pressures on his constables threatened 
the prestige and effectiveness of the administration. Ninnis feared for the 
worst and decided to take harsh action. Congress supporters condemned him 
for doing so, and pointed out that he and his subordinates were unnecessarily 
severe in their treatment of demonstrators. There is considerable agreement 
between Ninnis and his critics about the events that occurred at Bihpur 
ashram. The two accounts differ mainly in their interpretation of the events. 
In relating the events of 9 June Ninnis readily admitted that his police had 
made, not one, but several lathi charges, and that the attacks on the people 
assembled did not cease until they had been forced to disperse. He did not 
accept that the people had any right to assemble in front of the ashram and, 
for the sake of administrative prestige, police morale, and public order, felt 
it was his duty to disperse them. His opponents, in contrast, thought that 
the crowds had every right to assemble and that their dispersal was brutal 
and unnecessary. Anant Prasad, who had been in the midst of the crowd, denied 
that anyone had acted aggressively. He believed, it seems, that adherence to 
Gandhian principles of non-violence was widespread among the local population. 
Ninnis, in contrast, doubted whether the members of the crowd would avoid 
acting violently. Anant Prasad’s claim that no one had acted aggressively 
may have been correct, but it could also have been a mistaken impression 
arising because he was but one member of a large gathering spread over a wide 
area, and was not in a position to observe all sections of the crowd at all 
times. Such mistakes were unavoidable, and given that Ninnis took a consis­
tently harsh, extreme line of policy, given that the police were mistrusted 
and disliked, given that police lathi charges caused many injuries, and given 
that, without doubt, individual policemen exceeded the orders they received,
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it was also unavoidable that the actions of the police at Bihpur created 
considerable bad feeling. So strong, indeed, was the sentiment aroused by 
Ninnis's initiatives that, though intended to restore the position of the 
local police, they had, in the short term at least, precisely the opposite 
effect. Members of the Bhumihar community, the locally dominant caste group, 
controlled the local Congress organization, and in the weeks immediately 
after the clash of 9 June they were able to ensure that all the chaukidars of 
the area ceased working and that the activities of regular policemen were 
impeded. Eventually, by means of harsh repression, the administration was 
able to re-establish its position. The administration also employed harsh 
measures elsewhere in north Bihar throughout 1930. Official repression 
maintained British rule, but only at the cost of creating a long-term legacy 
of antagonism and disaffection. The intensity of this ill feeling towards 
the administration expressed itself dramatically early in 1931 on the occasion 
of the observation by Congress supporters of "Independence Day".
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On 26 January 1930, when Congress volunteers observed Independence Day with 
processions and demonstrations, few clashes developed between police and 
demonstrators. One year later, in contrast, violence erupted between police­
men and Congress supporters in three of the seven north Bihar districts. The 
backgrounds to these two days may be usefully compared. In January 1930 the 
civil disobedience campaign had not yet developed into a mass movement, and 
the administration wished to avoid direct confrontation with the supporters 
of Congress. The administration instructed the district authorities to deal 
strongly with subversive and revolutionary agitation, but to handle demon­
strations by the mainstream of the Congress movement leniently and without
92unnecessary fuss. During the next 12 months, and especially during the 
second half of 1930, the situation was much transformed. The civil disobedi­
ence movement gathered momentum, there was extensive mass protest, and,
especially concerning the prohibition and anti-chaukidari movements, repeated
93violent clashes erupted between the police and Congress activists. In
addition, the belligerence of Congress supporters and the extent of support
for the civil disobedience movement may well have been increased by the impact
from October 1930 onwards, of the world-wide economic depression, which sent
94the prices of agricultural products plummeting. Peasants relied on the sale
of their cash crops and their food crop surplus to earn money to pay their
rents and purchase consumer items, so the drop in prices put them under immedi
ate pressure. In early January 1931, the Purnea District Officer reported,
money in the villages was so scarce that money lenders were able to impose 
95their own terms. Throughout the 12 months from 26 January 1930, moreover,
police morale had been repeatedly challenged and the authorities had come to
96the view, already foreshadowed when civil disobedience first got under way,
Independence Day 1931
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that at all costs the loyalty of the police and the prestige of the admini­
stration must be preserved. Thus was the stage set for violent confrontation.
On Independence Day 1931 there were two violent clashes between police
and demonstrators and their supporters in Darbhanga, one in the Basantpur
thana of Saran, and one in Beguserai town, an important railway junction and
the principal town of north Monghyr. Both of the incidents in Darbhanga
occurred in the Madhubani subdivision, in thanas which adjoined the frontier
with Nepal. In the lesser of the two incidents, which occurred in the
Harlakhi thana, in the north-west of the subdivision, the local sub-inspector
of police and his men arrested 12 members of a procession. The people who had
been watching the procession reacted to this interference by assaulting the
police with sticks and clods of earth. The police fought back and, with the
aid of some Muslims and two of the headmen of the local chaukidari unions
97dispersed their assailants. The police later arrested some of the rioters.
It would appear from the Maithil Brahman names given in the police report that
the rioters were mostly kinsmen and/or caste fellows of the men who had
98initially been taken into custody. The other Darbhanga incident occurred
in the Khautana thana in the northeast of the Madhubani subdivision and began
when the sub-inspector, supported by a force of six constables and 60
chaukidars, stopped a small procession, confiscated the flags being carried and
arrested three of the processionists. "At the instigation of the local
Marwari merchants " the crowd of spectators protested to the
police over the arrests. The crowd refused to disperse and kept on confront-
99ing the police for two hours. Then, at about 5 p.m., some members of the 
crowd, among whom Yadavs were prominent, began an attack on the police with 
stones and lathis. ’*’00 Most of the chaukidars fled when the attack began and 
the remaining members of the police party locked themselves into a building
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that was within the compound of the local dispensary. The crowd continued 
to demonstrate outside the building and to pelt its doors and windows with 
rocks, despite the efforts of the Marwaris who, worried by the turn events 
had taken, tried to dissuade them from further protest.^0'*’ The position of 
the police party seemed to be precarious. The only firearm the police had 
with them was the sub-inspector’s pistol. At the beginning of the encounter 
the sub-inspector had had two rounds of ammunition for this pistol, but sub­
sequently he had fired one of them off into the air, during the period when
the crowd was first protesting against the arrests the police had made, in a
102fruitless effort to intimidate the demonstrators. The attack on the dis­
pensary building only ceased at 7 p.m., with the arrival on the scene of a
Muslim zamindar who, as a prominent figure in the locality, was able to
103persuade the demonstrators to disperse.
A more serious Independence Day clash occurred in the Basantpur thana
of the district of Saran. The setting for the confrontation was the village
of Goreakotlii, in the vicinity of which members of the Bhumihar jati pre- 
104dominated. Sub-Inspector Chandrika Sinha, accompanied by three constables
and about 50 chaukidars, encountered a procession of some 3,000 people drawn
from Goreakothi and 11 nearby villages. Sub-Inspector Sinha ordered the
processionists to disperse and, when they did not obey, arrested two of their
leaders, whom he sent off towards the police station under the guard of his
subordinates. Sinha, who was mounted on a pony, remained confronting the
crowd and tried to get them to disperse. At this point the students of
the nearby high school came out from their classes for their afternoon break
106and joined the processionists. The school was a centre of nationalist
activity. It had been founded by Babu Narain Prasad Singh, a leading member 
of the local Bhumihar community, who had been active during the non-cooperation
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movement and who had been sentenced, in April 1930, to one year's imprison-
107ment for a breach of the salt laws. The arrival of the students seems to
have given the crowd a new impetus, because soon Sub-Inspector Sinha found
10 8himself hemmed in and under threat. He drew his pistol and threatened
109the demonstrators but one of them snatched the pistol from his grasp. At
about the same time other members of the crowd began to throw stones. The
sub-inpector galloped off on his pony and a section of the crowd attacked and 
pursued his subordinates. The crowd pressed the pursuit with great determin­
ation; some of the members of the police party were chased for one or two 
miles before being caught and beaten up."*’^  The experience of Constable 
Parmeshwar Singh was, according to the District Police Superintendent, not 
untypical. Constable Singh escaped from the main crowd with only a few minor 
injuries and reached the village of Sawna, where he was suddenly set upon by 
several villagers. He fled into a hut but was pursued and beaten up. He 
finally managed to escape into some nearby fields where he collapsed, so 
badly beaten that he could scarcely move. A chaukidar, another fugitive from 
the riot, found him and brought him water and later, under cover of darkness,
arranged for a bullock cart to come and bear him, by a circuitous route, to
112the police station. Almost every member of the police party was injured,
34 of them seriously enough to require medical examination. Sub-Inspector 
Sinha was wounded on the head by a stone, and one of his subordinates 
suffered "a very nasty cut ... which laid bare 2^ inches of skull bone".
One chaukidar had a finger smashed and another had his arm broken. Other 
members of the party, including Constable Parmeshwar Singh, were so badly
113bruised that, even some 10 days later, they still had not fully recovered.
. 114To bring the area under control a body of military police was brought in. 
Twenty-seven of the rioters were brought to trial, of whom 18 were sentenced 
to six months' rigorous imprisonment, while the remaining nine were acquitted
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because they could not be positively identified as having taken part in the
riot. This acquittal, the District Police Superintendent alleged, "was
115entirely due to the witnesses being gained over".
The rout of the police party at Goreakothi illustrated the weakness of 
the police when, outnumbered and armed only with lathis, they encountered a 
hostile, determined crowd. When, however, the police bore firearms they 
fared better. Though outnumbered and heavily pressed, an armed police party 
managed to defend itself effectively against its attackers in an Independence 
Day clash in Beguserai town in north Monghyr.
At Beguserai on 26 January, 1,000 Congress volunteers and several 
thousand Congress sympathisers gathered to march in procession to commemorate 
Independence Day.^^ The procession, which according to a Congress estimate 
was 10,000 strong," ^ 7 moved along Tirhut road from west to east but stopped 
when it found its way blocked by a cordon of p o l i c e . T h e  police were 
stationed where Tirhut road was met at right angles by Local Board (or L.B.) 
road which ran to the north and gave access to the police station. The police 
party was under the direction of the Sub-Divisional Officer and of the Deputy 
Superintendent of Police and consisted of 45 men armed with lathis, who were 
drawn up in two ranks across the road facing the head of the procession, and 
of 33 policemen armed with muskets, who were also drawn up in two ranks, one 
facing towards the procession and one facing to the rear in case of an attack 
from that direction. On the flanks and to the rear of the police party, a 
large body of casual observers assembled. The officers in charge of the police 
moved forward across the 75 or so yards that separated the procession from the 
police cordon, and ordered the procession to disperse. When the members of the 
march refused to do so, the police arrested two of their leaders. Up to now, 
according to the official account, the processionists had been hurling abuse
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at the police party, and from the time the arrests were made they also, along
119with people from among the gathering of spectators, began hurling stones.
While he was being arrested one of the leaders called upon his fellows to
refrain from violence but this appeal fell upon deaf ears, and the crowd
120began to advance along the road. The Deputy Police Superintendent, accord­
ing to the official account, immediately ordered the lathi bearing police to
make a counter-attack "but as they did so brickbats were showered on them
121from every side" and they fell back in confusion. The shower of bricks
drove the lathi police back onto the riflemen, and drove them all back along
the L.B. road towards the thana. ^Several were knocked down and many 
122injured". Their officers retreated with them and while the subdivisional
officer was crossing "the ditch in front of the thana building ... he was 
knocked down by a brick on the head". He was also hit on the back by several 
bricks. As he rose to his feet he
... gave the order to fire, and the armed police 
opened fire in the first instance up the L.B. road 
down which they had been driven and then also on 
the rioters who were stoning them from other 
directions. ^
The subdivisional officer later said that he had ordered the firing of only
a few rounds, but if so, his order was either misheard, misunderstood or
ignored, and uncontrolled firing continued for 10 or 15 minutes until the
members of the crowd had stopped throwing stones. The police fired a total
of 146 rounds, of which 32 were buckshot and 114 were ball. By opening fire,
the police saved themselves from being overwhelmed, and managed to withdraw
into the thana compound. A number of demonstrators remained in the vicinity
of the thana for the next few hours, but no further clash occurred, and they
124eventually dispersed. During the encounter the subdivisional officer,
two sub-inspectors and six constables suffered bad head injuries, while the
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125tained other injuries. The police firing killed seven demonstrators.
(Four died on the spot, while the other three succumbed later to their 
wounds.) At least another seven demonstrators suffered gunshot wounds.
Four of the killed and three of the wounded were Bhumihars. These casual­
ties included both Congress activists and bystanders who, it seems, had taken
126no part in the assault on the police. The low casualty rate in spite of
the number of rounds expended reflected the panic among the police, many of
127whom fired wildly, and the poor quality of their arms. It should be borne
in mind, nonetheless, that the official casualty figures may well have been
inaccurate. It was rumoured that to escape police and official harassment
many people who had been wounded in the firing had decided not to attend
128hospitals and dispensaries and had gone into hiding in their villages.
Deputy Police Superintendent and 23 other members of the police party sus-
3ritish officials subsequently justified the action taken by the
police at Beguserai by claiming that they had had prior warning that the
procession intended to make an attack on the police station. They pointed
out that since the early stages of the civil disobedience movement there had
been growing tension between the police and the inhabitants of the locality,
and particularly with the members of the numerous and predominant Bhumihar
129community, who made up one-fifth of the population of the subdivision. On
29 May 1930, a group of Bhumihars from the villages of Ratanpur and Sadanandpur
broke into the police station compound, assaulted police, and rescued some
130prosecution witnesses who had been called in a "semi-political case".
Similar minor disturbances continued throughout June, with the result that the
Bhagalpur Divisional Commissioner suggested, early in July, that the best way
131to quieten the situation was "to have a 'battle1", by which he meant that 
the police should take the opportunity, if it eventuated, to disperse an
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excited crowd by means of a lathi, charge. Later in the same month a local
official related the aggressiveness of local activists to the absence among
them of any dominating figure. "Every man", he commented "is more or less
132a law unto himself and does as he pleases". On 5 August, according to a
police report, a group of Bhumihars prepared to make an armed night attack on
the Teghra police station, in retaliation against some arrests that had been
133made in the local bazaar, but some "responsible Congressmen dissuaded them.
On 14 September at the village of Bihat, four miles from Barauni, a town
five miles to the south of Beguserai, villagers stoned a group of policemen
while they were attempting to confiscate property in lieu of the money that
the villagers had refused to pay as chaukidari tax. Four days later the local
authorities sent to the village a force of 200 policemen, of whom about a third
bore lathis while the rest carried fire-arms. On arrival at Bihat the police
found that Namdhari Singh, the secretary of the District Congress Committee,
had preceded them by one day, and had persuaded the villagers not to offer 
134resistance. The police arrested 33 people and discovered that two days
before, on the 16th, in anticipation of the imminent arrival of the police 
after the disturbance of 14 September,
... there had been a gathering of some 8,000 Babhans
[i.e. Bhumihars] from 36 different villages, most of
them armed with lathis or garassas, with the object
of resisting the police and that 4 maunds of rice had 
been brought in to feed them.^^^
Two months later, at the nearby village of Khagaria, five constables and some
chaukidars arrested two Congress picketers, but were attacked by a large crowd
136and were forced to release them. Some five weeks later, on 24 December,
a detective constable who had been active in reporting on the activities of 
Congress supporters was attacked, at the village of Aigh, near Beguserai, by 
some Bhumihars who came from the nearby village of Ratanpur, and "was severely
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beaten, his arm being broken and his head cut open". A police party came
and made several arrests, but this did not bring the trouble to a conclusion.
A few days later a villager who had assisted the police in their investigation
138of the attack on the detective was assaulted and was also "severely beaten". 
Because of these incidents the local authorities later claimed they had 
anticipated trouble on Independence Day 1931. There was "every indication", 
the Police Superintendent reported a few days after the riot,
... that it was not so much the inhabitants of 
Beguserai itself who were responsible for the 
riot, as the Babhans from villages all over the 
subdivision, including Bihat and Majhaul.-^g
And, according to another senior policemen,
The mob consisted largely of Babhans, animated by
an intense hostility towards the police, not merely
as one tenet of a political creed, but also for more
intimate and personal reasons arising from contact
with the police during the last few months. There
seems good ground for believing that a large part
of the mob were deliberately seeking a trial of
strength with the police ... In the existing
temper of the mob, an attack on the thana would
have been almost inevitable, whether deliberately
planned or not. The smallest incitement would have
started it and there were plenty of persons ready
to furnish that incitement._ .140
The reports of the Beguserai clash by the local officials were
accepted, with reservations, by their administrative superiors. Mr Lee, the
District Magistrate, criticised the way in which the Subdivisional Officer had
deployed the armed police. In his view they should have been posted further
in the rear of the lathi bearing police, nearer to the thana, so that their
141fire power could have been used more effectively. The Subdivisional
Officer and the Deputy Superintendent of Police were also criticised for
142failing to limit and direct the firing of their subordinates more closely.
One senior official who was sent to make confidential enquiries into the events 
of 26 January commented that
ZhJ
I am not very satisfied that there was a real
apprehension on the part of the officials, at
the time, of an attack on the thana, and I am
pretty sure that the procession itself started
without any such intention. Had this been the
idea of the mob lathis would have been very
prominent, and it was clear that, although the
mob, at the time of the police charge and
afterwards, in moving towards the thana, was
well within striking distance of the police,
only one of the latter has marks of a lathi blow,
and the mob evidently confined themselves to
missiles, which, as one witness said, fell like
a hailstorm._ ._143
Despite this, he did not think that "the local officers were wrong in breaking
144up the procession". If the processionists had been allowed to continue
along Tirhut road, and had not turned left into L.B. road, they would have 
entered the bazaar area, where they may have caused much damage.
The procession was essentially an unlawful assembly, 
constituted with the direct intention of defying 
government and promoting sedition. Even if it had 
no intention of a conflict with the police, the 
danger of allowing such a procession to march through 
the bazaar is practically clear from what happened.
From the moment the police attempted forcibly to dis­
perse it, sympathisers began to hurl a storm of 
brickbats from all sides. With such inflammable 
material it was unsafe to allow even a peaceful pro­
cession of these dimensions to proceed through the 
bazaar, and no criticism is called for of the local
officers' decision to disperse it.,/r145
Many members of the Indian community could not accept that the action 
taken by the police at Beguserai had been justified. One public man from 
Patna, Bishundeva Narayan Singh, made an enquiry into the events and con­
cluded that the procession had merely wanted to pass along the Tirhut road 
through the bazaar, and that it had wished to avoid clashing with the police.
He pointed out that the procession had been stopped in a narrow stretch of
road, and that therefore its members were
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... packed into a very small compass. Those who 
were in front had no room to budge an inch either 
this side or that side in spite of the brutal lathi 
charge, because the entire procession was facing 
east and unless the men in the rear made room for 
them they could not disperse. In order to save 
themselves from being severely assaulted or killed 
on account of the indiscriminate lathi charge, they 
took recourse to throwing brickbats picked up from 
the vicinity of Ramtahal’s shop, then under con­
struction. The shower of brickbats resulted in 
scaring away the entire Police force to the thana.^^
A contrasting version of what occurred was given by a Congress activist,
Anugrah Narayan Sinha. According to his account the people at the front of the
procession remained perfectly non-violent in the face of the lathi charge. The
rock throwing was begun by bystanders and by people at the back of the crowd,
who became outraged by the brutality of the police. Then the procession
147began to move forward under the impetus of the people at the back. Both
these accounts probably contain an element of truth. Once someone had begun 
throwing stones it is likely that many people throughout the procession and 
among the bystanders followed suit. Bishundeva Narayan Singh and Anugrah 
Narayan Sinha agreed that next, having provoked the people into violence, 
the police responded by resorting to undisciplined, indiscriminate, and un­
necessarily prolonged firing. Both men emphasized that innocent bystanders
148had suffered because of the irresponsible actions of the police. One such
person was Banarsi Prasad Singh, a senior student at the high school that was
adjacent to the scene of the riot. This youth, who was described by
Bishundeva Narayan Singh as "the only hope of support to his family", was
149hit in the jaw by a stray bullet and subsequently died of the wound.
And both commentators agreed that the clash had been unnecessary and avoidable 
and that the police had acted throughout with extreme and unnecessary 
brutality. “^ 0 Editorially, the Searchlight compared police violence at 
Beguserai with that at Bihpur, and accused the Beguserai officials of acting
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as callously as General Dyer had at Amritsar in April, 1919. "In plain 
words", it commented,
Beguserai has had an exhibition of Dyerism with this 
difference that while Dyer had the courage to own up 
that he meant to teach the people a lesson the pinch­
beck Dyers of Beguserai have the cowardice of covering 
their incompetence or worse under a cloak of obvious 
subterfuge ... surely, in the face of this brutal 
episode it ill-becomes the officials of the province 
to talk about popular violence and lawlessness. That 
such an obvious case of incompetence, such a flagrant 
instance of outrageousness, should be sought to be 
white washed ... is but a reminder of the unspeakable 
humiliation of foreign rule administered by an arrogant 
bureaucracy 151
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The celebration of Independence Day on 26 January 1931 and its tragic results 
marked the highpoint of civil disobedience agitation in north Bihar. Exten­
sive arrests and the quartering of additional police in areas that were 
Congress strongholds had, by the first months of the year, begun to seriously 
erode the strength of the movement. A new phase began after 5 March when 
Gandhi and Irwin, the Governor-General, agreed to a pact in which, in return 
for the easing up of government restrictions on political activity and the 
release of Congress prisoners, Gandhi suspended mass protest pending 
the results of the second Round Table Conference on India's constitutional 
future, due to be held in London later in the year. Henceforth, according to
the terms of the pact, Congress workers would restrict their activities to
152propaganda work and to a peaceful, non-coercive picketing. In the short
run the Gandhi/Irwin pact was seen, in north Bihar, as a victory for Congress.
Irwin's treating with Gandhi as an equal and his apparent acceptance, in doing
so, of at least the quasi-legitimacy of the Congress movement shook the morale
of the police and boosted that of Congress supporters. Congress activists,
the authorities alleged, distorted the details of the pact and used its
153existence to drum up support. In doing so they were helped greatly by the
release of Congress prisoners. In Muzaffarpur town, for example, the arrest 
in early January of 180 Congress volunteers, most of whom had come in from 
the countryside, took the wind out of the sails of the local Congress organ­
ization, and little enthusiasm was displayed on Independence Day. Yet with
the release of the prisoners there was a new surge of activity and picketing
154was carried out with renewed intensity. By early April in the Muzaffarpur
countryside, according to a police report, the people had come "to understand 
that Swaraj has been obtained", and Congress workers were successfully
The waning of protest
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collecting subscriptions. The Police Superintendent commented:
The fact that such people as the Mahanth of Maniari, 
the Mahanth of Jaintpur, Rai Bahadur Shyamnandan 
Sahai and others are now helping to support the 
Congress indicates that the general public are of 
the opinion that Congress has obtained authority and 
can seriously injure the interests of those who fail 
to lend their support.
And from north Bhagalpur officials reported that villagers in the vicinity of 
Bihpur had been asking when the chaukidars and police "are to be replaced by 
a Swaraj f o r c e " . T h e  authorities claimed that the revival of agitation 
involved numerous breaches of the Gandhi/Irwin pact.'*'“*7 In Saran, there was 
a renewed wave of sabotage of toddy palms, and in the Tegra thana of north 
Monghyr an old man who had purchased some ganja was attacked by Congress
158volunteers, kicked in the stomach, and subsequently died of his injuries.
Before long, however, the flurry of agitation died down. The national
and provincial leaders of Congress urged their followers to observe restraint,
and the police, once they learnt that there was no truth in the widespread
rumours that their past excesses were to be the subject of enquiry, dealt
159harshly with Congress activists. By July, the situation had quietened
sufficiently for the authorities to withdraw the contingents of additional
police from everywhere in north Bihar except for the Bhorey thana, where
extra police remained because, officials explained to Rajendra Prasad, even
160in normal times the area was "turbulent and criminal". This state of
inactivity persisted throughout the remaining months of 1931.^^
Early in 1932 protest briefly revived. In late 1931 the Government of 
India became worried over outbreaks of turbulence and violence in Bengal, the 
United Provinces and the North-West Frontier Provinces and grew impatient of 
Gandhi's unwillingness to make the concessions it sought. The government
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passed an emergency powers ordinance, proclaimed the civil disobedience 
campaign and threw the Congress leadership into jail. The Congress re­
activated mass civil disobedience and a wave of protest erupted, to which the
162authorities responded draconically with police violence and mass arrests.
As in 1931, Independence Day supplied the occasion for serious clashes.
At Motihari town in Champaran on 26 January 1932 Congress supporters 
attempted to hold a demonstration at the Banjaria Pandal, an open air meeting 
place which, a few days earlier, had been notified under the Unlawful Associ­
ation Ordinance and had been taken,over by the police. During the days before 
the 26th the police were informed that
an attempt was being made throughout a wide area in 
the Sadr Subdivision to bring in large crowds into 
Motihari to form processions and hold demonstrations 
at the Banjaria Pandal 163
On two occasions during the course of the afternoon of 26 January the police 
broke up Congress processions and made a total of about 20 arrests.
Undeterred, the demonstrators made their way to the pandal. A party of 20 
police arrived at the pandal and dispersed, by means of a lathi charge, the 
demonstrators who had already arrived there. While they were doing this more 
demonstrators arrived and soon the police found themselves threatened with 
encirclement by a crowd of about 3,000, some members of which began throwing 
rocks at them. The District Magistrate arrived and, according to the police 
account,
... attempted to parley with the crowd, but the only 
result was a continued hail of missiles. One Congress 
leader, Ram Lochan Singh, asked the District Magistrate 
to hold his fire and to allow him to address the crowd.
He was, however, not given a hearing, and was actually 
struck with lathis by the crowd which then began to 
advance on the Pandal and was clearly determined not 
to listen to reason but to attack the police force and 
the magistrate.
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The police responded to this threat by firing 35 shots, some of them buck­
shot and some of them ball, and the crowd retreated. Within five minutes a 
section of the crowd renewed the attack only to retire after five more shots 
were fired. The District Magistrate then learnt that a plain clothes
constable had been caught on his own and was being beaten up a few hundred
¿¿ad./
yards away. A lorrytroT"policemen departed to rescue him and came under 
attack while turning on to the main road. The police in the lorry retaliated 
by opening fire, killing one man and fatally injuring another. Their attackers 
withdrew and they completed their rescue mission. During the remainder of the 
afternoon no further attack occurred and the demonstrators slowly dispersed.
Of the members of the crowd two had been killed, one had been seriously wounded, 
seven had been sufficiently injured to require hospital treatment as in­
patients and a number of others had been less seriously i n j u r e d . A m o n g
their opponents, the District Magistrate had minor injuries from being stoned
166and a number of police had minor injuries from stones and from lathi blows.
In February, at the Sheohar police station in Muzaffarpur, the local
authorities anticipated a demonstration on the 26th, and posted a detachment
of Gurkha military police there. Nothing happened on the 26th or the 27th,
but the police received the news that "there would be a demonstration and an
167attempt to put up the Congress flag on the thana building on the 28th."
From about 1 p.m. on 28 February a large crowd, headed by about 100 volunteers, 
began to assemble on the main road 30 yards from the front verandah of the 
police station, the compound of which had no definite boundary. The crowd 
grew until it numbered about 7,000. Some of its members "were carrying 
Congress flags and a large bamboo ladder and considerable numbers were armed 
with lathis". Two attempts to disperse the crowd by means of lathi charges 
did not succeed, and the crowd began hurling stones at the thana and its
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police. The police were later to be informed that the "local people had
168been told that the police would not fire", and if this were true, then it 
might help account for the determination of the crowd's demonstration. The 
commanding officer, a deputy-magistrate, decided that "it would be impossible 
to disperse the mob except by opening fire". The District Magistrate reported 
that on the command of the Deputy Magistrate the officer-in-charge of the 
police force,
... detailed four men to fire one round each at the 
more violent members of the mob. Four rounds were 
fired by the Gurkha Military Police stationed at the 
north-east corner of the thana building. This firing 
with .303 rifles at close range had a very pronounced 
effect on the mob who dispersed at once. Four dead 
were picked up on the spot, two of whom, as well as 
one of the injured, were identified as ring leaders 
of the attack. Nine injured have been treated in the 
local dispensary, one of whom died during the night.
One other case of spinal injury is not expected to 
recover. The others will probably recover. 169
The initiatives taken by the police at Sheohar police station and at
Motihari town were characteristic of the harsh line now being adopted by the
authorities. Harsh action against demonstrators and the making of mass arrests
soon broke the back of the movement. By the middle of March the Viceroy
was able to advise the Secretary of State that, in Bihar and Orissa, agitation
was now on the "downgrade", and this assessment was to be repeated throughout
the year."*"70 In January 1933, on Independence Day, there were numerous arrests
but there were "no serious incidents" and less interest was shown than had
been the case in previous years."*"7"*" The civil disobedience movement died a
lingering death, not finally being called off until April 1934. Right until
the end dedicated nationalists were willing to risk a lathi blow or a spell in
172jail by joining in a flag waving procession or a vociferous demonstration.
But from mid-1931 on, with the exception of the brief flurry of excitement in
defenders, injuring two of the constables and three members of the military
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early 1932, the movement was no longer a mass agitation. The administration 
of north Bihar, which had been vexed by the prohibition movement and gravely 
worried by the anti-chaukidari movement, had encountered and overcome a 
crisis.
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In north Bihar in the early 1930s high caste, locally dominant peasants led 
an extensive civil disobedience campaign against British rule. The movement 
they led lacked the social depth of the non-cooperation movement, yet commanded 
considerable support and elicited widespread sympathy throughout north Bihar 
society. Like its predecessor, however, the 1930s campaign involved numerous 
violent incidents. At first civil disobedience operated in strict accordance 
with the Gandhian principle of non-violence, but before long it became 
characterized by sabotage, intimidation, and assault. These elements, indeed, 
proved essential to the successes civil disobedience achieved. Initially, 
activists concentrated on the salt campaign but the police dealt effectively 
with this challenge by selectively arresting Congress leaders and by sabotag­
ing salt-making utensils. The salt campaign was thus quickly quelled and 
raised only passing interest. Congress workers had more success in their 
campaigns against the sale of liquor and drugs and their campaign against 
the chaukidari system. Success in the prohibition campaign resulted from the 
intimidation of vendors and customers and the sabotage of the spathes on the 
toddy palms. Peaceful picketing and propaganda work on their own, it seems 
likely, would have produced a far less dramatic impact. The anti-chaukidari 
campaign had most success in those areas where, in addition to peaceful per­
suasion, Congress workers brought stern social pressures upon the local 
chaukidars and their families.
The violence of Congress supporters conflicted with the adherence of 
the leaders of Congress to the principle of non-violence. The Congress leaders 
dealt with this problem by ignoring it. On this issue the drawing of a 
parallel with the workings of the British administration in India may be 
instructive. As Anil Seal has pointed out, British officials in the
Conclusion: "Limited violence" and police/administrative control.
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subcontinent, despite their noble words and high-flown sentiments about bring­
ing justice to the masses, were in practice, because of their reliance on 
local intermediaries, "winking at the existence of a legal underworld where
the private justice of faction settled conflicts with the blows of lathis..."
The leaders of the Bihar Congress movement were in a broadly comparable situ­
ation. They might not approve of the methods of their local supporters, but 
these methods had the merit of getting things done, of crippling the liquor 
trade for example, or of ensuring the resignation of chaukidars. The im­
portance of physical force to Congress success meant that, side by side with 
the official policy of non-violence, there emerged an unofficial, covert 
policy of limited violence. ‘An all out, explicitly violent, attack on the 
administration was not made, since such an enterprise would be both socially 
divisive and would stimulate massive and bloody repression, but the use of 
violence to a limited extent became tacitly accepted. Limited violence 
forced waverers and dissidents into the Congress camp and encouraged the 
police into harsh action which gave a publicity victory to Congress, even if 
the victory in the physical clash went to the police. Limited violence, more­
over, put pressure on the administration and damaged its prestige, but yet 
encouraged it, for reasons of publicity, to delay making a repressive response.
Individual Congress leaders attempted to counteract the tendency towards
the use of violence, but such men could not be everywhere at once. In Patna
in the weeks immediately after the signing of the Gandhi/Irwin pact, for
example, Rajendra Prasad was able to use his personal influence to ensure that
Congress workers adhered to the provisions of the pact concerning picketing.
But British officials complained that elsewhere the aggressive, intimidatory
174picketing characteristic of the pre-pact period continued unabated. And
at times even such a devoted Gandhian as Prasad found it necessary to turn a
173
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blind eye to the activities of some of the movement's supporters. In the 
early months of 1931 Prasad responded to official complaints about violence 
by Congress workers by enquiring from the local Congress committees which 
had jurisdiction over the areas in which the alleged offences were said to 
have happened. When the local Congress officials replied that there was no 
substance whatsoever in the allegations, Prasad took them at their word and 
relayed a summary of their findings to the administration.’*’7'* This action 
was disingenuous, since Prasad must have been aware that there was some truth 
in the official charges.
Violence on the part of Congress supporters was often a response to, 
and often stimulated, violence by the police. The police, by their aggressive­
ness, worked to the long-term disadvantage of the administration they served. 
Sometimes, like Ninnis and his men at Bihpur, the police acted with unnecess­
ary severity; sometimes, like MacKensie in Saran, they acted with gleeful 
brutality. The police unleashed violence against demonstrators and treated 
Congress prisoners harshly after they had been taken into custody. Police 
and prison officers were accustomed to mistreating those given into their
charge. They beat and tortured Congress prisoners, molested women Congress
1 76prisoners and made homosexual assaults on younger Congress prisoners.
Congress activists and the Congress press reported such incidents widely.
These reports, it seems probable, contained exaggerations, ^ 77 but they also 
contained much truth and given popular hostility towards the police they 
helped rally support for the Congress movement. Congress spokesmen were in 
an excellent position to take advantage of violence by the police. Because 
the official Congress policy was one of non-violence, and because some 
members of the organization adhered strictly to the policy while the rest 
gave lip service to it, spokesmen could explain away incidents of violence on
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the part of Congress supporters as accidental abberations, while pointing
out that police violence was completely in accordance with the traditions of
178police work in the province. Frequently as at Beguserai and Bihpur the
police won victories in clashes yet lost the propaganda and prestige war.
Police repression created an emotional groundswell of sympathy and support
for Congress, and because of this, as D.A. Low has pointed out, the crushing
of the civil disobedience movement was a phyrric victory for the admini-
179stration.
The success of the technique of "limited violence" had a serious
impact on the finances of the administration. This was partly because more
money had to be spent maintaining law and order. The administration spent a
large sum on the recruitment, training, and deployment of 400 extra police-
180men. Much more important, however, was the impact of Congress sabotage and
intimidation on the revenue the government earned from excise duties. Up to
30 December 1930 the total loss of excise revenue to the provincial admini­
stration amounted to 4,300,000 rupees, out of an annual excise income which, 
by 1930, totalled some 20,000,000 rupees. Nor did rapid recovery occur in
the ensuing years, because the destruction of toddy spathes had a long-term
181effect on productivity. The drop in excise revenue came, moreover, at a
time when, from the end of 1930 onwards, the finances of the province were 
suffering from the impact of the great depression. Even in 'normal* times 
the finances of the province were precarious. In future, with the budget 
even more strained than previously, the government found it difficult to keep 
even basic administrative structures operating and had even less money avail­
able than usual to spend on various public amenities, the provision of which
182may have reaped a valuable harvest of support for British rule.
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The success of "limited violence" also illuminated the fragility of 
police control over north Bihar. In his speech to the annual police parade 
in February 1930 the Bihar and Orissa Governor commented that
Taking the criterion of area or population, we have 
still the smallest police force in India; we spend 
less on our police per head of population than any 
other province. We cannot respond to the demand for 
new police stations; we cannot even man properly 
the stations we have whose jurisdictions extend in 
several cases from 300 to 800 square miles. 183
184Nor did the police have effective weapons. Moreover, as officials admitted
privately to one another, there were great deficiencies in the human material
185from which the police force was drawn. During the course of the civil
disobedience movement the members of the force, because of these weaknesses,
were not always able to cope effectively with violent confrontations. The most
successful police action of the period, from the police point of view, was the
firing at Sheohar police station in early 1932, at which ex-soldier members of
the Gurkha Military Police company, armed with .303 rifles, wrought havoc and
186rapidly dispersed a crowd with the firing of a few shots. On other
occasions, at Beguserai and Bhorey for example, less well-trained, armed, and 
led police suffered casualties and temporary reverses, and accordingly lost 
prestige. Such loss of prestige, as the Chief Secretary complained to Rajendra 
Prasad, made it more difficult than previously for the police, with their
187limited numbers, to handle ordinary crime, let alone political disturbances.
The chaukidars displayed even more weaknesses than the regular police. 
The chaukidars, because they resided in the locality in which they worked, 
had always been subject to the pressure of the locally powerful. In the early 
1930s, in some parts of north Bihar, such pressure was applied with such 
success that the whole chaukidari system temporarily collapsed. Nor did the 
chaukidars prove themselves reliable in clashes between police and
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demonstrators. Outside the Goreakothi school in Saran, for example, the 
chaukidars broke and ran before the onset of the crowd, while at Khautana in 
the Madhubani subdivision of the Darbhanga district, they decamped and left 
the regular police to their fate once stones began to fly. Overall, the 
conduct of both chaukidars and regular policemen during the period of the 
civil disobedience movement indicated that the whole police system needed 
drastic and extensive reforms. Such reforms, however, would be financially 
costly, and because of the financial problems which were bedevilling the 
province they were postponed again and again. The political and administrative 
costs of these successive postponements were to be revealed, a decade later, 
in the complete collapse of British rule over north Bihar during the Quit 
India revolt.
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In the early 1930s the Bihar Congress shook the foundations of British 
administration in north Bihar by means of extensive civil disobedience.
During the civil disobedience movement Congress workers lessened government 
income through the prohibition campaign, put pressure on an undermanned, over­
burdened regular police force, and temporarily subverted the chaukidari 
system, the basic unit in the collaborative structure of imperial rule. By 
these agitational achievements the Bihar Congress won recognition as a 
political institution which offered an alternative to the existing government. 
In a period of deepening economic crisis the reward for winning this recog­
nition, and the British administration's punishment for its harsh, inept 
handling of protest, came in the form of electoral triumphs, initially in the 
elections to the Central Legislative Assembly in 1934 and later, and more 
importantly, in the provincial elections in 1937. The Bihar Congress, once 
it had come to power after its success in the 1937 elections, encountered a 
situation in sharp contrast to that which it had met during the years of the 
civil disobedience movement. Where previously the Congress had shaken the 
foundations of political control it now held responsibility for orderly admini­
stration and for the maintenance of law. Where previously Congress had 
presented itself as a possible alternative government it now had to turn this 
possibility into reality. In responding to these challenges the Bihar 
Congress had to deal with popular expectations that had been raised during 
the civil disobedience movement and the 1934 and 1937 election campaigns and 
with widespread discontent arising from the impact of the great depression 
and of natural disasters on an inequitable, tension-ridden society. The 
potential for popular turbulence in north Bihar made possible the expansion 
in influence of the kisan sabha (peasant association) movement. From 1930
Introduction
to 1934 local-level kisan sabhas had operated as front organizations for 
the Bihar Congress, but from 1934 onwards, organized into the Bihar 
Provincial Kisan Sabha, they assumed an increasingly independent stance.
Swami Sahajanand Saraswati, a charismatic sanyasi, dominated the Bihar 
Provincial Kisan Sabha, but great influence was exerted within its organiza­
tion by Jay Prakash Narayan and the other members of the small bloc of 
Congress Socialist Party members within the Congress Party. The great 
depression resulted in a catastrophic collapse in the prices for primary 
produce, and in consequence landlord/tenant relations became strained when 
tenants found it extremely difficult to meet their rent payments. The Bihar 
Provincial Kisan Sabha campaigned vigorously in favour of the interests of 
the tenantry and sought to expand its influence within the Bihar Congress 
and to alter Congress policy to ensure that tenant interests were protected 
and advanced. The conservative mainstream of the Bihar Congress reacted 
unfavourably to these kisan sabha initiatives. Small zamindars played a 
pivotal role in the Congress organization, and most Congressmen adhered to 
the Gandhian ideals of social harmony and peaceful, gradual socio-economic 
change. Conservative or "orthodox" Congressmen accordingly responded to the 
challenge of kisan sabha militance and kisan sabha demands for substantial 
agrarian reforms by attempting to squeeze kisan sabha activists out of the 
Congress organization. Tension within the Bihar Congress culminated, in late 
1937, in violent clashes between the orthodox mainstream of the party and an 
amorphous left-wing group made up of kisan sabha activists, some of whom 
were also members of the Congress Socialist Party, and of disgruntled, 
formerly orthodox Congressmen who had lost out in faction fights for position 
and privilege. In late December 1937 the election of delegates to the 
Haripura session of the Indian National Congress provided the occasion for
violent: confrontation between conservative Congressmen and their opponents. 
Confrontation was sparked off when the conservative-dominated Bihar 
Provincial Congress Committee ruled, early in December 1937, that henceforth 
Congress workers could not be involved in both mainstream Congress and kisan 
sabha activity. When the dissidence within the party came to a head in late 
1937 and early 1938 the conservative mainstream won a victory against the 
left-wing challenge. In consequence, from 1937 to 1939, the left-wingers 
found themselves obliged to relinquish their ambitions to gain organizational 
power within, and to alter the policy of, the Bihar Congress Party. Instead, 
they concentrated on initiating direct action, against the administration and 
the Bihar Congress Ministry, to protect and advance tenant interests. Left- 
wing direct action became focused on disputes between landlords and their 
tenants and sharecroppers over the control of land which landlords claimed 
to be in their bakast, or "direct cultivating" possession. The bakast 
struggle came to a head in 1939, and created considerable anxiety within the 
administration and government. But eventually, by a mixture of repression 
and conciliation, the Bihar Congress Ministry, ably assisted by the police 
and the administration, brought the bakast campaign under control.
Though ultimately unsuccessful, the challenge by the left-wing to 
mainstream Congress control had long-term repercussions for police and admini­
strative control in north Bihar. The use by the Congress Ministry of the 
police as a coercive force in support of landlords in their disputes with 
tenants over bakast lands did nothing to enhance the already low popularity 
of the police, while the success of the Bihar Congress in maintaining order 
in 1937-39, and the prospect that eventually it would return to government, 
adversely affected the morale of Indian policemen and officials when British 
government was re-established after the resignation of the Congress Ministry
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in October 1939. The following chapter, before examining the effects on 
police/administrative control of the left-wing challenge, discusses the 
impact of natural calamities and economic depression on the people of north 
Bihar and the rise of the kisan sabha movement; traces the development and 
culmination of conflict within the Bihar Congress; and examines the direct 
action campaign waged by the Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha over the bakast 
lands issue.
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Economic depression3 natural calamities and the rise of the 
kisan movement
North Bihar, in the late 1930s, was the setting for much political turbulence,
a development which received great impetus from the impact of the great world
economic depression. The depression, which began in 1929 with the collapse
of the United States stock market, eventually resulted, in north Bihar and
throughout India, in a catastrophic collapse in primary produce prices.
These prices began to fall in October 1930. By December 1931, as G. McDonald
has noted, "grain was selling at only one half of its 1929 price"."*“ This
price depression continued until the advent of the Second World War. The
serious effect of the fall in the price of primary products was intensified
2because the prices of the products of secondary industry remained stable.
In 1928, as Table 12 illustrates, one rupee could only buy 5h seers of rice, 
but in 1936, it was sufficient to purchase 10 seers. During the same period, 
in contrast, the price of cotton had only decreased slightly, that of kerosene
oil had remained constant, and that of salt had increased slightly.
The collapse of primary produce prices had a lessened impact at
first because of the occurrence, in 1930 and 1931, of unusually good agri- 
3cultural seasons. Eventually, however, the price fall affected every section
of north Bihar society. In 1934, moreover, the region suffered greatly from
the impact of a major earthquake. The 1934 earthquake collapsed houses,
damaged roads, twisted railway tracks and reduced the productivity of land as
a result of the emergence and spread of deposits of sand from fissures that
4opened up in the earth. As a result of the earthquake's impact on agrarian 
conditions, one official commented, "there can be no hope of improvement in 
Tirhut and the adjoining districts for a very long time to come".^
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TABLE 13
Primary -produce and commodity prices_, 1928 and 1936
(a) PRIMARY PRODUCE PRICES
(Quantities given could be bought for one rupee)
Common rice
Wheat
Maize
(b) COMMODITY PRICES
Kerosene oil 
per case of
2 tins.
Cotton per bundle 
of 8 to 9 pounds
Salt per maund.
1928
5 seers, 8 chataks
7 " ,  8
11 " ,  9
rupees, 9 annas 
" , 11 "
" 2 "
1936
10 seers 
12 "
19 "
rupees, 9 annas
" , 11 "
" , 4 "
Source: "Report of the Bihar Kisan Enquiry Committee", PPf VII, 1937, 
microfilm 6, chapter 3, pp. 1, 2, NML.
Next, in the second half of the 1930s, the inhabitants of the region suffered 
from the devastation of several serious floods.^ The combination of natural 
disasters with economic depression created grave difficulties for the people 
of north Bihar. Given the distribution of power and wealth in north Bihari 
society, however, some groups of people suffered more than others. At the 
bottom of the social scale landless labourers, selling their services in a 
market where supply far exceeded demand, found themselves under stern pressure
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to accept lower wages and more of their wages in kind. Sharecroppers now 
found that they could earn less than previously by selling a portion of their 
share of the crop they cultivated. In an especially precarious position 
were those sharecroppers who, during the period of high prices before the 
depression came, had agreed to become short-term tenants by paying a high 
cash rental instead of a produce rent. 7 Occupancy tenants had more legal 
protection than short-term tenants and sharecroppers against summary eviction, 
but they also found it increasingly difficult to meet their rental and debt 
obligations. Those who were less well established found themselves in serious 
difficulties, whereas those who were better established managed to weather the 
storm more effectively. Some zamindars found conditions harder, because as a 
result of general impoverishment it was more difficult to collect rent and to 
profit from various exactions. But those zamindars who could exert sufficient 
leverage at the local level found that the vulnerability of the tenants to 
their pressure had increased. In the Darbhanga Raj, because of stricter 
management, rent collections for the five-year period from 1932 to 1937 in­
creased by an average of 600,000 rupees each year over the collections for the 
five-year period from 1926 to 1931. This increase, the Chief Manager of the 
Darbhanga Raj pointed out, occurred despite the fact that the earlier period 
had had favourable agrarian and economic conditions, whereas the later 
period was affected by depression, earthquake, and political turbulence.
Much of the political turbulence of the post 1932 period developed 
among the occupancy tenants of north Bihar. The world economic depression and 
the associated collapse in primary produce prices made it impossible for many 
tenants to earn sufficient money to pay their rents and meet their other 
expenses. Indebtedness, which had long been a serious problem, became greatly 
intensified during the 1930s. In February 1934, the registrar of the provinces' 
cooperative societies commented that "In a very large number of cases the
cultivator has practically given up all attempt to cope with his liabilities". 
The situation, he concluded, was desperate, and predicted that a“non-payment 
complex" would develop. If there was no improvement in economic conditions,
he contended, "it is difficult to see how widespread agrarian trouble can
£ , „ 10 fail to result .
Tenants who fell behind in their rent payments could be summonsed 
to court to face a rent suit. In the period from 1929 to 1935, as Table /f- 
illustrates, there was an increase in the number of rent suits filed and a 
dramatic rise in the frequency of suits in which a tenant's "immovable 
property", that is, his occupancy holding, was sold up to pay for the arrears
r i u . 1 1of the rent that were owing.
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TABLE 14
Rent suits and forced sales of immoveable property 1929 to 1935
YEAR NUMBER OF RENT SUITS SUITS IN WHICH IMMOVEABLE 
PROPERTY SOLD UP
1929 123,458 14,891
1930 122,030 17,910
1931 122,116 25,416
1932 121,926 26,861
1933 149,036 39,159
1934 157,321 42,134
1935 180,001 45,847
Source: "Report of the Bihar Kisan Enquiry Committee", PPf VII, 1937, 
microfilm 6 , chapter 3, pp. 1.
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These rent suit and immovable property cases directly affected
only a small proportion of the tenantry. And even when a tenant did have his
holding sold up this did not necessarily mean that he was reduced to abject
poverty. In the Darbhanga Raj, where there was a large number of suits
12filed, the estate usually bought up the holding when it was auctioned by 
the court to pay off the rent arrears, with the intention of either settling 
it at favourable terms with another occupancy tenant or else of cultivating 
it by means of labourers, sharecroppers, or short-term tenants. But the legal 
and administrative task of actually acquiring possession of the sold-up holding 
was long and arduous. After success in what was usually a long drawn out rent 
arrears suit and having bought the holding, thus establishing its nilami, or 
"newly purchased at auction sale" status, the landlord next had to send his 
amlas to take actual physical possession of the holding and concurrently to 
file a dakhaldehani suit in order that this take over be legally recognized
13and recorded. The inefficient, overworked, and corrupt lower-level officials
of the Darbhanga Raj often did not complete this process, with the result that
some judgement debtors, (and especially those with enough wealth and influence
to confuse and sway the local amlas), remained in possession of their sold-up
holding for year after year, enjoying its proceeds without paying any rent
14whatsoever, and eventually managed to regain their occupancy rights with 
relatively little expense.Overall, nonetheless, the increase in the number 
of rent cases, when considered in conjunction with the intensification of 
indebtedness, accurately reflects the increasingly difficult economic circum­
stances of the tenantry. Not many tenants actually lost the legal rights to 
their holdings, but many had this threat hanging over them, which added to 
the general anxiety of having to live through a period of financial 
s tringency.
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Many of those who were under pressure had been active partici­
pants in or interested spectators of the civil disobedience movement, and with 
this experience behind them they hoped for political solutions to their 
problems. In the early 1930s, according to the Kisan Enquiry Committee 
established by the Bihar Congress in 1936,
The distress of the tenantry grew and when in 1934
after the civil disobedience movement they were
asked to assemble in any public meeting they would
come in large numbers believing that a way out of
the distress would be found out by the organisers....,16
The kisan sabha movement assumed the leadership of the north
Bihar tenantry. ^ 7 Bihar's first kisan sabhas (peasant associations) had
been formed in the 1919 to 1923 period, but had had relatively little impact
18at that time, and had soon become moribund. In the years from 1929 onwards
a number of local kisan sabhas had become active under the leadership of
Swami Sahajanand Saraswati, a sanyasi who hailed from a Jujhautil Brahman and
small zamindari family based in the district of Ghazipur in the United
19Provinces. These kisan sabhas operated as front organizations for the
provincial Congress movement. In 1934, Swami Sahajanand coordinated their
20activities into the Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha.
On paper the Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha had an elaborate formal
structure, but to quote Walter Hauser, it could be "more accurately
characterized as a movement than an organization as such. Its primary
21instruments were numerous meetings, the rallies and annual sessions".
The Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha sought to protect the interests of all kisans, 
but did not define clearly who exactly it meant by the word kisan, which can be 
variously translated to mean "farmer", "cultivator", or "peasant". In his 
early years as a kisan activist Swami Sahajanand gave the word a broad appli­
cation, and hoped to unite landless labourers, occupancy tenants and small
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zamindars into a coalition against the great zamindars and the admini-
22stration. In contrast to this ideal, however, the main support and impetus
for the movement came from the occupancy tenants of Bihar, people who were
"peasants" in what is, as Andre Beteille points out, the strict sense of the
term by virtue of their direct involvement in agricultural production and
23their control over the holdings they tilled.
Swami Sahajanand Saraswati, the leading figure and dominating in­
fluence in the Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha, was a loyal Congressman who 
thought that the national struggle should take precedence over other political 
campaigns and who held that the Indian National Congress must play the central 
role in the achievement of the goal of national independence. But Sahajanand 
also worried over the harsh economic situation and lacked confidence in the
ability and willingness of the conservative mainstream of the Bihar Congress
24to initiate substantial agrarian reforms. From 1934 onwards Sahajanand and 
his followers began to differ increasingly from the mainstream members of the 
Bihar Congress. In doing so, they were much influenced by a continuing 
groundswell of popular discontent and by the ideological and organizational 
impetus supplied by the Bihari members of the Congress Socialist Party.
The Congress Socialists were a bloc of young intellectuals who 
sought to capture control of the national movement and ensure that it led both 
to Indian independence and to the creation of a liberal-democratic socialist 
society. The Bihar branch of the party was initiated in 1931 during the 
period of the Gandhi/Irwin pact. Most of its members were jailed after the 
resumption of civil disobedience in January 1932. After their release from 
jail in April 1934 the Bihar members of the Congress Socialist Party involved 
themselves wholeheartedly in the kisan movement. They soon established them­
selves as the dominant force in the organization of the Bihar Provincial Kisan
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Sabha. From 1934 onwards they were always in a strong majority in the Bihar 
Provincial Kisan Council, the chief executive organ of the Bihar Provincial 
Kisan Sabha. The Bihar Congress Socialists, McDonald points out,
saw in the Kisan Sabhas the mass base they needed 
to attain their objectives. They brought with them 
an enthusiasm and a revolutionary programme that 
provided the rationale for the Kisan Sabha agitations 
... More important they provided ... an organisation­
al ability which had been missing previously in the 
Kisan Sabhas. ^
The intervention of the Congress Socialists into the Bihar 
Provincial Kisan Sabha created three tiers of leadership in the kisan movement. 
At the top was the single, dominating figure of Swami Sahajanand. In the 
middle were the young intellectuals of the Bihar branch of the Congress 
Socialist Party, among whom Jay Prakash Narayan exerted great influence. At 
the bottom were activists, often of only limited education and sometimes from 
middle rather than high caste groups, who exercised leadership within a 
restricted locality.
The new dynamism and the new perspectives supplied through the 
intervention of the Congress Socialists in the kisan movement greatly en­
couraged support for the policy of zamindari abolition. In the early 1920s,
when Swami Vidyanand had called for the abolition of the zamindari system,
2 6his had been a voice in the wilderness. Some 10 years later, in vastly
changed economic, social and political circumstances, the policy attracted
growing support, and in November 1935, bowing somewhat reluctantly before
pressure from both the Congress Socialists activists and the "discontented
tenantry", Swami Sahajanand included it as a major plank in the platform of
27the provincial kisan movement. Apart from the abolition of the zamindari 
system, the other main aims of the Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha, as summed up
in a manifesto issued in July 1936, were the cancellation of agrarian debts; 
the granting of ownership rights over their holdings to peasants; the exemp­
tion from taxation of all those whose income was below the minimum necessary 
to keep them and their families at a reasonable standard of living; and the 
provision of gainful employment for the landless. In the interim before these 
major, long-term aims could be fulfilled, the kisan movement sought the 
implementation of 19 short-term aims, which included the provision by legis­
lation of common pasture in every village, the cancellation of arrears of 
rent, the limitation of interest rates to six per cent, the provision of 
cheap government loans, the right to vote for every adult, and the rein­
statement of peasants in lands lost due to their participation in the "freedom 
movement" or due to failure to pay revenue or rent during the economic 
depression. Before listing these aims the manifesto claimed that the Bihar 
Provincial Kisan Sabha "stands ... for all who live for cultivation" and 
argued that the kisan movement, by organizing the villagers,
enables them to put a stop to the thousand and 
one harassments and extortionate practices of 
their landlords and their men and of petty 
government officials. L o
Kisan sabha activists complemented the radicalism of the Bihar
Provincial Kisan Sabha platform with militance in their propaganda and demon-
29strations. Orthodox Congressmen viewed these developments with alarm.
Their dominance in the nationalist movement in Bihar had managed to ensure
that during the civil disobedience campaign, in contrast to developments in
30the United Provinces, no landlord/tenant conflict emerged. By its practice 
of assertiveness and its policy of agrarian reform the kisan movement 
threatened to split the Congress movement asunder, and in particular to destroy 
that alliance between small landlord and better-off tenant which hitherto had
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been crucial to Congress success. But despite considerable tension and
31occasional eruptions of conflict an open cleavage within the Bihar Congress
did not develop until after the January 1937 elections to the provincial
legislative assembly. Prior to the 1937 elections mainstream Congressmen and
kisan sabha activists were bound together in a relationship of mutual need.
The elections were held in an electorate which had been enlarged, under the
terms of the Government of India Act of 1935, from 1.1 to 9.3 per cent of 
32the population. Many of the newly enfranchised electors were more im­
pressed by kisan sabha propaganda in favour of agrarian reform.than by the 
orthodox Congress 'constructive work' programme which sought to foster 
village handicrafts and improve village sanitation, and hence the Bihar 
Congress profited electorally from kisan activism. Kisan sabha propaganda
provided an electoral asset from which mainstream Congressmen were glad to
33benefit and against which they could not afford to protest too openly.
Yet while the kisan movement held the agitational and propaganda initiative
during the pre-election period the mainstream of Congress maintained control
over the party organization. Kisan sabha activists formed only a small
minority within the Bihar Congress and had, only minority representation on
the provincial Congress committee. They held firm control over the Patna
District Congress Committee and for a time controlled the Gaya District
Congress Committee, but mainstream Congressmen controlled all the other
district committees. (Kisan sabha activists did, however, form substantial
minorities in the Champaran, Muzaffarpur, Darbhanga and Monghyr district
34committees). Given their weak position in the Congress organization,
kisan sabha activists needed to delay the eruption of extensive confrontation
with their opponents. Meanwhile they sought to increase their leverage by
, , . 35rallying mass support.
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In the pre-election period kisan sabha activists won votes for the 
Congress and increased the expectations and militancy of the peasantry. After 
the election the provincial administration acknowledged the significance of 
their impact and informed the Government of India that
In the more advanced parts voters, who would normally
have done what their landlords told them to do^  are
reported to have remarked that they voted for the
Congress because they had noticed that the kisan
agitation had led to a marked diminuition in the
amount of begari which their landlords dared to
demand.0,36
While kisan activists busied themselves rousing the peasantry their opponents
iin the mainstream of the Bihar Congress actively wooed and were wooed by local
notables who were much concerned to avert dramatic social change. In many
instances locally influential men who previously had been lukewarm or even
hostile to the Congress movement became absorbed into the Bihar Congress and
37won nomination as Congress candidates.
The Bihar Congress achieved dramatic success in the 1937 elections.
It won more than 90 per cent of the seats it contested and finished with 98
3 8of the 152 seats in the Bihar Legislative Assembly. Thanks to the main-
39stream Congress domination of the candidate selection process, only seven
of the newly elected members of the assembly came from what the provincial
government described as the ’’socialist element", whereas most of the others
40could "... be described as belonging to the right wing". With unity no 
longer a pressing concern there was increasing opportunity, in the ensuing 
months, for conflict to find expression.
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developed over whether it should form a government. The minority of kisan
sabha activists, led by Jay Prakash Narayan and by Swami Sahajanand, called
on the Congress to boycott the legislatures and instead to press forward
with a programme of mass protest. But the majority of orthodox Congressmen
did not want to see the spoils and privileges of power thrown away and
realized the potential dangers of mass agitation to social stability and to
their entrenched position within the party organization. The orthodox majority
succeeded, after a period of some hesitation and uncertainty, in ensuring that
41the Congress assumed office. The new ministry, which took office in July 
1937, soon found that it could not keep the allegiance of all those who had
42supported its coming into power. In impoverished, financially-stricken Bihar 
the government's powers of patronage and appointment were limited, and not all 
those who felt deserving of favours could be accommodated. Some of those who 
were thus disappointed rebelled against the party establishment and henceforth 
sided with the kisan and socialist activists. Caste and factional rivalries, 
moreover, led to the squeezing out and subsequent disenchantment of several 
leading figures. Nor, by the policies it initiated, did the ministry succeed 
in silencing criticism from the left-wing made up of kisan sabha activists 
and disgruntled "rebels". The Bihar Congress Ministry sought to ensure that 
the Congress remained what McDonald has described as a "multi interest" party 
dedicated to the preservation of stability and social harmony. It therefore , 
initiated policies designed to improve the position of the tenantry without, 
however, substantially affecting the position of the small zamindars. The 
left-wing responded by claiming that the ministry was betraying the official
Conflict within the Bihar Congress
Once the Bihar Congress had won victory in the 1937 elections, controversy
Throughout 1937 the left-wingers, bereft of power within the
Congress Ministry and the Bihar Provincial Congress Committee, took steps to
44bring pressure to bear on the government by means of mass protest. Among
the peasantry, the combination of harsh economic conditions and kisan sabha
propaganda had created a readiness to engage in direct action. In Bhagalpur
in March 1936 the local kisan organizers interpreted the teachings of the
45kisan movement as a call to stop paying rent. In north Monghyr in the
following year, shortly after a visit by Swami Sahajanand, tenants who had
been displaced from their land after it had been sold up in a rent suit
attacked and killed the servant of a zamindar while he was engaged in plough-
46ing the forfeited holdings. In south Bihar, in the Gaya and Patna districts
and in the Barahiya Tal area of south Monghyr, peasants and landlords clashed
47repeatedly. Sahajanand and his lieutenants took an active interest in and
drew inspiration from these local struggles. But they displayed a reluctance
to escalate these local conflicts into a wholescale, broad-based campaign of
direct action against the zamindars and the administration. Their reluctance
derived from their acceptance of the primacy of the national struggle against
48alien rule and of the primacy of Congress within that struggle. The kisan 
leaders also, it seems probable, realized that as yet their organization and 
support base did not have the strength to make mass direct action feasible 
and effective. Instead, kisan sabha workers concentrated on defending their 
position and, where possible, increasing their strength within the Congress 
organization in order to get Congress to assume a more militant and radical 
position.
The struggle that developed in 1937 between the left and the main­
stream of the Bihar Congress reached its climax at the elections, held in late
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/ 'XCongress policy and the specific promises made during the election campaign.
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Congress, due to be held at Haripura in February 1938. These elections were
of crucial importance, because under the terms of the constitution adopted at
the Bombay plenary Congress session in 1934 the delegates who were elected
at the election to attend the annual Indian National Congress session also
served on the provincial Congress committee, the district Congress committees
49and the local Congress committees. In most districts the delegate elections, 
apart from some incidents of rowdiness and of malpractice on the part of 
presiding officials, passed off smoothly, but in Darbhanga all but a very few 
of the elections had to be suspended because of clashes between the adherents 
of kisan sabha candidates and the supporters of the orthodox Congressmen who 
controlled the local party machine. ^ 0
In the 1930s the Bihar Congress was a ’top heavy' political organ­
ization.“*"^ In theory the dynamism of the party was generated by the rank 
and file membership of its local thana and municipal units, but in actuality 
control was concentrated in the hands of the members of the district and 
provincial committees. Many of the rank and file members took very little 
part in the running of the organization. Often^indeed, they had been signed 
up merely for the sake of their subscription, for the sake of their care­
fully tutored vote in internal party elections, or to justify by their 
numbers the election of extra committee men and delegates. Frequently, such 
members were not even active supporters of Congress policy except when 
prodded into action by party organizers during periods of mass protest or 
during election campaigns. This situation worked to the advantage of 
orthodox Congressmen, who kept an iron fast grip over the machinery of the 
party. Their opponents, in contrast, viewed it with dismay and set out to 
transform it by "politicizing" and "radicalizing" the existing members and by
December 1937, of delegates to the annual session of the Indian National
enrolling new rank and file members. They were especially active and most
successful in Darbhanga, the home district of the skilled activist Ramnandan
52Misra, the estranged son of a well-established Bhumihar zamindar. In 
Darbhanga, the orthodox Congressmen who controlled the party machine had to 
adopt extreme means which to defeat the left-wing challenge.
In the months preceding the Haripura delegate elections the orthodox
Congressmen who held the reins of power in Darbhanga worked busily to ensure
53the defeat of their rivals. To begin with, they neglected to supply their
opponents with the official Congress forms which were necessary for the proper
enrolment of Congress members, while making these forms widely available among
their own allies. The leaders of the local opposition responded to this
challenge by continually badgering the local Congress officials for the
forms and by appealing to the higher organs of the party. The opposition was
successful in getting a supply of enrolment forms and was soon forging ahead
in the enrolment of supporters. The group in power responded by covertly
allowing the enrolment of its potential supporters to continue beyond the
final date set down, subsequently backdating the completed membership slips
and subscription receipts. The group in power, moreover, made full use of its
control over the party apparatus to gerrymander the constituencies in its
favour and to appoint carefully selected partisans as presiding and electoral
officers. Finally, on 13 December, the tension between the contending
parties in the district came to a head when the Bihar Provincial Congress
Committee voted in support of initiatives that had already been taken by the
Champaran, Saran and Monghyr District Congress Committees and agreed that
henceforth, in view of the "violent" propaganda of kisan activists, Congress
54members would be barred from participation in kisan sabha activities.
From now on individuals would have to opt for involvement in either kisan
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sabha or Congress activities. For the kisan sabha activists of Darbhanga 
district the forthcoming delegate elections would be the last opportunity for 
them to capture, as a group, power within the Congress organization.
In the days leading up to the election excitement mounted to a high 
pitch, and in one or two instances violence erupted. In the Jale constitu­
ency, on the day before the election, processions in support of the rival
55candidates met and clashed. On the same day a canvasser for the orthodox 
Congress group was assaulted by members of the kisan party. On the following 
day polling began at the Kamtoul polling station under the direction of a 
presiding officer who was a partisan of Rampratap Thakur, the orthodox candi­
date. According to the presiding officer polling proceeded smoothly until 
about three in the afternoon when a disturbance began outside the polling 
station. The presiding officer fled, leaving the ballot boxes behind, and 
subsequently discovered that they had been interfered with. He then decided 
that supporters of Jamuna Karjee, the kisan candidate, had been responsible 
for the riot; that they had been guilty of interfering with the ballot 
boxes; and that since Rampratap Thakur had been winning at the time of the 
riot he should be declared the winner of the poll. The Congress Violence 
Enquiry Committee, a neutral body set up in the wake of the delegate election 
disturbances, visited Kamtoul to investigate the propriety of the presiding 
officer's decision. The members of the Enquiry Committee later reported that 
the evidence presented before it
was of the type that is usually seen in criminal 
courts where each witness tries to go one better than 
his complainant. One thing is patent. That men of 
both parties assaulted each other with lathis and we 
refuse to believe considering the previous history 
that they did not come armed. 56
Many of the details about what had occurred remained uncertain. What was 
clear, however, was that
all the objections and telegrams made with regard 
to the voters being prevented from voting came from 
Rampratap Thakur who even filed a petition to stop 
the polling.^
"This conduct", it seemed to the members of the Enquiry Committee, was diffi­
cult to understand if, as the presiding officer alleged, Rampratap Thakur was
5 8"so patently leading at the polls".
At another polling station, that of Songar in the central Tajpur 
59constituency, the members of the Enquiry Committee found it equally hard 
to get at the facts. "Oral evidence on both sides", they found, was "of the 
usual type in criminal cases in the Moffasil, full of exaggerations, embellish­
ments and patent falsehood" . ^ 0 All that could be definitely established was 
that a disturbance occurred. According to the orthodox Congress version, 
kisan sabha voters, angered because their candidate was losing, made an 
attack on the booth, forcing the presiding officer and his assistant to flee, 
and then interfered with the ballot boxes. The Enquiry Committee discovered, 
however, that at the time of the disturbance the candidates had been running 
neck and neck, and decided that it was most likely that the disturbance arose 
when kisan sabha voters protested about not being permitted to record their 
votes because of obstruction by members of the orthodox party.
Obstruction of kisan sabha voters was also an issue in the central 
Warisnager constituency, at the Phulahara polling station, where Rameshwar 
Thakur, a kisan sabha candidate, ran against Babu Rajeshwar Narain Singh, a 
representative of the orthodox Congress group.^ The Enquiry Committee later 
collected evidence from Rameshwar Thakur and learnt that Rajeshwar Narain
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Singh and his two brothers, Maheshwar Narain Singh and Chandreshwar Narain
6 *2.Singh were "very big and powerful'zamindars". Chandreshwar Narain Singh
was the leader of the opposition in the Legislative Assembly. Maheshwar 
Narain Singh and Rajeshwar Narain Singh, in contrast, had been returned to the 
assembly at the January 1937 elections as Congress candidates.^  Until he 
ran for the Legislative Assembly Rajeshwar Narain Singh had never been a 
member of the Congress, and his selection as the party’s candidate had had a 
"very great effect on the feelings of the kisans". Rajeshwar Narain Singh's 
home was within a mile of the Phulahara polling station and before the day 
of the delegate election Rameshwar Thakur, or so he later claimed, had made 
an application requesting that the voting be secret, so that Rajeshwar Narain 
Singh would be unable to exert undue influence on the voters. But this appli­
cation disappeared, under mysterious circumstances, from the Congress office, 
and open voting was held in the presence of Rajeshwar Narain Singh and his 
amlas. At the polling station, according to Rameshwar Thakur, kisan sabha 
voters were not allowed in to vote, while other potential k-isan sabha voters 
were waylaid on their way to the booth and threatened with ejection from 
their holdings unless they agreed to return home without casting their vote.
Voting was also interfered with at the Baurhur polling station in 
64the Harlakha thana. Here the contest was between Nawalal Pande, a kisan 
sabha candidate, and Rajendra Narain Choudhary, a zamindar representing the 
orthodox Congress group. Harendra Kishore Choudhary, an agnatic relation 
of Rajendra Narain Choudhary, was the presiding officer. According to the 
version of the orthodox Congress group, trouble began when the kisan sabha 
candidate, finding that he was losing, called Dhanraj Sharma, a prominent 
kisan organizer, to the scene. Orthodox Congress workers claimed that Sharma 
arrived in a motor taxi loaded with brick bats, clods of earth, and bal
fruits and led the local kisan activists in an attack on the orthodox
Congress supporters of Rajendra Narain Choudhary. Having dispersed them, the
kisan activists then took over the polling booth, destroyed the ballot boxes,
and stole the voting papers and other articles. According to the version of
the kisan sabha activists, Rajendra Choudhary, knowing that he could not win in
a fair competition, placed a group of lathials outside the polling station
to stop the kisan sabha voters getting into the polling room to cast their
vote. Dhanraj Sharma arrived to vote and protested against the situation.
In response the supporters of the orthodox group began throwing brickbats at
the kisan activists and then brought in four elephants to disperse them. When
the criminal case arising from this clash first came to a court decision, in
September 1938, the trying magistrate found in favour of the orthodox Congress
group, but this finding was later reversed, in the appeals court, by Judge
S.A. Fath. Judge Fath pointed out that all the witnesses for the orthodox
Congress case were "the connected persons" of Rajendra Narain Choudhary, and
they were all from Choudhary’s home village of Khirhar, whereas the witnesses
in support of the kisan sabha case were "mostly disinterested", and were
drawn from 20 different villages. The testimony given by some of the witnesses
called in support of the orthodox Congress case, furthermore, revealed upon
close examination that the majority of voters in the constituency were
6 6likely to have been supporters of the kisan sabha cause. On the basis of 
the evidence, Judge Fath decided, it seemed clear that the clash had been 
started by members of the orthodox Congress group and had then developed into 
a free for all. ^ 7
Despite the vigour with which they competed in the Haripura dele­
gate elections, and despite the fact that the findings of the Congress 
Violence Enquiry Committee generally favoured them, the kisan sabha activists
318
lost their struggle to retain and expand their influence within the Congress 
party machine. Summing up its findings on the election disturbances, the 
Enquiry Committee commented that
all sorts of objectionable tactics were used.
Factionalism, groupings, doubtful pacts and 
alliances, exploitation of caste sentiments, 
enrolment of bogus members for the purpose of 
retaining and grabbing power became rampant.
Heads were broken, riotous mobs were led to the 
polling stations and inside the polling room ... 
lathies [sic] were displayed and in some cases 
used ... ballot boxes were taken away, windows 
of polling rooms were smashed ... Abuse and 
threats were very common. The pity of it is 
that responsible officials of Congress were not 
free from such practice. 68
In view of the turmoil that had characterized the elections the Enquiry 
Committee called for reforms in the demarcation of constituencies, the pro­
vision of polling booths, the appointment of electoral officers and the conduct 
of elections, but pointed out that such measures could not really succeed un­
less there was a change of attitude on the part of Congress workers and a
return to faithful adherence to the Gandhian values of non-violence and
69truth. Such a change of heart was not forthcoming, and it soon became 
apparent that the struggle over the control of the party apparatus was an 
unequal once .
The c.l.ee Lions which had caused so much disturbance 
in Darbhanga decided the composition of the All-India Congress 
Committee and of the "working committee" of the Bihar Congress, the head­
quarters component of party organization in the province. Only five of the 36 
Biharis elected to the All-India Congress Committee came from the left, and 
there was not even one left-winger elected to the provincial working committee. 
(This was one less even than the previous year, when Sahajanand had been the 
sole left-wing representative).7'*' In Darbhanga left-wing activists kept
trying to capture control over the local party organization until the final
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months of 1938. They even set up a rival, parallel, district Congress
committee, a development which also occurred, during the same period, in
72Saran. But eventually, with orthodox Congressmen denouncing them for 
their radicalism and militance and shutting every door in their face the 
left-wing activists were forced to relinquish their attempt to gain control 
over the party machine. The heightening of tensions in the countryside, 
moreover, obliged them to look to the interests of the tenantry. In 
August 1938 Ramnandan Misra reported from Laheriaserai town in Darbhanga 
that
In the interest of the cause ... we must get out 
of the party struggle at least for a year. Kisan 
problems require our immediate attention. Situation 
is very critical and serious, how can we leave the 
kisans, who are being assaulted, murdered, abused 
and their crops and property looted. In any case I 
cannot leave my district at least for a week.
Yesterday morning one of my workers was attempted 
to be murdered. I think we shall be able to save 
his life, but I must proceed to the spot at once.^
From late 1938 onwards kisan sabha activists concentrated their
efforts towards mobilizing the peasantry into direct action against their
landlords and against the pro-landlord policies of the Bihar Congress and
the provincial administration. The change in tack on the part of the kisan
movement achieved formal recognition at the annual conference of the Bihar
Provincial Kisan Sabha, held at Waini in Darbhanga in December 1938. The
conference passed a resolution supporting the use of satyagraha as the chief
74weapon of struggle in defence of the peasants' interest. From now on, as an 
official policy, the kisan sabha movement would engage in intensified direct 
protest against the zamindars and the administration and, if other-methods 
of agitation failed to result in the redress of grievances, would employ the 
weapon of satyagraha. The central focus of this direct action became the 
struggle for control over those lands defined as being part of the bakast 
holdings of the zamindars.
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Under the zamindari system bakast (or bakasht), along with ryoti and zirat,7"* 
was one of the three main categories of agricultural land. Bakast land con­
sisted of holdings in which the zamindar exercised direct control over culti­
vation, but in which, under certain circumstances, occupancy rights could be
7 6acquired by short-term tenants paying a cash rental or by sharecroppers.
Because of intensifying population pressure77 competition over the possession
of bakast lands had been a feature of agrarian relations in north Bihar since
the late 19th century. Zamindars, their property being broken up through
inheritance as generation succeeded generation, had competed fiercely with
7 8tenants in order to maintain and expand their control over land. Nor had
they always been scrupulous in the methods they used: in one instance,
recorded in the village notes for Darbhanga, a zamindar had intimidated some
tenants so that, when questioned by government officials collecting data for
their village's "record of rights", they denied that they held ryoti rights
in the lands of the village and instead said that the lands in question were
79part of the zamindar's bakast.
During the 1930s the bakast issue became particularly crucial
because an unusually high number of tenants' holdings were sold up as a result
80of rent arrears suits. Often the purchaser of the holding was the landlord
who was glad by this means to convert what had been ryoti land into bakast
land, a category of land in which, for the time being at least, no rights
other than those of the landlord existed. By having his bakast lands tilled
by labourers, short-term tenants, or sharecroppers, a landlord could
81generally make a better profit, and be less hampered in doing so by legal
and social restrictions, than he could by letting out the land to an occupancy
8 2tenant. Often the former tenants of lands that had newly become bakast
The bakast lands issue
remained tilling the land as sharecroppers or short-term tenants. Former 
tenants who had in this way, during the depression period, been pushed down 
a rung in the social ladder were deeply resentful. They viewed the coming 
of the depression not as one of the normal risks of agricultural life but as 
a highly unusual circumstance, equivalent in its unexpectedness and its 
catastrophic impact to a major natural calamity, against the effects of which 
they felt they deserved protection and support from their zamindars and the 
administration, rather than harassment and the loss of their legal rights to 
their land. Even more resentful were those tenants who had actually been dis­
placed from their holdings, which had been passed down to them through several
generations, to make way for another occupancy tenant or for a sharecropper or
84short-term tenant. These resentments were articulated into a recurrent 
demand for the restoration of ryoti rights in bakast lands to tenants who had 
lost them during the period of the depression. Once kisan sabha workers 
had begun protest movements over newly bakast lands, moreover, peasants became 
inspired to claim possession, under a seldom used provision in the Bengal 
Tenancy Act, to lands that had been held as bakast by landlords over a long 
period. In the Padri circle of the Darbhanga Raj, tenants demanded the 
restoration of newly bakast lands. In the Pandoul circle of the Darbhanga 
Raj and in the Barahiya Tal area in Monghyr, in contrast, sharecroppers 
campaigned in defence of their rights in long established bakast lands.
In the Padri (or Parri ) circle of the Darbhanga Raj in the south­
east of Darbhanga tenants strongly demanded the return of ryoti rights in 
newly bakast lands. In the late 1930s the Padri area had a population of 
some 40,000 people spread over some 50 villages. "Practically the*whole
population", Ramnandan Misra reported in June 1939, "consists of Koeris and
85Goalas who have been kept down under the iron wheel of the Hindu society".
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the landlord had been able to raise the rents to a high level. But throughout
the 1930s Padri suffered repeatedly from serious flooding, the effects of
which were worsened because the local Darbhanga Raj officials had neglected
to keep the dams that had earlier been built for flood protection in good 
86repair. Flooding, combined with the collapse in primary produce prices, 
had a disastrous effect on the kisans of Padri. "Year after year",
Ramnandan Misra tells us, the
tenants would cultivate in the tragic hope of 
getting something. But nothing would come except 
the notice of the sale of their holdings. In this 
way about ten thousand bighas ... became bakast 
lands ... But the lands remained in the possession 
of the tenants. 87
Despite their plight, the Padri kisans received little sympathy from the
agents of their landlord. The patwaris and other subordinate amlas of the
Darbhanga Raj, on the contrary, took advantage of the tenants' difficulties to
88bring extra pressure to bear on them. Nor were the Padri circle managers
89willing to ease the burden of the kisans. Under these conditions the local 
peasants turned readily to kisan sabha activists for assistance.
In June 1936 the local officials of the Darbhanga Raj broke up a
90large kisan meeting by driving an elephant into the midst of the crowd.
91In the ensuing months, using this incident as a rallying cry, kisan workers
continued in their efforts to have the grievances of the tenants' redressed.
Late in 1937, in response to continuing agitation, Sri Krishna Sinha, the Bihar
Congress Chief Minister, visited Padri in the company of R.E. Russel, the
Commissioner of the Tirhut division, and as a result the administration made
92representations to the top management of the Darbhanga Raj. In response
Until the 1930s the area had grown lucrative cash crops, and because of this
the Darbhanga Raj Chief Manager, G.P. Danby, made a personal investigation.
"I regret", he began the report of his enquiry,
to say that this circle has been neglected ...
The tenantry are generally in a deplorable 
condition ... If we do not give immediate con­
sideration to the tenants so distressed will 
they become that I cannot imagine their future.
There has been considerable agitation. I am 
ashamed to say that it is due to some extent 
to the neglect and lack of sympathy shown to 
tenants ... I believe the tenants are still loyal 
to the Raj and would become as good tenants as 
any others if now, and in the future, due con­
sideration were given to them, [sic]
At Padri, tenants demanded the return of lands that had recently 
become part of the landlords' bakast holdings. Elsewhere, in contrast, 
protest developed over the control of land that had been part of the land­
lords' bakast over a long period. A provision of the Bengal Tenancy Act 
of 1885 had made it possible for sharecroppers and short-term tenants who 
cultivated bakast holdings continuously for a period of 12 years or longer 
to acquire occupancy rights, but this provision had seldom been taken advantage 
of because of the ignorance, low morale, and lack of power of those whom it 
was intended to benefit. But in the 1930s, under the impetus of the kisan 
movement, villagers began to campaign for the fulfilment of their rights in
94the bakast lands that they had tilled over long periods for their landlords.
The most striking instance of this development occurred at Barahiya Tal in
south Monghyr. In 1931 Rajendra Prasad had pointed to this village with pride
because of the active part its Bhumihar landlords assumed in the civil dis-
95obedience movement, but a few years later the area was proving a great
source of anxiety to Prasad and to other Congress leaders. From November 1936
onwards the sharecroppers and short-term tenants of Barahiya Tal began
96agitating strongly against their landlords. At first they protested against 
the exaction from them of forced labour, but soon they began demanding that
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they be given ryoti rights in their landlords’ bakast lands. They continued
their protest for the next three years, and only quietened down after the
arrival of a large police force that had been deputed to keep the peace and
98protect the position of the zamindars. Sharecroppers and short-term
tenants, many of them Yadav by jati, also began to claim rights to long
99established bakast lands in the Pandoul area in Darbhanga. In the Pandoul
area one piece of land which became the subject of a series of related dis­
putes had been let out every year by the Darbhanga Raj for the growing of a 
rabi crop and had then been resumed so that the Raj could use it for the 
cultivation of sugar cane.^°° The local villagers, if they could establish 
that they had tilled this land successively for a period of 12 years or more, 
were legally entitled to be awarded occupancy rights over it.~*~°^
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In some localities struggles over the bakast issue developed between 
members of distinct social strata. In Barhiya Tal in south Monghyr depressed 
short-term tenants campaigned against their well established Bhumihar land­
lords. In the Padri area, impoverished low and middle caste peasants struggled
102against the Darbhanga Raj, the greatest zamindari in north Bihar.
Elsewhere, in contrast, the socio-economic distinction between the conflicting
parties was less clearly marked. In a campaign that developed in the vicinity
of Dekuli village in the Bahera thana of Darbhanga, for example, the local
kisans claimed that they had acquired occupancy rights in about 150 bighas of
103land. The ownership of this disputed land was divided between the members
of five distinct groups of co-sharing zamindars, who claimed that they culti­
vated the land directly by means of hired labour, and that therefore no 
tenants had any rights in the land. Detailed information is, unfortunately, 
not available about the total number of zamindars involved, and the distri­
bution of the land among them, and nor is detailed information available about
fact that the average amount held by each zamindari group totalled only some
10630 bighas, it seems probable that some of the co-sharing zamindars held,
at least so far as this disputed area of land is concerned, only a small
parcel of land. The leader of the bakast campaign was described as a petty
zamindar and ryot,^ "07 and it is perhaps not unlikely that some of his leading
supporters were well established occupancy tenants with some zamindari
108interests. In this context the struggle over the bakast lands assumed the
character of a clash focused within the landed interest and involving competing 
vertical social alliances rather than distinct, horizontally stratified groups. 
In some instances, moreover, both vertical and horizontal cleavages contri­
buted to the development of bakast conflict. In Radhanager, the north Bihar 
village studied by Ramashray Roy, simmering discontent existed among the 
poorer peasants, who were under the thumb of an interconnected group of 
Brahman families. In the 1930s kisan sabha activists attempted to draw on 
this discontent to initiate a mass protest movement but they found it hard to
get protest underway because the poorer peasants feared reprisals from their
109landlords. Eventually, however, they succeeded by taking advantage of the
fact that
Some of the impoverished landowning Brahmana 
families had some old scores to settle with their 
richer brethren; others^, seriously indebted [to 
them] ... were in search of an opportunity to bring 
their indebtedness to an end —  because debts were 
not legally registered —  by breaking away from their
benefactors
The kisan organizers managed to win the support of these families, and the 
"... impoverished landed gentry ... joined their social and economic inferiors 
in a common fight ..." against the dominant landowning families.'*"'*"'*’
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105the kisans who became involved in the campaign. But on the basis of the
to locality, it is clear that the concentration of the Bihar Provincial Kisan
Sabha on the bakast issue reflected the extent to which the kisan movement
in Bihar drew its strength from and acted in the interests of the middle
strata of north Bihar society. The leaders of the kisan movement (like the
leaders of the mainstream of Congress) were drawn from high caste, zamindari
112and literate backgrounds. Their supporters generally came from middle
113status caste groups such as Yadavs and Koeris. The members of these middle
status groups differentiated themselves from the higher caste zamindari
families, who they regarded as their oppressors, and from the low caste,
Harijan and Adivasi small holders and landless labourers whom they often
114themselves oppressed. This point is made crystal clear by an investigation
which probes beyond the rhetoric of the Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha to the 
realities of the bakast campaign.
Judging merely from the repeated bitter attacks of kisan activists 
on the zamindari system and from the contents of the kisan sabha manifesto 
one might have expected the Bihar kisan movement to engage in a rent strike, 
to call for a general moratorium on debt repayments or to take some other 
radical initiative. There are, perhaps, two reasons why such initiatives 
were not taken. One reason was that many of the better established tenants 
operated as money lenders and also, on part of their holdings, collected 
rents from sharecroppers and short-term tenants. The second reason is that 
the main body of kisan supporters had something to lose from a rent or debt 
repayment strike because they had some property which could be confiscated 
in the course of a rent or debt suit. Agitations about bakast lands, rather 
than being radical initiatives, were in fact efforts to work within the 
zamindari system, either to re-establish rights which had previously existed,
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Although the character of the bakast struggle varied from locality
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or else to take advantage of rights under the law which had been in existence 
for some years. Potentially, of course, the bakast issue could mobilize a 
variety of supporters drawn from a wide section of the social spectrum. But 
significantly the Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha does not seem to have made use 
of the issue to cross the status line which divided Karijans and Adivasis 
from the rest of society, even though there were stirrings of dissidence 
among Adivasi sharecroppers over their rights in long established bakast 
lands. "*'"*'~* Nor, though it claimed to represent "all who live for culti­
vation",^"^ did the Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha take much interest in the 
plight of landless labourers, except to assure them now and again that there 
was no need for them to organize themselves separately since it would protect 
their interests. Significantly the Bihar Kisan Manifesto, rather than calling 
for the breaking up of large holdings and the distribution of land to the 
landless, instead called for the granting of full ownership rights over their 
holdings to tenants and for the provision of gainful employment for the land­
less. When, in 1937, under the leadership of the Harijan activist Jagjivan 
Ram, the Bihar Provincial Khet Mazdoor Sabha (Agricultural Labourers*Associ­
ation) came into existence, it received no support from the province's kisan 
sabha movement."*""*"7 And when, in the mid-1930s, agrarian labourers began to
protest against exploitation by their kisan and zamindar employers their
118protest was quickly curbed by intimidation, physical assault and, in one
119or two instances, murder. Some years later, having become disillusioned
with the movement that he had led in the 1930s, Swami Sahajanand pointed out 
that it was "really the middle and big cultivators" who had been "for the 
most part with the Kisan Sabha", and contended that such people were in the 
habit of "using the Kisan Sabha for their benefit and gain". He and his 
supporters, in contrast, had been trying to use these middle and big peasants
"to strengthen the Sabha, till the lower and lowest strata of the peasantry
120are awakened to their real economic and political interests and needs..."
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The people who formed the backbone of the Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha found
the bakast issue a worthy subject for protest during 1936 and 1937. In 1938
they found further reasons to focus on the subject of the bakast lands. In
an effort to defuse kisan sabha protest over the ryoti lands which had been
swallowed up into the landlords' bakast the Bihar Congress government framed
a restoration of bakast lands bill. This bill came before the Bihar
Legislative Assembly in early 1938. The bill provided for the return to
tenants of lands which had been sold up in the period from 1929 to 1936, if in
return the tenant paid, within a period of five years, half the auction price
121of the holding as well as the legal costs. The amount of land to be
returned varied, as table 15 illustrates, in proportion to the amount that had 
been sold up.
The Bakast Restoration Act and the bakast direct action campaign
TABLE 15
Formula for the restoration of bakast lands3 1938
AREA SOLD UP QUANTITY RESTORABLE
Less than 6 acres All to be restored
More than 6 but less than
15 acres Half to be restored
More than. 15 but less than
30 acres A third to be restored
More than 30 acres A quarter to be restored
Source: Indian Nation3 31 July 1938.
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The bakast restoration bill was emasculated by clauses exempting
from restoration those bakast lands which were either (a) under the direct
cultivating control of a petty zamindar, who tilled the land by means of
labourers, or (b) which had already been settled with another occupancy
122tenant. The presence of these provisions meant that the bill worsened
123rather than improved the position of many tenants. In many cases former
tenants who had remained associated with their former ryoti holdings as
sharecroppers or short-term tenants were summarily displaced from them by
zamindars anxious either to re-settle the holdings with other occupancy
tenants (who would pay a better price for them than could be gained from the
former tenants under the restoration provisions), or else to bring the holdings
under their own direct cultivation. After learning of the legislation,
according to one report, "... the land-holders of Bhagalpur have settled every
124inch of restorable bakast lands benami or on acceptance of salami". In the
Darbhanga Raj the senior management effectively pressured the Padri circle
amlas into forging ahead, during 1938 and 1939, with the settlement of tenancy
125holdings. G.P. Danby, the Chief Manager of the Raj, felt sympathy for the
plight of the Padri peasantry. In both 1938 and 1939, Danby tried to help
126them by lowering rents and by cancelling rent arears. But the drive to
settle holdings on occupancy tenures more than cancelled out the good done by
rent remission and arrear cancellation. The settlement drive played into the
127hands of a small minority of "money lending kisans" who could afford to pay
the high salami rates being levied (in spite, by the way, of legislation
passed in mid-1938 specifically abolishing salami), and could influence the
local Raj amlas in their favour. In 1939 the circle manager reported that
128"35 percent of the tenantry has become landless" and Ramnandan Misra 
commented that
330
... by starting land settlement the Raj is forcing 
us to organize Bakast struggle. In several plots 
of land I found standing sugar cane crops but the 
land has been settled with another person. For 
instance in the village Sihma, a plot has been 
settled with Tribeni Raut, where still stands the 
crop of the tenant who has been cultivating it for
long'129
The Bakast Restoration Act, moreover, moved at a snail’s pace through
the legislature, which allowed zamindars additional time in which to find ways
130to avoid its provisions. Many tenants, furthermore, could not afford the
131costs of filing a suit in order to take advantage of the legislation. The
efforts of former tenants to establish that bakast lands should be returned 
to them and the attempts of sharecroppers and short-term tenants to establish 
their occupancy rights over bakast lands also often failed because of the 
peasants' inability to bring convincing documentation before the courts. As 
the author of the provincial year book for 1938-39 pointed out
... the cultivator often finds it difficult to prove his 
claim even when it is just, because the conditions under 
which bakast land is let out by the landlord make it 
impossible for him to produce documents. In the absence 
of reliable oral evidence on either side, the courts 
have in the past been compelled to decide cases mainly 
on documentary evidence. ^
Documentary evidence usually favoured the landlords because through their 
agents, the patwaris, they kept a strict control over the creation and distri­
bution of documents and could usually ensure that their potential legal 
adversaries had little documentary evidence on hand. This was so whether 
their adversaries were trying to prove that they had acquired ryoti rights to 
a holding or whether, alternatively, they were claiming that they had 
previously held such rights and that the land in question had neither been 
settled elsewhere nor had been kept under the direct control of a petty 
zamindar. And even where their opponents had been able to collect some
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133challenge by bribing lower level officials and by forging documents.
Indeed, on the subject of forging evidence a letter from a member of the 
legal staff of the Darbhanga Raj makes intriguing reading. The letter, which 
concerns the progress of court cases over a disputed area near village 
Raghopur in Darbhanga known as the Tinconwa zerat, reads in part:
... on account of the claim of the accused to the 
tinconwa lands the other two cases fixed for the 
tenth have become difficult ... In order to explain 
away the receipts and prove that those do not refer 
to the disputed tinconwa [lands] and then to prove 
that the disputed tinconwa [area] is in Khas [i.e. 
direct] cultivation of the Raj, what labour I have 
been taking in examining and shifting documents 
and in getting maps and statements prepared can 
better be known from your Amlas. Today I had in 
my own hand given forms of statements to the Zirat 
clerk, Amin and others and they compiled them in 
part and to see whether they are doing rightly this 
evening I again examined them and compared them with 
registers and gave them further instructions to com­
plete them and get other wanting papers. As desired 
by you, I am personally doing the whole thing and for 
reasons better known, [sic] we cannot safely rely on
others for such matters.in/134
Gravely disadvantaged in the courts, and receiving no sympathy from
the administration and the mainstream of the Bihar Congress, kisan sabha
activists had no alternative left other than direct action. By having effects
quite opposite to its nominal intentions the Bakast Restoration Act helped
135crystallize conflict over the bakast issue. In Radhanagar village the
struggle involved "... numerous law suits ... [and] ... use of physical
force". The kisans "... resorted to social boycott of their landlords ...
136[and to] ... tilling their land by force ..." In the Padri circle, during
written evidence, the zamindar and his amlas could usually rise to the
1939, the discontented peasantry engaged in what the circle manager later 
described as "... a violent explosion of ... agitation", in the course of
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in Zirat and Dahnal [i.e. flood affected] lands was ... a daily feature ..."
which rent collections "almost stopped" and the "loot of Raj crops standing
137
In north Bihar, in 1939, intensified bakast protest culminated in
the employment of satyagraha as a weapon of last resort. Kisan direct action
138was intended, in principle, to be non-violent, but in actuality violent
clashes eventuated. These clashes were on a small scale and happened in
widely dispersed areas. Since the crucial issue was the ownership and
possession of holdings the clashes occurred when one or the other party to a
dispute attempted to exert what it claimed to be its rights in a particular
plot of land. Such action might take the form of ploughing up and sowing the
disputed land, or the harvesting of crops growing on this land. It might also
139involve the sabotage of crops previously planted by the opposition party.
The peak months for bakast clashes, (as for agrarian disputes generally), were
those in which harvesting and/or ploughing and planting were under way —
December/January, March/April, and July/Augus t. The zamindars, knowing
that they had the sympathy of the administration, generally called in the
police when a confrontation seemed imminent. The administration posted extra
police in particularly troubled areas and in Darbhanga, at the height of the
141campaign, established a special police station. The small scale of the
encounters, and their occurrence in the open fields, made it easier for the
police and the zamindars to control them. Unlike those of the clashes of
the civil disobedience period which had occurred in congested urban settings,
there were fewer bystanders to be drawn into action against the police and
there were no impartial observers to carry away and publicize stories of
police harshness. As it developed the bakast movement got an extremely bad
press, being unsympathetically treated and under reported in the nationalist 
142media and being subjected to a tirade of criticism in the columns of the
Indian Nation.
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Reora in the Gaya district in south Bihar, the District Magistrate, after
investigating a dispute that had been simmering for several months, made a
144settlement which awarded 4/5ths of the disputed land to the tenants.
145Heartened by this success kisan workers at Amwari in Saran, at Dekuli,
Raghopore, Padri and Pandoul in Darbhanga and at a number of other places in
north Bihar continued to mobilize support for bakast campaigns. At Dekuli
and Raghopore, according to a report by the Bihar government, neither the
local kisan workers nor the zamindars were cooperating with officially
supported efforts to arrange a compromise settlement. The kisan workers
moreover, the report commented disapprovingly, seemed to be "hell bent on 
146satyagraha". On 16 March, at Dekuli in the Bahera thana of Darbhanga,
a group of villagers obstructed the progress of a cartload of rice which was
being taken away on behalf of a local zamindar. A quarrel developed and one
of the zamindars was assaulted. In retaliation the local zamindars and their
supporters turned out "in force" and fired on the villagers, wounding nine of 
147them. During April, elsewhere in the district, kisans looted two
148 149zamindar s kutcherrries (store-houses). During May there was a lull in
kisan protest, but in the first fortnight of June, with the commencement of 
the ploughing season, there came such a revival of activity that the provincial 
administration reported that the "kisan movement ... appears to be working 
to a c r i s i s " . A  fortnight later the administration reported that
the agrarian situation continues to deteriorate and 
reports of attempts or threats to seize bakasht land 
have come in from nearly every district in Bihar.
In the Raghopore and Dekuli areas of Darbhanga the kisan leaders were all set
to initiate satyagraha, and only postponed the commencement of a satyagraha
152campaign pending the results of official efforts to arrange a settlement.
In February 1939 the kisan movement received a fillip when, at
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terms which, according to an official view, were "very favourable to the
tenants". At Dekuli and elsewhere, in contrast, attempts at settlement
154failed, and heightening tension prevailed. At Chitauli village in Saran
kisan activists and supporters of the landlord clashed over disputed lands.
Two of the kisan activists were beaten up, and the kisan leader, Jamuna
155Karjee, was arrested and sentenced to eight months imprisonment. By the
first weeks of July, in wholesale defiance of the All-India Congress 
Committee's ban on the initiation of satyagraha campaigns that had not been 
authorized by the relevant provincial Congress committee, kisan activists
were leading tenants in direct action against their zamindars in a number of
. 156 localities.
At Raghopur these efforts were successful and the dispute was settled on
The storm centre of kisan sabha activity over the bakast issue 
duirng 1939 was Darbhanga, the district where kisan activists had made the 
strongest efforts to capture control of the Congress party machine. In 
Darbhanga, according to an official report prepared in early July
Attempts to seize the land or to obstruct cultivation 
... have been almost daily occurrences and numerous 
clashes have occurred. There has been a large number 
of prosecutions and a number of the principal leaders •.. 
have been arrested. The agitation was intensified 
by the Provincial Kisan Sabha meeting which was held 
at Sakri close by on the 7th and 8th ... Volunteers 
are now being imported from elsewhere to continue the 
attack which it is intended to enlarge into a general 
attack upon the bakast lands of the Darbhanga estate.
It has been necessary to keep Magistrates and armed 
police continuously on the spot and a large number of 
arrests have been made. It is clear that this agitation 
is going to be made a provincial issue as the attack is 
upon the principal landlord of the province.
In July, in the Pandoul area of Darbhanga, one confrontation began when some 
Darbhanga Raj amlas arrived with a tractor to plough a disputed holding. The
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local tenants attacked the driver of the tractor with a volley of stones and
15 8a free for all developed between them and the Raj amlas. In three
Muzzaffarpur thanas, similar disturbances occurred, while in the Gogri thana
in north Monghyr police arrested several leaders for encouraging a crowd to
plough disputed lands. In this area, according to an official report,
Most of the lands have been ploughed and settled 
by the landlords, but attempts have been made to 
replough the lands and uproot the seedlings. 13 9
By the middle of July, according to a kisan sabha publicity officer, the
rt . ii 160agrarian situation was getting more serious day by day .
For some time it seemed that the bakast issue would lead to dis­
turbances on a wider and more intensive scale, but a mixture of coercion 
and concession thwarted such a development. In Darbhanga by late July the
police had arrested the local kisan leaders and 180 of their followers, thus
161striking a severe blow to the movement. When amlas of the Darbhanga Raj
arrived at a village in the Pandoul area to plough some disputed holdings
only women, children and old men rallied to demonstrate against them, all
the younger adult males already having been arrested. (The protesters, most
of whom came from the Yadav jati, put up a brave fight. They stopped the
ploughing by sitting down in front of the plough bullocks, and only left
162after they had been jostled and beaten by the Raj amlas. With the
immediate future of the Darbhanga campaign looking bleak, Jay Prakash Narayan
intervened and made a fresh attempt, with official support, to arrange a
163 . . . , , . .compromise settlement. Success m  containing the kisan campaign m
Darbhanga, the provincial government later reported, was achieved through 
cooperation betwen the district officials and the members of the local district 
Congress Committee. The head of the district Congress Committee, Satya Narain 
Singh, MLA, the administration reported approvingly, had "worked hard to
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counteract false propaganda by the Kisan Sabha and to infuse a more reason­
able frame of mind among the tenants.""*"^ 4
The imprisonment of kisan sabha activists and administration
initiatives to ensure the negotiation of compromise settlements which gave
the tenants some concessions"*"^ "* dampened the fires of kisan discontent.
By early August the situation had quietened considerably. The only exception
to this general trend was a clash between landlords and tenants in the Laukaha
thana in the Madhubani subdivision of Darbhanga district, in the course of
which the landlord's amlas opened fire, killing two of the tenants and injuring
167several others. By the end of the month the provincial government was able
to report that
There has been a general decrease in agitation partly 
owing to the fact that the ploughing and the sowing 
season is drawing to a close and partly due to 
exhaustion and the success of local officers with 
the assistance of prominent non officials in settling 
a large number of important disputes.
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A fortnight later, in mid-September, the government was able to report that
169kisan sabha activity had "become much less pronounced", and it was clear 
that the provincial government had effectively contained the bakast movement. 
The government had achieved this success with relatively little trouble. In 
Darbhanga, the district where the movement attained its greatest strength, 
the police curbed protest by arresting the local leaders and 180 of their 
supporters. In Bihar as a whole only about 600 people were arrested during 
1939 in connection with the bakast movement."*^0 This figure pales into insig­
nificance when compared with the figure of 10,889 arrests made in connection 
with the civil disobedience movement up to November 1930. "*”7"*~ Nor at any stage, 
and again in contrast to the civil disobedience movement period, did bakast 
campaigners effectively challenge the local authority of the police by giving
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them a sound beating during small-scale clashes. The bakast movement was 
limited both in the areas and in the number of people it affected. The Bihar 
Congress Ministry viewed the bakast campaign with anxiety, but found the 
informal and formal mechanisms of control at its disposal perfectly adequate 
to deal with the challenge of kisan turbulence.
By September 1939 the bakast campaign was on the wane, but it had
not fully disappeared. In the second half of September, with the coming of
the Second World War, those kisan workers who were not at the time in custody
172were distracted from the bakast issue by the problems posed by the war.
In the following month a settlement was finally reached on the long-standing
Padri dispute, on terms which the provincial government regarded as "very
173favourable to the tenants". Later in October there was an upturn in kisan
sabha activity, and the administration advanced the opinion that more protests
174could be expected as the harvesting season approached.
But these protests did not eventuate, partly because on 31 October
1939, in obedience to an All-India Congress Committee resolution, the Bihar
Congress Ministry resigned from office. The decision to relinquish office
175in the provinces was, according to the All-India Congress Committee, an act 
of protest against the way Britain had brought India into the war without 
consulting the nationalist leadership and without offering Indians further 
constitutional advance in return for help in the war effort."*"7^
After the resignation of the Bihar Congress Ministry the left-wing 
and mainstream members of the Congress movement coalesced in opposition to 
the British. The occurrence of this development has inspired B.R. Tomlinson, 
M.V. Harcourt and G. McDonald to argue that the need to preserve party unity 
was the underlying reason for the decision to relinquish office. This
338
in relation to other provinces, but in the context of political developments
in Bihar in the late 1930s it cannot be supported with substantial evidence.
B.R. Tomlinson contends that the prevalence of factional conflict over spoils
and the resulting adverse effect on the prestige of the Congress movement
encouraged the party leadership to decide that a spell out of office and a
revival of anti-British propaganda would restore party unity and clean up the
177tarnished image of the nationalist movement. But though Tomlinson has
demonstrated at some length that since at least the early 1930s bitter
factional conflict had been characteristic of provincial and local Congress
178activity and organization, he does not present evidence in support of the
view that in Bihar by late 1939 the problems of unity and image arising from
factional strife had become compelling enough to force the Congress out of
179office. From another perspective, G. McDonald and M.V. Harcourt have
suggested that the strength of the left-wing opposition to the mainstream of 
the Congress obliged the conservative Congress leadership to pay the price 
of office resignation in order to restore unity and preserve control. But
their claims are exaggerated; as has been shown, the challenge of the left- 
wing bad only affected a limited area and involved only a limited number of 
people. By August 1939, weeks before the resignation decision, the movement 
had been contained by the Bihar Congress Ministry and the provincial admini­
stration and was on the wane.
In late 1939 mainstream and left-wing Congressmen agreed over the 
need to oppose British rule but differed over the tactics which should be 
employed to express this opposition. In the following months left-wingers 
called for the initiation of mass protest against imperial rule, and partly 
as a result of the pressure they brought to bear the All-India Congress
suggestion may have some validity at the level of all India politics, and
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Committee eventually adopted the compromise tactic of 'individual
181satyagraha'. The demands of this debate over tactics took attention
away from the waning bakast movement. In the course of November 1939 there 
was only one notable landlord/tenant clash, during which shots were fired 
and a member of the tenant's party was killed by a gunshot wound, but other­
wise the situation remained quiet, and kisan workers were reported to be
182"marking time, waiting to see how the policitical situation develops". 
Concerning developments in Darbhanga an official report commented that
where a few months ago kisan agitation was causing 
grave anxiety the Kisan Sabhaites are now quiet and 
are not speaking against the Congress. 183
In the first fortnight of December the possibility of a revival of bakast
184agitation was further reduced by a 20 per cent rise in food grain prices.
This increase marked the end of the long period of depression and took the edge
185of kisan discontent. In December, despite the commencement of the har­
vesting season, the agrarian situation remained quiet and "nothing but
186ordinary disputes between landlords and tenants" were reported. And in
January 1940, the condition of the countryside was officially estimated to
187be "unusually quiet". The bakast campaign, which at one stage had caused
188"grave anxiety" in official ranks, had come to an end.
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In the late 1930s the Bihar Congress encountered a challenge from left-wing
dissidents within its ranks. These dissidents were organized into the Bihar
Provincial Kisan Sabha and claimed a right to influence Congress policy
because of the breadth of their support among the peasantry. "Who does not
know", Jay Prakash Narayan asked in December 1937, "... that our Kisan Sabha
workers have won the last general election for the Congress and are asking
189for nothing more than the fulfilment of the Congress Agrarian Programme?"
In 1939, after they failed to capture control of the Congress organization 
and had come under heavy pressure from mainstream members of the party, the 
left-wingers turned their full attention to organizing mass protest over the 
bakast lands issue.
The Bihar Congress was strikingly successful in coping with this
190challenge. Though lackadaisical in their activity in other areas, the 
orthodox majority of Congressmen held firmly to the reins of power. In 
holding on to power orthodox Congressmen were much assisted by the prestige 
and sympathy gained for Congress during the nationalist struggle, by the 
administrative experience gained by many of them on district and municipal 
boards and in the reformed councils, by the strength of their links with 
vested interests in the localities, by their close cooperation with the civil 
service and the police, and (perhaps most importantly) by the failure of their 
left-wing opponents to mount an effective campaign against them.
In Bihar, in the late 1930s, the main (indeed almost the only)
alternative political institution to the left of the mainstream of the Congress
191was the Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha. The leaders of the Bihar Provincial
Kisan Sabha, (like the provincial and local Congress leaders), were high caste
Conclusion: The left-wing challenge and police/administrative control
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men from zamindari backgrounds who accepted the primacy of the nationalist 
struggle over other agitation. The campaigns they led essentially sought 
to transform the policy and activities of the Congress, either from within 
by capturing control over the Congress organization or from without by pressur­
ing the Congress by means of mass protest. The leading supporters of the 
kisan sabha movement were middle and big tenants who sought to defend their 
own interests against zamindari pressure. In doing so their aims were short 
term and reformist. Significantly, and despite all the rhetoric about 
zamindari abolition, the Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha, when forced into a 
position in which it had to attempt to initiate extensive protest against the 
Congress government, chose to focus on the fundamentally conservative issue of 
the bakast lands. The bakast campaign had the potential to gather wide 
support, but as it developed it tended to become focused on disputes within 
the landed interest. The bakast movement did not gather sufficient support 
for the mounting of an effective anti-Congress campaign. During the middle 
months of 1939 the bakast movement created difficulties for the Bihar 
Congress government. Ultimately, however, the government, by combining 
coercion and concession, was able to bring the situation under control. The
kisan movement won some concessions and encouraged the kisans to stand up for
192their rights and protest against landlord harassment. By late 1939, how­
ever, the movement had been effectively contained. When the Bihar Congress 
Ministry relinquished office in October 1939 it did so from a position of 
strength rather than of weakness. Withdrawal from office, combined with an 
economic upturn, did reduce intra-party and landlord/tenant tensions, but 
these results were by-products rather than conscious aims of the decision to 
resign.
After announcing that the Bihar Congress Ministry would relinquish 
office the Chief Minister, Sri Krishna Sinha, thanked the police and the
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administration for their cooperation in preserving law and order during a
193period of agrarian turmoil. The effective cooperation of the police and
the administration with the Bihar Congress Ministry had long-term reper­
cussions for the future of police/administrative control in north Bihar. By 
reacting conservatively towards an agrarian dispute the Bihar Congress 
weakened its support among some sections of the population, and used up some 
of the political capital it had gained through the sacrifices of the civil 
disobedience movement. But because the bakast movement had been limited 
in its extent and support, and because conservative Congressmen had played 
the role of mediator and had brought the kisans concessions, the Bihar 
Congress emerged from the period of bakast struggle with its prestige 
relatively unimpaired. The use by the Congress government of the police as a 
coercive force in support of landlords in their disputes with tenants over 
bakast lands decreased the already low popularity of the police. And the 
sucdess of the Bihar Congress in maintaining control in 1937-39, combined 
with the expectation that eventually Congress would return to government, had 
a bad effect on the morale of Indian policemen -and officials when British 
government was re-established in the province after the resignation of the 
Congress Ministry. Lukewarm support for British rule manifested itself 
among police officers and throughout the bureaucracy, and was particularly 
prevalent among those younger officials who had been appointed, in many cases 
as an act of favouritism by a leading Congressmen, during the period when the 
Congress Ministry held power. This lack of support prevailed during the 
following years. In January 1942 the Director of the Government of India 
Intelligence Branch, reporting on the political situation in Bihar, commented 
that Indian officers in all the services, feeling that eventually Congress 
would return to power, were "reluctant to take firm action".
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on the inequitable treatment of Bihar relative to other provinces under 
the Niemeyer award. Solomon, a member of the civil service in Bihar, 
wrote this article in his private capacity in the hope that its contents 
could be brought to the attention of British parliamentarians. He was 
obliged to abandon this plan, however, as a result of the intervention 
of the provincial government. See GOI, HPf 51/5/1936, NAI.
43 McDonald, "Unity on Trial", pp. 307-311; "Sahajanand's Statement of 
September, 1937", f G98, 1937-38, AICCP, NML; GB FR(1) Sept. 1937 to 
GOI, HPf 18/9/1937, NAI
44 As M.V. Harcourt points out, the left-wing also attempted to outflank 
the Bihar Provincial Congress Committee by going over its head to the 
All-India Congress Committee, in which the left-wing was relatively 
stronger than it was in the provincial committee. See his "Kisan 
Populism and Revolution in Rural India: The 1942 Disturbances in 
Bihar and East United Provinces", in Low, Congress and the Raj,
pp. 315-48, p. 331. On the subject of mass agitation, see also 
Hauser, "Bihar Kisan Sabha", pp. 118-22 and McDonald, "Unity on Trial", 
pp. 307-9.
45 GBO FR (2) March 1936 HPf 18/3/1936, NAI.
46 GB FR (1) Dec. 1937, HPf 18/12/1937, NAI.
47 GBO FR (1) July 1936, GOI HP f 18/7/36; Indian Nation3 10 April 1938;
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Indian Nation3 5 August 1938; GB "Fortnightly Reports on Agrarian 
Troubles (Patna Division), 1938* , f62, FMP, BSA; "A short history 
of the agrarian trouble in the Barahiya Tal area", Land Reform files, 
f226, 1938, JPNP, NML.
McDonald, "Unity on Trial", p. 306.
Tomlinson, National Congress and Raj, p. 65.
McDonald's "Unity on Trial" is an excellent introduction to the dis­
turbances at the time of the Haripura delegate elections. But 
McDonald generalizes too far on the basis of events that were mainly 
concentrated within the single district of Darbhanga and over emphasizes 
the extent of Congress disunity and the strength of the left-wing 
challenge to the orthodox Congressmen.
The following information on the character of mass participation in 
the Congress organization is from "Answers to Congress and Mass Contact 
Questionnaire" INC f 116, 1936, JPNP NML, and "Report of the AICC Mass 
Contacts Committee:, f IX, 1936, microfilm A, PP, NML.
GB FR (2) Nov. 1937, HP f 18/11/1937, NAI. Ramnandan Misra was the 
son of Rajendra Prasad Misra, a middle-range zamindar of the Bhumihar 
jati from the village of Raghunathpur in Darbhanga. Rajendra Prasad 
Misra had an annual income of some 20,000 to 25,000 rupees, of which 
about one-tenth went ot the government in land revenue payments. 
Ramnandan Misra was born in 1906 and became involved in politics while 
studying for his matriculation. In 1922 he joined the Congress and left 
school to take part in the non-cooperation movement. He studied briefly 
at the National College at Benares and then became a full-time political
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worker. In the course of his political activity he "became aware of 
the extent of exploitation of the people by the landlords" and also 
"saw the need for the masses to be involved in the mainstream of the 
nationalist struggle". He also became involved in social uplift work, 
and was active in anti-purdah activity. His increasing radicalism and 
interest in socialism led to conflict with his family, with whom he 
eventually broke all ties. (This breaking of ties, it should be noted, 
is one striking point of contrast between his career and that of 
mainstream nationalist leaders). Interview, Laheriaserai town 31 Oct, 
1976.
53 The following information on misconduct in the period leading up to 
the elections is from: Dhanraj Sharma and fifteen others to the 
President, Bihar Provincial Congress Committee, 7/1/1938, f P6 , 1936, 
AICCP, NHL; Assistant Secretary, BPCC to General Secretary AICC 
13 Sept. 1937 f P6 , part II, 1937, AICCP, NML; Violence Report pp. 4-5. 
For details concerning intra-Congress struggles in Darbhanga in the 
period preceding the 1937 Legislative Assembly elections, see 
Tomlinson, National Congress and Raj, pp. 78-9.
54 McDonald, "Unity on Trial", p. 309; GB FR (1) and (2) Dec. 1937,
GOI HP f 18/12/37 NAI; letters cited note 29 above.
55 The information given here on events in the Jale constituency is from 
"Case No. 11" of the "Darbhanga Cases" appended to the Violence Report.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
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59 See "Case No. 1" in 'ibid.
60 Ibid. The finding of the Enquiry Committee on the reliability of 
evidence presented before them in the central Tajpur constituency was, 
they contended, generally applicable to all the evidence they were 
presented with in the course of their investigations. See Violence 
Report, p. 1.
61 The information given here on events in the central Warisnager 
constituency is from "Case No. 6" of the "Darbanga Cases" appended to 
ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 For details of the political activities of Maheshwar Singh during 1936 see 
Tomlinson, National Congress and Rag, pp. 78-9.
64 The information given here on events at the Baurhar polling station 
is from Judge S.A. Fath, "Appelate Court Judgement", 6 Feb. 1939,
f P6 , 1939-40, AICCP, NML.
65 A bal fruit is about the same size as a large orange and has a hard 
outer casing.
66 Judge Fath commented:
It is to be noted that the election was held in 
December 1937 after the Congress had come into 
office and the cleavage between the kisan party and 
the zamindar party in the Congress had become more 
sharp and prominent. The evidence is that there 
were 42 polling stations in the Madhubani subdivision 
and at each polling station a candidate on behalf of 
the kisan party had been set up ... The trying magis­
trate seems to think that Rajendra's academical 
qualifications being better than Newelal's he must 
have got more votes. This is a misapprehension.
Votes were likely to go the interest which each party
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candidate represented and there can be no doubt 
that kisan voters were much more numerous.
Prosecution Witness 1 admits that most of the 
voters were kisans. Prosecution Witness 6 states 
that in Khirhar itself there were about 600 voters 
out of whom 40 to 50 were zamindars and the rest 
were kisans". See Fath, Court Judgement".
67 Ibid.
68 Violence Report p. 2.
69 I b i d pp. 4-6.
70 McDonald, "Unity on Trial", p. 310.
71 GB FR(1) May 1937, HPf 18/5.1937, NAI.
72 Krishna Chandra Mukerji, General Secretary, Bihar CSP, Darbhanga 
Branch to J.P. Narayan, 5 Aug. 1938, CSP f 23, 1937-38, JPNP, NML;
GB FR (2) June 1938, FR (1) Aug. 1938,FR (1) Sept. 1938, HP files 
18/6/1938, 18/8/1938, 18/9/1938, NAI.
73 (Punctuation as in original). Ramnandan Misra to Dear Comrade 
(presumably J.P. Narayan), Laheriaserai, 17 Aug. 1938, Agriculturists’ 
Unions, f 149, 1936, JPNP, NML.
74 S.M. Wasi, Bihar in 1938-39, (Patna 1942), p. 7.
75 Ryoti lands, which generally comprised by far the greater part of a 
zamindar’s property, were those in which an occupancy tenant had 
acquired protected rights. Zirat lands, which usually formed only a 
tiny part of a zamindar's property, were the ’homestead* lands of the 
zamindar in which no other rights could accrue. (Strictly speaking, the 
term zirat was only applicable to these ’homestead* lands, but in 
popular usage it was often employed to refer to both ’homestead’ and
bakast lands).
76 Under the terms of the tenancy law produce rent had an equivalent 
status to cash rent. In actuality, however, payers of cash rents were 
more secure and more able to advance their rights than sharecroppers.
Note by R.N. Prasad on "Agrarian trouble in ... the district of Purnea", 
PSf 120(1), 1940, p. 19, BSA.
77 In some districts, by the 1930s, land had become so scarce and so much 
sought after that landlords were able to rent out for cultivation lands 
formerly used for tanks, roads_,burning ghats and other miscellaneous 
purposes. Kisan report, chap. 2, p. 56; Murari Prasada to Chief 
Manager, 29 June 1939, f 34F, C Pandoul, L 1938-39, RDA.
78 Kerr, Da.rbha.nga Settlement R e p o r t p. 101.
79 Village Note for Kubaul, February 1901, village 407, Bahera thana, 
Collectorate Record Room, Laheriasarai town, Darbhanga.
80 In the Darbhanga Raj, the large number of holdings that were sold up 
put a great strain on the Raj's administrative machinery. See the 
comments quoted in note 15 above.
81 Small landlords who supervised cultivation personally profited most 
from bakast holdings, whereas large landlords often found that their 
amlas, who were indispensible for supervisory work in a large estate, 
soaked up most of the extra profits that could be derived from holding 
direct cultivating control. In mid-1938 the chief manager of the 
Darbhanga Raj commented that land held by the Raj under direct culti­
vating control "is always a source of income to Amlas if they are not 
properly controlled". "Inspection report", 7 May 1938, f 6H2, C Padri,
G 1938-39, RDA. And as Hauser points out, the cost of closely super­
vising amlas was prohibitively high. Hauser, "Bihar Kisan Sabha", p. 28.
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Large landlords generally attempted to resettle newly sold up land 
with an occupancy tenant. But because the administrative machinery 
of the great zamindari estates moved slowly and inefficiently great 
landlords often held large areas as bakast. On the slowness and 
inefficiency of the Darbhanga Raj administrative machinery, see the 
material cited in notes 13 and 15 above.
82 For information on this point and also for more general information
on the bakast campaign and on agrarian relations and political develop­
ments in north Bihar I am grateful to Ramnandan Misra who, though in
ill health as a result of advancing age and of the long-term effects of 
torture and harsh treatment while imprisoned by the British during the 
Second World War, gave me three interviews at Laheriaserai in 
October and November 1976.
83 Because of this development the legal position concerning the right 
to cultivate the lands often became "... exceedingly obscure",
GB FR (1) Aug. 1937 HPf 18/8/1937.
84 Harcourt, "Kisan Populism", p. 332.
85 Ramnandan Misra, "A short note on the conditions of tenants of Raj 
Darbhanga of parri elaka", Land Reform file 226, 1938, JPNP, NML. In a 
circular dated 6 July 1939 accompanying this document Misra comments that 
all other avenues of agitation having been patiently tried over a period 
of two years "it seems that there is no way open for the tenants but to 
organize a direct fight".
86 Ibid.; In a report submitted in October 1937 the Padri circle manager 
reported that "In absence of bunds the Elaka has become Dahnal to a great
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extent". (Dahnal lands are lands whose productivity has been adversely 
affected by inundation). He also commented that "The Elaka remains 
surrounded on all sides with water for full four months and all communi­
cations is stopped during the rainy season. 11 Padri AAR 1344 F (1936-37), 
f 10 H 3, C Padri, G 1937-38, RDA.
87 "A short note".
88 According to Ramnandan Misra, the tenants, by losing their occupancy 
rights, were reduced to a condition of "absolute slavery". Ibid.
89 One Padri circle manager was dismissed late in 1936 after it was dis­
covered by his superiors that he had colluded with the amlas under his 
control in defrauding and exploiting the peasantry. This manager had 
also failed to implement the Darbhanga Raj policy of arranging rent 
remissions on land that had been adversely affected by inundation. His 
successor, nonetheless, did not show much sympathy for the people of 
Padri. In his report for the year beginning September 1936, he noted 
that "the condition of the tenants is not at all good ... due to flood 
and high rental ,^*1 and that "Poverty is prevailing". He then went on
to boast that the collection of rents had been the best for four years 
and that "Never before was such a big amount in Raj salami realized".
He also commented, in the course of his report, that the tenants of 
Padri were "Not good in any respect. They are illiterate but talking law, 
selfish and mean". In support of his contention that the tenants were 
mean he noted that "If the distribution of Alms (even a half seer of 
rice) is done in the circle, even well-to-do tenants also come and 
accept the Alms without caring for their position". The possibility 
that it was abject poverty that drove people to come forward to accept
358
alms does not seem to have occurred to him. "Inspection report",
7 May 1938 cited in note 81 above; Padri AAR cited in note 86 above.
90 The Government of Bihar reported that "... a somewhat blatant attempt 
to break up a big kisan meeting was made by agents of the Darbhanga 
estate, including the somewhat crude device of driving an elephant into 
the crowd. This piece of opposition did more good to the Swami than to 
the estate". GBO FR (1) June 1936, HPf 18/6/1936 NAI.
91 Ibid.; Ramnandan Misra, "A short note"; AICC Foreign Department
Newsletter No. 2, 18 June 1936, f XI, 1936 (microfilm 4), JPNP, NML 
(The official account refers to "an elephant", whereas the kisan and 
Congress accounts refer to elephants plural).
92 Ramnandan Misra, "A short note".
93 Inspection report, cited in note 81 above.
94 The distinction between protest over control of newly sold up bakast 
land and that over long established bakast land was not clearly defined. 
To strengthen their claim tenants, no matter what the facts were, tended 
to claim that they had only recently lost their occupancy rights in the 
land under dispute, and conversely landlords tended to claim that they 
had held the disputed land as their bakast over a long period. Protest 
campaigns seeking the granting of ryoti rights in both types of land 
ran concurrently and drew strength from one another.
95 Rajendra Prasad to General Secretary, AICC, 7 October 1931 f 75, 1931, 
AICCP, NML.
96 "A short history of the agrarian trouble in the Barahiya Tal area",
Land Reform f 226, 1938, JPNP, NML.
97 Rajendra Prasad to Jawarharlal Nehru, 10 March 1937, f P6 (i), 1937, 
AICCP, NML. In this letter Prasad contends that though some of the 
disputed land had only recently been taken over by the landlords, most 
of it had been part of their bakast over a long period. I have accepted 
Prasad’s interpretation, but it should be noted that a contrasting per­
spective is given in a report by the Bihar Government. According to 
this report the produce rents of the tenants of the area had been 
commuted to high cash rents in the period prior to the 1930s, and with 
the price slump of the 1930s the tenants had no longer been able to 
pay their rents. It is difficult to decide which version is correct. 
Prasad's version is sympathetic to the Bhumihar landlords because they 
were stalwart Congress supporters, whereas the official version is 
antipathetic to them for the same reason. GB FR (1) March 1937,
HP f 18/3/1937. See also note 94 above and Hauser, "Bihar Kisan Sabha", 
pp. 11, 26, 30, 111.
98 "A short history of the agrarian trouble in the Barahiya Tal area".
Land Reform f 226, 1938 JPNP, NML.
99 Unfortunately there Is only limited documentary information available 
on the caste background of the people who participated in bakast cam­
paigns. The evidence in support of the suggestion that Yadavs were 
active in the Pandoul bakast campaign consists of a sentence in a 
report by subdivisional officer H.R. Krishnan on a clash between Raj 
amlas and tenants. Commenting on the testimony of one of the witnesses 
to the clash Krishnan records that the witness in question "... is a 
Goala [i.e. a Yadav ] but otherwise had no connection with those that
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29 Aug. 1939 PS f 79(X), 1939, pp. 75-82, BSA.
100 Note dated 13 July 1939, p. 9 in ibid.
101 The burden of proof lay with the tenants, but they were usually ill 
equipped to provide evidence because landlords avoided giving receipts 
for rental payments. Failure to give receipts was a technical breach 
of the tenancy law but as Hauser points out there was no effective 
machinery to ensure that receipts were given. Hauser, "Bihar Kisan 
Sabha", pp. 127, 131.
102 Walter Hauser and M.V. Harcourt have based their assessments of the 
bakast struggle mainly on those instances where conflict developed 
between members of distinct social strata, and have concluded that the 
struggle was essentially a class conflict. But as will be shown, the 
bakast struggle assumed different forms in different localities, and 
many of these forms do not fit neatly into any simple class conflict 
model. For the views of Hauser and Harcourt see "Bihar Kisan Sabha" 
pp. 33-4 and "Kisan Populism", pp. 323-25.
103 K.P. Sinha, Collector's Office, Darbhanga to R. Russell, Chief Secretary 
to Government of Bihar. 13 March 1939, PSf 79, 1939, BSA.
104 Ibid.
105 There is, unfortunately, only a limited amount of official documentary 
data available on the bakast campaigns. In the indices of the Bihar 
Government Political Special Department for the late 1930s there are 
numerous files listed under "Agrarian Disputes", "Landlord/Tenant 
Relations", "Riots", and other relevant headings, but unfortunately most
took part in the Kisan movement". H.R. Krishnan, "Report on enquiry",
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of these files have either been destroyed or cannot currently be 
located. Sri T.S. Sinha, the Archives Director, told me that he had 
it on good authority that the British, before they left in 1947, 
destroyed many files which they felt reflected badly on their admini­
stration. Another possibility is that Congress politicians, anxious 
about their reputations, have arranged the suppression of material.
Even if, however, all these files were available, they would only tell 
one side of the story. Fortunately, however, answers to many of our 
questions about this period will in due course by supplied by Walter 
Hauser of the University of Virginia, who in recent years, building on 
the foundations laid in his doctoral thesis, has engaged in intensive 
field work research into agrarian turbulence in Bihar in the 1930s. 
Hauser has isolated five areas which were centres of peasant discontent, 
and has visited them to make an extensive series of interviews with 
people who were involved (on one side or another) in landlord/tenant 
conflict. He has, in addition, located private documents surviving 
from the period and has also delved into previously unused 
district level official documents. For information about his work 
and for generous help in a variety of ways I am grateful to Walter 
Hauser, whom I met during my initial field trip to India in March and 
April 1975.
106 This estimate is based, of course, on the information that some 150 
bighas was divided among five groups of landlords.
107 According to the official version, which must of course be treated with 
caution, the Dekuli bakast agitation began with a private quarrel 
between Ajab Narain Rai, the biggest co-sharing zamindar, and Satyadeo 
Rai, "a petty co-sharer malik and cultivator". As a result of this
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quarrel there was a rioting case and a counter case. Next, Satyadeo 
Rai became the local leader of the kisan sabha, called Ramnandan 
Misra into the area, and with his help, and apparently in order to 
harass his rival, mobilized the tenants into involvement in a bakast 
campaign. K.P. Sinha, Collector's Office, Darbhanga to R. Russell,
Chief Secretary to Government of Bihar, 13 March 1939, PSf 79, 1939,
BSA.
108 As Walter Hauser points out, big tenant cultivators could well be better 
off than many small zamindars. Hauser, in^Bihar Kisan Sabha", p. 21.
109 "North Bihar Village", pp. 304-6.
110 Ibid., p. 306.
111 Ibid.
112 There were, in addition, some middle caste leaders, but these people 
were only to be found in local leadership roles. Hauser, "Bihar Kisan 
Sabha", pp. 75-8.
113 Harcourt, "Kisan Populism", p. 331.
114 Ibid., p. 331.
115 The main centre of this dissidence was the Dhamdaha thana in Purnea. In 
Purnea, in contrast to the other districts of north Bihar, there was, in 
addition to occupancy tenants, a large number of tenure holders who held 
permanent leases on proprietary rights from the superior landlord, the 
Maharaja of Darbhanga. Some of these tenure holders had extensive hold­
ings, but most, due to fragmentation of holdings by inheritance, held 
only a small amount of land. Most of these tenants and tenure holders
did not engage directly in cultivation, but instead had their fields
cultivated for them by sharecroppers. Some of these sharecroppers were
Santals, a tribal people who had originally been brought north across
the Ganges to Purnea from the Chota Nagpur area to clear the land of
jungle and bring it under cultivation. (The land in question had become
available because of the steady westward movement of the main channel
of the Kosi river, and was covered with a thick grass jungle. The
Santals were brought in to clear the jungle because they were docile
workers and because they were more capable of doing the heavy work
involved and more resistant to malaria and other diseases than the
indigenous labouring population). The first Santals were brought into
Purnea around the turn of the century and there was a particularly heavy
influx in the 1920s and 1930s. Under the terms of the tenancy law the
Santals were entitled to acquire occupancy rights in the holdings they
tilled for tenure holders, but in actuality, to quote one official,
On account of ignorance of their own statutory 
rights, they were at the mercy of the landlords who 
were ... free to evict them and settle their lands 
with whomsoever they choose". a
In theory, the Santals shared their produce half and half with their 
landlord, but in fact, because of the imposition of abwabs, the propor­
tion left to them was about one third. The
lands assigned to them were frequently inter­
changed, rent receipts were never granted to 
them and they were on the land merely on suffer­
ance and could be ousted at any time at the 
Malik’s [i.e. landholder's] will. b
From mid-1938 the Santals began to protest against their situation. One 
reason for this was that under the revisions to the tenancy laws 
implemented by the Bihar Congress government, the rights of sharecroppers, 
particularly the rights of those who cultivated as under tenants to
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occupancy tenants were more clearly defined. A second reason, accord­
ing to the District Magistrate, was that local Congress and kisan 
activists, "from disinterested as well as interested motives ... began 
to educate them in their rights". (These interventions by Congress 
and Kisan Sabha workers seem to have been purely local initiatives and 
received little attention and made little impact in the wider arenas of 
institutional and agitational politics.) A third reason, one can 
speculate, for the beginning of dissidence among the Santals was the 
fact that they, in common with the other elements of Bihari society, had 
been affected by the economic difficulties and the political ferment of 
the 1930s. In their protest campaign the Santals initially concen­
trated on the demand that their landlords fulfill the provisions of the 
law and grant them receipts in return for their share of the crop. The 
effective meeting of this demand would ensure that the Santals would 
eventually be able to take advantage of the law and acquire occupancy 
rights. The tenure holders and occupancy tenants responded to this 
demand by refusing to give the required receipts and "began to oust the 
existing Santal Bataidars [i.e. sharecroppers] and to set up fresh 
Bataidars from among their relations and servants".^ The Santals res­
ponded by attempting to take over possession of the lands they claimed 
as theirs by right of long-term cultivation. According to the 
District Magistrate, "they rapidly organized themselves", and "moved in
0large numbers, many times with bows and arrows". There were a number 
of crop-cutting cases, a number of confrontations in which only the 
arrival of the police averted riots and a number of clashes, some of 
which resulted in casualties. One clash began when a group of Santals 
who were ploughing up some disputed land were interrupted by a group of 
Yadavs. It seems from the evidence available, the Police Superintendent 
reported, that the Yadavs attempted to drive the Santals away with a
365
lathi charge, and that the Santals responded with a volley of arrows. 
Members of both parties were injured in the affray and one of the Yadavs 
was killed by an arrow through the chest. In conjunction with and 
partly as a result of confrontations such as these, the Santals and 
their opponents fought against each other in a series of civil and 
criminal cases. Santal/landlord tension simmered on throughout 1939 
and 1940, despite official attempts at arbitration and settlement. 
Eventually, in late 1940, the administration was able to quieten agi­
tation by arresting Santal activists and by bringing pressure to bear 
on occupancy tenants and tenure holders in order to oblige them to 
provide receipts. Significantly, though 1939 was elsewhere in north 
Bihar the year of the highpoint of the kisan sabha direct action, the 
kisan sabha movement did not involve itself in support of the Santals.
At first, as we have seen, kisan (and Congress) workers played a part 
in activating the Santals, but once the Santal movement got under way 
they away from it.
The information presented in this note is from PSf 120(1), 
1940, BSA. The direct quotations are from documents held in this file 
as listed below:
a. Quoted from a Board of Revenue letter of 3 Dec. 1931 in 
a note by R.N. Prasad dated 5 June 1940.
b. N.P. Thadani, Purnea Collector/Magistrate, Report on the 
Agrarian trouble in Dhamdaha and Darbhanga police stations 
of Purnea.
c. Ibid.
d. Ibid.
e. Ibid.
See also GB Fortnightly Reports for 1939, 1940, and Martin Hoskins, 
"Land-Holding and Development in the Kosi area", pp. 79-80, and 
Geof Wood, "The legacy of the past : the agrarian structure", pp. 106-8, 
in Joy and Everitt, The Kosi Symposiumpp. 78-92 and pp. 93-112. For 
information about discontent and protest among Adivasi sharecroppers in 
Champaran where conditions broadly similar to those in Purnea prevailed, 
see GB Fortnightly Reports for June, July and August of 1938,
HPf 18/6/1938, 18/7/1938, and 18/8/1938, NAI.
116 The preamble to "The Manifesto of the Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha", 
states that "The Kissen [sic] Sabha means the unity of the peasants.
The Sabha stands not only for the raiyats, but also for petty zamindars 
and agricultural labourers in other words for all who live for culti­
vation". Agriculturalists' Unions fl49, 1936, JPNP, NML.
117 Hauser, "The Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha", p. 20 and footnote 1, p. 20.
118 In April and May 1936 there were, in the Tirhut division, a large 
number of "social uplift" meetings among members of the Musahar 
community, a Harijan group whose members were mainly engaged in agri­
cultural labour. In late May the Musahar leader, Santdas Bhagat, 
mounted a large demonstration against a Muzaffarpur sugar factory. A 
few weeks later he drew a crowd of several thousand Musahars to a 
protest meeting at Dalsingsarai in Darbhanga and complaints were 
levelled against Ramasre Prasad Chaudhuri MLC, a leading local zamindar, 
and against Mr Parr of the Harsingpur factory. Subsequently a demon­
stration was held at Parr's factory and a protest letter was sent to 
Chaudhuri. Several thousand Musahars assembled near Chaudhuri's 
residence, armed (according to an official report) with lathis.
Chaudhuri assembled a large body of men and a confrontation seemed
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imminent. At this point a body of police arrived, arrested the 
Musahar leaders, and then broke up the crowd by means of lathi charges. 
As a result of this encounter the Musahar leaders and 30 of their 
followers were charged in court with riotous behaviour. In the ensuing 
weeks the Musahars held two large meetings to discuss the situation; 
at one of these meetings the police intervened and arrested the leading 
Musahar spokesmen. As a result of this repression Musahar activity 
subsided for some months, and the only other newsworthy event which 
occurred in the remainder of 1936 occurred in August when one of the 
Musahar leaders broke bail and fled to the safety of Nepal. In the 
following year there were some minor disturbances, but no major events 
until September, when a group of Musahars demonstrated outside the 
Sitamarhi court in Muzaffarpur while some of their caste fellows who 
were under-trial prisoners were having their suitability for bail con­
sidered. A clash occurred between the demonstrators and the jail staff 
and the police, and the Musahars were severely beaten up and dispersed. 
Press reports appeared claiming that the police and jail staff were 
unnecessarily provocative and brutal in their treatment of the pro­
testers. But according to one official explanation the severest force 
used against the Musahars was employed by outside members of the public 
who came to the assistance of the police and jail staff. If this state­
ment is correct (and given prevailing public attitudes towards the 
police), it throws an interesting light on the attitude of the other 
elements of the population to the Musahars and their cause. After this 
Musahar activity subsided, though there was a brief revival, in June 
1938. There is no evidence that kisan workers, despite the obvious 
political potential of the Musahars, showed any interest in their cause, 
though there is an allegation (in GB FR(2) June 1936, HPf 18/6/1936 NAI)
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that "certain Congress agents" were responsible for encouraging Santdas 
Bhagat to protest. GB Fortnightly Reports for April, June, July and 
August 1936, July and September 1937 and June 1938, HP files NAI; 
Muzaffarpur Collector to Tirhut Commissioner, 1 Sept. 1938 and 
R.S.L. Norsering, "Enquiry into Allegations", Police file 51, 9, 1940 
(includes 51, 15, 1938 and 51, 21, 1937), Commissioner's Record Room, 
Muzaffarpur town.
Indian Nation, 9, 22 July, 4 Aug. 1938.
Quoted form Sahajanand's presidential address to the annual session 
of the All-India Kisan Sabha, 14, 15 March, 1944 in Hauser, "The Bihar 
Kisan Sabha", p. 19.
Indian Nation, 2 April, 27 July, 31 July 1938; Hauser, "Bihar Kisan 
Sabha", pp. 127-30.
Indian Nation, 2 April 1938. For trenchant criticism of the legis­
lation, see Swami Sahajanand Saraswati, "Tenancy Measures in Bihar", 
chap. Ill of R.G. Ranga (ed.)j Peasants and Congress (Madras 1938 ?) 
pp. 37-46.
Martin Hoskins points out that "as is commonly the case with land 
reform, attempts to implement it lead to consequences opposite to those 
intended". See his "Landholding and Development in the Kosi area", in 
Joy and Everitt, The Kosi Symposium, p. 91.
H.K. Prasad to Rajendra Prasad, 30 June 1938, f IA, 1938 (microfilm 8) 
PP, NML. See also Hauser, "Bihar Kisan Sabha", pp. 129-30.
During the 1930s the senior management of the Darbhanga Raj made con­
tinuing efforts to reorganize and rationalize the administration of the
Raj estates. See the Conference Proceedings, 13 May 1937 and 10 January 
1938, f 10F G 1937-38 RDA: Conference Minutes 4,5 May 1938, f 10D3,
G 1938-39 RDA.
126 Danby decided that the current rent rates, which averaged about five to 
six rupees per bigha, were too high, given flood damage and prevailing 
food grain prices, and recommended that rents be lowered so that in no 
instance they amounted to more than about four to five rupees per bigha. 
He also urged that a substantial portion of the rent arrears owing be 
cancelled. For these recommendations see his "Inspection report", 7 May
1938, f 6H2, C Padri, G 1938-39 RDA. A special officer was deputed by 
the Darbhanga Raj to implement these recommendations. In October 1938 
this officer informed Danby that the rent arrears cancellations that 
had been authorized up to a maximum of 50 per cent had failed to sub­
stantially improve the position of the tenants. The reason for this, 
he explained, was "that the condition of the tenants is really very bad 
... they are in great distress and the major number ... are not really 
in a position to pay rent in respect of Dahnal lands". On these 
grounds the special officer advised the complete cancellation of rent 
arrears on flood affected lands. Special Officer to Chief Manager,
31 Oct. 1938, f 6H2, C Padri, G 1938-39, RDA. There is no evidence to 
indicate that this advice was followed: the Darbhanga Raj, it seems 
probable, was willing to make some concessions but not to the extent of 
drastically reducing its profit margin. Nor, despite the opinions ex­
pressed by Danby in June 1938, do the Padri tenants seem to have had 
their rents substantiallyreduced. There is no evidence on this point, 
but perhaps Danby, in view of the financial interests of the Darbhanga 
Raj, had a change of heart and subsequently was supported in this stand 
when the monsoon of 1939 passed without -serious flooding and when, in
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the final months of 1939, food prices began to rise. What is clear is 
that the Padri tenants gained little from the rent reduction operations 
carried out by the provincial administration in 1939 and 1940 under the 
terms of a Tenancy Amendment Act passed by the Bihar Congress Ministry 
in 1938. (For details about the contents of this act see "Babu 
Rajendra Prasad's Comprehensive Statement addressed to the tenantry",
27 Dec. 1937, Bihar Landholders' Association Papers, Sinha Library, 
Patna). The rent reduction section of the act was nominally intended 
to reduce rents which had been increased during the period of high 
prices from 1911 to 1930 to a level more consistent with the depressed 
prices of the 1930s, but also contained compromise provisions designed 
to protect the zamindari interest. In his report for the year beginning 
September 1939, the Padri circle manager congratulated himself on 
successful counter-action, by means of "strong contest,representations 
to charge officer, rent officer and collector", to the activities of 
government appointed rent reduction officers, who in his opinion were 
characterized by "kishanite predilections", and concluded by remarking 
that "considering the vastly Dahnal areas of this circle rent reduction 
was very light". Padri AAR, 1347 F. (1939-40), f 16 D1, G 1941-42, RDA.
Padri AAR, 1347 F. (1939-40), f 16D1, G 1941-42, RDA.
Ibid.
Ramnandan Misra, "A short note". For Danby's response to Misra's 
charges, see Indian Nation, 16 July 1939.
Indian Nation, 1 July 1938.
Harcourt, "Kisan Populism", p. 332.
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132 Wasiy Bihar 1938-393 p. 7.
133 Interview, Ramnandan Misra, Laheriaserai town, 31 Oct. 1975.
134 The letter concludes: "So my labour is daily increasing and almost the 
whole day I have to remain in these cases. You were pleased to send 
word ... that special remuneration would be paid for this heavy work".
Anup Lall Thakur, Raj Muktear, Madhubani to Pandoul circle manager,
8 June 1939, f 56A. C Pandoul L 1938-39 RDA. See also the other 
letters held in this file.
135 This was particularly the case in north Bihar. In south Bihar dis­
content over the bakast issue had been simmering from 1936 onwards, and 
there had been several violent clashes. For the development of the 
bakast campaign in south Bihar see Hauser, "Bihar Kisan Sabha",
pp. Ill, 113, 132.
136 Roy, "North Bihar Village", p. 306.
137 Padri AAR 1347 F (1939-40) f 16D1 C Padri G 1941-42, RDA.
138 Swami Sahajanand and his supporters contended that, though they hoped 
that kisan protest would be non-violent, the kisans had every right to 
use violence in self-defence. See Sahajanand quoted in the "All India 
Kisan Bulletin", 14 Jan. 1938, and Ramnandan Misra to Rajendra Prasad,
17 Jan. 1938, f G98, 1937-38, AICCP, NML. See also Ranga, Peasants and 
Congress3 pp. 67-8.
139 For an account of a case in which a zamindar’s tobacco crop was apparently 
sabotaged see K.P. Sinha to R.Russell, 13 March 1939, PSf 79, 1939, BSA.
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140 On this point the comments of Hoskins and Wood are instructive.
Hoskins points out that
Most ... antagonism is due to landholders attempting 
to evict tenants and generally preventing them 
claiming any sort of occupancy rights, particularly 
at harvest time when a successful reaping of the 
crop by the landholder effectively puts the tenant 
in the position of being a hired labourer ... If the 
landholder successfully harvests the crop he effectively 
denies that the tenant has had any decision-making role 
in the cultivation of the plot and he implies that the 
tenant’s labour has been contracted under the same con­
ditions as hired labour ... most of the violence is 
associated with such behaviour .
Wood comments that
Although the underlying conflict simmered all the 
time, the flashpoints usually occurred at harvest 
time in the process of establishing rights over the 
harvested crop (or portions of it) when the peasant 
was asserting or reinforcing a claim to a certain 
tenancy status over the land on which the crop was 
cultivated. To lose a dispute in any one year weakened 
one’s long term position since the previous status quo 
could be used to defend a claim in the following year.
It is common even now [i.e. 1976] for the crop to be 
guarded at harvest time — perhaps by opposing sides to 
the claim — and for fights to occur in the fields.
See their articles on ’’Land-Holding and Development" and "Agrarian
Structure", in Joy and Everitt, Kosi Symposium3 pp. 82, 107.
141 GB FR (1) July 1939, HPf 18/7/1939 NAI; Indian Nation3 11 July 1939.
142 Interview with Ramnandan Misra, Laheriaserai town, 2 Nov. 1976.
143 See for example, the Indian Nation for 21, 29 and 30 July 1939.
144 Hauser, "Bihar Kisan Sabha", p. 132; GB FR (1) Feb. 1939, HPf 18/2/1939 
NAI.
145 This success was followed, however, by dissension among the kisans. In 
May the administration reported that a stalemate had developed because 
"the Bhumihar tenants will not accept Jagunandan Sharma’s socialist
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distribution of the land in equal shares to the raiyats whether of 
high or low castes". GB FR (1) May 1939. HPf 18/5/1939, NAI.
GB FR(1) March 1939, HPf 18/3/1939, NAI.
GB FR(2) April, 1939, HPf 18/4/1939, NAI.
Ibid.
In May it was reported from the Dhaunali area in Darbhanga that the 
kisans "have divided the bakasht land of their malik between themselves 
without any opposition from the maliks". GB FR(1) May 1939, HPf 
18/5/1939, NAI.
GB FR (1) June 1939, HPf 18/6/1939, NAI.
GB FR (2) June 1939, HPf 18/6/1939, NAI.
GB FR (1) June 1939, HPf 18/6/1939, NAI.
GB FR (2) June 1939, HPf 18/6/1939, NAI.
According to the Indian Nation of 21 July 1939 "A kind of madness has 
seized the peasantry and they are now unable to distinguish between 
right and wrong. That is why they are plundering what in no way 
belongs to them".
GB FR(2) June 1939, HPf 18/6/1939 NAI. At around the same time another 
prominent kisan leader, Dhanraj Sharma,was arrested and sentenced to 
six months rigorous imprisonment and to a 200 rupees fine. Indian 
Nationj 26 July 1939.
Indian Nation, 6 , 16 July 1939; GB FR(1) July 1939, HPf 18/7/1939, NAI. 
Ibid.
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158 This and other confrontations are reported in a note by R. Russell 
dated 13 July 1939 in PSf 79(X), 1939, BSA.
159 GB FR(1) July 1939, HPf 18/7/1939, NAI.
160 "Account of the Bakast struggle", by the publicity officer, Darbhanga 
District Kisan Sabha, no date, but internal evidence indicates second 
half of July 1939, Land Reforms file 226, 1938, JPNP, NML.
161 GB FR(2) July, 1939, HPf 18/7/1939, NAI. According to the "Account 
of the Bakast struggle", up to 13 July a total of 210 kisan workers 
and their followers had been arrested in connection "with the Darbhanga 
Raj Bakasht dispute alone".
162 This incident occurred on 6 August. H.R. Krishnan, "Report on Enquiry", 
29 Aug. 1939, PSf 79(X), 1939, BSA.
163 GB FR(2) July 1939, HPf 18/7/1939, NAI.
164 Ibid. Eighteen months earlier, in December 1937, when there had been, 
coincident with the harvesting season, an upsurge of kisan turbulence, 
the administration had praised the mainstream of Congress for taking
a firm stand against what was described as "irresponsible action".
GB FR(2) Dec. 1937, HPf 18/12/1937, NAI.
165 In addition to the granting of concessions in individual disputes, there 
was also the general effect of reforms in the tenancy law which allowed 
for the reduction of rents. The rent reduction operations carried out 
by the administration in the late 1930s, as Hauser points out, affected 
only limited areas and did not always serve the interests of the tenants 
(In some instances, indeed, tenants were impoverished by the legal costs 
they incurred while trying to take advantage of the reduction
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legislation). But despite this, Hauser concludes, there is no question 
that the rent reduction operations did alleviate the situation in 
politically critical areas. Hauser, "Bihar Kisan Sabha", p. 27, foot­
note 1. See also note 126 above.
In July a kisan spokesman had claimed that the "dual policy of 
repression and appeasement "would not succeed". In the event, however, 
this prophecy was proved wrong. See "Account of the Bakast struggle".
GB FR(1) Aug. 1939, HPf 18/8/1939, NAI.
GB FR(2) Aug. 1939, HPf 18/8/1939, NAI.
GB FR(1) Sept. 1939, HPf 18/8/1939, NAI.
Interview, Ramnandan Misra, Laheriaserai town, 4 Nov. 1976.
McDonald, "Unity on Trial", note 20, p. 312.
GB FR(2) Sept. 1939, HPf 18/9/1939, NAI.
GB FR(1) Oct. 1939, HPf 18/10/1939, NAI.
GB FR(2) Oct. 1939, HPf 18/10/1939, NAI.
Harcourt, "Kisan Populism", p. 333.
Congress was to remain out of office for six years. Because of the 
length of this period it is tempting to regard the decision to relinquish 
office as the epitome of idealistic self-sacrifice over a matter of 
principle. But as B.R. Tomlinson points out, in 1939 no one could 
predict the length of the period during which Congress would remain in 
the political wilderness, and hence the resignation can be seen as to 
some extent a bargaining ploy designed to pressure Britain into the making 
of further constitutional concessions. National Congress and Raj, p. 111.
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177 Ibid.
178 Ibid., chap. 3.
179 Ibid., p. 111.
180 McDonald has argued that in Bihar "The bitterness and disillusionment 
unleashed during the period of the Congress ministry", in addition
to leading to extensive militant kisan sabha campaigns had "also found 
an outlet in renewed vituperations against the British." The left-wing, 
though insistent that there be a new campaign against the British 
administration, was "... adamant that such a campaign could not be 
mounted by the ’rightist' domin— -^ated Bihar Congress." Confronted 
by this
... demand for a new campaign against the British, 
and fearful of the consequences if they stood aside 
from such a movement, the ’orthodox’ Congressmen 
found themselves forced towards relinquishing office.
Ultimately, in 1939, they were obliged "to relinguish power in an 
attempt to re-establish unity, and redirect the agitation into less 
violent channels." But the only evidence McDonald presents to demon­
strate the existence of a "rising tide of anti-British sentiment" is 
drawn from the official provincial reports for May and June of 1938 
and consists of references to anti-British speeches and to an attack 
on a police constable. Incidents and speeches such as these were a not 
untypical feature of life in the province throughout the period from 
1920 onwards, and do not, therefore, of themselves serve as strong 
evidence of the presence of a "rising tide" of feeling against the 
British. And if this tide did exist in mid-1938, it seems to have 
ebbed very quickly, or else to have been insufficiently significant to 
attract much attention from the compilers of the official provincial
reports from July 1938 to September 1939. "Unity on Trial", pp. 310-11, 
and notes 102-4 on p. 314; GB FRs 1938-39 NAI.
Harcourt contends that by September 1939, as a result of
vigorous kisan protest,
the stage seemed set for a major conflagaration 
in the countryside accompanied by an irretrievable 
split within the Bihari Congress party,
but that this "wave of kisan unrest ended in anti-climax with the out­
break of the Second World War." This anti-climax occurred, Harcourt 
argues, because the coming of the war led to an improvement in food 
grain prices and because the way the British handled the question of 
the involvement of India in hostilities supplied Gandhi with a justifi­
cation for calling for the resignation of the Congress ministries, 
though his decision to do so was "In actuality ... directed as much at 
Congress’ internal strife ..." Harcourt is mistaken in his claim that by 
September 1939, a "major conflagration" and "an irretrievable split" in 
the Bihar Congress were likely. As has been shown, agitation over the 
bakast issue had reformist rather than radical implications. Bakast 
protest, moreover, developed on only a small scale. In Darbhanga, the 
district where the bakast movement attained its greatest strength, 
the police effectively curbed the campaign by arresting the local 
leaders and 180 of their supporters. The Bihar administration viewed 
the bakast campaign with anxiety, but found the instruments of political 
and social control at its disposal perfectly adequate to contain it. 
Moreover, the bakast movement had subsided by the beginning of September, 
partly because the season for the planting of the winter crops had 
finished but also because of the effectiveness of the administration’s 
efforts to pacify the tenantry through the combination of concessions 
with coercion. A revival of activity could be anticipated with the
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beginning of the harvest season in December, but a "major 
conflagration" was not likely. Nor was there any likelihood of an 
"irretrievable split" in the Congress occurring at this time. Such a 
split had already occurred in 1937, and had clearly shown itself to be 
in existence in December of that year during the elections of the dele­
gates to the Haripura conference. A facade of unity had been maintained, 
but unrelenting pressure had been put on the minority of left-wingers 
to oblige them either to obey the official party line or else to leave 
the party altogether. In 1937 and 1938 the left-wingers attempted, 
fruitlessly to increase their influence within the Congress. In 1939, 
they involved themselves in mass protest only as a last resort, other 
alternatives having been closed to them. "At no time in the 1930s", as 
McDonald has pointed out, did the Left ever question "the primacy of the 
Congress in the struggle against the Raj ..." Even in 1939, their 
efforts sought to whip up popular feeling to force a transformation of 
Congress policy, rather than to pose a radical alternative. An 
"Irretrievable split" had already occurred, but the Left refused to 
accept this. All that the coming of the Second World War did was to 
delay, temporarily, the formal expression of this split. All this, of 
course, is not to deny that the resignation of the Bihar Congress 
Ministry did help further to defuse the agrarian issue. But this result, 
it must be stressed, was a by-product, rather than a major motivating 
factor, of the decision in favour of resignation.
Harcourt, "Kisan Populism", p. 333; McDonald, "Unity on Trial", p. 306. 
For an account of developments, in the early years of the war, in the 
Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha, and their relationship to nationalist 
politics, see Hauser, "Bihar Kisan Sabha", pp. 143-8.
181 Harcourt, "Kisan Populism", p. 335.
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182 GB FR(1) Nov. 1939, HPf 18/11/1939, NAI.
183 GB FR(2) Nov. 1939, HPf 18/11/1939, NAI.
184 GB FR(1) Dec. 1939, HPf 18/12/1939, NAI; Hauser, "Bihar Kisan Sabha", 
p. 136.
185 There were, in addition, "good harvests in the 1939-40 season, which 
enhanced the restorative effects of high produce prices." Harcourt, 
"Kisan Populism", p. 334.
186 GB FR(1) Dec. 1939, HPf 18/12/1939, NAI.
187 GB FR(1). Jan. 1940, HPf 18/1/1940, NAI.
188 In the ensuing months there were some minor disturbances, but by late 
May the administration was able to report that "Purely agrarian 
agitation has almost ceased." See GB Fortnightly Reports for February, 
March, and for the second half of May 1940, HP files 18/2/1940, 8/3/1940 
and 18/5/1940, NAI.
189 Amrita Bazar Patrika, 20 Dec. 1937, clipping held in f G98, 1937-38, 
AICCP, NML.
190 On 4 March 1938 Rajendra Prasad wrote a detailed memorandum to
Sri Krishna Sinha, Chief Minister of the Bihar government, complaining 
that although the Congress Ministry had now been in office for eight 
months it had done little "to fulfill all that was promised in the 
election Manifesto." Bihar Ministry Affairs, f 3B 1938, PP, NML.
191 In Bihar the Forward Bloc was a small cluster of intellectuals without 
a mass base. In Bihar during the 1930s the Communist Party devoted 
almost all its efforts to attempting to organize railway workers and 
the industrial workers of the mining towns in south Bihar, and did not 
involve itself in agrarian agitation. The Congress Socialist Party had
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only a limited number of adherents, but exerted influence because of its 
penetration of the Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha.
192 Ramnandan Misra argues strongly that though the bakast campaign was 
effectively contained it yet had an important long-term psychological 
effect in that it encouraged the kisans to stand up to oppression. Misra 
contends that before the campaign the kisans were in a state of virtual 
serfdom, but that afterwards the zamindars and their men treated them 
with more restraint and respect. Interview Laheriaserai town, 1 Nov. 
1976. Mishra's opinion on this point was shared by his adversaries.
On 25 April 1938 the manager of the Jhanjharpur circle of the Darbhanga 
Raj noted that the "Tenants are not so submissive as they used to be".
In February of the following year the Birnager Circle Manager reported 
that
Owing to the change in the angle of vision brought 
about by political change in the country, admini­
stration has become difficult. The methods which 
worked so well a year ago are ineffective. One 
has to be cool and sympathetic in his treatment 
of his tenant,
and in 1940 a Raj official recorded the opinion that increased diffi­
culties in rent collection were due to "the process of transformation of 
"Prajas" [i.e. subjects] to "Kisans". Jhanjharpur Manager to Chief 
Manager, 25 April 1938, f 10F, G 1937-38, RDA; Birnager AAR 1345 F 
(1937-38) submitted 20 Feb. 1939, f 10K2, C Birnager, G 1938-39, RDA; 
Marginal note on the Chief Manager’s note on the Rohika AAR 1348 F 
(1940-41) f 16D2, C Rohika, G 1941-42, RDA. See also Roy, "North Bihar 
Village", pp. 306-7.
193 GB FR(2) Nov. 1939, HPf 18/11/1939, NAI.
Chapter 5
1942 : The Quit India Revolt
Introduction; October 1939 to August 1942: the back­
ground to revolt; August 1942 and after: the Quit 
India Revolt; Conclusion: the collapse of formal 
control and the continuation of the social order.
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"quit India", and in an attempt to force them to leave, initiated mass civil
disobedience. In response the British administration implemented a carefully
worked out programme designed to cope with the challenge of large-scale civil
disobedience in time of war. The British arrested leading Congressmen,
declared the Congress organization illegal and shut down Congress offices and
printing presses.'*" Throughout most of India these measures succeeded and
after three or four days of angry street demonstrations the situation quietened.
But in Bombay city, in Gujarat, in the Deccan, in Midnapore district of Bengal
and in the eastern United Provinces and in Bihar protest against the British
3intensified. In north Bihar police and administrative control over the 
countryside broke down, and was only re-established by the deployment of large 
bodies of troops. Before it was put down the "Quit India Revolt" caused 
extensive damage to government property and completely disrupted communications. 
In the opinion of the Viceroy the Quit India Revolt amounted to the most
4serious challenge to British control over India since the Revolt of 1857.
The collapse of the law and order apparatus in August 1942 marked 
the culmination of that steady erosion of police and administrative control 
over north Bihar which had begun in the first decades of the 20th century. The 
collapse, moreover, indicated the success which the Bihar Congress had achieved 
in harnessing turbulence and directing protest. The following chapter describes 
the immediate background of the Quit India Revolt, discusses the course of the 
revolt, and examines the extent to which the collapse of formal control created 
a potential for anti-landlord protest.
Introduction
In August 1942, the All-India Congress Committee called on the British to
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October 1939 to August 1942: The background to revolt
The coining of the Second World War brought an abrupt end to the price 
depression of the 1 9 3 0 s . B y  the end of March 1941 the average price of 
coarse rice in Bihar had increased by 32.5 per cent over the average price in 
1939 and by 13.2 per cent over the average price in 1940. As table 16 
illustrates, primary produce prices rose higher and higher throughout the 
wartime period. With rising prices and the dislocation of the world economy 
by the war many commodities became scarce. For the zamindar and the big tenant, 
and particularly for those engaged in grain dealing and black marketeering, 
wartime conditions provided many opportunities to profit.
TABLE 16
Official wholesale price for rice and gram 1941-45 
(At three-monthly intervals. Prices given in rupees per maund)
YEAR AND MONTH RICE GRAM
1941 January 4-12-0 3- 4-0
April 4-15-0 3- 4-0
July 5-10-0 2-14-0
October 5-12-0 3-12-0
1942 January 5-12-0 3-10-0
April 5- 9-0 3-12-0
July 6- 7-0 4-14-0
October 6-12-0 6- 8-0
1943 January 7- 4-0 5- 0-0
April 9-10-0 5- 0-0
July 25- 0-0 13- 0-0
October 18- 4-0 11- 8-0
1944 January 12- 8-0 11- 8-0
April 17- 0-0 11- 8-0
July 15- 0-0 9- 8-0
October 12- 8-0 9- 0-0
1945 Janury 13- 0-0 7- 0-0
April 13- 4-0 7- 0-0
July 14- 8-0 7- 0-0
October 18- 0 -0 9- 0-0
Source: Darbhanga District Census Ihndbook (1951 Census), pp. 169-72.
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The smaller tenant was vexed by the shortages of cotton, kerosene and other 
important consumer items, but found it easier to pay his rent and to profit 
from the sale of cash crops and rice. (The smaller producer was especially 
advantaged because the prices for rice and cash crops rose higher than did 
those for the 'inferior' grains, such as gram, on which he generally relied 
for the subsistence of himself and his family. Thus he could manage success­
fully even when his harvests were below average). However the dramatic rise 
in primary produce prices, by eroding real wages, had a catastrophic effect 
on the position of dwarfholders and landless labourers.
Intense economic pressure on the poor resulted in a dramatic rise 
in the crime rate and helped inspire market looting. 7 Crime figures, an 
official report commented in December 1940, had been rising steadily "since
g
1939, if not before", and now indicated "a disquieting position". In April
1941 the Bihar government recorded 92 dacoities, an increase of 100 per cent
9on the monthly average figure for the previous three years. In June of the
following year dacoities reached a record level,"*"0 and a "serious outbreak" of
market looting occurred at Raxaul town, Champaran, during which a crowd of 500
looted three cloth shops. In the following week looting incidents occurred
12at six other places in the district. The disturbances, the administration
later established, partly resulted from antagonism to local mill owners who,
to avoid prosecution under the anti-hoarding regulations, had shifted large
13quanties of grain over the border to Nepal so as to hoard it there. To 
lessen discontent the government attempted to control price levels and to 
ensure the supply of essential commodities. But the measures taken did not 
succeed"*"^  and served only to provide opportunities for corruption, thus 
further increasing popular dissatisfaction.
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Politically, the 1939-1942 period was characterized by increasing 
tension. The Congress leadership displayed reluctance to initiate mass civil 
disobedience against the British administration, but also did not intend to 
cooperate with the British in the war unless the British gave Indians a 
significantly greater share of power. But the British, engrossed in the war 
and unwilling to surrender control over India’s resources, were not prepared 
to make any substantial concessions.^ To meet the challenge of this situation 
Gandhi launched, in October 1940, an "Individual Satyagraha" campaign. The 
Individual Satyagraha campaign of October 1940 to December 1941 set out to 
embarrass the British without seriously hindering the war effort, and con­
currently to placate that section of the Congress which demanded that some
16initiative be taken. During the campaign individual satyagrahis came forward
and publicly breached the government’s wartime regulations restricting the
right of free speech. ^ 7 The Individual Satyagraha campaign, in the words of
18M.V. Harcourt, "was not one of Gandhi's success stories". In Bihar, many 
of the Congressmen designated as satyagrahis did not wish to relinquish the 
influential positions they had gained on municipal and district boards, parti­
cularly when factional rivals were always ready to move into their places, and
19were extremely slow to answer the call to court arrest. Nor, because of
the individual, ritual quality of the law breaking involved, did the campaign
attract extensive popular interest and support, though because of this it did
at least succeed, unlike previous mass based campaigns, in adhering strictly
20to the principle of non-violence. But Individual Satyagraha, whatever its 
limitations, did serve to keep alive interest in the nationalist movement and
21to prepare the ground for the eventual initiation of mass civil disobedience.
The initiation of a mass civil disobedience campaign became in­
creasingly likely with the worsening of the war situation and the repeated 
failure of the Government of India and the Congress to reach a compromise
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agreement. In December 1941 Japan entered the war, and within three months
22devastated Britain’s position in East and South-East Asia. By March 1942,
with the Japanese army thrusting through Burma and with Japanese ships and
aeroplanes active in and over the Bay of Bengal the invasion of India seemed
23imminent. At this juncture the British attempted to buy extensive Indian
support by making some limited concessions. The suggested concessions were
marketed in India by Stafford Cripps, a long-time friend of the Indian
24nationalist movement. The terms offered, however, did not differ greatly 
from those of the limited "August Offer" of 1940, and the nationalist leader­
ship rejected them. The failure of the negotiations with Cripps underlined 
the complete unwillingness of the British to make any substantial concessions 
until the end of the war and indicated that more than Individual Satyagraha 
was needed to force them to reconsider their position. Britain’s worsening 
military position in Asia, moreover, encouraged the conclusion among Congress­
men that now would be a tactically appropriate time to launch mass civil 
disobedience, and supported the suggestion, advanced by Gandhi, that the best
way of averting a Japanese invasion of India would be to force Japan's enemy,
25Britain, to relinquish control over the subcontinent. In Bihar, anxiety
2 ^intensified because of the province's proximity to the war zone. With the
Japanese invasion of Burma, overseas Indians who originally hailed from Bihar
returned to their native villages, impoverished and full of complaints about
27British mismanagement. Trainloads of allied wounded from the Burma campaign
28travelled across north Bihar, arousing disquiet among the local population.
Labourers, sick and war weary after their exertions on the Assam border,
29returned to their homes in Bihar. And from Calcutta, which seemed a likely 
target for serious Japanese attack, large numbers of casual workers returned 
to their Bihar homes, placing additional economic pressure on their families, 
swelling the petty crime rate and helping to encourage rumours of an impending
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British collapse.
faith in the future of British rule. People with liquid assets began buying
buildings and land as a precaution against the collapse of the currency, and
in the first three weeks of February, savings banks withdrawals "were nearly
31double those in the corresponding periods in the preceding years". Early 
in July the provincial government reported that
the defeatism prevailing in political and particularly 
in Congress circles in its turn produces its reper­
cussions on the uneducated classes. The impending 
collapse of Government is freely talked about even by 
villagers.
Nor was the provincial government itself immune from the general decline in
confidence. "The usual depression!" was the comment of the Home Secretary to
33the Government of India on the provincial report for the second half of May.
But pessimism on the part of the Bihar government was understandable, and
certainly the view from Patna was even less rosy than that from Delhi. In
January 1941, when there had been no threat of Japanese invasion and little
immediate likelihood of mass civil disobedience, considerable doubt already
existed about the ability of the police and the administration to fulfill their 
34responsibilities. Indian officers in both the lower ranks of the civil 
service and in the police force, the Director of the Government of India 
Intelligence Branch reported, were unwilling to engage themselves fully and 
vigorously in their work,because they felt that eventually a Congress govern­
ment would return to power, and thus did not wish, for fear of future reper­
cussions, to identify themselves overmuch as loyal servants of British rule.
In the police force this lack of morale prevailed among both sub-inspectors
35and their superiors, but had not yet extended to the rank and file. The 
police, in addition to the problem of officer morale, were also greatly
During the early months of 1942 the people of Bihar placed little
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hampered in their work by their sparse numbers. In the 1930s, increases in
the numbers of the police had kept pace neither with the rise in the size
of the population, nor with the increase in the number of serious crimes. In
1930 the ratio of police to population had been 1 : 2364, and there were
44,449 cognizable crimes reported. In 1939 the ratio had declined to 1 : 2625,
36but the number of cognizable crimes had risen to 53,903. Even though (the
Director of the Intelligence Branch reported in 1941),
... a large proportion of the Province is very thickly 
populated and often contains as many as one thousand 
persons to the square mile, the ordinary rural police 
station has as a rule no more than about 1 Sub Inspector 
and 6 constables, and it is not unusual to find that 
the Sub Inspector has to contend with crime which may 
run to as many as 200 cases registered in the course of 
a year. My own experience of crime conditions is limited 
to the United Provinces, and there, although the average 
rural population is not often in excess of about 600 
persons to the square mile, it is the exception rather 
than the rule to find a police station with fewer than 
2 Sub Inspectors and 8 cons tables.^
The Bihar police, moreover, found their work difficult because the people of
the province viewed them with disdain. This disdain prevailed among the
Magistracy, with the result that "when the police take a case to court they
are up against the prisoner and his witnesses, the bar, and in very many
3 8cases the magistrate too. The inadequacy of the number of police was a key
reason, in the opinion of the Director of the Intelligence Branch, for the
continuing rise in the crime rate, and particularly for the rising number of 
39dacoities. To assist the police in coping with the dacoity problem the
provincial government formed, in 1940, a Village Defence Organization, a
voluntary group made up of villagers willing to organize and train themselves,
on a part-time basis, to defend their property against dacoity. The Village
Defence Organization generally only attracted support from the "haves" rather
40than the "have nots" of village society. And unfortunately for administrative 
prestige the speakers who went on tour calling on people to join the Village
impression that the Police are not strong enough to tackle the dacoits".
Nor was it just the police force which was too small to meet is responsibili­
ties. The districts of Bihar were large, roughly twice the size of those in
Bengal and the United Provinces, which meant that Bihar had a lower ratio of
42district and subdivisional officers to the population. The demands of war
service, furthermore, siphoned off district officials into overseas service
in the army, seriously affecting the quality of British administrative
personnel. In some districts the local officials were either well past their
43prime or else were young and inexperienced. By the early 1940s the police 
and administrative system in Bihar experienced serious strain in meeting its 
routine responsibilities. It had nothing in reserve with which to meet a 
major crisis.
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Defence Organization were "to some extent, responsible for creating the
41
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August 1942 and. after: The Quit India Revolt
Within 24 hours of the acceptance, on 8 August, of the ’’Quit India" resolution 
by the All-India Congress Committee, meeting in session at Bombay, the 
authorities arrested almost all of the leading Congressmen, both in the All- 
India Congress Committee and at the provincial and district level, declared
44Congress an illegal organization, and took steps to paralyse its operation.
In Bihar, this government repression was greeted with consternation. At
first the reaction centred in the towns, with students and members of the
middle classes participating in rowdy street demonstrations and flag-waving
processions. At Patna, on 11 August, police fired on a crowd trying to
force its way into the grounds surrounding the Secretariat building, killing
45seven people, all of«them students, and wounding several others. In 
reaction to official violence protest intensified. On 12, 13 and 14 August 
there were recurrent demonstrations in the towns, and disturbances began
46throughout the countryside. The mechanics of the spread of the movement to
the rural areas are not entirely clear, but it seems that the spread of news
by word of mouth and the movement of students from the towns to their native
47villages both played a part. As the movement spread to the countryside it 
became more and more violent, and there was extensive sabotage of government 
property. In Darbhanga
... the villagers ... cut all the roads and railways.
The roads were cut where they were carried over
embankments several feet high, trees felled across
them, masonry bridges demolished, pontoons of the
pontoon bridge on the main road sunk; railway lines
torn up, 40-foot spans of the bridges removed and
dropped into the rivers, the delicate and at that
time irreplaceable electrical signalling apparatus
at all stations destroyed; telephone and telegraph
wires everywhere cut, rolled up and carried off
home.,_48
Crowds of villagers invaded post offices, destroying furniture and papers, 
and made attacks on police stations. In some places they were repulsed but 
elsewhere they succeeded in overwhelming the local police.^0 Some police 
stations were demolished or burnt down, while in others furniture and docu­
ments were d e s t r o y e d . S o m e  policemen surrendered, and handed over their 
weapons and the control of their posts to the rebels, but others fought to
the last. At Rupauli in Purnea, three policemen were burnt alive while
52defending their thana. In Darbhanga, between 14 and 20 August, 20 of the
district's 25 police stations came under attack. At seven of the police
stations the defenders opened fire and repulsed the attackers, but at the
other 13 the occupying police either gave in or were overwhelmed and the
53rebels did extensive damage to the buildings and their contents. In north
Monghyr, by 24 August, all rural police posts had either been overrun or
abandoned, and the district administration had concentrated their garrisons
54at Beguserai town. Throughout north Bihar chaukidars stopped functioning, 
either because they had been intimidated or else because they sympathized 
with the movement. With the disruption of communications and the collapse of 
the police system the British lost control of most of the countryside. They 
retained control of the region's towns, in which they concentrated their 
forces, but elsewhere, according to one official account, "Perfect chaos and 
anarchy were reported to be reigning. .
The creation of "Perfect chaos and anarchy" was the achievement of
56a movement which was itself only very loosely organized. The arrest of most 
of the senior Congress leadership and of the leading local nationalist activists 
resulted in a situation broadly similar to that which prevailed at the high 
points of official repression during the civil disobedience campaign of 
1930-34. At the local level, lower rank and less important activists and 
other nationalist sympathizers attempted to fill the leadership vacuum. One
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local activist who assumed a leading role in 1942 was officially described 
as follows:
Until some three years or so ago ... Jubba 
Mallah, who is a man in his middle thirties, 
appears to have earned an honest living, as his 
forefathers had done before him, by exercising 
his craft as a fisherman. Some three years ago, 
however, he became a congress volunteer, and 
since then has done little or no work and has 
moved about in the locality ... preaching the 
creed of the congress party.^
During the uprising Jubba Mallah led the attack, bearing a Congress
5 8flag, on the Minapur thana in Muzaffarpur. In the village of Garkha in the 
neighbouring district of Saran leadership was assumed by the devout Gandhian 
Jaglal .Choudhury, assisted by two local men, Kumar Pashupati Singh and 
B. Firangi Singh. On 15, 16, 18 and 19 August they organized and spoke at 
meetings in the Garkha bazaar, building up feeling against the police and the 
British. They also visited the Garkha thana, and urged the sub-inspector 
in charge to hand over control of the thana to them. On 19 August they 
arrived at the thana supported by a crowd of about 1 ,0 0 0 people armed, accord­
ing to a police report, with lathis, spears, swords and other weapons, and 
the sub-inspector, deciding that resistance was useless, surrendered. The crowd
burnt the furniture, papers and other contents of the thana and demolished the
59thana building. The police who had manned the thana were not, however, 
molested. The leaders of the attack adhered to the Gandhian notion of non­
violence,^ and ensured that the police were protected from harm that night
before making arrangements for their journey to Chapra, the district head-
61quarters town, the following morning. The initiatives of lower level 
leaders succeeded in getting local protests under way, but no effective co­
ordination developed between different localities. Because of the arrests 
the movement lacked experienced cadres, and the extensive sabotage of 
communications hampered the organization of the insurgents as much as it did
involved in the movement had no very clear idea of what tactics to adopt. Até
first, in imitation of what had been done in previous nationalist civil dis­
obedience campaigns, protesters engaged in street demonstrations and par-
6 2ticularly in slogan shouting processions behind the Congress banner. At 
this early stage some sabotage of government property occurred, but extensive 
sabotage did not begin until the police had violently repressed protests by 
means of lathi charges, gunfire, and mass arrests. In the initiation of ex­
tensive sabotage (and also of attacks on police stations throughout the
6 3countryside), some part was played, M.V. Harcourt has pointed out, by those 
Congress left-wingers who, in the 1930s, had been critical of the deification 
of the tactic of non-violence by the members of the mainstream of the 
Congress. As early as 1938 and 1939 Congress Socialists had publicly empha­
sized the need, in any future mass-based campaign, to sabotage road and rail
64communications. The Left was influential among students, who at first 
spearheaded the campaign, and during its course left-wingers distributed 
pamphlets calling on the people to sabotage communications and attack govern­
ment property. But the importance of left-wing influence should not be over­
emphasized. The Left was strongest in Darbhanga, and had some influence in 
Muzaffarpur, but was of little significance throughout the rest of north 
Bihar.^ Both mainstream and left-wing Congressmen produced pamphlets calling
for sabotage, and in both cases the pamphlets only seem to have appeared when
66sabotage was already under way. Because the communications system was 
already in considerable disarray, these pamphlets did not have a wide circu­
lation. The leading Left activist of the 1930s, Swami Sahajanand Saraswati, 
supported Britain arid the USSR in what he regarded as the "peoples' war" 
against international Fascism, and hence he and his supporters took no part in
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that of their opponents.
The absence of effective overall coordination meant that those
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the revolt. And Jay Prakash Narayan, Ramnandan Mishra and most of the 
other leading pro-revolt left-wingers were in jail during the high point of 
the movement, at which time only those less influential left-wingers whom the 
British had regarded as too unimportant to be taken into custody in the first 
wave of pre-emptive arrests were still at large to engage in protest and 
propaganda.^
Ironically the authorities themselves were in part responsible for
the tactics adopted by Congress supporters. The government, to justify its
draconiati response to the passing of the Quit India resolution, alleged that
Congress had planned a wholescale programme of sabotage and disruption. In
the first few days after the arrest of the All-India Congress Committee
leaders the government widely publicized this allegation. Arun Chandra Bhuyan
argues convincingly that this publicity encouraged Congress supporters to
believe that disruption and sabotage were central to the wishes of the
69Congress High Command.
But overall, perhaps, neither the role of the Left nor of the 
authorities decisively determined the measures adopted by the supporters of 
the Quit India movement. Sabotage was no new weapon in the armoury of the 
Congress, and had been used extensively against toddy tappers and liquor 
merchants during the 1930-34 campaign. There had also been, in the 1920s and 
1930s, one or two incidents in which Congress supporters sabotaged communi­
cations. 70 Nor was strong antagonism to the police a new phenomenon. In 
north Bihar during previous mass civil disobedience campaigns there had been 
attacks both on policemen and on police thanas. On three occasions during the 
non-cooperation movement groups of demonstrators overran and occupied thanas7"^ 
and several times during the civil disobedience movement crowds of demon­
strators attempted to raise the Congress flag over thanas but were repulsed
6 7
with gun fire. The key difference in 1942 was not that such events occurred,
but that they occurred with a greater intensity and were concentrated within
a shorter period of time than previously. The absence of the restraining
73influence of the senior Congress leaders because of their imprisonment 
allied with the angry reaction to their summary arrest did much to cause this 
frequency and intensity of protest. The depth and extent of hostility to the 
authorities, and particularly to the police, meant that government property 
and personnel provided a natural target. And when, throughout the countryside, 
the administration buckled under the strain, many people who were not regular 
Congress supporters became further encouraged to participate in sabotage, 
assault and disruption.
The Quit India Revolt reached its height during the 10 days after
14 August. At this time the insurgents dominated the countryside and the
74authorities had to bring in large bodies of troops to recapture control.
During this period the revolt drew support from a broad section of the social 
spectrum. M.V. Ilarcourt, on the basis of information about the backgrounds of 
those taken prisoner during the movement, has concluded that, among those 
actively involved, young, high caste men predominated, but that many repres­
entatives from lower status groups were also included.7“* This finding is
76supported both by contemporary accounts and by the evidence supplied by the
official lists, compiled in 1953, of the "Martyrs" who died as a result of
77police and military violence. Information on prisoners and casualties, of 
course, does not give completely reliable impression about those involved in 
the movement. No doubt a number of prisoners were wrongfully or maliciously 
arrested. When the police and the military opened fire, their shooting was 
not always accurate, and at times it was indiscriminate. But despite these 
problems, the evidence on prisoners and casualties, supported as it is by
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contemporary accounts, does seem to give an accurate picture of those in 
the forefront of protests and demonstrations. But it does not give a fully 
accurate portrayal of those who, without necessarily being in the front line 
of agitation, did become actively involved. The evidence suggests that 
in north Bihar in August 1942 there developed not one but two distinct 
insurgencies, one a "nationalist protest" by Congress supporting, high caste 
peasants, and the other a "rebellion of desperation" by the poor low caste 
people of the region.
The "nationalist protest" began with the circulation of the news of
the arrest of the Congress leaders and the initiation of wholesale repression
of the Congress party, and intensified after the harsh official reaction to
78the first series of protests. The essential motivation of this "nationalist
protest" was political, but it also had an economic dimension. A significant
section of those who actively supported Congress were small zamindars primarily
79dependent on their cash rental incomes. At first, the price rises contin­
gent upon the war had improved their position, because with higher prices for 
agrarian produce their tenants found it easier to pay up their rent. Subse­
quently, however, those zamindars who had no other source of income such as 
direct cultivation, money lending or grain dealing to supplement their 
rental income found themselves seriously pressured by rising prices and by 
acute shortages.
The "rebellion of desperation" got under way when the success of 
nationalist protest in temporarily paralysing the mechanism of formal control 
and the excitement generated by this protest stimulated the poor to join in 
demonstrations and attacks on government buildings and property. Often their 
main object was loot: they were, indeed, very much the same group of people 
who had engaged in market looting in the earlier months of the year and who
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had swelled the figures for petty crime throughout the previous months. The 
Madhubani subdivis.ional officer reported that
Most of the Hindus who took part in the movement 
were from the higher castes ... There were agitators 
from other castes also. Generally people from lower 
castes or those belonging to the agricultural labourer 
class did not take part in the movement at first.
They joined the movement in its later stage when they 
hoped that they would be able to make something out of 
it by looting • • • g0
In north Monghyr, according to the subdivisional officer, the
Congress had their organisation in every village more 
or less: the young men ... specially the Bhumihars, 
had an inherent tendency to work as volunteers under 
Congress flag. These village organisations were in 
the best form at the time of Congress government.
After the fall of Congress government there was marked 
decline but in many villages they maintained it; the 
village teachers played an important part in maintaining 
the organisation ... the school students started the 
[Quit India] movement; they were joined by all sections 
of Congress workers. The sober section of Congress tried 
to keep the movement under control, but when they allowed 
the village mass to join, it became an economic question: 
the vast properties, specially foodgrains at the railway 
station attracted them ... Of the villagers the Bhumihars 
and the poor labourers took prominent part in the loot.
The merchants class in outlying stations were at the 
mercy of the Congress ... But somehow, they managed to 
get the leaders on their sides and thereby saved their 
property from loot: at some places, they got hold of 
the leaders by making payment to the Congress cause: 
at some places they joined the movement to some extent 
... [By 14 August] the situation was completely out of 
the hands of the students: the looters got complete 
upperhand: in order to keep the hold the younger section 
of the Congress began to support the action of the looters 
and even joined: the sober section did not approve it but 
they had no hold at the time, [sic]
31
And in Purnea, according to an official report, Congress workers used the
protest of loot as a means by which to encourage people to participate in
82anti-government activities. It seems probable that those who joined in 
the revolt mainly because of economic necessity began taking part last and 
withdrew first when repression began. Because of this they are under-
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formal control apparatus, it should also be noted, supplied great opportunities
for 'professional criminals'. The crime figures during the period ran at a
83high rate, and it is impossible to discover what proportion of 'crimes' were 
committed by 'professional criminals', and what proportion were the work of 
impoverished villagers driven by economic necessity. Indeed, these categories 
overlap extensively, since every year in impoverished, inegalitarian north 
Bihar dire poverty forced many to make crime their profession.
Many of those active in the Quit India Revolt were driven by
economic hardship, and for a period they operated in a context in which the
formal control apparatus had temporarily dissolved. This might seem to have
been an appropriate situation for the development of anti-landlord protest,
particularly given the historical background, during the 1930s, of bitter
criticism of the zamindari system and of numerous clashes between landholders
and their occupany tenants and sharecroppers. Despite these apparently
favourable circumstances, no anti-landlord protest movement developed during
and immediately after August 1942. Quit India activists made no attacks on
84property other than on that belonging to the government. Impoverished 
villagers and 'professional criminals' made some attacks on zamindari 
property, but these attacks were not given explicit ideological justification 
as part of an anti-landlord movement.
The non-development of an anti-landlord movement at the time of the 
Quit India revolt resulted partly from the dominant role in initiating and 
directing protest played by high caste members of the landed interest who had 
a vested interest in ensuring that an anti-landlord campaign did not get under 
way. It also resulted from the attitude taken by left-wing activists. Left­
wingers were divided over the question of whether or not to support the
represented in the casualty and imprisonment figures. The breakdown of the
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insurrection. Swami Sahajanand, the left-wing leader who had commanded the 
most extensive support in the 1930s, opposed the revolt on the grounds that 
India should support Britain and the Soviet Union in their "People's War" 
against the threat of Fascism. Jay Prakash Narayan and other left-wingers
who supported the revolt emphasized the primacy of the nationalist struggle
85
over the struggle for agrarian reform. The authorities, moreover, clapped 
many of the pro-Congress left-wingers into jail in their initial pre-emptive 
wave of arrests. If they had been left at large some of these left-wingers
may have decided in the heat of battle that the opportunity to engage in anti-
86
landlord protest was too good to miss. Anti-landlord protest also remained
latent because, to the chagrin of the British who had always looked to them
for support, most zamindars either remained strictly neutral or else supported
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the Congress. The Maharaja of Darbhanga, for example, refused to supply the
authorities with the assistance of the armed guards whom he employed to guard
his treasury and property. He justified his refusal by claiming that the
guards could not be relied upon to fire at demonstrators who might perhaps
include their kinsmen, caste fellows or fellow villagers, but it was generally
acknowledged that his real reason for refusal was that he had no wish to
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direct popular discontent against himself and his property. In the event 
those involved in the Quit India Revolt took no action against the Darbhanga 
Raj. The manager of the Parihar circle, which lay in the Sitamarhi Sub­
division of Muzaffarpur, subsequently reported that
In the month of August last there was an unprecedented 
congress movement in this sub division. The Sub Divisional 
officer and several Sub Inspectors of Police were 
murdered ... There was no agitation whatsoever against 
the Raj and in spite of the above movement Raj works 
were never suspended. oy
Similarly, the manager of the Nishankpur circle in north Bhagalpur reported 
that
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... the political disturbances started in the month 
of August. It first took shape in the form of strikes 
in the Higher English school at Madhipura, the cutting 
of telegrah wires, the dislocation of railway communi­
cations and the forcible closing of both the Civil and 
Criminal courts at Madhepura and Supaul. Though the 
disturbances were widespread ... there was no harm 
done to the Raj a n y w h e r e . ^
From Padri circle, a storm centre of kisan protest in the 1930s, the manager 
reported that
... an unparalleled congress rebellion of terrible 
magnitude reared its head and within a week crippled 
and paralysed the Govt. ... Hasanpore road railway 
station was burnt down and looted, fish plates [were] 
removed, wires [were] cut and roads breached [and] 
culverts smashed ...
9 1
The manager does not mention, however, any occasion on which this popular 
fervor was directed against the Darbhanga Raj. Indeed, it would seem that 
the activities of the insurgents received sympathy from the Darbhanga Raj 
management. The Padri m a n a g e r’s report continues with the comment that after 
order had been restored the Padri
tenants were saved ... from military and police 
atrocities by very prompt action taken by the Chief 
Manager and his constant attention towards this 
bringing pressure on [the] S [uperintendent of]P[olice],
[the] District Magistrate and [the] Samastipur S[ub]
D[ivisional]0 [fficer] ... Protection from military 
tortures brought [the] tenants under very heavy obli­
gation to the Raj. As a consequence [the] Padri 
tenants willingly contributed rupees 6 ,0 0 0 towards 
[the] Christmas fund. Not a single Padri tenant was 
allowed to be arrested although a huge number was 
made accused ... whose names still appear in the 
absconders printed list.
And in the Bhawanipur circle in Purnea, wherein the insurgents stormed a thana
and burnt alive three of its defenders, there were again no attacks on the
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Darbhanga R a j .
The dominance of mainstream Congressmen, the attitude taken by the
zamindars and the lack of effective left-wing leadership contributed to the
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this absence was that the big and middle tenants who had formed the backbone
of the kisan movement in the 1930s were, in the early 1940s, benefiting from
the high prices prevailing for agricultural produce. In the 1940s they found
it easy to meet their rent obligations, and through their involvement in
money lending and grain dealing found themselves in a position of strength
vis-a-vis the strata below them of dwarfholders, sharecroppers and labourers.
Their grain dealing and money lending activities, moreover, meant that they
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profited handsomely from the acute wartime currency and credit shortage.
In the 1930s such people had suffered from the price depression, but in the 
following decade they moved from strength to strength. Hence their involvement 
in the Quit India revolt can not be explained in economic terms. It seems, 
rather, that when they did become involved they did so out of loyalty to the 
Congress, out of sympathy with nationalism, out of antagonism to the police, 
and out of the feeling that the collapse of British rule was at hand.
The Quit India movement in north Bihar drew in a broad cross-section 
of the population and temporarily succeeded in demolishing police and admini­
strative control. But despite this striking initial success the authorities,
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by deploying large bodies of troops, soon re-established control. Initially
the auhorities used troops to secure the headquarters towns and the lines of
communication, and then they sent them out to pacify the villages and to
support the police in the imposition of collective fines. Within a few days
of the arrival of troops in an area, the mass participation phase of the move- 
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ment ceased, to be replaced by a long drawn out phase of sporadic guerilla 
warfare. Why were the authorities able to re-establish control so quickly?
One reason was that at the time of the insurrection the British had a massive
military force, concentrated in order to face the Japanese, at their disposal.
absence of an anti-landlord campaign. But the more fundamental reason for
9
Given war censorship, they could repress revolt ruthlessly without worrying
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about domestic or international opinion. By this crucial stage of the
war, moreover, the British had developed a siege mentality, and had determined
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to cope relentlessly with internal dissidence. M.V. Harcourt has argued
that armament was the key difference between the insurgents and the authorities 
The rebels, armed with spears, lathis, and axes first challenged policemen 
armed with muskets and then encountered soldiers armed with magazine rifles 
and machine guns and supported by air p o w e r .'*'00 This was certainly true, but 
it does not tell the whole story. Organization, or more exactly the lack of 
it, also contributed to the failure of the revolt. The usual procedure before 
an attack on a police station was for some meetings to be held nearby, at 
which speakers whipped up feeling against the police and the authorities.
Next would come an all out frontal assault on the police station, almost 
always by broad light of day. This meant that the police got advance warning 
of the impending attack, and thus the rebels lost the advantage of surprise.
Nor need the imbalance on weaponry between the two sides have been as great.
The rebels captured guns in many of the early successful attacks on police
102 „ _ i_ 1 j • • - , , J n.
stations, and fire arms were also held by private citizens who had been
granted the privilege of bearing arms. There was, furthermore, an extensive
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arms "underground" which supplied arms to professional criminals. It seems
that the arms confiscated from policemen and officials were generally taken
away by individuals and hidden. In the early stages of the revolt, the
insurgents made little effort to gather arms from various sources and train
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people in their use. The rebels could not hope to match the armament of
the military, but they perhaps could have managed to arm themselves more 
effectively to carry on guerilla war. Moreover, if the rebels had been able 
to organize themselves sufficiently to direct effective attacks against 
district headquarters towns, the short-term success of the movement could have
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Until the arrival of the military, the towns were held only by small 
groups of officials and policemen. Many of the police, in the early days of 
the revolt, were wavering, and a number of police officers relinquished their 
posts. In the Madhubani subdivision of Darbhanga, for example, a Sub- 
Inspector gave up his thana and his pistol to the insurgents, and decamped to 
N e p a l . F r o m  Champaran, the Police Superintendent reported his dissatis­
faction with the conduct of the Mounted Military Police, an elite unit within 
the Bihar Police force. When, on 24 August, he ordered them to disperse a 
crowd
there was a marked reluctance on their part to take 
any action and even after my order to clear the crowd 
with sword sticks this was not done and they merely 
waved their sticks over the heads of the crowd ... I 
also ordered them to dismount and to protect our 
flank during the mass attack on our force but without 
any orders they retired without firing a single shot.
... the whole troop should be disbanded and replaced
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In Saran, lathi-bearing constables were moved by the use by demonstrators of 
the slogan, "Police Hamara Bhai H aiM (the police are our brothers) and showed 
great reluctance to break up a march led by several leading women national­
i s t s . “*"07 And in Muzaffarpur, on 27 August, a group of police panicked when 
about 1,000 Congress supporters gathered at a village about a mile from the 
Belsand police station. The police station was manned by 33 policemen, namely 
one inspector, two sub-inspectors, three assistant sub-inspectors, 16 ordinary 
constables and 11 Armed Police Reserve constables. This garrison was armed 
with 11 muskets, eight shot guns, and some revolvers. According to the account 
of the Muzaffarpur District Magistrate,
The formidable police force ... could not stand the 
collection of the mob in that village, left the police 
station, and retreated to P a r s a u n i , which is about six 
miles from Belsand. That such a force should leave the
been even greater than it was.
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police station without orders under such circumstances 
shows that their morale is very low indeed.
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Even those policemen whose morale remained high were not always
effective when faced with a determined attack. Some of the older constables
called upon to use guns during the revolt had little knowledge of fire-arms
109
and were terrified of them. Nor, moreover, did all the subordinate Indian
officials, when faced with a crisis, prove to be loyal and reliable servants 
of the B r i t i s h . " ^ 0 Most official buildings, furthermore, had been built to 
suit the climate. They had wide verandahs and many windows and doors and 
could not be easily defended."*"^ If, in the first days of the revolt, the 
rebels had made determined attacks on the towns, using sheer weight of numbers 
and all the available fire-arms, the short-term success of the movement could 
have been considerably greater. (Such a massed attack was actually attempted 
at Katihar in Purnea district on 26 August. Congress workers assembled a 
large crowd, brought in Santal bow men to add fire-power and placed women and 
children to the front to discourage the police from opening fire. Unfortunately 
for the members of the crowd a military detachment had arrived at Katihar a
couple of days earlier and was on hand to disperse them with the aid of a bren
. 112 
gun) .
If the rebels had been able to take over the towns, even if only
until the arrival of the military, the whole complexion of the revolt could
have been changed. In the suppression of the revolt the police and officials
acted as the 'eyes and ears' of the military, and also acted to lessen the
113
ruthlessness of military repression. If the local police and officials
had either been killed or driven out of the towns, then the military repression 
would have been more brutal and indiscriminate. The reaction to such repres­
sion might have been an intensification and lengthening of mass resistance and 
may well have greatly helped those who carried on guerilla activities in the
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The rebels, in addition to being ineffectively organized, also
displayed great tactical naivety. There were few attacks under cover of
night and little attempt at concealment. (One exception to this occurred
at Marhowrah village in Muzaffarpur district, where a crowd of villagers
emerged from the cover of a tall standing maize crop and overwhelmed and
114
killed five British soldiers and an Anglo-Indian civilian). It was only
later, after the high point of the movement had passed, that greater tactical 
sophistication developed. The influence of Gandhian ideology also played 
a part in the collapse of the mass movement. Rebel activists who were 
devoted Gandhians eschewed efforts to damage their opponents. They thought 
that dedicated activists should be ready to sacrifice themselves in encounters 
with their opponents, and therefore encouraged suicidal frontal confrontation. 
Such an approach, whatever its moral value, was militarily disastrous.
After the first, dramatic phase of the Quit India Revolt was 
brought to a speedy end by the arrival of troops, the expression of unrest 
rapidly declined. By early September officials were able to report that the 
situation was returning to n o r m a l . I n  the following months small groups 
of rebels engaged in intermittent guerilla warfare, but the mass of the popu­
lation, intimidated by extensive arrests, police and military reprisals,
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military route marches and large collective fines, no longer participated.
Small groups of rebels often allied themselves with professional dacoits, and
not infrequently politically inspired banditry became difficult to distinguish
from its non-political counterpart. The most successful band of rebel
dacoits was led by Siaram Singh. Siaram Singh's band was active for several
weeks in the south Monghyr and south Bhagalpur area, where it received con-
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siderable support from Sing's Bhumihar caste fellows. In April 1943
police pressure forced the band to move north of the Ganges, where it operated
months after the initial rising was quelled.
band, until apprehended by the police in late 1944, engaged in a series of
fund raising robberies, waged a campaign of terror against chaukidars and other
collaborators with government, and made a well planned, though abortive,
attack on a police outpost situated on the Gangetic diara lands in the
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Sonbarsa police circle of the Bhagalpur district. (The reason for the
failure of the attack is instructive, since it reveals that support for the
rebel bands was limited: the attack failed because the police were given
prior warning of what had been planned as a surprise, pre-dawn attack by a
member of a low caste group which suffered oppression from the locally domin-
120
ant Bhumihars ). Other bands of rebels operating in north Bihar fre­
quently took refuge over the border in Nepal. At first the Nepal authorities
took no action against them, apparently because they had sympathy for the
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insurgents and wished to wait and see how the conflict developed. In
response to strong pressure from the British, the Nepal authorities eventually
began rounding up the insurgents, but their measures against them were never
as vigorous and effective as those employed south of the border. The guerilla
movement received a great fillip on 9 November when Jay Prakash Narayan,
Ramnandan Misra and four other Left activists managed to escape from
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Ilazaribagh jail in south Bihar. After getting in touch with rebel
activists throughout India, Jay Prakash Narayan made his way to Nepal, where
he attempted to coordinate guerilla activity and to lay the foundations for a
renewal of mass agitation. He kept in touch with underground workers by
special courier, and set up a training camp to give workers instruction in
123
military tactics and in the use of fire-arms and explosives. The Nepal
authorities, prodded by the British, eventually arrested Narayan and some of
his supporters and confined them in the Hanumannagger jail. But in May 1943 a
. . 12
force of 50 rebels raided the jail and rescued Narayan and six other activists.
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successfully in the jungly country of the Kosi basin. Siaram Singh's
407
Narayan returned to India and continued his underground work until captured
125
in September 1943. Narayan's arrest marked, as M.V. Harcourt has pointed
126
out, the end of the main period of underground activity. By the end of
1943 the British had arrested most of the important underground workers and
had broken up most of the rebel bands. Siaram Singh and his men evaded
capture until late 1944, but this was an exception to the general trend. By
late 1943 the British had also managed to bring down the crime rate, which
121
had been running at high levels throughout 1942 and 1943. To achieve these
results the British authorities had been obliged to keep detachments of troops
in the region and to improve the efficiency of the police force. Within
three weeks of the initiation of the revolt they raised the pay of the police,
recruited a large number of additional police, procured arms from far and wide
to ensure that every police station was equipped with at least six efficient
fire-arms, gave the police more training in the use of these weapons, and
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employed barbed wire to improve the defensibility of police stations.
In north Bhagalpur, where rebel bands were especially active, the authorities
set up the new sub-district of Saharsa, and in north Monghyr and north
129
Bhagalpur they established five new armed police posts. Guerilla attacks
occurred sporadically until late 1944, but by late 1943 the British had the 
situation under control.
408
Conclusion: The collapse of formal control and the continuation 
of the social order.
In north Bihar in August 1942 the formal apparatus of control temporarily 
collapsed. This collapse marked the culmination of that steady erosion of 
police/administrative control which had begun in the first decades of the 2 0th 
century. It also indicated the great degree of success which the Bihar Congress 
had attained in harnessing the region's potential for popular turbulence. In 
the 1917-23 period extensive popular protest, some of it led by Congress, had 
revealed the fragility of police/administrative control. In the early 1930s 
the Congress led civil disobedience campaign employed the technique of limited 
violence to put great strain on the formal system of control and to develop 
popular hostility to the police and the British administration. From 1937 to
1939 agrarian protest created difficulties for the Bihar Congress, tested the 
formal apparatus of control and had long-term effects on the popularity of 
the police and the morale of policemen and officials. In the early 1940s the 
erosion of police/administrative control reached a climax, and the Bihar 
Congress initiated a revolt which temporarily demolished the state structure.
The Quit India Revolt in north Bihar revealed that the British 
could no longer rely on their apparatus of police and administrative control. 
During the crisis of the insurgency, the chaukidars stopped functioning, some 
regular policemen went over to the rebels, and many more temporarily wavered. 
Among Indian officials, many were lukewarm in their activities in support of 
the British administration. During the guerilla phase of the revolt, many
policemen and chaukidars were lackadaisical in their performance of anti-rebel
130 . .
operations, and low morale was all pervasive. In future, so the admini­
stration decided in November 1942, every effort would be made to recruit 
policemen from outside the province, since Biharis could no longer be relied
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officials began to wonder about their future once Congress returned to power,
132
which was regarded as an inevitable development once the war was over.
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Among the mass of the population, anti-British feeling continued to prevail.
A large cross-section of the population had been actively involved in the
revolt, and many of the rest of the people had been sympathetic to it. In
the months after the revolt pro-British speakers seeking support for the
war effort had to trade on the future by making large promises about the
134
coming of Swaraj immediately after the war.
Because of its success in attracting extensive support and because
it temporarily demolished the apparatus of police and administrative control,
the Quit India Revolt has attracted considerable scholarly interest. Writers
of the nationalist school have promulgated what has been called "The Myth of
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the ’42 Rebellion". For propaganda purposes and to supply Indian national­
ism with a myth of heroic armed struggle these writers have exaggerated the 
extent, intensity and success of the movement in north Bihar and elsewhere
and have neither looked closely at the social groups involved in the insurrec-
136
tion nor analysed why they became involved. More recent writers, such as
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Bhuyan and Hutchens, have used their material more rigorously but have 
still arrived at the conclusion that the revolt was essentially a "nationalist 
protest", failing to perceive that it also incorporated a "rebellion of des­
peration" .
M.V. Harcourt offers another perspective. Harcourt sees the "small­
holder peasant" as playing a central role both in the peasant agitations of 
the late 1930s and in the revolt in 1942. He describes the "small-holder
peasant" as occupying the middle range of the social hierarchy and as pro-
138
ducing both for subsistence and for the market. H a r c o u r t’s interpretation
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upon. More and more often during the wartime years, Bihari policemen and
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cannot be accepted without reservations, either for the late 1930s or 
for the period of the Quit India movement. In the early 1940s many "small­
holder" peasants were doing well because of high cash crop prices. For
example in the Padri area, according to the local Darbhanga Raj manager, the
140
tenants had benefited from the cultivation of sugar cane. Small-holder
peasants also profited from high food grain prices. Apart from the excellent 
harvest of 1939/40 the wartime harvests were below average and contributed to 
the scarcity of grain. Harcourt contends that from mid-1942 onwards the 
threat of worsening scarcity created anxiety among the peasantry so that they 
launched themselves into protest when the initiation of the Quit India revolt 
provided them with an opportunity to express their discontent. His argument 
does not take account of the fact, however, that in a situation of increasing 
scarcity and rising prices many peasants who produced both for subsistence 
and the market could afford to sell a smaller amount than hitherto of their 
crop to earn cash to pay their rent, and thus could either have more dis­
posable income from the sale of the rest of their surplus or else store a
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portion of their crop as insurance against an adverse future season. In
June 1943, when the scarcity was even worse than in the previous year the
provincial administration commented that
One of the reasons why disorder has not appeared in 
the rural areas may be that ordinarily the Indian 
cultivator, after paying his rent, takes care to 
keep in hand sufficient grain for the next year’s
s e e d s‘142
The following month the administration commented that
The cultivator and the petty landlord who are pros­
pering as a result of the high prices of grain are 
expected to remain aloof if there is any revival of 
trouble. But the daily wage earner in urban areas 
and the landless agricultural labourer in the interior 
might be a source of trouble.^
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Because they were doing well out of high grain prices, most small-holder 
peasants had no economic motive to engage in the Quit India Revolt. When 
they did become involved they did so because of antagonism to the police and 
the administration, because of sympathy for the nationalist cause, and because 
of encouragement from those above them in the social hierarchy. Harcourt 
suggests that peasant small-holders took the leading part in the Quit India 
Revolt. The evidence indicates, however, that the role of these middle 
peasants was secondary to that of groups from opposite ends of the social 
spectrum, namely the locally-dominant, Congress-supporting rich peasants at 
one extreme and the poor and the landless at the other.
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Harcourt also errs in his suggestion that kisan sabha activists 
played a leading part in the organization of the insurrection. His suggestion 
is perhaps true of Darbhanga, where socialist/kisan sabha activity had been 
intense in the late 1930s, and where kisan activists had done considerable 
propaganda work in 1940, 1941, and the first half of 1942. (Their propaganda, 
however, it should be noted, stressed the need for a united front against 
British rule rather than class conflict). But kisan sabha activists did not 
do much in the way of preparation and propaganda for insurrection in the rest 
of north Bihar, throughout which there was extensive protest in August 1942. 
Harcourt contends that the politicization and radicalization of the late 1930s 
paved the way for the 1942 revolt. In Darbhanga, and to some extent throughout 
the region, kisan activism in the 1930s helped develop anti-government feelings, 
and particularly anti-police feelings. But the 1942 movement was also intense 
in areas that had only been slightly touched by kisan agitation. In Purnea, 
north Monghyr and Bihpur thana in Bhagalpur, for example, the main politicizing 
force had been mainstream Congress activity from the 1920s on. Throughout the 
region, indeed, "nationalist protest" during the Quit India Revolt was a com­
pressed version of the civil d i s o b e d i e n c e  campaign of 1930-34, with its
411
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intensity and fast-moving pace being a reaction to harsh and immediate 
official repression. This politically motivated "nationalist protest" over­
lapped with an economically motivated "rebellion of desperation" akin to 
some aspects of popular participation in the non-cooperation movement of 
1920-22. These two upheavals combined to produce an insurrection which tem­
porarily demolished the fragile structure of police and administrative 
c o n trol.
The collapse of formal control created a situation seemingly
favourable to the development of anti-landlord protest. The dominance of
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conservative Congressmen, the lack of effective left-wing leadership and
the attitude taken by the zamindars helped ensure that this possibility did
not become a reality. More fundamentally, prevailing economic conditions which
suited the interests of big and middle tenants made them disinterested in
anti-landlord protest. The high food grain and cash crop prices of the early
1940s meant that the interests of big and middle tenants coalesced with those
of the landlords, and moved into opposition to those of dwarfholders and the
landless. Hence better-established tenants did not wish to campaign against
their landlords. The Quit India Revolt dissolved the formal apparatus of
146
control but in the absence of anti-landlord protest or any other radical 
147
initiative it had little impact on the informal control apparatus.
Because of the conservative policies of the imperial ruler (as will be detailed 
in the following chapter), the informal control apparatus remained resilient.
The revolt temporarily demolished the state structure in north Bihar, but 
left the social order intact.
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It was perhaps because of this that at this time better established
tenants were unwilling to open the p a n dora’s box of agrarian protest.
147 In any initiative, however, the leadership role of a section of the
landed interest would seem to have been crucial because at this stage in 
the history of north Bihar the poor and the landless were too down trodden 
and too poorly organized to operate effectively as an independent politi­
cal force.
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Chapter 6
C o n c l u s i o n
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At the beginning of the 20th century the colonial agrarian society of north 
Bihar haboured a numerous, impoverished and rigidly stratified population.
The r e g i o n’s poverty, combined with official support for the politically 
expedient but economically disastrous zamindari land-holding system, meant 
that the provincial administration had only limited funds and hence could 
perform only the minimum functions of government. Consequently the formal, 
police/administrative apparatus of control in north Bihar was skeletal, and 
hence the main burden of maintaining social control over the region was left 
in the hands of the groups which made up the landed interest, namely the great 
landlords, the European planter-landlords, and the locally dominant small 
landlords and big tenants. Partly because of the limitations which prevailing 
social, economic and cultural conditions placed on protest, and partly because 
of the effective informal control exercised by members of the landed interest, 
protest tended, until the first decades of the 20th century, to be sporadic, 
small scale and localized. The protest that did develop was effectively 
directed, contained and controlled by members of th e  landed interest. From 
around 1920, however, unprecedently intense and extensive popular protest 
became a recurrent feature of political life in north Bihar. This protest 
was led by members of the landed interest but commanded wide support among 
poorer and less powerful members of north Bihar society. Some of these poorer, 
less powerful people became mobilized because they were the clients, retainers, 
or servants of locally dominant peasants, while others participated in 
protest of their own accord because they saw an opportunity to air their 
grievances and protect and advance their own interests. Middle range tenants 
had some opportunity to assume leadership roles and take initiatives in 
protest movements, but economic constraints and social prejudices denied this 
chance to the poor and landless, low caste and Harijan and Adivasi people of
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north Bihar. (The poor people of north Bihar did not assume an independent 
political role until, in the post-independence period, the limitations on 
their protest which had hitherto prevailed began to break down. The epilogue 
of the thesis gives a brief account of their involvement in protest movements 
during the 1960s and 1970s),
The key factor behind the emergence of mass protest in north Bihar was 
demographic. The long term repercussions of the imposition and consolidation 
of British rule had allowed a continuing increase in the size of the 
population, but the conservatism of British social and economic policies had 
thwarted the transformation of the agrarian economy. Such a transformation 
was necessary in order to produce an increase in wealth commensurate with the 
expansion of the population. But though population increase pressed hardest 
on the poor and raised the crime rate, it did not, of itself, inspire mass 
political protest. Protest only emerged when it could crystallize around 
particular sets of grievances, and when local and regional leaders, and 
particularly those organized into the Bihar branch of the Indian National 
Congress, assumed responsibility for its coordination and direction. The 
protest campaigns that developed in particular contexts reflected prevailing 
socio-economic and political conditions in their goals and social bases. In 
the late 1930s, for example, the depression-induced collapse of primary produce 
prices catastrophically affected the position of many people from the middle 
range of north Bihar society, impelling them to engage in a protest movement.
At the time of the non-cooperation movement and of the Quit India Revolt, in 
contrast, the presence of scarcity and high prices impelled many people from 
the poorest strata of north Bihar society into political protest.
But whatever the particular character and context of individual protest 
movements, the Bihar Congress was generally extremely successful in controlling
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and directing protest. The Bihar Congress was controlled by locally 
dominant small landlords and big tenants who sought to unite all sections 
of north Bihar society into opposition to alien rule. The Bihar Congress 
was particularly anxious to ensure that agrarian and nationalist protest 
did not fuse together, because such a development would both directly 
challenge the conservative, landed interests which it represented, and 
threaten the stability of the small landlord/big tenant alliance which was 
the foundation of its strength. The efforts of the Bihar Congress to keep 
nationalist and agrarian protest separate were greatly helped by the presence 
and character of the system of zamindari land-holding. Because Bihar had been 
settled under the zmindari system the mass of the population had only limited 
direct contact with the representatives of the alien administration in 
connection with rent and revenue matters. Hence protest over agrarian issues 
did not necessarily involve the administration. In Bihar, moreover, most 
of the zamindars were 'small' men with effective local ties. These people 
could easily adopt an attitude of ambivalence, or even antagonism, to the 
British. The contrast with the situation in the neighbouring United Provinces 
is striking. Most of the areas comprised within the United Provinces were only 
temporarily settled. In consequence the revenue administration was large and 
visible and impinged itself regularly upon the peasant consciousness when it 
engaged in settlement operations so as to assess the productivity of the land 
and to examine levels of rent. In the United Provinces, moreover, a highly 
visible group of large landholders existed which, with much official 
encouragement, had become clearly identified as a bulwark of British rule."*"
In the Congress organization in the United Provinces during the early decades 
of this century, furthermore, the dominating figures were Motilal Nehru and 
his son Jawaharlal, a pair of anglicized urban professionals with no kinship 
and only limited economic ties to elite groups in the countryside. In Bihar,
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in contrast, the dominating figure was Rajendra Prasad, a man of traditional 
habits who hailed from a rural, small landlord background. For these reasons 
the tendency for agrarian and nationalist protest to coalesce was stronger in 
the United Provinces than in Bihar.
In addition to keeping the national struggle distinct from agrarian 
conflict the Bihar Congress also sought to defuse agrarian protest. By and 
large this attempt succeeded. In 1919-20 Swami Vidyanand led an intense and 
extensive peasant protest movement against the Darbhanga R a j . The Bihar 
Congress, in contrast to the eagerness with which it latched on to the issues 
raised during the more or less contemporaneous anti-indigo planter movement, 
gave the grievances being raised by Vidyanand only scant attention. The 
Congress found criticism of the predominantly European indigo planters was 
grist to its anti-administration and anti-British mill, but did not wish to 
raise the spectre of an anti-zamindar movement by supporting Vidyanand in 
criticism of the Maharaja of Darbhanga, the largest landlord in the region. 
Rajendra Prasad denounced V i d y a n a n d’s movement and accused him of being a 
charlatan out for his own ends. In the 1930s a small group of left-wingers 
within the Congress put themselves at the head of a peasant movement motivated 
by the disastrous impact of a slump in primary produce prices on the position 
of many tenants. The left-wingers sought to fuse agrarian with nationalist 
protest, but found themselves effectively outmanoeuvred by the mainstream 
members of the Congress organization. In the 1930s the main achievement of the 
left-wingers was rhetorical: as a result of their activity the Congress found 
it expedient to include some radical items in its platform, but not with any 
serious intention of implementing them. (The epilogue to this thesis comments 
briefly on the gap between rhetoric and achievement involved in the abolition 
of the zamindari system between 1947 and 1952, which left substantial wealth 
and power in the hands of the zamindars). The agrarian movements of 1919-20
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and of the 1930s won some concessions, but were contained adequately by the 
Congress. Congress's task in containing these movements was made easier 
because the well-established tenants who dominated them had limited, reformist 
aims. (The big tenants of north Bihar had an ambivalent attitude towards 
their landlords. They quarrelled /with them over particular issues, but also 
aspired to join their ranks by purchasing zamindari property. And, because 
people from high caste jatis dominated the ranks of zamindars and big tenants, 
the two groups were meshed together by kinship and caste affiliation.)
The Bihar Congress eschewed the use of agrarian grievances to fuel
anti-administration protest. Despite this, however, it managed to mount
extensive, intense and effective nationalist protests. The success of the
Bihar Congress in mobilizing mass support contrasted markedly with the failure
of the nationalist movement to do so in the other areas where the zamindari
system prevailed. The success in Bihar resulted from the existence of strong
kinship and mutual interest ties between the regional intelligentsia and the
locally dominant peasants. Such ties did not exist elsewhere in the areas
in which the zamindari system operated. (Midnapore was the only district in
Bengal where an extensive nationalist peasant protest got under way. The
success of the Midnapore movement resulted from the presence in the district
of the Mahishya caste-cluster which formed an unusually large proportion of
the population and which turned en masse against the British in response to
police repression and economic hardship. The links of this group with the
2
Bengali intelligentsia were tenuous.)
The Bihar Congress drew on the potential for popular turbulence in 
north Bihar and played a directing role in successive waves of mass protest 
which progressively eroded formal police/administrative control to the point 
of collapse. Because of the financial weakness of the province the formal
control apparatus was fragile even before the erosion process began. In the 
first decades of this century, Bihar had the lowest proportion of police to 
population of any province in British India, and because its districts were 
twice as big as in the neighbouring, and broadly comparable, provinces of 
Bengal and the United Provinces, it had a lower proportion of district level 
officials. This skeletal apparatus of police/administrative control came under 
great strain from the popular turbulence of the years from 1917 to 1922.
During this period the Bihar Congress shunned Vidyanand's campaign but turned 
the anti-indigo planter movement to useful propaganda advantage. The Congress, 
moreover, initiated and directed the non-cooperation movement, throughout which 
it was able to draw on a variety of popular discontents. The next test for 
the formal control apparatus came with the civil disobedience movement of 
1934. Under the banner of the Congress nationalist activists employed the 
tactic of limited violence to bring pressure to bear on the British admini­
stration. Through the use of limited violence Congress activists hamstrung 
the chaukidari (village watchman) system, brought waverers on side, cut at 
government revenue from excise duties, and helped elicit a harsh response 
from the police the repercussions of which were of great propaganda value to 
the nationalist movement. The people of north Bihar distrusted and disliked 
the police, and the use by the administration of the police to bolster its 
rule turned popular feeling against the administration. The police/admini­
strative control apparatus next came under test in the 1937-39 period, 
during which a Congress Ministry, elected under the terms of the Government 
of India Act of 1935, held office in Bihar. The success of the Congress 
Ministry in meeting the challenge of agrarian turmoil during the 1937-39 
period had long term repercussions for the future of police/administrative 
control in north Bihar. Henceforth police and officials, knowing that in 
future a Congress government would return to power, became lukewarm in their
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support for British rule. The police, moreover, further decreased their 
popularity with the public through their actions in support of the landed 
interest. The acid test for the police/administrative apparatus came in 
August 1942, when the Indian National Congress launched a mass civil dis­
obedience campaign to force the British to quit India. Price inflation in 
the early 1940s increased popular discontent, helped increase the crime rate, 
but worked to the advantage of locally dominant peasants. Confidence in the 
administration declined because of the inability of the police to check the 
crime rate, and because the dramatic victories of the Japanese after they 
entered the Second World War in December 1942 struck grievous blows at the 
edifice of British imperial power in Asia. The Quit India Revolt combined a 
politically motivated nationalist protest by high caste, Congress-supporting 
big peasants and an economically motivated rebellion of desperation on the 
part of the poor, low caste and Harijan people of north Bihar. The revolt 
temporarily succeeded in demolishing the apparatus of police/administrative 
control, and thus created a potential for the development of an anti-landlord 
movement. This potentiality did not develop into a reality partly because of 
the organizational and intellectual dominance of the Congress, and partly 
because the better established tenant farmers of north Bihar had benefited 
from the price inflation conditions of the 1940s and hence had no interest in 
agitating against their landlords.
More fundamentally, a challenge to the social order did not develop 
because of the long-term impact of imperial policies on north Bihar society. 
After the 1857 Revolt the British had attempted to secure their rule by con­
serving existing social structures. This policy was especially well carried 
out in the remote, backward, under-administered region of north Bihar. In 
north Bihar, to use Anand Yang's perceptive phrase, the British operated a 
'limited Raj' which left long established structures intact and which relied
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on the support of the small number of great and middle range landlords in 
the region and on the acquiescence of locally dominant small landlords and big 
tenants. (When this acquiescence began to be replaced by opposition during 
the course of the 20th century the days of the British Raj were n u m b e r e d ) .
The British did nothing to modernize the agrarian economy of north Bihar, and 
hence long established patterns of social relationship persisted. The only 
significant body of European entrepreneurs in the region, the indigo planters, 
operated within the existing social and productive structure. "The impact of 
the indigo industry on the peasant economy," C.M. Fisher points out,
can be summarised as distortion rather than funda­
mental destruction. The indigo factories created 
tensions and difficulties in the operation of the 
indigenous economy, but did nothing to alter or 
undermine the structure The indigo industry
created tensions in the peasant, subsistence economy, 
but instituted no radical change.^
Similarly the north Bihar agrarian social structure was merely distorted, 
rather than transformed, by British imperial rule. Consequently traditional 
patterns of deference, organization and leadership continued. When the Quit 
India Revolt dissolved the formal control apparatus the continuing strength 
of the social order precluded the emergence of radical initiatives.
The British further reinforced the existing social order by their 
policy of limited tolerance for social and political dissidence. The British 
administration allowed people to engage in constitutional political activity, 
and gave a grudging tolerance to non-violent and non-coercive agitational 
politics, but vigorously repressed militant and violent protest. This policy 
suited the interests of the locally dominant in north Bihar society. Locally 
dominant peasants wanted to capture governmental and administrative control, 
but did not wish to alter the existing social structure. Violent revolt and 
the violent repression it would inspire had the potential for polarising and
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radicalising society, and hence locally dominant peasants were not interested
in more than the limited use of violence to attain their ends. The area of
tolerance allowed by British imperial rule (in contrast to the absence of
tolerance for dissent in other European imperiums), nicely suited the
4
interests of conservative, locally dominant peasants. In contrast, those 
north Biharis who took a more radical stance suffered under the burden of 
heavy and effective repression. The post-independence rulers of north Bihar 
have been true heirs of their British predecessors. They have controlled and 
directed dissidence by combining minimal tolerance with effective repression. 
And despite much rhetoric promising otherwise, they have consolidated rather 
than transformed the prevailing structures of economic, social and political 
p o w e r .
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3 Fisher, "Indigo Plantations", p. 312.
4 The analysis in this chapter owes much to D.A. Low. See his
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Epilogue: The maintenance and consolidation of 
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In August 1942, police and administrative control over north Bihar temporarily
collapsed. Even when re-established, formal control remained precarious.
Turmoil persisted long after the climax of the 1942 revolt and was reflected
in the crime rates, which continued to be much higher than before the war.^
High crime rates and a high incidence of riots prevailed throughout the final
2
war and immediate post-war years. Among Bihari members of the public
3
services and particularly among the Bihar police, low morale was pervasive.
Policemen feared for their future when the Congress returned to power, and
their fears intensified because of Congress propaganda critical of police
4
excesses during the quelling of the 1942 insurrection. Among the police 
low wages and poor conditions continued to be a source of discontent, and 
this discontent heightened because of scarcity and high prices.^ In June
1946 many constables joined in strike action in protest against their 
wages and conditions. For three or four days, until the administration broke 
the strike by combining small concessions with the arrest and trial of 400 
constables, large areas of the province were completely without the services 
of the police.^* But despite its fragility, formal control continued to 
operate during the years in which power was transferred from British to Indian 
hands and in which the new regime established itself. The formal control 
apparatus was maintained during the 1940s and consolidated during the 1950s. 
Meanwhile the abolition of the zamindari system allowed the crystallization of 
a class of rich peasants which exercised effective informal control over the 
countryside. Both formally and informally the social order was well prepared 
to meet the challenge issued to it during the 1960s and 1970s by protest 
from the poor.
Introduction
443
During the final years of the Second World War the British kept a strong 
military presence in north Bihar to deter a revival of mass protest and 
employed effective measures to contain the guerilla activity that continued 
after the crushing of the Quit India Revolt. During the last few months of the 
war they released Sri Krishna Sinha, Rajendra Prasad, and the other mainstream 
members of the Bihar Congress from jail but kept Jay Prakash Narayan and other 
left-wing activists in custody until several months later . 7 Mainstream 
Congressmen saw no need for a renewal of direct action against the British 
Raj, being confident that Congress would soon come to power by constitutional, 
electoral means. This opinion strengthened when a Labour government came to 
office in Britain in June 1945, and undertook the restoration of representative 
government and the transfer of power over the subcontinent.
The Left failed to provide a coherent alternative to the mainstream 
Congress policy of constitutional advance. Sahajanand and his Communist 
associates, discredited by their support of the British war effort, exerted 
g
little influence. The Congress Socialists emerged from jail to find that 
their opponents within the Congress had already effectively re-established their 
positon. The Congress Socialists eschewed direct action for an attempt, which 
proved fruitless, to expand their influence over the nationalist movement and
to stop the rush, which became more marked as Independence drew nearer, of
, _ 9
opportunists into the Congress party.
Mainstream Congressmen gathered widespread support by reference to the 
heroism and determination of the Congress "Freedom Fighters" who had taken part 
in the mass protest against the British. In doing so, they put emphasis on the 
part played by those who had been involved in.the insurrection of August 1942."*"°
1942-1947: The maintenance of control.
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Through their policy that under current circumstances Congress should concen­
trate on advance by peaceful, constitutional means the mainstream members of 
Congress drew extensive support from the better established sections of 
society. As table 17 illustrates, high prices prevailed throughout the late 
1940s. The level of prices greatly benefited big and middle peasants. As 
early as February 1944 a kisan sabha organizer, while on tour in Monghyr had 
berated the local peasants for their apathy.
TABLE 17
Official wholesale rice3 wheat and gram prices_, 1945-50 
(At three-monthly intervals. Prices in rupees per maund. See also table 163 p
& MONTH RICE WHEAT GRAM
January 13-0-0 9-0-0 7-0-0
April 13-4-0 12- 8-0 7-0-0
July 14-3-0 12-0-0 7-0-0
Oc tober 18-0-0 13-0-0 9-0-0
January 15-8-0 13-0-0 9-0-0
April 19-8-0 13-0-0 10-0 -0
July 19-0-0 13-0-0 12-0-0
October 19-0-0 14-0-0 12-0-0
January 19-0-0 14-0-0 12-0-0
April 26-0-0 11- 12-0 11- 8-0
July 13-5-0 12- 1-0 9-12-0
October 13-5-0 12- 1-0 9-12-0
January 23-0-0 26-0-0 16-0-0
April 18-0-0 26-0-0 16-0-0
July 26-0-0 25-0-0 18-0-0
Oc tober 24-0-0 25-0-0 16-0-0
January 22- 0-0 25-0-0 18-0-0
April 24-0-0 26-0-0 17-0-0
July 28-0-0 24-0-0 15-0-0
October 23-0-0 26-0-0 15-0-0
January 23-0-0 24-0-0 15-0-0
April 26-0-0 26-0-0 16-0-0
July 30-0-0 25-0-0 20- 0-0
October 33-0-0 .29-0-0 22-0-0
.383
Source: Darbhanga District Census Rxndbook (1951 Census) pp. 170-2.
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In his view they were "... prosperous as a result of the boom in grain, and 
therefore absorbed in their selfish interest." ^ With the people who played 
a pivotal role in society and politics thus contented, no effective ground- 
swell developed in favour of direct action politics. Among the poor and 
landless, discontent over high prices and scarcity expressed itself in crime 
and in sporadic rioting, but assumed no coherent, effective political form. 
Congress workers, moreover, defused popular discontent by raising expectations 
about the implementation of agrarian and social reforms once Congress had 
returned to power.
The mainstream of Congress also benefited from the diversionary effect 
of the extensive communal rioting that began in Bihar in October 1946 in 
response to news of communal clashes in Bengal during the preceding August and 
Sept e m b e r .^  The riots in Bengal began with the 'great Calcutta killing' of 
16 August. "During the Calcutta killings", Jawaharlal Nehru later 
commented,
a large number of Biharis had lost their lives. Their 
relatives had returned to Bihar ... and had spread out 
all over the rural area carrying stories of what had 
happened in Calcutta. The people of Bihar were stirred 
profoundly. Then came news of Noakali in East Bengal.
These stories and more especially the accounts of 
abduction and rape of women, of forcible conversion of 
large numbers of people, infuriated the populace • **23
The ensuing disturbances extended over five weeks. They severely strained 
the formal control apparatus, but eventually the authorities re-established 
order. The heightening of communal tension in late 1946 reinforced vertical 
ties between members of the two religious communities and drew attention away 
from horizontal and sectional cleavages of interest in north Bihar society as 
a whole. Communal clashes performed a 'safety valve' function, allowing the 
dissipation of tensions that may otherwise have been directed in ways which 
threatened the stability of the social order.
446
In December 1946, only a few weeks after the communal situation had
been brought under control, elections were held to the provincial legislature.
The Bihar Congress swept to power, winning 87 per cent of the vote in the
general constituencies and gaining 98 of the 152 seats in the Bihar
14
Legislative Assembly. The most pressing problem facing the newly elected 
government was that of reforming the zamindari system.
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In the years after the war the demand that the zamindari system be abolished 
was expressed even more vociferously than it had been in the immediate pre-war 
years. With the British about to leave India the zamindars faced an uncertain 
future. Outnumbered by the tenants and without their imperial ally they were 
obliged to give ground. In doing so, however, they fought an extended and 
successful rearguard action."*""*
In defending their position the zamindars benefited from the 
conservatism of the Bihar Congress, an organization controlled by members of 
the landed interest. Between 1947 and 1950 the Congress passed legislation 
which abolished the zamindari system. Like the bakast legislation of the 
late 1930s, the zamindari abolition legislation promised much but delivered 
little. The abolition legislation obliged the zamindars to relinquish their 
position as rent collecting intermediaries between the state and the culti­
vator, but allowed them to do so under very favourable terms. The state 
gave them generous compensation and allowed them to keep possession of both 
their 'homestead' land, and land on which they had their residence or on
which they had a dwelling place let out for rent, and their khas land, or
16
land held under their direct cultivation. F. Tomasson Jannuzi points out
that under the provisions of the legislation the term khas lands
... referred not only to land cultivated personally by 
the intermediary, but also to lands cultivated by his 
servants, hired labor, or stock. This broad definition 
of possession allowed the ex-intermediary to claim land 
that he did not cultivate himself (prior to "zamindari 
abolition" legislation) — even though that land was in 
the personal, cultivating possession of a raiyat, so long 
as the raiyat did not possess the means (monetary or 
documentary) of establishing his right of occupancy.
1947-1952: Zamindari abolition and rich peasant dominance.
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of this legislation to force many smaller tenants and sharecroppers off their
18
plots and then defined these plots as within their khas possession. The
zamindars, moreover, disguised the extent to which they had been able to
retain control over large areas by the device of partitioning their lands
among a number of benami (fictitious) holders drawn from among their kinsfolk
19
and retainers. Among the zamindars, those absentees who could not defend
their interests against substantial tenants in particular villages lost out
20
as a result of zamindari abolition. But many zamindars managed to get
21
round the provisions of the act and salvage much wealth and property. This
was particularly the case if they had firm local ties. Tenants, as a group,
favoured the abolition legislation because it helped lessen the local power 
22
of the zaminars, and big tenants benefited from it by winning against
absentee landlords in local land disputes. But smaller tenants, sharecroppers,
and the landless did not benefit from zamindari abolition. Many small-holders
were forced off their land, and the poor as a group discovered that despite
much rhetoric, the abolition of the zamindari system did not establish a
foundation for effective measures to place a ceiling on land holdings and to
23
distribute land more equitably. In Darbhanga the peasant activist
Ramnandan Misra and the Communist activist Bhogendra Jha headed movements
which attempted to defend the interests of sharecroppers and dwarfholders, but
the campaigns which they led were curbed through a combination of coercion by
24
the police and counter-action by the locally dominant peasants.
Once the zamindars had been removed as intermediaries between the state 
and the ryot the financial position of the Bihar government improved 
dramatically. Previously the state had only managed to get around 10 per cent 
of the rental income earned by the zamindars, but now it had a claim to the 
entire land rent of the region. But because of the absence of adequate land
While the administration turned a blind eye, the zamindars took advantage
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stration, and because the ryots often did little to assist the land revenue
officials, the government only managed to collect some 60 to 70 per cent
25
of the total rental amount which in theory was owing to it. This meant 
that the tenants prospered. They also benefited because the government, for 
fear of electoral repercussions, could not raise the rental demand, even 
though continuing high prices and increased the profitability of agriculture 
Tenants, moreover, were better off because they no longer had to pay abwabs 
to zamindars.
The abolition of the zamindari system allowed the crystallization of a
new class of rich peasants, drawn from among former big tenants and small
26
zamindars. These people dominated the Bihar Congress, and had profited
greatly from the high prices of the war and post-war periods. Most of them
belonged to high caste groups, but some came from the numerous, and hence
27
elec.torally powerful, middle caste Yadav, Kurmi and Koeri groups. Prior 
to the dismantling of the zamindari system, small zamindars and big tenants 
had both been part of the landed interest in north Bihar, but on many 
occasions their interests had been opposed. The implementation of the 
zamindari abolition legislation transformed the tenurial structure and 
removed the basis for this opposition.
The members of the new class of rich peasants had a firm title to
their land and held a disproportionate amount of the total area of land in
the region. Their positon, moreover, was much strengthened by government
policy. The Bihar government spent a considerable amount of the extra
revenue it gathered through direct access to the rental demand on measures
of economic and agrarian amelioration. These measures were of the greatest
2 8
benefit to the better established peasantry. Because they lived well 
above subsistence level, the rich peasants had a surplus on hand with which
records, because of the inefficiency and corruption of the provincial admini
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market, and hence benefited immediately from improvements in rail and road
29
communications and in storage facilities. Because of their dominance over
local society, moreover, rich peasants could ensure that they reaped most of
the advantage from government investment in the agrarian sector. Congress
politicians and government officials generally came from a rich peasant
30
background, and usually acted in support of rich peasant interests. In
Kajha village in Purnea, for example, the government set up a cooperative
society to advance short-term loans to the villagers. Under the rules of the
cooperative only land-owning villagers were eligible for loans. Some local
rich peasants borrowed from the cooperative at the annual interest rate of 6
to 8 per cent, and then lent to poor villagers at rates ranging from 36 to
31
72 per cent. The establishment of the cooperative had had the nominal 
intention of offering the villagers a cheaper source of credit than that 
offered by rich peasant money lenders, but instead it reinforced the existing 
credit mechanisms.
The class of rich peasants which had crystallized as a result of 
zamindari aboliton exercised effective informal control over the countryside. 
Their dominance was supported by a formal control apparatus which was greatly 
strengthened during the 1950s.
to invest and speculate. They were already geared to production for the
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The 1950s and after: The consolidation of formal control and the 
development of unrest among the poor.
I
During the late 1940s many north Bihar policemen had worried about their
32
future when the British transferred power into Indian hands. Their 
apprehensions proved to be ill founded: once voted into office in 1947 
the Bihar Congress, as in 1937-39, was more interested in the maintenance of 
law and order than in putting its election rhetoric into practice.
In the 1950s law and order was difficult to maintain because of the
continuing frequency of crime resulting from the pressure of poverty and the
33
prevalence of high food-grain prices. Burglaries and petty thefts occurred
34
at well above pre-war rates, and in most districts large, well organized
35
dacoit gangs operated. The problem of coping with crime was compounded by 
the wider availability of fire-arms. "After independence", P.C. Roy Chaudhury 
c o mments,
the army was demobilized and illicit traffic in 
arms followed and this was taken advantage of 
by criminal gangs. Another opportunity to get 
firearms presented itself to the criminals in 
the year 1950 when there was political upheaval 
in Nepal due to the fight between the King and 
the Ranas ... some individuals were successful 
in obtaining illicitly firearms from Nepal. The 
rules for granting firearms have also been 
relaxed and it is possible that some of the anti­
social gun-licensees may have been abusing their 
privileges.
As tables 18 and 19 illustrate, the Congress government responded to the 
challenge of increased crime and crime involving fire-arms by greatly 
strengthening the police force.
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TABLE 18
Strength of Bihar 'Police Force, 1930-1960
1930 11,000
1940 13,800
1950 17,763
1960 32,566
TABLE 19
Numbers of armed and unarmed policemen in Bihar, 1950 and 1960
ARMED UNARMED
1950 1,443 16,293
1960 14,468 18,098
Sources: Appendix II: Number of Crimes reported in Bihar and proportion 
police to population, 1930-39, HPf 31/1/1941, NAI;
David H. Bayley, The Police and Political Development in India, 
(Princeton 1964) p. 64, Table 2, "Growth of Police, Selected 
States, 1950-1960".
After the challenge of the Quit India Revolt the British had increased the
size of the police force. In the 1950s, the Congress government increased the
size of the force much more substantially. Between 1950 and 1960 the size of
the police force increased by 80 per cent, whereas in the same period Bihar's
37
population increased by approximately 14 per-cent. Even more striking was
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12.5 per cent of the total membership of the Bihar Police force bore arms,
38
but by 1960 some 44 per cent did so.
Throughout the 1950s the much strengthened police force was mainly 
occupied in containing the high crime rate which resulted from the pressure 
of scarcity and high prices on the poor and landless people of north Bihar. 
Since criminals often operated in distinctive gangs and characteristically 
acted in opposition to society as a whole the police found that they could 
contain, if not quell, their activities. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the 
poor people of north Bihar began to express their discontent more directly 
through political protest demanding agrarian and social reform.
By the 1960s and 1970s the limitations on protest that had hitherto
39
restricted the political expression of the poor began to break down.
Continuing population pressure dissolved the traditional relationships of
mutual albeit unequal, obligation between prosperous peasants and their poor
clients. The increase in the numbers of the poor created an over-supply of
40
labour, weakening the bargaining position of dependents, while the need of
landholding families to provide for their own increasing numbers lessened
41
their capacity to act paternally towards their employees. Post-independence 
improvement of road and rail communications helped lessen the parochialism of 
the villager. Increased access to education made it possible for some 
exceptional individuals from low caste and Harijan groups to gain a broader 
comprehension of the society in which they lived, and to give their kinsfolk 
and ca s te-fellows political leadership. Gambhira, a leader active in East 
Champaran, was born in 1947 and matriculated from a village high school before 
studying up to the Intermediate standard at the Motihari College. He then 
worked as a truck mechanic in Motihari town before returning to his village in
the tenfold increase in the size of the armed police force. In 1950, only
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labourers. Up until his death in mid-1977 Gambhira achieved considerable
success in mobilizing a poor people's protest movement. (According to the
account given by Arun Sinha, Gambhira was tortured to death by a group of
43
rich peasants and po l i c e m e n ) .
The beliefs and attitudes which supported the continuation of grave 
inequality also came under serious challenge because of the repercussions of 
the populist ideology which, in an electorate in which all adults are 
eligible to vote, had become the staple fare of political propaganda. This 
ideology criticized the rigidities of the caste system and promised extensive 
agrarian reforms including the effective implementation of land ceiling laws 
and the distribution of land confiscated from large landholders to the land­
less. The failure of the government to fulfill the expectations raised by
44
populist ideology exacerbated tensions and inspired protest. In several
localities protest from the landless and the poor "began during the Emergency,
partly spurred by the false hopes raised by the round-the-clock propaganda
45
about the 20-point programme."
It can also be suggested that members of the poorest strata of north
Bihar society became more willing to engage in protest because of the increase
in the relative number of the poor due to continuing population pressure on a
46
static agrarian base. Downwardly socially mobile people who had become 
'newly poor' were perhaps particularly likely to adopt militant means to 
protect their interests.
In recent years many poor people from north Bihar society have engaged 
in protest campaigns over such issues as the wages paid for agrarian labour, 
the distribution of the harvest between sharecroppers and landholders, and the
1971 to engage in political work among the poor peasants and landless
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arrogant, exploitative behaviour of rich peasants and their retainers. Their
protests have encountered harsh opposition. There have been a number of
violent clashes, and armed police have been despatched to the countryside
47
to support the rich peasants. To date these challenges to the social order 
have been effectively contained. Protest by the poor and the landless has 
managed to shake but not to topple the rich peasant r a j .
456
1
N O T E S
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Because of constraints of space the overview given in this chapter 
of post-1942 developments is selective in its approach and touches only 
briefly on many important issues and events. On a later occasion I 
hope to deal in more depth and a greater length with the topics raised 
here. Concerning crime rates see GB FR(1) Feb. 1944, FMPf 80, 1944, 
BSA.
Ibid.; GB FR(2) Oct. 1945, FMPf 81, 1945, BSA.
GB FR(1) Oct. 1945, FMPf 81, 1945, BSA.
Ibid.
"Representation to the Prime Minister of Bihar", Miscellaneous 
Associations' Files, f 159, 1946.
GB FR(2) March 1947, FMPf 81, 1947, BSA; Datta, Freedom Movement III, 
p. 338.
Datta, Freedom Movement III, p. 326.
In March 1945 Sahajanand parted company with the Communist Party.
Later that year he spoke at kisan meetings and urged his audience to 
vote for Congress. He also pointed out, however, that once a Congress 
government came to power the kisans should oppose if if it failed to 
further their interests. Searchlight 20 March 1945; GB FR(2) Dec. 
1945, FMPf 81, 1945, BSA. See also Hauser, "Bihar Kisan Sabha", 
pp. 151-2.
The Congress Socialists were forced out of the Congress in 1948 and 
henceforth concentrated on attempting to gain influence via electoral 
competition. They won a substantial proportion of the vote in the
: C H A P T E R  7
457
1952 national elections, but remained too weak to act as a counter­
balancing force to Congress. Into the 1 9 5 0 ?s and beyond, moreover, 
Jawaharlal Nehru's democratic socialist rhetoric, which promised 
substantial advances via peaceful means, quietened dissidence by in­
fluencing many to believe that the creation of a better-off, more 
equitable society would only be a matter of time, and could be 
achieved by the Congress Party. Ramashray Roy, "A Study of the 
Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee, Bihar, India", (University of 
California, Berkeley, Ph.D. Thesis, 1966), pp. 191-2, 312;
Ram Padarath Vishwakarma to Secretary, AICC, 12 Oct. 1946, f P 6 , 
1945-46, AICCP, NML; Suresh Chandra Mishra to President, AICC, 23 May
1947 f PC5 (part 1), 1947, AICCP, NML; B.B. Majumdar, "Bihar" in 
S.V. Kogekar and Richard L. Park (eds.) Reports on the Indian 
General Elections 1951-52 (Bombay 1956), pp. 17-30; Paul R. Brass, 
"Radical Parties of the Left in Bihar: A Comparison of the SSP and 
the CPI", in Paul R. Brass and Marcus F. Franda (eds), Radical Politics 
in South Asia (London 1973) pp. 325-97, 329.
10 See the Searchlight, 1945-46.
11 GB FR (2) Feb. 1944, FMPf 80, 1944, B S A .
12 Datta, Freedom Movement III, pp. 339, 343.
13 J. Nehru, quoted in Percival Griffiths, The History of the Indian 
Police (London 1921), p. 308. This passage is also quoted in Datta,
Freedom Movement III, p. 347.
14 "Provincial Assembly Elections, 1946", f ED-1, 1946, KW II, AICCP,
NML.
15 F. Tomasson Jannuzi, Agrarian Crisis in India, The Case of Bihar 
(New Delhi 1974) pp. 12-13; Anand A. Yang, "Agrarian Reform and
Peasant Dissidence: The Continuing Crisis in India", Peasant Studies,
V, 3, July 1976, pp. 9-14.
Jannuzi, Agrarian Crisis, pp. 19, 30-1.
Ibid., p. 31.
Ibid., p. 32; GB FR (1) July, 1947, FMPf 81, 1944, BSA; Ramnandan 
Misra, Peasant Revolt or the Great Challenge (Darbhanga 1950?).
Interview, R.L. Chandapuri, Patna, 10 April 1975; "10,000-acre 
Benami land of Darbhanga Raj detected", Searchlight,18 April 1976;
Brass, "Radical Parties", p. 391.
Jannuzi, Agrarian Crisis, chaps. 3, 4; Geof Wood, "The Process of 
Differentiation among the peasantry in Desipur Village", in Joy and 
Everitt, Kosi Symposium, pp. 113-30, 114.
Jannuzi, Agrarian Crisis, chaps. 3, 4; Wood, "Differentiation in 
Desipur", p. 113.
Jannuzi, Agrarian Crisis, chap. 4.
Ibid., chaps. 5, 7; Roy, "Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee", pp. 307-11.
Interview, S.K. Jha, Darbhanga town, 5 Oct. 1976; Interview, Ramnandan 
Misra, Laheriaserai town, 1 Nov. 1976; Ramnandan Misra, Peasant Revolt 
and- Kisans are on the March, (Darbhanga 1949?, 1950?). Ramnandan Misra 
kindly lent me copies of these two pamphlets.
Jannuzi, Agrarian Crisis, pp. 20-25.
Wood, "Differentiation in Desipur", p. 113 and "From Raiyat to Rich 
Peasant", South Asian Review, 7 (1), 1973, pp. 1-17,
Interview, R.L. Chandapuri, Patna 10 April 1975; Harry W. Blair, 
"Ethnicity and Democratic Politics in India. Caste as a Differential
459
Mobilizer in Bihar", Comparative Politics3 5, 1972-73, pp. 107-127 
and "Caste, Politics and Democracy in Bihar State, India: The 
Elections of 1967" (Duke University Ph.D. Thesis 1969), passim and 
pp. 353-5.
28 Geof Wood, "Rural Development and the Post-Colonial State: 
Administration and the Peasantry in the Kosi region of north Bihar, 
India", in Joy and Everitt, Kosi Symposium3 pp. 131-50. Wood also 
details how the compensation given for the abolition of zamindars' 
rights has been invested fruitfully in a variety of commercial enter­
prises. See his "Differentiation in Desipur", p. 113.
29 The control of the rich peasantry over the countryside has been 
further consolidated because from 1947 onwards, largely as a result 
of official corruption and favouritism, they have had easy access to 
fire-arms. For details of an allegation that the Congress government 
had given out gun licenses in return for electoral support, see 
"Statement on malpractice in Elections for Khagaria Subdivision, 
Monghyr", n.d., but internal evidence suggests 1951-52 f 369,
1937-52, J P N P , N M L .
30 Wood, "Rural Development", p. 137; Interview, R.L. Chandapuri,
Patna, 17 April 1976.
31 Dilip Hiro, Inside India Today3 (London 1976), p. 6 .
32 "Representation to the Prime Minister of Bihar", Miscellaneous 
Association's Files, f 159, 1946, JPNP, NML.
33 P.C.  R o y c h a u d h u r y , Bihar District Gazetteer Champaran (Patna 1960) 
p. 440; Bihar District Gazetteer Purnea (Patna 1963) p. 533; Bihar 
District Gazetteer Saharsa (Patna 1965) p. 360.
460
34 Roy Chaudhury, Champaran, p. 440.
35 Roy Chaudhury, Bihar District Gazetteer Darbhanga (Patna 1964) p. 467 
and Saharsa, p. 358.
36 Roy Chaudhury, Darbhanga, p. 466. See also note 29 above.
37 David H. Bayley, The Police and Political Development in India 
(Princeton 1964), p. 63.
38 For discussion of the strengthening of the coercive capacity of 
the state at the all-India level in recent years see Ranajit Guha 
"Indian Democracy: Long Dead, Now Buried". Journal of Contemporary 
Asia, 6 , 1, 1976, pp. 39-53, 44-46. Guha comments that "During the 
last twenty-four years police expenditure by the central government 
has increased 52 times from 30 million rupees spent in 1950-51 to
1,564 million budgeted for 1974-75."
39 See above, chap. 1, pp. 34-7.
40 Wood, "Differentiation in Desipur", p. 114.
41 Hoskins, "Land-Holding and Development", p. 78; Interview,
R.L. Chandapuri, Patna, 17 April 1978.
42 Arun Sinha, "Murder of a Peasant Leader", Economic and Political 
Weekly, 30 July 1977, pp. .1214-15.
43 Ibid., p. 1215.
44 Jannuzi, Agrarian Crisis3 chap. 8 .
45 Arun Sinha, "Class War, Not 'Atrocities against Harijans'", Economic 
and Political Weekly, 10 Dec. 1977, pp. 2037-8, 2037.
46 Jannuzi, Agrarian Crisis, p. 167.
461
47 Sinha, "Class War:, p. 2037; Hiranmay Dhar and Kalyan Mukherjee, 
"Growing Peasant Revolt", Economic and Political Weekly_, 14 Jan. 
1978, p. 52; Jannuzi, Agrarian C r i s i s pp. 134, 137, 148-155; 
Jayaprakash Narayan, "The Land Grabbers", Searchlights 7 Aug. 1970; 
Brass, "Radical Parties", pp. 387-94.
B i b l i o g r a p h y
Arrangement:
1 - GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES
2 - DARBHANGA RAJ ARCHIVES
3 - PRIVATE PAPERS
4 - NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS
5 - OFFICIAL AND OFFICIALLY SPONSORED PUBLICATIONS
6 - ARTICLES, BOOKS, PAPERS AND THESES
7 - INTERVIEWS
GOVERNMENT ARCHIVES
West Bengal Archives and Bihar State Archives
Government of Bengal Revenue Department, Land Revenue Branch, files 
and proceedings 1875-1911 (selective coverage only).
Bihar State Archives
Government of Bihar and Orissa, "Bihar Police Abstracts", 1912-1920. 
Government of Bihar and Orissa, "Reports on Native Newspapers,u 
1916-1922 .
Government of Bihar and Orissa, Political Special Department files 
1914-1936 (as available).
Government of Bihar, Political Special Department files 1936-1945 
(as available).
Government of Bihar, Freedom Movement Papers, 1912-1952.
Government of Bihar and Orissa and Government of Bihar, Land Revenue 
Department files, 1912-1946 (selective coverage only).
Collectorate Record Room, Laheriaserai town.
"Village notes" for Darbhanga district, c. 1900 (highly selective 
coverage only).
Commissioners ' Record Room, Muzaffarpur town
Police and Political files, 1916-1946 (highly selective coverage only).
National Archives of India
Fortnightly Reports to the Government of India from the Government 
of Bihar and Orissa and the Government of Bihar, 1918-1946. 
Government of India, Home Political Department files, 1912-1946.
464
2. DARBHANGA RAJ ARCHIVES
General Department, 1910-1946
Annual Administrative Reports (as available).
Conference Papers (as available).
Head Office files.
Management files.
Darkasht [i.e. 'Petition’] files (selective coverage only). 
Miscellaneous files (selective coverage only).
Law Department, 1910-1946
Civil Cases files (selective coverage only).
Criminal Cases files (selective coverage only).
3. PRIVATE PAPERS
Nehru Memorial Museum and Library 
All-India Congress Committee Papers. 
Jay Prakash Narayan Papers.
Rajendra Prasad Papers.
Swami Sahajanand Saraswati Papers.
S.L. Siriha Library
Bihar Landholders' Association Papers.
4. NEWSPAPERS
Indian Nation, 1932-1 9 4 6.
Searchlight, 1919-1946.
465
5. OFFICIAL AND OFFICIALLY SPONSORED PUBLICATIONS
Byrne, J. Final Report on the Survey and Settlement Operations in the 
District of Pumea (Calcutta, 1901).
----- Bengal District Gazetteers: Bhagalpur (Calcutta, 1911).
Government of Bengal. Bengal District Gazetteers: Statistical Appendices 
(Calcutta, 1908-12). Those relevant to north Bihar districts 
consulted.
Government of Bihar and Orissa. Synopsis of History of NCO Movement 
(Patna, 1924).
----- Report of the Committee on the Agrarian Conditions in Champaran
(2 vols., Patna, 1917).
----- Instructions for the preparation of the electoral rot& (Patna, 1920).
Government of Great Britain. Indian Statutory Commission (12 vols.,
London, 1930).
Government of India. Census of India 1951, District Census Handbooks 
for Champaran, Saran, Muzaffarpur, Darbhanga, Monghyr, Sdharsa and 
Pumea.
----- Census of India, 1961, Volume IV, Bihar, part l-A(i).
----- Census of India, 1971, Series 1, Paper 1.
Mansfield, P.T. Bihar and Orissa in 1930-31 (Patna, 1932).
Murray, C.R. Bihar and Orissa in 1929-30 (Patna, 1931).
O’Malley, L.S.S. Bengal District Gazetteers for Champaran (Calcutta, 1907) 
Muzaffarpur (Calcutta, 1907), Darbhanga (Calcutta, 1907), Saran 
(Calcutta, 1908), Monghyr (Calcutta, 1909) and Pumea (Calcutta, 1911).
Owen, G.E. Bihar and Orissa in 1921 (Patna, 1922).
Prior, H.C. Bihar and Orissa in 1922 (Patna, 1923).
----- Bihar and Orissa in 1923 (Patna, 1924).
Roy Chaudury, P.C. Bihar District Gazetteer for Muzaffarpur (Patna, 1958), 
Champaran (Patna, 1960), Pumea (Patna, 1963), Darbhanga (Patna, 1964), 
and Saharsa (Patna, 1965).
466
Secretary of State for India. India Office and Burma Office List,
1922_, (London, 1922).
Stevenson-Moore, C.J. Final Report on the Survey and Settlement
Operations in the Muzaffarpur District3 1892-1899 (Calcutta, 1901). 
Sweeney, J.A. Final Report on Survey and Settlement (Revision )
Operations in the District of Champaran 1913-1919 (Patna, 1922).
Wasi, S.M. Bihar in 1938-39 (Patna, 1942).
Addendum:
Kerr, J.H. Final Report on the Survey and Settlement Operations in the 
Darbhanga District 1896 to 1903 (Patna, 1926).
467
6 . ARTICLES, BOOKS, PAPERS AND THESES
Ahmad, M. Razi. "Indigo Unrest in Champaran and Mahatma Gandhi",
Patna University Ph.D. thesis, 1966.
Ahmed, Qeyamu ddin, "Origin and growth of the Darbhanga Raj (1574-1666), 
based on some contemporary and unpublished documents", Indian 
Historical Records Commission Proceedings, XXXVI, Part II, 1961, 
pp. 89-98.
Ajuha, B.N. (ed.). "J.P." India's Revolutionary Number One (Lahore, 
1947).
Arnold, David. "The Police and Colonial Control : An Introduction"
and "The Indian Policeman", in his forthcoming "Law and Order". 
Essays on the Policing of Colonial Madras, 1858-1947.
----- "The Armed Police and Colonial Rule in South India, 1914-1947",
Modern Asian Studies, II, I, 1977, pp. 101-25.
Baden-Powell, B.H. The Land-Systems of British India (3 vols. London, 
1892) I, pp. 389-442.
Bayley, David H. The Police and Political Development in India 
(Princeton, 1964).
Beames, J. Memoirs, of a Bengal Civilian (London, 1961).
Beteille, Andre. Six Essays in Comparative Sociology (Delhi, London
1974).
Bhattacharjea, Ajit. Jay Prakash. A Political Biography (Delhi, 1975).
Bhuyan, Arun Chandra. The Quit India Movement. The Second World War 
and Indian Nationalism (Delhi, 1975).
Bihar Research Society, "Maharajadhiraj Dr Kameshwara Singh Memorial 
Volume, Journal of the Bihar Research Society, XLVIII, 1962.
Blair, Harry W. "Ethnicity and Democratic Politics in India. Caste 
as a Differential Mobilizer in Bihar, Comparative Politics, 5, 
1972-73, pp. 107-127 and "Caste, Politics and Democracy in Bihar 
State, India: The Elections of 1967", Duke University Ph.D. thesis 
1969.
Bondurant, Joan. Conquest of Violence, The Gandhian Philosophy of 
Conflict (New Jersey, 1958).
Brass, Paul R. "Radical Parties of the Left in Bihar: A Comparison of 
the SSP and the CPI", in Paul R. Brass and Marcus F. Franda (eds.),
Radical Politics in South Asia (London, 1973).
468
Brass, Paul R. Language3 Religion and Politics in North India (London, 1974).
Broomfield, J.H. "Twentieth-Century Bengal: Peasant Mobilization 
in an Asian Region", forthcoming.
Brown, Judith M. Gandhi's Rise to Power: Indian Politics 1915-1922 
(London, 1972).
----- "The Role of a National Leader: Gandhi, Congress and Civil Dis­
obedience, 1929-34", in Low (ed.), Congress and the Raj3 (London, 197
----- Gandhi and Civil Disobedience. The Mahatma in Indian Politics3
1928-34 (London, 1977).
Bremen, Jan. Patronage and Exploitation. Changing Agrarian Relations 
in South Gujarat^ India {Berkeley, 1974).
Carter, A.T. "Political Stratification and Unstable Alliances in
Rural Western Maharashtra", Modern Asian Studies3 6 , 4, 1972, 
pp. 423-42.
Chaudhuri, Binay Bhushan. "Agrarian Economy and Agrarian Relations in 
Bengal, 1859-1885", Oxford D. Phil, thesis, 1968.
----- "Agrarian Movements in Bihar and Bengal, 1919-1939" in B.R. Nanda
(ed.), Socialism in India (Delhi, London, 1972).
Cohn, Bernard S. "Structural Change in Indian Rural Society 1596-1885", 
in Robert Eric Frykenberg (ed.), Land Control and Social Structure 
in Indian history (London, 1969).
Crawley, W.F. "Kisan Sabhas and Agrarian Revolt in the United 
Provinces 1920 to 1921", Modem Asian Studies3 5 , 2 , 1971, 
pp. 95-109.
Datta, K.K. History of the Freedom Movement in Bihar (3 vols. Patna,
1957).
-----  Rajendra Prasad (New Delhi, 1970) .
Dewey, Clive. "The Agricultural Statistics of the Punjab, 1867-1947", 
Bulletin of Quantitative and Computer Methods in South Asian 
Studies3 2, March 1974, pp. 3-14.
----- "The History of Mithila and the Records of the Darbhanga Raj",
Modern Asian Studies3 10, 1976, pp. 453-60.
Dhar, Hiranmay and Mukherjee, Kalyan, "Growing Peasant Revolt",
Economic and Political Weekly3 14 Jan. 1978, p. 52.
Dhanagre, D.N. "Congress and Agrarian Agitation in Oudh, 1920-22 and 
1930-32", South Asia,5, Dec. 1975, pp. 67-77.
469
Dhanagre, D.N. "Peasant Movements in India c. 1920-1950", Sussex 
D.Phil. thesis, 1973.
Filgate, T.R. "The Behar Planters’ Association, Ltd", in Arnold
Wright (ed.), Bengal and Assam, Behar and Orissa (London, 1917).
Fisher, C.M. "Indigo Plantations and agrarian society in North Bihar 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries", Cambridge 
University D.Phil. thesis 1976.
----- "Planters and Peasants: The Ecological Context of Agrarian
Unrest on the Indigo Plantations of North Bihar", in Clive Dewey 
and A.G. Hopkins (eds.), The Imperial Impact. Studies in the 
Economic History of Africa and India (London, 1978).
Frykenberg, Robert Eric (ed.) Land Control and Social Structure in 
Indian History (London, 1969) .
Gallagher, John and Gordon Johnson and Anil Seal (eds.), Locality, 
Province and Nation: Essays on Indian Politics, 1870-1940 
(London, 1973).
Gandhi, M.K. An Autobiography. The Story of My Experiments With 
Truth (London, 1966).
Gordon, Richard. "The Hindu Mahasabha and the Indian National Congress, 
1915 to 1926", Modern Asian Studies, 9, 2, 1975 , pp. 145-203.
Grierson, George A. Bihar Peasant Life, (London, 1885).
Griffiths, Percival. The History of the Indian Police (London, 1921).
Guha, Ranajit. "Neel-Darpan: The Image of a Peasant Revolt in a
Liberal Mirror", The Journal of Peasant Studies, 2, 1, Oct. 1974, 
pp. 1-46.
----- A Rule of Property for Bengal. An Essay on the Idea of Permanent
Settlement (Paris, 1963).
----- "Indian Democracy: Long Dead, Now Buried", Journal of Contemporary
Asia, 6 , 1, 1976, pp. 39-53.
Hagen, James R. and Anand A. Yang, "Local Sources for the Study of
Rural India: The 'Village Notes' of Bihar", The Indian Economic 
and Social History Review, XIII, 1, 1976, pp. 75-84.
470
Harcourt, M.V. "The 'Quit India' Movement, August 1942: A Case 
Study in Militant Indian Nationalism", University of Western 
Australia, MA thesis, 1967.
----- "Kisan Populism and Revolution in Rural India: The 1942
Disturbances in Bihar and East United Provinces", in Low (ed.) Congress 
and the Raj (London, 1977).
Harrison, F.C. "The Behar Ryot at Home", Calcutta Review, Oct. 1890, 
pp. 274-305.
Hauser, Walter. "The Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha, 1929-1942. A Study
of an Indian Peasant Movement", University of Chicago Ph.D. thesis 
1961. .
Henningham, Stephen. "The Social Setting of the Champaran Satyagraha:
The Challenge to an Alien Elite", Indian Economic and Social History 
Review, XIII, 1, 1976, pp. 59-73.
----- "Elite Adjustment and Social Control in Bihar: The Darbhanga Raj,
1879 to 1962", Australian National University, South Asian History 
Section seminar paper, July 1976.
Hiro, Dilip. Inside India Today, (London, 1976).
Hoskins, Martin. "Land-Holding and Development in the Kosi area", in Joy 
and Everitt (eds) The Kosi Symposium (University of Sussex, 1976).
Houlton, Sir John. Bihar: The Heart of India (London, Calcutta 1953).
Hunter, Sir William Wilson. Bengal MS Records (2 vols. London, 1894) I.
Hutchins, Francis G. India’s Revolution. Gandhi and the Quit India 
Movement (Cambridge Massachusetts 1973).
Huttenback, R.A. Gandhi in South Africa, British Imperialism and the 
Indian Question, 1860-1914 (London, 1971).
Inglis, James [under the pseudonym 'Maori'] Sport and Work on the Nepaul 
Frontier (London, 1878).
Jannuzi, F. Tomasson. Agrarian Crisis in India. The Case of Bihar 
(New Delhi, 1974).
Jha, Hetukar. "Nation Building in a north Indian region. The Case of
Mithila", unpublished manuscript (Sociology Dept, Patna University).
Jha, Jata Shankar. "A Peep into the Darbhanga Raj Records Office",
Indian Archives, XII, 1958, pp. 45-50.
-----A History of Darbhanga Raj (Patna, 1968).
471
Jha, Jata Shankar. Biography of an Indian Patriot, Maharaja Lakmishwar 
Singh of Darbhanga (Patna, 1972).
----- Beginnings of Modem Education in Mithila, Selections from Educational
Records of the Darbhanga Raj, 1860-1930 (Patna, 1972).
Johnson, Gordon. "Partition, Agitation and Congress: Bengal 1904 to 
1908", in Gallagher et al., Locality, Province and Nation 
(London, 1973).
Joy, J.L. and Everitt, Elizabeth (eds.) The Kosi Symposium. The Rural 
Problem in North-East Bihar : Analysis, Policy and Planning in the 
Kosi Area (University of Sussex, 1976).
Karna, M.N. "Health, Culture and Community in a North Bihar village",
Patna University Ph.D. thesis 1970.
Klein, Ira. "Population and Agriculture in Northern India, 1872-1921", 
Modem Asian Studies, 8 , 2, 1974, pp. 191-216.
Kling, B.B. The Blue Mutiny. The Indigo Disturbances in Bengal 
1859-1862 (London, 1966).
Krishna, Gopal. "The Development of the Indian National Congress as
a Mass Organization, 1918-23", in Metcalf (ed.), Modem India. An 
Interpretive Anthology (London, 1971).
Kumar, Ravinder. "The Political Process in India", South Asia, 1, 1971, 
pp. 91-108.
----- (ed.), Essays on Gandhian Politics — The Rowlatt Satyagraha of
1919 (London, 1971).
Low, D .A. (ed.) Congress and the Raj: Facets of the Indian Struggle
1919-1947 (London, New Delhi, 1977)
-----"'Civil Martial Law': The Government of India and the Civil Dis­
obedience Movements, 1930-34", in Low (ed.), Congress and the Raj.
----- "The Asian Background to Decolonization in Africa: Barebones of an
Introduction", (paper presented at the Conference on the Transfer of 
Power in Africa, Bellagio, Sept-Oct. 1977).
-----"The Asian Mirror to Tropical Africa's Independence" (forthcoming in
1979 in a symposium based on the papers presented at the Bellagio 
conference). *
472
Low, D.A. "The Indian Schism", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies} 
IX, 2, July 1971, pp. 158-67.
----- "The Government of India and the first non-cooperation movement,
1920-2" , in Ravinder Kumar (ed.), Essays on Gandhian Politics 
(London, 1969).
---- (ed.) Soundings in Modem South Asian History (London, 1968).
Majumdar, B.B., "Bihar" in S.V. Kogekar and Richard L. Park (eds.) Reports 
on the Indian General Elections 1951-52 (Bombay, 1956).
Maori [pseudonym for James Inglis] Sport and Work on the Nepaul Frontier 
(London, 1878).
McDonald, G. "Unity on Trial: Congress in Bihar, 1919-39", in Low (ed.)
Congress and the Raj (London, 1977).
Metcalf, Thomas R. (ed.) Modern India. An Interpretive Anthology 
(London. 1971).
Miller, D.B. From Hierarchy to Stratification: Changing Patterns of 
Social Inequality in a North Indian Village (London, 1975).
Misra, B.B. (ed.) Select Documents on Mahatma Gandhi's Movement in 
Champaran, 1917-18 (Patna, 1963).
Misra, Ramnandan. Peasant Revolt or the Great Challenge (Darbhanga,
1950?)
----- Kisans on the March (Darbhanga, 1949?)
Mishra, G. "Socio-Economic Background of Gandhi’s Champaran Movement",
The Indian Economic and Social History Review, V, 3, Sept. 1968, 
pp. 245-75.
----- "Indigo Plantation and the Agrarian Relations in Champaran during
the Nineteenth Century", The Indian Economic and Social History 
Review, III, 4 Dec. 1966, pp. 332-57.
Moore (jnr), Barrington. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.
Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (London, 1967). 
Moore, R.J. The Crisis of Indian Unity 1917-1940 (London, 1974).
----- "The Problem of Freedom with Unity: London’s India Policy, 1917-47"
in Low (ed.), Congress and the Raj (London, 1977).
Morris-Jones, W.H. "India's Political Idioms", in Metcalf (ed.)
Modern India. An Interpretive Anthology (London, 1971).
Mukherjee, Nilmani. A Bengal Zamindar, Jay Mukherjee of Uttarpara And 
His Times, 1808-1888 (Calcutta, 1975).
473
Munshi, Sunil. "Railway Network Growth in Eastern India 1854-1910",
Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta, Occasional Paper 
No. 3.
Musgrave, P.J. "Landlords and Lords of the Land: Estate Management 
and Social Control in Uttar Pradesh, 1860-1920", Modern Asian 
Studies  ^ 6 , 3, 1972, pp. 257-75.
Nanda, B.R. (ed.) Socialism in India (Delhi, London, 1972).
Narayan, Jay Prakash. "Within the Congress", in B.N. Ajuha (ed.)
"J.P.” India’s Revolutionary Number One (Lahore, 1947).
Neale, Walter C. Economic Change in Rural India. Land Tenure and 
Reform in Uttar Pradesh 1800-1955 (London, 1962).
Neimeijer, A.C. The Khilafat Movement in India} 1919-24 (The Hague,
1972) .
O'Donnell, C.J. The Ruin of an Indian Province: An Indian Famine 
Explained (London, 1880).
Owen, H.F. "Towards Nationwide Agitation and Organisation: the Home Rule 
Leagues, 1915-18", in D.A. Low (ed.), Soundings in Modern South Asian 
History (London, 1968).
----- "Organizing for the Rowlatt Satyagraha of 1919", in Ravinder Kumar
(ed.), Essays on Gandhian Politics. The Rowlatt Satyagraha of 1919 
(London, 1971).
Pandey, Gyanendra. "A Rural Base for Congress: the United Provinces
1920-40", in Low (ed.), Congress and the Raj (London, 1977).
----- "Mobilization in a Mass Movement: Congress 'Propaganda' in the
United Provinces (India), 1930-34", Modern Asian Studies3 9, 2,
1975, pp. 205-26.
Pouchepadass, Jacques. "Local leaders and the intelligentsia in the 
Champaran satyagraha (1917): a study in peasant mobilization", 
Contributions to Indian Society_, New Series 8 , 1974, pp. 67-87.
Prasad, Rajendra. Satyagraha in Champaran (Ahmedabad, 1949) .
Raj Darbhanga. Raj Darbhanga Directory 1941 (Darbhanga, 1941).
Ranga, R.G. (ed.) Peasants and Congress (Madras, 1938?).
Rasul, M.A. A History of the All Indian Kisan Sabha (Calcutta, 1974).
474
Reeves, P.D. "Agrarian legislation and rural society in Uttar
Pradesh, India — An historical study with especial reference to 
the period 1921-1958", University of Tasmania MA thesis 1959.
----- "The Landlords' Response to Political Change in the United Provinces
of Agra and Oudh, India, 1921-1937", Australian National University 
Ph.D. thesis 1963.
----- "The Politics of Order. 'Anti-non-co-operation' in the United
Provinces, 1921", Journal of Asian Studies, XXV, 2, Feb. 1966, 
pp. 261-74.
----- "Landlords and Party Politics in the United Provinces, 1934-7",
in D.A. Low (ed.) Soundings in Modern South Asian History,
(London. 1968).
Reid, D.J. "Indigo in Behar" in Wright (ed.), Bengal and Assam, Behar 
and Orissa (London, 1917).
Robinson, Francis. Separatism among Indian Muslims. The Politics of the 
United Province's Muslims, 1860-1923, (Cambridge, 1974).
Roy, Ramashray. "Conflict and Co-operation in a north Bihar village", 
Journal of the Bihar Research Society, XLIX, 1963, pp. 297-315.
----- "A Study of the Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee, Bihar, India",
University of California, Berkeley, Ph.D. thesis, 1966.
Sahajanand, Swami. "Tenancy Measures in Bihar", in R.G. Ranga (ed.), 
Peasants and Conqress (Madras, 1938?).
Sarkar, Sumit. "The Logic of Gandhian Nationalism: Civil Disobedience 
and the Gandhi-Irwin Pact (1930-1931)", Indian Historical Review,
III, 1, July 1976, pp. 114-46.
Scarfe, Wendy and Allen. Tiger on a Rein, (London, 1969).
Seal, Anil. "Imperialism and Nationalism in India", in Gallagher et. al. 
(eds), Locality, Province and Nation (London, 1973).
Sen, Gertrude Emerson. Voiceless India (Benares rev.ed. 1946).
Shah, Ghansham. "Revolution, Reform or Protest? A Study of the Bihar 
Movement", Parts I-III, Economic and Political Weekly, 9, 16, 23 
April 1977.
Siddiqui, Majid Hayat. "The Peasant Movement in Pratapgarh", Indian 
Economic and Social History Review, 9, 1972, pp. 305-26.
Singh, Ishvari Prasad. The Yjungest Legislator of India: The Biography 
of the Hon’ble Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh, Bahadur, K.C.I.E. 
of Dabhangha (Patna, 1936).
475
Sinah, Rameshwar. Collected Speeches (Calcutta, 1931).
Singh, Shyam Narayan. History of Tirhut from the earliest times to the 
end of the nineteenth century (Calcutta, 1922).
Sinha, Arun. "Murder of a Peasant Leader", Economic and Political Weekly3
30 July 1977, pp. 1214-15.
----- "Class War, Not ’Atrocities against Harijans'", Economic and
Political Weekly3 10 Dec. 1977, pp. 2037-8.
Sinha, Sachchidananda. Some Eminent Behar Contemporaries (Patna, 1944).
Spate, AM/C. , A.T.A. Learmonth and B.H. Farmer. India3 Pakistan and 
Ceylon: The Regions (London, 3rd ed. 1967).
Tendulkar, D.G. Gandhi in Champaran (Calcutta, 1957).
Thorner, Daniel and Alice. Land and Labour in India (London, 1962).
Tomlinson, B.R. "India and the British Empire, 1880-1935", Indian 
Economic and Social History Review XI, 2-3, 1974, pp. 337-80.
----- The Indian National Congress and the Raj3 1929-1942. The
Penultimate Phase (London, 1976).
Upadhya, Badrinath. Reply to ’The Open Letter’ Printed in the
Searchlight Steam Press with a foreword from an alleged Sanyasi 
calling himself Swami Vidyanand (Bankipore, n.d.), p. 1.
Voigt, Johannes H. "Co-operation or Confrontation? War and Congress
Politics, 1939-42", in Low (ed.) Congress and the Raj (London, 1977).
Washbrook, David. "Gandhian Politics" (review of Brown's, Gandhi's Rise) 
Modern Asian Studies3 7, 1, 1973, pp. 107-15.
----- "Country Politics: Madras 1880 to 1930", in Gallagher, et. al. (eds.)
Locality3 Province and Nation (London, 1973).
Whitcombe, Elizabeth. Agrarian Conditions in Northern India. Volume One: 
The United Provinces under British Rule3 1860-1900 (Los Angeles, 
London, 1972).
Wilson, Minden. vistoru of Behar Indigo Factories> Reminiscences of Behar, 
Tirhoot and its inhabitants of the past3 Historu of Behar Light Horse 
Volunteers,(Calcutta 1908, first published 1885).
476
Wood, Geof. "From Raiyat to Rich Peasant”, South Asian Review, 7 (1)
1973, pp. 1-17,
----- "The Process of Differentiation among the peasantry in Desipur
Village", in Joy and Everitt (eds.), Kosi Symposium (University of 
Sussex, 1976).
----- "Rural Development and the Post-Colonial State: Administration
and the Peasantry in the Kosi region of north Bihar, India", in 
Joy and Everitt (eds.), Kosi Symposium (University of Sussex, 1976).
----- "The Legacy of the Past: The Agrarian Structure", in Joy and
Everitt (eds.), Kosi Symposium (University of Sussex, 1976).
Woodruff, Philip. The Men Who Ruled India (London, 2 vols., 1953-54), 
vol. II, The Guardians.
Wright, Arnold (ed.) Bengal and Assam, Behar and Orissa (London, 1917).
Yang, Anand A. "Agrarian Reform and Peasant Dissidence: The Continuing 
Crisis in India", Peasant Studies, V, 3, July 1976, pp. 9-14.
----- "The Optimizing Peasant: a study of Internal Migration as an Option
in a north-east Indian district", paper presented at a workshop on the 
Effects of Risk and Uncertainty on Economic and Social Processes in 
South Asia, University of Pennsylvania, 10-12 Nov. 1977.
----- "Dissidence and Collective Violence in an Agrarian Society: A study
of Riots in Saran District, 1886-1920", paper presented at the 20th 
annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, New York,
25-27 March 1977.
----- "An Institutional Shelter: The Court of Wards in late Nineteenth
Century Bihar", Modem Asian Studies, forthcoming.
477
R.L. Chandapuri (one-time President All India Backward Castes 
Association). Patna, 10 and 17 April 1976.
Buddhikar Jha (senior officer in the Raj Darbhanga administration). 
fef-bhanga town, 20, 25, 27 September 1976.
Jageshwar Mishra (officer in the Darbhanga Raj administration).
Darbhanga town, 15, 23 September, 12 October 1976.
Ramnandan Misra (Congress Socialist and Kisan Sabha activist), 
Laheriaserai town, 30, 31 October, 1 November 1976.
Umarpathi Tewari- (one-time officer in the Raj Darbhanga administration
and one-time revenue officer with Bihar government). Dumeri village, 
Darbhanga, 17 October 1976.
7. INTERVIEWS
Gl o s s a r y
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ANNA
ABWAB
ADIVASI
AMIN
AMLA
BAKAST (BAKASHT) 
BEGARI
BENAMI
BIGHA (BEEGHA)
CHAUKIDAR (CHOWKIDAR)
DACOIT 
DAFADAR
DAHNAL
DAKHALDEHANI
Unit of currency amounting to ^/u5th of a rupee.
Cess or additional due exacted from a tenant by 
a landlord or his agents.
Member of a "tribal" non-Hindu or semi-Hinduized 
group.
Accountant. Landlord's agent specializing in 
financial matters.
Agent, retainer of a landlord.
Land held under direct control by a landlord, but 
in which a tenant can accrue occupancy rights.
Labour service exacted from a socially subordinate 
person by a superordinate person for which no 
wage or a wage below the current market rate is 
paid.
Holding of land under false name or in the name of 
a client or relative.
A unit of area. The extent of a bigha varies from 
locality to locality. In north Bihar roughly 
equivalent to 1 acre.
Village watchman. Locally appointed member of 
auxiliary police force.
Member of a robber band.
Senior village watchman. Member of village police 
force acting as supervisor over a group of 
village watchmen.
Land which has had its productivity lowered due 
to flooding.
Legal and administrative process whereby the new 
owner of a tenancy holding that has been sold up 
at an auction sale takes physical possession of 
the holding.
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DEHAT
ELAKA
JAMADAR
JETHRYOT
KUTCHERRY (CUTCHERRY)
KISAN
HARIJAN
LAKH
LATHI
MAUZA
MUKHTIAR (MUKHTEAR) 
MOFASSAL (MOFUSSIL) 
MAHANT (MAHANTH)
NILAMI
PATWARI (PATWARY)
DIARA Land subject to flooding. Particularly fertile 
land on river bank, or forming an island in a 
river.
Landlord’s sphere of influence. A rural area, 
the countryside generally.
Local area. Unit of a landlord’s estate.
Supervisor. Head assistant of landlord or indigo 
planter.
Head tenant. Locally powerful peasant responsible 
for collecting a landlord’s rents from his 
tenants.
Landlord's store-house and/or office building.
Cultivator. Farmer. Peasant.
Gandhi’s term for a member of an "untouchable” 
group. Now in general usage.
1 0 0 , 0 0 0  (usually of rupees).
Quarter staff carried by peasants as weapon. 
Standard weapon of Bihar constabulary.
’Revenue village’. An area of land, which may or 
may not cover the same area as a particular 
village and its lands, owned by a landlord or a 
group of landlords.
Lower court lawyer.
The countryside. The interior.
Priest in charge of a tempJe who controls areas of 
temple-owned land nearby.
Tenancy holding which has been newly purchased at 
an auction sale from a tenant unable-to meet his 
rent payments.
Village accountant responsible to landlord for 
keeping land, rent and revenue records.
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RYOT (RAIYAT) 
RYOTI
SATYAGRAHA
SWARAJ
SALAMI
SHARABESHI
SWAMI
TAMASHA
TAWAN
THANA
THIKADAR
TINKATHIA
TEHSIL 
TEHSILDAR
VAKIL
ZAMINDAR
ZIRAT (SEERAT,
A tenant with permanent or '’occupancy” rights to 
his land. More generally, a cultivator or 
peasant.
Category of land held by an occupancy tenant to 
which he has permanent rights.
Non-violent civil disobedience.
Self-rule. Independence from Britain for India.
Fee paid for settlement of tenancy holding.
Arrangement whereby a tenant pays a higher rent 
in return for no longer being expected by his 
landlord to grow a certain crop on a portion 
of his tenancy holdings.
Religious leader. Title assumed by a religious 
mendicant.
Show. Exhibition. Public function. Festivity.
Lump sum paid by a tenant in return for being 
released from the obligation to grow a certain 
crop for his landlord.
Police station building. Rural area under
jurisdiction of the staff of a police station.
Lessee of proprietary rights from a landlord.
System under which a tenant grows a certain crop 
on ^/2 0th of his holding.
Unit within a landlord's holdings.
Collector of rents on behalf of landlord in a 
specified unit (the "tehsil”) of the landlord's 
holding.
Higher court lawyer. Agent. Emissary.
Landowner. Landlord whose rights were guaranteed 
by the Permanent Settlement of 1793.
ZEERAT) Land held by a landlord in which no other rights 
can accrue.
